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Abstract 
My thesis aims to show that detailed stylistic analysis of Plato's Greek is a key 
element in understanding the construction of argument in the Phaedo. I argue that 
style is integrally connected to the semantic structure of a text and that this is true for 
all stylistic modes. Accordingly, style allows us both to approach all parts of the 
dialogue on equal terms and to escape the usual compartmentalisation of the text 
which occurs in conventional `literary' and `philosophical' readings. 
In Part I, I propose a definition of 'style' and a detailed methodology for stylistic 
analysis, which I then use to analyse six short passages, chosen to reflect the 
Phaedo's varied stylistic modes. I consider the passages in themselves and also in 
terms of their stylistic affiliations to other (archaic and) classical Greek literature. 
Part II comprises three . 
`case studies', offering interpretations of selected sections, 
heavily based on stylistic analysis, so revealing the significance of style for the 
construction of argument. My first study analyses the stylistic transition between 
the end of Socrates' `apology' and the `argument from opposites' (Phd. 66b1-72e2), 
looking at the contrasting stylistic modes and their relation to the status of the 
passages as philosophy. I_ then concentrate on allusion, exploring how Plato's 
allusions to Anaxagoras mount a complex' critique, while also advancing Plato's own 
points. The third chapter deals with the `second sailing', showing how style and 
language clarify Plato's position, and examining their relation to Socrates' 
description of the `second sailing' as based on logoi. 
I demonstrate that stylistic analysis allows us a fuller understanding of Plato's 
argument, shedding new light both on old questions and on issues which have been 
relatively un- or under-explored. Moreover, it points us towards a more holistic and 
cohesive reading of the structure of the text. 
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Preface 
Style and its function: the poetics of argument in Plato's Phaedo 
To a mind concerned with the beauties of language, what is trivial to the logician may seem 
to be just what is important. ' 
Neither `style' nor `poetics' are terms usually found in close conjunction with 
`argument' 2 Conventionally, the type of verbal features focused on by poetics or 
stylistic analysis are seen as those very features which are at best, irrelevant, at worst, 
harmful, to the logic of the argumentative process. I intend to challenge this view 
by showing that style plays a significant role within philosophical argument. 
Frege, the `founder' of analytic philosophy, 5 makes a classic statement of this 
position in his seminal paper `Thought' (Der Gedanke), where he proposes that non- 
scientific language contains elements without `assertoric force', irrelevant to its 
content ('thought'). He appeals to one of the most common distinctions posited 
between scientific (prosaic)/philosophical and poetic/literary language - the view that 
the former prioritises content over language, and the latter vice versa. 6 This view is 
accompanied, both here and elsewhere, by a chain of related ideas. Literary/poetic 
language is seen as relying on the evocation of emotion and indeterminacies of 
language, rendering it essentially untranslatable, whereas philosophical/scientific 
language is felt to avoid such features and to be plain and precise. Method of 
expression is effectively incidental to the context, facilitating paraphrase or 
1 Frege, 1918,33 1. 
2 Cf. Most, 1999,332, on the 'paradox or provocation' of talking about 'the poetics of early Greek 
? hilosophy'. 
Following the preferred choice of Preminger and Brogan, 1993,929-30, I take 'poetics' to denote 
'theory of literary discourse' which 'is framed within theory of (verbal) discourse and... specifically 
retains the concept of the literary'. 
4 Throughout the thesis I will only be dealing with argument as expressed in natural language, and not 
with formal logic. 
s By 'analytic philosophy' here and throughout, I refer, very generally, to the predominant c. 20 
Anglo-American model of philosophy, summarised by e. g. Audi, 1995,22: ' "Analytic philosophy" is 
a very general term which covers the predominant schools of English-speaking philosophers in the 
twentieth century and emphasises the importance of logical "philosophical analysis". Although their 
positions are disparate 'analytic philosophy' can perhaps be characterised by 'an implicit respect for 
argument and clarity, an evolving through informal agreement as to what problems are and are not 
tractable, and a conviction that philosophy is in some sense continuous with science'. 6 E. g. Frege, 1918,331: 'What is called mood, atmosphere, illumination in a poem, what is portrayed 
by intonation and rhythm, does not belong to the thought'. 
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translation.? As I will discuss in detail in my Introduction such ideas have been 
enormously influential, especially in philosophy. Philosophers have repeatedly 
aimed towards a `scientific' style giving unambiguous access to content and free 
from the indeterminacies which they feel are present in more `literary' forms of 
expression. 
A philosophical reading of a text aims, presumably, to understand its argument. 
According to the `Fregean' view such an investigation precludes the study of style. 
Nevertheless, working with a conception of `argument' accepted within the analytic 
tradition itself, we find that there may, after all,. be.. room to accommodate style 
within philosophical analysis. 
In Logical Forms Sainsbury uses `argument' to refer to `any collection of 
propositions, one of which is singled out as the conclusion' and in which the 
premises provide the reasons for the conclusion. 8 From this it can be inferred that 
arguments are verbal (constructed within language); dynamic (insofar as their 
constituent elements move towards a conclusion); and structured (the argument's 
construction depends upon the semantic structure connecting its elements). 
Sainsbury also adds that an argument expressed in natural language would include `a 
word used to show that one has come to the conclusion which is being drawn from 
the previous propositions', showing that it is the verbal features of an argument 
7 Frege, 1918,330-1: 'An assertoric sentence often contains, over and above a thought and assertion, a 
third component not covered by the assertion. This is often meant to act on the feelings and mood of 
the hearer, or to arouse his imagination. Words like 'regrettably' ['leider'] and 'fortunately' 
['gottlob'] belong here. Such constituents of sentences are more strongly prominent in poetry, but are 
seldom wholly absent from prose. They occur more rarely in mathematical, physical, or chemical 
expositions than in historical ones. What are called the humanities are closer to poetry, and are 
therefore less scientific, than the exact sciences, which are drier in proportion to being more exact; for 
exact science is directed towards truth and truth alone. Therefore all constituents of sentences not 
covered by the assertoric force do not belong to scientific exposition; but they are sometimes hard to 
avoid, even for one who sees the danger connected with them. Where the main thing is to approach 
by way of intimation what cannot be conceptually grasped, these constituents are fully justified. The 
more rigorously scientific an exposition is, the less the nationality of its author will be discernible and 
the easier it will be to translate. On the other hand, the constituents of language to which I here want 
to call attention make the translation of poetry very difficult, indeed make perfect translation almost 
always impossible, for it is just in what largely makes the poetic value that languages most differ'. 
Such views are widespread and are also found in those whose primary concern is with 'poetic/literary' 
language. On the content/ language distinction cf. e. g. Jakobson, 1960,37: 'The set (Einstellung) 
towards the MESSAGE as such, focus on the message for its own sake, is the POETIC function of 
language'; Frye, 1957,74. On its 'untranslatability' see Valery, 1937,1314. By contrast, see e. g. 
Lang, 1990,12-13 on the 'neutralist' model of philosophy and its translatability. 8 Sainsbury, 1991,19-20. 
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which reveal its logical structure. Of course, talk of `propositions' or `premises' and 
`conclusions' may make us think, first and foremost, of the type of philosophical 
analysis found in contemporary analytic works. Nevertheless, what we actually have 
is a very broad conception of argument. While this points to necessary verbal and 
structural components, it does not prescribe a particular verbal form either for 
arguments or for their component premises and conclusions. 9 
Such a conception of argument suggests that analysis depends on establishing the 
structures of the verbal features which connect its elements. Thus it opens the way 
for seeing style as integral to understanding the construction of argument, since style 
plays, as I will show, such an important role within the verbal structure of a text. 
There is no real reason why even the multivocity of some stylistic phenomena, often 
seen as a defining feature of non-philosophical language, could not be incorporated 
into such a scheme, providing that we can account for the way in which the semantic 
alternatives fit into the wider structure. 
The aim of this thesis is not to propose a radically different understanding of 
argument or philosophy, 10 but to show that the interconnection of verbal features 
which constitutes the stylistic structure of the Phaedo is itself part of the dynamic 
conclusion-orientated structure at the heart of philosophical argument. In so doing I 
will be expanding the scope of `argument', to include certain stylistic features 
conventionally treated as immaterial, and also `style', so as to incorporate a much 
fuller range of features than the group of verbal phenomena usually viewed as 
`stylistic'. 
I began this project with two main objectives: to understand the contribution of so- 
called `literary' features to the construction of philosophical argument; and to 
demonstrate that a close reading of Plato's Greek will lead to a richer understanding 
9 This is, of course, entirely different from formal logic. 
10 In other treatments of similar questions alternative models are often proposed, so as to retrieve the 
philosophical import from discourse written in an 'unphilosophical' style or to 'save' philosophy from 
style altogether. Warner, 1989a, for example suggests the idea of philosophical 'finesse' as a type of 
philosophical method to be used instead of `geometric' argumentation. Davey, 1995, proposes the 
notion of a 'meaningfulness' which is non-verbal 'philosophical awareness' (182), attempting to save 
philosophy from 'deconstruction's attempt to reduce all philosophical statements to a body of 
rhetorical idioms or stylistic strategems', which precludes philosophy because of the 'limitless 
potential for variant meanings within language' (177-8). 
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of his dialogues. In showing the importance of style in the Phaedo, now the main 
aim of my thesis, I address both these issues. 
In the chapters which follow I investigate Platonic style and its function, showing 
both that its significance for the argument of the Phaedo is not restricted to particular 
types of discourse and that style is also important for establishing the holism of the 
dialogue. I will use stylistic analysis to look into certain old questions about the 
Phaedo, but also to consider some issues which remain relatively un- or under- 
explored. However, it is not my aim to offer a comprehensive reading of the 
dialogue, and only selected parts will be discussed. 
Outline of the thesis 
Following the Introduction, which briefly discusses the project in the context of 
current Platonic scholarship and ideas about the literature/philosophy relationship, 
the thesis falls into two main parts: Stylistic Analysis and Case Studies. Part I begins 
with a methodology for stylistic analysis, designed as suitable even for those type of 
stylistic features not considered within traditional methods of analysis, so that it can 
accommodate the whole range of the Phaedo's discourse types. This methodology is 
then put into practice in Chapter 4 with a detailed analysis of six short passages, 
while Chapter 5 traces the generic affiliations of these passages' distinctive stylistic 
features within archaic and classical Greek texts. 
Having drawn some general conclusions, in Part II I move on to three case studies, 
which take the earlier stylistic/generic analyses of three of the six passages and 
consider them in terms of their wider context. Here I explore how the distinctive 
stylistic features of these passages contribute to the dialogue's arguments and ways 
in which this might change our views on certain issues raised within scholarship on 
the Phaedo. It is through these case studies that I demonstrate the significance of 
style for the philosophy of the dialogue. 
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The selection of passages in Parts I and II 
Given the limitations of space, only three of the six initial passages are considered as 
case studies, although these three passages do provide a fairly representative sample 
of the major general points about style which arose in Part I. In the case studies I 
look at not just the original passages, but also the larger sections of the Phaedo from 
which these passages are taken. For we need the wider context, in order to comment 
on the significance of the initial passages. Given that many key stylistic aspects of 
Part I's short passages are also relevant for their wider context we can, by comparing 
similarities and differences with these short passages, understand the style of the 
larger sections to a certain degree, even without carrying out an independent and 
detailed stylistic analysis. 
Although three of the six passages analysed in Part I are not considered in Part II 
they are not in any way irrelevant. For Part I's conclusions about Platonic style 
provide the basis for the case studies' methodology and, for many reasons, these 
depend upon using a very broad sample of the Phaedo's stylistic types. 
Since my aim is to develop a methodology for stylistic analysis applicable to all 
styles of discourse, Part I uses a wide selection of passages, giving a representative 
sample of the dialogue's major stylistic types. Furthermore, in order to ascertain the 
distinctiveness of individual features, we need to assess them against a fairly broad 
background of styles. Similarly, if we dish to demonstrate Plato's stylistic variety it 
will be beneficial to have as broad a sample as possible. 
Nevertheless, it is not simply for assessing the distinctiveness of individual sections 
that a broad range is useful, but also for examining common traits. By bringing 
together a number of disparate passages it is possible to draw some general 
conclusions about style and generic affiliations. The larger the number of passages 
discussed, the more plausible it is to posit general tendencies, which would also have 
been less visible if considering a smaller range of passages. Thus, in many ways, 
Part I establishes a fairly broad understanding of similarities and differences in the 
Phaedo's use of style, and it is the diversity of stylistic types examined there which 
facilitates the approach used in the subsequent case studies of Part II. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: towards a `literary' reading of the Phaedo? 
A project which focuses on Platonic style may well appear to fit into a contemporary 
trend towards `literary' readings of Plato, given that style is more conventionally 
associated with literary than philosophical investigation. However, I am actually 
aiming to break away from this opposition and my approach differs from other 
`literary' readings in ways I will explain below. 
1.1 The `literary' movement in Platonic scholarship 
The past twenty years have seen a distinct trend towards `literary' readings of Plato, 
so that what began as a reaction against the dominant `philosophical' approach has 
now itself become an important part of mainstream Platonic scholarship. ' 
1.1.1 The motivations behind this `literary' approach 
This `literary' turn has been motivated primarily by a desire to depart from those 
`philosophical' readings which dominated post-war Anglo-American Platonic 
scholarship and concentrated on establishing and assessing sequences of 
argumentation, 2 in order to explore aspects of the dialogues neglected by such 
1 On the growth of the 'literary' approach see e. g. Stokes, 1986,1: 'There is a steadily accumulating 
body of writing by scholars determined to do justice to Plato's literary [italics mine] art no less than to 
the "wiry argument" of Plato's Socrates'. Cf. Rutherford, 1988,216. Critical works include: 
collections of essays, e. g. Griswold, 1988 and Press, 1993; individual works on particular dialogues, 
e. g. Ferrari, 1987, an influential study of Plato's Phaedrus; and individual collections on a number of 
Platonic works, of which two of the more prominent recent examples are Nightingale, 1995 and 
Rutherford, 1995. On the Phaedo alone, specific works include books by e. g. Gilead, 1994; 
Ahrensdorf, 1995; Bolotin, 1987. For further bibliography, see Gilead, 1994,143-8. The general idea 
of taking Plato's arguments in their full literary context can also be traced back further. See e. g. Press, 
1993,5, on Schleiermacher. Many recent works, including some listed above, have also focused on 
Platonic dialogue form: e. g. Griswold, 1988; Gill and McCabe, 1996; Klagge and Smith, 1992. 
2 Cf. e. g. Stokes, 1986,1: 'A host of philosophical papers and monographs... have illuminated the 
premises, inferences, and conclusions presented in Plato's dialogues; Weingartner, 1973,3ff.; McKim 
in Griswold, 1988,34; Warner, 1989a, 69, n. 3. Bostock, 1986, constitutes a paradigm example of this 
type of reading, stating that his commentary 'concentrates entirely on the philosophical interest of the 
dialogue, and has nothing to say of its considerable literary merits and dramatic power'. Cf. e. g. 
commentaries by Gallop, 1975, and Hackforth, 1955; the comments of Warner, 1989a, 67-9, on 
Hackforth and Gallop; or articles by Vlastos, 1973; Keyt, 1963. 
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interpretations. In many ways it also reflects a more widespread scepticism about 
'analytic' philosophy ,4 and a growing interest in interdisciplinary approaches to 
literature and philosophy, s for which `hybrid' authors like Plato and Nietzsche, 
whose works defy easy classification into either category, provide useful examples. 
`Literary' interpretations of Plato focus on such questions as the dialogues' form and 
unity, the function of allusion, intertextuality, metaphor, characterisation and other 
'dramatic' aspects. 7 Significantly, they often claim to avoid the segmentation of the 
dialogues' which they see as resulting from the philosopher's tendency to analyse 
individual arguments, withdrawn from their context. 8 
1.1.2 Problems with these `literary' readings 
Given their preoccupation with unity and opposition to compartmentalisation, it is 
ironic that the majority of these `literary' readings have simply arrived at an 
alternative form of segmentation: avoiding those parts of the dialogue most amenable 
to `philosophical' analysis and making no substantial or rigorous contribution to the 
questions which have motivated `philosophical' interpretations. Rather than unity, 
what we have are, effectively, two discontinuous branches of Platonic scholarship, 
whose views have little bearing on each other. 9 
3 Cf. e. g. Gilead, 1994,1: 'Plato's art of writing has been well acknowledged. Yet many Plato 
scholars have not devoted much of their efforts to a meticulous and detailed analysis of his artistic 
achievements and their philosophical implications'. Cf. e. g. Warner, 1989a, 67; Rutherford, 1995, ix. 
Among the most influential of these attacks on analytic-philosophy are e. g. the 'deconstructive' 
writings of Derrida (see e. g. Derrida, 1981); and Rorty, 1980. s See e. g. the journal Philosophy and Literature, first published in 1976 by the University of 
Michigan. 
6 Cf. e. g. Most, 1999,360, on the alternative 'discursive modes' of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger. For analysis of such works see e. g. Warner, 1989a; Lang, 1990, WE and passim. 7 Cf. e. g. Rutherford, 1988,217, on Ferrari, 1987; Press, 1993,5. 
Cf. e. g. Stokes, 1986,2: 'very few philosophers indeed have undertaken the task of interpreting a 
dialogue from start to finish, through passages overtly philosophical and manifestly literary alike in 
exploration of the relation between the parts and the whole'; McCabe, forthcoming; Bolotin, 1987,39. 
For 'unity' readings see e. g. Rutherford, 1995, passim; Rowe, 1991b, 159, Weingartner, 1973,7; 
Press, 1993,4-5. 
9 Even e. g. Warner, 1989a, 85 and 4-5, who talks about the 'balance' between different types of 
arguments in the Phaedo, draws a distinction between ' "regular" (geometric) and "irregular" means' 
of argument, and himself concentrates on the latter. 
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Rutherford quite explicitly dissociates himself from the `philosophical' approach. '° 
Yet even those less blatant about stating such aims seem generally unconcerned with 
key `philosophical' questions. On one level this is reflected in the dialogues studied, 
with `literary' readings attached mainly to middle and early dialogues, whereas later 
works like the Sophist, Philebus, and Parmenides are left almost exclusively to 
'philosophers'. 11 On another, with respect to individual dialogues themselves, 
segmentation is also very marked in the selection of passages considered within the 
different approaches. This is very evident from recent works on the Phaedo, where 
philosophical readings revolve mainly around the four `main arguments' for the 
immortality of the soul, 12 whereas `literary' readings branch out to consider other 
parts, but rarely contribute at all to philosophical debate on the four `main 
arguments'. - 
So, typically, literary works look at so-called `literary' aspects of the dialogues, 
while keeping away from philosophical rigour13 and the questions which traditionally 
provide the focus for philosophical analysis. 14 By contrast, philosophers seek out 
10 Rutherford, 1995, Preface. 
11 This is certainly true of some more notable recent 'literary' works. See e. g. Rutherford, 1995, who 
devotes only a short final chapter to some of the late dialogues; Nightingale, 1995, who avoids the late 
dialogues almost entirely, apart from briefly considering the Theaetetus' definition of the philosopher 
(179) and one definition of the sophist in the Sophist (23); Kahn, 1996, barely mentions the later 
dialogues; Thesleff, 1993,28. There are also many 'literary' readings of e. g. the Phaedrus and 
Symposium. Gill and McCabe, 1996, a collection of essays discussing dialogue form in the late 
dialogues, is a notable exception. 
12 Except for the episodes concerning Simmias' objections to the 'affinity argument' and brief 
comments on the first part of the 'second sailing' most of the commentaries of e. g. Bostock, 1986, 
Gallop, 1975; and Bluck, 1955, focus on the four 'main arguments'. Cf. the number of articles on 
these sections: e. g. Rowe, 1991a and b; Fine, 1987; Frede, 1978; Gallop, 1982; Keyt, 1963; Schiller, 
1967; Sedley, 1998; Vlastos, 1973; O'Brien, 1967-8; Kanayama, 2000. Cf. Warner, 1989a, 4 and 6, 
n. 4. 
13 By philosophical rigour I refer not solely to 'deductive' arguments (see Warner, 1989a, 17-18), but, 
more generally, to reason-conclusion sequences. 
14 On Plato in general, cf. e. g. Nightingale, 1995. In the introduction to her fascinating study of 
Platonic intertextuality, she writes: 'I am not concerned then with Plato's methods and doctrines or, 
indeed, with his development and practice of analytic thinking'. On the Phaedo specifically, see e. g. 
Gilead, 1994,2, who makes some interesting points about its relation to other literature but, despite 
claiming that 'in the Phaedo philosophy and poetry are harmoniously, flawlessly interwoven', 
concentrates on dramatic setting, motifs, and overall form, without incorporating these into arguments 
or ideas of any philosophical complexity. Cf. also Bolotin, 1987, whose 'dramatic' reading argues 
that 'Socrates' primary intention in the Phaedo is not to discuss the fate of the soul after death, but 
rather to persuade his friends that even despite the persecution of philosophers, the philosophic life 
remains the wisest and the best one' (43). He does little more than summarise certain parts of the 
Phaedo; simply accepts without debate others' views that the soul's immortality is not proven (46), 
and, without offering any substantial argumentation, discusses Socrates' justification for persuading 
his friends of beliefs he himself does not necessarily accept. Ahrensdorf, 1995,3ff., follows Bolotin 
and makes the same unquestioned assumptions. Cf. Warner, 1989a, who aspires to a unified 
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key `arguments' and analyse them in terms of premise and conclusion. What we 
need, then, is an approach which shows the relevance of literary details for the 
philosophical analysis of argument. 15 For it is only by bringing together these 
supposedly opposing pursuits that we can hope to arrive at a truly unified 
literary/philosophical reading of the dialogues, accounting for all parts and 
sacrificing neither philosophical rigour for literary analysis, nor vice versa. 
A final point about existing `literary' readings of Plato is that, despite claiming an 
interest in the style or literary features of the dialogues, they tend to pay little or no 
attention to the details of Plato's Greek. 16 `Close' analysis goes only so close as 
translation or consideration of isolated Greek words allows, and many significant 
interpretation (70), but nevertheless skims over the cyclical and recollection arguments (91), and gives 
only the sketchiest summary of some of the 'final argument' (93). When such readings do venture 
into 'philosophical' territory there is little philosophical rigour. E. g. Ahrensdorf, 1995,63-4, says of 
the 'argument from opposites' that `Socrates points to the possibility that the living and the dead are 
two fundamentally distinct kinds of beings', although the argument actually hinges upon the necessity 
of a cyclical transformation between opposite conditions taking place in a continuous underlying 
being. 
15 Concerning the Phaedo in particular, the gulf between `literary' readings and traditional 
philosophical concerns could not be clearer. E. g. Thesleff, 1993,26, on `opposites' in the Phaedo: 
'The theme of opposites occurs throughout the dialogue but I would see here, basically, the unequal 
opposites of Plato's two-level model: Socrates and his partners, soul and body, life and death, even 
pleasure and pain, are after all no dualistic contraries'. To see these simply as analogous parallel 
oppositions shows complete prioritisation of literary form over philosophical oppositions and is 
typical of the vague impressionistic method of such works. For although these pairs may all be 
presented as oppositional, each has an entirely different function, which can only be understood 
through analysing their place within the philosophical arguments (taken in the broadest sense) of the 
dialogue. For an analysis of different oppositions within the Phaedo and their correspondence to each 
other see Ch. 6 above, on consideration of stylistic oppositions within their full argumentative context. 
16 This tendency is widespread and accepted. So e. g. Rutherford, 1995, who sees himself as 
concerned with 'rhetoric, irony, poetic style and imagery', still considers no more than the occasional 
Greek term; Nightingale, 1995, who discusses only the significance of occasional words or phrases 
and is more interested in motifs than stylistic parallels as such. Cf. also Belfiore, 1997,33-4, on 
Rutherford. Cf. also e. g. Warner, 1989a, 67-104. 
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points are ignored, '7 while other points take on a significance derived more from 
English translation than from the nuances of the original language itself. 18 
1.2 Style and the literature/philosophy opposition 
Segmentation of the dialogues within the critical literature seems to result from the 
assumption, sometimes silent, sometimes voiced, of a literature/philosophy 
opposition, which leads literary and philosophical readings to focus on different 
aspects of the text and different concerns. Questions concerning the so-called 
literature/philosophy distinction, whether it exists and, if it does, in what it consists, 
have generated much interest over the last twenty or thirty years. There are various 
views about the grounds for this opposition, though a style-based distinction appears 
most significant in explaining why segmentation arises in readings of the Phaedo. 
Yet, especially when considering a work like the Phaedo, this oppositional 
formulation is problematic, no matter what its basis. 
The basis and problems of the literature/philosophy opposition 
In broad terms literature and philosophy are seen as oppositional on three main 
counts: world view; theme; style. The first implies that a `philosophical' world view 
sees rationality as giving us access to an objective, supra-personal truth, to which all 
other human experiences are subordinated. Literature, by contrast, views such truth 
17 Gilead, 1994,66, commenting on the exchange between Socrates and Cebes at Phd. 77d5-e8, talks. 
of Cebes' ' "Freudian" insight' and says 'Cebes employs childish language to get his emotional needs 
across to Socrates', while 'Socrates' amusement and irony do not affect Cebes' solemn frame of 
mind': `the frightened child within Cebes is stronger than Cebes, and his fear... represents the frame of 
mind of the audience in a tragedy'. However, Cebes has actually responded to Socrates' first joke by 
laughing, ical 6 Kißris iTM-fAäcaS (77e4), and seems to be picking up on Socrates' ironic humour 
by asking Socrates to rid their 'inner child' of his fear of rä µop11oX1KELa, appearing to act more 
through self-effacement than intense emotion. Extant usage of VOPµL0 vK¬iov points towards possible 
humorous connotations, given that it only occurs three other times, all of which are in Aristophanes. 
Especially relevant is fr. 958: did' oü Kwµw3LK6v µopµoXvKELov Zyvwv (Meineke). Cf. also fr. 1001 
and Th. 417. Gilead does mention µopµoXvic¬ia, but seems to see it as implying real horror. 
18 E. g. Ahrensdorf, 1995, though insisting on the dramatic context's importance (lff. ), seems to stray 
from the text altogether with strange and entirely unsubstantiated points like 'Cebes' doubts [i. e. about 
the goodness of the philosophic life] have led him to think about committing suicide' (60), which he 
has somehow managed to infer, presumably from Cebes' statement that he has heard suicide is 
unlawful (61 e5-9), although there is absolutely no implication of intention on Cebes' part. 
Chapter 1 17 
as unattainable and aims towards `humanly apprehended reality', 19 to which we have 
access through the whole range of human responses, as opposed to reason alone. 
However, this position, which can roughly be summarised in terms of philosophical 
rationality versus literary holism, 20 is based on a conception of philosophy which, 
though possibly plausible for the Phaedo, is in no way representative of philosophy 
in general; there are significant counter-examples in all periods. 2.1 
The thematic literature/philosophy distinction is no less problematic. Based on the 
idea that themes essential to philosophy have a purely aesthetic function when 
included in literature, 22 it hinges upon the controversial assumption that the 
stimulation of reflection and thought are secondary to the aesthetic aspects of 
literature. Moreover, the Phaedo itself clearly reveals this idea's flaws in a 
philosophical context. For, as in so many other `philosophical' works, the dialogue's 
philosophical themes are inseparable from the dramatic situation and its literary 
evocation, making it impossible to give a separate assessment of their relative 
importance for the work as a whole. 
These two formulations are not only flawed, but have no obvious relevance for the 
Phaedo. By contrast, the style-based literature/philosophy distinction seems to be at 
the heart of much of the divide which exists between so-called `literary' and 
`philosophical' readings of the dialogue. This distinction takes us back to the idea 
mentioned in the Preface that philosophy is written in plain and neutral quasi- 
formalisable prose, as opposed to the emotive, elaborate, indeterminate, poetic style 
of literature. From Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's Forms as `empty speech 
19 Falck, 1989,32. 
20 For a typical statement of this position see e. g. the post-post-modernist defence of literary truth in 
Falck, 1989,32 ff. 
_% From Protagoras' 'man is the measure' to Rorty's 'edificationism' (see e. g. Rorty, 1980,373-9), 
there are many philosophers who see 'truth' as humanly-mediated, rather than being some external 
supra-personal reality. Contemporary epistemology is, like many of its predecessors, beset by 
scepticism . about our capacity to attain any knowledge, while even Aristotle, far from being anti- holistic, attributed an important philosophical role to intuition (NE 1140b31 ff. ), emotion and 
imagination (see Nussbaum, 1990,74-8). 
u E. g. Beardsmore, 1984, maintains that philosophical problems are essential to philosophy, but 
incidental to literature. 'Though works of literature', he says, 'may involve such problems, 
philosophy starts from them' (72). Cf. e. g. Olsen, 1984,86,91, and passim; Lamarque and Olsen, 
1994.391. 
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(KEVoXoyeiv) and poetic metaphors (µ¬Ta4opäs TfoLT'TLKGS)'23 to Frege's call for 
scientific language in philosophy, such ideas have been extremely influential within 
Western thought, manifesting themselves in terms of oppositions like the 
literary/philosophical, poetic/prosaic, literary/scientific, personal/abstract, 
rhetorical/non-rhetorical. 24 
Nussbaum describes the `conventional style of Anglo-American philosophical prose' 
as: 
a style correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid, a style that seemed to be regarded as a 
kind of all-purpose solvent in which philosophical issues of any kind at all could be 
efficiently disentangled, any and all conclusions neatly disengaged. u 
On one level, this provides a fitting summary of the `scientific prose' which many 
philosophers have either used or advocated as correct. Models such as Melissus and 
Aristotle' works or the typically dry academic prose of analytic philosophy are 
widespread, and the view that this type of style constitutes philosophical as opposed 
to literary writing has a long history, being echoed by philosophers and literary 
theorists alike. 26 
In antiquity Epicurus advocated clear speech and prose rather than poetry for 
philosophy, 27 while Sprat, in the seventeenth century, condemned the `ornaments of 
speech' as inimical to reason: 
They are in open defiance against Reason; professing, not to hold much correspondence with 
that; but with its Slaves, the Passions: they give the mind a motion too changeable and 
bewitching, to consist with right practice. Who can behold, without indignation, how many 
mists and uncertainties, theses specious Tropes and Figures have brought on our 
Knowledge? 28 
23 AristMetaph. 991a22. Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1404a28-9, on there being krIpa X&yov Kal Tro«jaEC, c 
X LS and 1404b1ff., on the necessity of clarity in prose. 
24 On the idea of rhetorical language being seen to preclude reasoning, see e. g. Gergel, 2000,291 ff.; 
Lang, 1990,2. 
25 Nussbaum, 1990,19. 
26 Cf. e. g. Warner, 1989a, 70 on the 'separate canons of exact, rigorous, logically argued, and "non- 
? oetic" style such as we have since learnt to associate with philosophy'. 7 See e. g. Asmis, 1991,72, who also gives the relevant references to Epicurus. Cf. also Silk, 1974, 
220. 
28 Sprat, 1667,112. 
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In calling then for `mathematical plainness' he echoes the sentiments of `several of 
the leading figures of the seventeenth century revolution in philosophy, 29 such as 
Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who espoused a `geometrical' 
model of reasoning. 30 Such views became very influential in Western philosophy 
and also occur later, for example in Kant, or the analytic movement. 31 
Scientific/philosophical language is felt to avoid the indeterminacies present in 
literary language and to present its statements and arguments in the clearest and most 
unambiguous manner possible. 32 So Richards distinguishes between `scientific' 
language, in which `the connections and relations of references to one another must 
be of the kind which we call logical' and must not `impede further reference', and 
`emotive', for which `logical arrangement is not necessary'. 33 
However, these ideas about `scientific', 'zero-degree', neutral, or plain style are 
based on a stereotype of a certain type of philosophical writing and in no way 
provide an accurate general picture of philosophical discourse. Counter-examples 
can be found, not only in `hybrid' authors like Plato, Nietzsche, or Pascal, 34 but even 
2' Warner, 1989a, 1. 
30 Sprat, 1667,113 and xxviii. On Descartes and the 'geometrical model' see e. g. Warner, 1989a, 1 
and 6ff. 
31 See e. g. Van Eck, 1995,11; Warner, Lang, 1990,12ff. 
32 See, e. g. Rorty, 1982,220, on analytic philosophy as 'scientific': ' "Scientific" now means 
something like "argumentative". The contrast between the old and the new is now no longer a 
contrast between an immature prescientific and a mature scientific stage of discussion of a common 
set of problems, but a contrast between styles - the "scientific" style and the "literary" style. The 
former style asks that premises be explicitly spelled out rather than guessed at, that terms be 
introduced by definitions rather than by allusion. The latter style may involve argumentation, but that 
is not essential; what is essential is telling a new story, suggesting a new language-game, in the hope 
of a new form of intellectual life'. See Richards, 1978,5-6, on the 'Realm of Poetry' as 'Guessland', 
while 'Scientific Prose aims ... at 
being unequivocal'. Cf. e. g. Wellek and Warren, 1963,22-3: 'the 
ideal scientific language is purely "denotative": it aims at a one-to-one correspondence between sign 
and referent'... 'Thus scientific language tends towards such a system of signs as mathematics or 
symbolic logic. Its ideal is such a universal language as the characteristica universalis which Leibniz 
had begun to plan as early as the late seventeenth century. Compared to scientific language, literary 
language will appear in some ways deficient. It abounds in ambiguities; it is, like every other 
historical language, full of homonyms, arbitrary or irrational categories such as grammatical gender; it 
is permeated with historical accidents, memories, and associations. In a word, it is highly 
"connotative" '. Cf. Ricoeur, 1975,139ff., on Cohen. Some, like Frege, 1892,157, have even gone 
so far as to suggest that it is only scientific/philosophical language which can have true reference, 
while literary/poetic language is interested purely in the 'sense', without concern about its 
correspondence to an underlying 'reference': 'we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and 
the images and feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic 
delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the 
name 'Odysseus', for instance, has a Bedeutung, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art'. Cf. 
Preminger and Brogan, 1993,1346. 
" Richards, 1934,113 
34 See e. g. Van Eck, 1995,11-13. 
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in those very writers who themselves espouse the `geometrical' or 'scientific' 
method. 35 
Conclusion 
Despite its obvious flaws the style-based literature/philosophy distinction, is very 
significant for the literature/philosophy division within scholarship on the Phaedo. 
Conventionally, `philosophical' interest in the dialogue focuses on the four `main' 
arguments for the immortality of the soul (the `argument from opposites', `argument 
from recollection', `affinity argument', and `second-sailing') and especially on the 
first, second, and fourth of these. 36 As I will explain in more detail below, these 
arguments are not only explicitly presented as `proofs', but come closest to the so- 
called `scientific' style favoured by contemporary analytic philosophers. Hence they 
provide rich pickings for the analytically-trained philosopher, but little scope for 
traditional literary interpretation. By contrast, the other aspects of the dialogue, on 
which literary readings tend to focus, more or less rule out conventional 
philosophical analysis through the `literariness' of their style. 
Underlying the whole issue are, apparently, the twin assumptions that an ostensibly 
literary style is incompatible with philosophy and that style is irrelevant, or even 
absent from, philosophical argument. Therefore, in order to escape this dichotomy, 
style must be shown to be present within and relevant to the construction of 
argument in all parts of the Phaedo. This requires a methodology equipped for 
dealing with a comprehensive range of discourse and not simply those types 
conventionally regarded as literary. 37 Even if termed `literary' because of its 
preoccupation with style, such an approach will nevertheless be a legitimate tool for 
philosophical analysis, in no way discontinuous with its aims or methods. 38 
35 See e. g. the analysis of Descartes' style in Lang, 1990, ch. 3; Van Eck, 1995,13. 
36 See n. 12, above. 
37 Cf. Lang, 1990,2: 'the critical means that have been found relevant to more conventionally 
"literary" texts can be - ought to be - also applied to philosophical writing'. However, Lang does not 
go on to construct stylistic categories suitable for types of writing generally excluded from literary 
analysis. 
38 Cf. Warner, 1989a, 71. 
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Part I: Stylistic Analysis 
22 
Chapter 2 
Style and its importance for Platonic interpretation 
A comprehensive methodology for stylistic analysis will allow us to consider all 
parts of the Phaedo and may facilitate a reading without segmentation. Nevertheless, 
we still need to show why stylistic analysis is of interest for the investigation of 
argument. To a certain extent, the results of the project as a whole should serve to 
justify an examination of Platonic style. However, there are also specific points, 
about the nature of style itself, as well as the study of Platonic style in particular, 
which give some initial indications as to the significance of style for the analysis of 
Platonic argument. 
In my Preface, argument was defined as a verbal and dynamic structure, whose 
premises provide reasons for its conclusions. Accordingly, philosophical analysis 
should explicate the semantic connections between the verbal elements from which 
an argument is constructed. Traditional accounts define style in terms of `form' as 
opposed to `content', the `how' as distinct from the `what'. Yet, on this view, it 
would be difficult to see how style could possibly impinge on the semantic structure 
of the text. By contrast, I will argue that style is bound up with semantic structure on 
a microcontextual level and therefore has clear potential significance for the 
construction of argument. 
2.1 What is style and why is it significant for philosophical analysis? 
No general consensus has ever been reached as to the meaning of `style', in spite of 
extensive debate. ' Much twentieth-century discussion challenged the conventional 
`form' as opposed to `content' notion of style. Nevertheless, in practical terms, when 
it comes to analysis of texts, even the staunchest opponents of the `style as form' 
idea seem to drift back towards this conception. What is responsible for so much 
1 The heyday of forms stylistics was the '60s and `70s, thought arguably the most productive 
discussions of style belong to the earlier decades of formalism and new criticism. Nevertheless, the 
questions about style discussed then still remain at issue. On the diversity of definitions of style see 
e. g. Gray, 1969,12; Chatman, 1971, xiff.; Obmann, 1971,243. 
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confusion? Is there perhaps some truth in the traditional understanding of style after 
all? 
2.1.1 The `Aristotelian' form/content distinction and its problems 
Aristotle's notion of style Q is) as `how' rather than `what' things are said has 
come to be probably its most widely accepted definition. 2 Style is understood in 
terms of `form' as opposed to `content'; manner or appearance as distinct from 
underlying meaning, message, or substance .3 At first glance it seems that textual 
analysis presupposes just such a form/content distinction, apparently depending upon 
extracting meaning from form or showing how the latter reflects the former. 4 
` See Arist. Rh. 1403b6ff., although, strictly speaking, the d side of the distinction also includes 
arrangement (TdýLS), covering suitability of components and ordering of a speech. Cf. also 1404a10, 
where XEtLS is w& ij w& Eltr¬ly. However, Aristotle was not the first to use this distinction. See 
e. g. P1. Rep. 60la-b where Plato talks about stripping away the adornments of poetic style (ETre't 
-yv1ivCJeEVTa 'YE Tfi1V TFS gOV LKfT XPW[1dTWV Ta TLJV TTOL1qTCUV, 6T& E4' abTWV XEy6geva) 
to reveal the lack of real content underneath, and therefore appears to have the same type of 
distinction in mind. For further references see notes ad loc. in Shorey, 1937. Cf. e. g. Dover, 1997,1: 
'It is generally, though not universally, agreed that if I am asked about the style of your performance 
of a certain act, I am being asked not what you did but how you did it. Also see Dover, 1997,16, 
for parallel formulations in ancient critics; and Barthes, 1971,3, who traces this opposition through 
various ancient and modem formulations. 
3A notion of style as deviation from a linguistic norm/s has also been important in theories of style. 
This is especially so in the twentieth century (see Barthes, 1971,4), although similar ideas are also 
found much earlier. See e. g. Arist. Po. 1458a21ff. on the use of ZEVLK6T words in poetry. It has been 
influential for e. g.: formalism (e. g. Erlich, 1981,172; Jakobson, 1960,32; Shklovsky, 1917,28) and 
stylistics (e. g. Widdowson, 1996,144; Ullman, 1966,154; Fowler, 1966,15; Enkvist, 1971,53-5). 
There are, however, many obvious objections. 'Linguistic' or `literary' norms are not simple and 
stable objectively-established entities, easily obtainable for use in stylistic analysis. Theorists have 
criticised this notion's impracticability and irrelevance (E. g. Halliday, 1996,65; Riffaterre, 1959,168; 
Barthes, 1971,6; Wellek and Warren, 1963,181; Fish, 1980,97-111). Nevertheless, as with the 
form/content opposition, even its staunchest opponents seem to assume some notion of 'style as 
deviation', so that this conception of style seems in some way an inescapable part of our reading 
practices (see e. g. Wellek and Warren, 1963,181ff. ) who dismiss the norm/deviation model although 
their descriptions of the style of particular authors or genres must depend upon establishing how their 
stylistic norms deviate from other literary types; Riffaterre, 1959,167-71, who posits the 'irrelevance 
of the linguistic norm', but replaces it with the idea of stylistic context as a deviation from a normal 
linguistic context understood by the notional `average reader'). Identification of stylistic features 
must always be largely based on picking out elements distinguished by their differences from features 
used elsewhere. However, none of these stylistic types constitute a particular norm. 'Norm' and 
'deviation' are, nevertheless, of some relevance to the study of generic affiliations, which examines 
features in terms of similarities and differences to a notional generic norm. So, in this respect alone 
the norm/deviation model will be incorporated into my thesis. Yet, given that it is simply one aspect 
of how we identify stylistic features and not a potential definition of style itself, I will not explore it in 
any depth in the present section. 
See even e. g. the structuralist Barthes, 1971,4, on the form/content opposition: 'There is no doubt 
that it contains a certain irreducible grain of truth. The structural analysis of narrative... is based 
entirely on the conviction (and the practical proof) that one can transform a given text into a more 
schematic version, set it in a metalanguage which is no longer the language of the original text, 
without essentially changing its narrative character. ' This assumption pervades critical 
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Yet, however intuitive such a notion of style might seem, it is still problematic: 
If we want to distinguish style and work, form and content, structure and content, or any of 
the other familiar dualisms into which works of literature are divided, then we have to be 
able to say what the style, or the form, or the structure, as opposed to the work or the 
meaning is. 5 
If style is `form' as opposed to `content', its definition and analysis should only 
involve description of form and should avoid interpretation, given that this concerns 
meaning and content. 6 
However, a stylistic feature like metaphor reveals the limitations of this position, 
since its identification clearly depends on the perception of different levels of 
meaning. When, for example, Socrates says that wisdom (#6v-OQis) is `the only 
true coin' (µövov Tö V%Ualia 6pe6v), 7 it is essential to recognise both the `literal' 
meaning of the vehicle v6µtoµa and of the suppressed tenor (say, `thing of value') if 
this feature is be identified as metaphor. 8 Therefore, even if the metaphor's 
contribution to its wider textual context remains unexplained the most basic analysis 
of this feature already involves semantics and is an interpretive act. 
Yet it is not just in obvious examples like metaphor where semantics plays a 
necessary role, but in all stylistic features to some extent. To identify antithesis 
involves the recognition that components stand in a particular semantic relation. To 
identify pleonasm implies the recognition of synonymy, while even features like 
pairs and lists or parallel structures involving aural effects imply semantic 
connections between their elements. Even if the identification of such phenomena is 
interpretations: e. g. Quinn, 1973,422, on Catullus 85. '` odi et amo". It is the emotions and the fact 
that he feels both together that matter; a direct object is irrelevant. Note how word order and elision 
transfer the emphasis to amo: the hating is taken for granted... '. 6 Gray, 1969,61. 
For a typical formulation of style as separate from meaning see e. g. Ullman, 1966,101, who 
describes style as 'expressiveness': 'a wide range of linguistic features which have one thing in 
common: they do not directly affect the meaning of the utterance, the actual information which it 
conveys'. 
7 Phd. 69a9-10. 
$ Using the terms to mean 'deviant-element' (vehicle) and 'non-deviant element' (tenor). See Silk, 
1996,967, and Silk 1974, HE For a more detailed analysis of the structure of metaphor see 3.4, 
below. 
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not related to their wider context, it still relies upon understanding some aspect of the 
text's meaning, albeit on a microcontextual level. 
2.1.2 Attacks on the form/content distinction 
It is a preoccupation with the structuring rather than referential aspects of language 
which motivated probably the strongest attacks on the form/content distinction in the 
twentieth century, ranging from the formalists' prioritisation of literature's formal 
activity to the post-structuralist denial of the existence of fixed content. 9 
The Russian formalists reacted against traditional literary criticism's predominant 
concern with content or message rather than style. 1° Their attempts to define the 
special qualities of art or `literariness' established new frameworks for understanding 
literary language, and significantly shifted the focus away from the form/content 
distinction. " Notwithstanding individual differences between formalist positions, 
the formal side to literature was prioritised while content, the object of reference, lost 
its given significance. 12 
9 See e. g. Lamarque and Olsen, 1994,263: '... most prominent literary theories this century have 
assumed that the [form/content] distinction is somehow naive and theoretically invalid... The formalist 
theories of the New Criticism, structuralism, and post-structuralism have had as a central tenet that in 
creating form, the author creates content'. I would, incidentally, question their omission of formalism. 
Cf. also Girard, 1989,251. 
10 Erlich, 1981,19-32 (passim) and 31. Although Shklovsky and Jakobson's formalist theories do not 
centre explicitly on style, I think it is fair to discuss them here as relevant to the questions of style 
under consideration. Cf. Attridge, 1996,37: 'Jakobson confidently defines 'poetics' as what most of 
us would now call 'stylistics'. 
11 Cf. e. g. Lodge, 1988,31; Erlich, 1981,172 and 186ff., although see also ibid. 34 and 45 on 
formalism's debt to symbolism and futurism respectively. 12 The form/content distinction was, in general, replaced by a 'device/materials' distinction or interest 
in 'form' and 'defamiliarization' (see e. g. Erlich, 1981,188ff. ). The meaning of 'materials' was not 
unanimously agreed, but represented 'the raw stuff. of literature' and incorporated e. g. 'content', 
'ideas', 'emotions' and 'words'. 'Device' was the technique of 'making it strange', known as 
'de familiarization' and probably formalism's key term. E. g. Shklovsky, 1917,20-27, focuses on 
'defamiliarization', a technique of making the formal level strange to make us perceive afresh and 
extend the goal of art, perception: 'An image is not a permanent referent for those mutable 
complexities of life which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to make us perceive meaning, but 
to create a special perception of the object - it creates a 'vision' of the object instead of serving as a 
means for knowing it'. Jakobson, 1960,35-7, concentrates on the autonomy of the literary text (see 
e. g. Erlich; 1981,183-5) and sees the poetic function, whose prominence characterises 'poetic' or 
'literary' language, as one of a complex schema of functions in language use, for which form ('focus 
on the message for its own sake') is all important. Poetic language is separated from non poetic by 
the former's far greater degree of importance, so that both Shklovsky and Jakobson distinguish 
'poetic' or 'literary' language from other types on the basis of qualitative formal differences and the 
downgrading of the referent (cf. Sturrock, 1993,109-110). Certain formalists also seem to have 
anticipated structuralism by making 'content' an aspect of 'form' (Erlich, 1981,186-7). Todorov, 
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V 
Whereas the fornnlists acknowledge the existence of content, the referential aspect 
of language use, but advocate its strictly secondary importance for the analysis of 
literature, structuralism reduces content to form. 13 In `Style and Its Image', a paper 
characteristic of structuralism, Barthes claims: 
... we can no longer see a text as a binary structure of Content and Form; the text is not double but multiple; within it there are only forms, or more exactly, the text in its entirety is only a 
multiplicity of forms without a content. 14 
For Barthes, the text is an interweaving of `codes' (e. g. `symbolic', `hermeneutic' 
and `actional') and forms. Stripping these away to reveal content or signified 
(signifie) continues indefinitely because the signified underneath every signifier 
(signifiant) is itself found to be a further signifier. Style, in terms of form as opposed 
to content becomes a `historic concept', a code tending to `pigeonhole' other textual 
codes, which gives an illusory continuity to the text's discontinuous elements 
through creating a false impression of `surface'. Finally, he suggests that writing 
itself is always a structure of citations of preexisting, culturally acquired, modes of 
sentence and subsentential structure. No stage of writing or even thought precedes 
these. Style is then redefined as the `layeredness' of interwoven semantic codes and 
citations of the preexisting structures constituting literary language, which have been 
called 'style'. 15 
Post-structuralism goes one step further, not only denying the possibility of 
determinate content or meaning, but also deconstructing the fixity and existence of 
the very underlying structures on which structuralism's understanding of discourse 
was based. 16 In denying the possibility of the signified, post-structuralism rejects the 
circular process of structuralism, where the signifier reveals a signified which is in 
1973,10-12, suggests that this latter viewpoint was characteristic of formalist doctrine as a whole, 
citing the idea of 'form' as 'all-embracing' and as 'the totality of the work of art', and quoting 
Eichenbaum: 'clearly the concept of Form had become increasingly merged for us with the concept of 
literature as a whole and the notion of the literary event. ' 
13 Although see n. 12, above, on formalist anticipations of this doctrine. 
14 Barthes, 1971,6. Although Barthes differs from other structuralists in certain ways (see Sturrock, 
1993,130), his approach here seems broadly characteristic of structuralism. 
's Barthes, 1971,6-10. 
16 See e. g. Derrida's critique (Derrida, 1988) of Levi-Strauss's anthropological method with its 
reification of underlying oppositions. Cf. Eagleton, 1983,133. 
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itself always a further signifier. All discourse is therefore reduced to an endless chain 
of signifiers, constantly redefining themselves through differences with each other. '7 
Such theoretical positions may well seem rightly critical of the naive idea of style as 
entirely separate from the meaning it conveys which, as we have seen, fails to 
provide a framework accounting for the semantic aspect of verbal structures. By 
broadening `form' they stress the semantic and structural implications of style and 
thereby escape some of the problems inherent in the Aristotelian dichotomy. 
However, when it comes to the discussion and analysis of style, there are serious 
problems with these positions too. For if content becomes either redundant or an 
aspect of form then style, as Barthes suggested, becomes an outmoded `code' of 
reading or an umbrella term to describe the `layeredness' of literary structure. Thus 
style is either discarded or becomes the entire focus of literary analysis. Similarly, 
from a post-structuralist viewpoint, style must be rejected or become all-embracing 
so that, if we see style as language, then style is all there is. 
While the notion of style as all-embracing cannot perhaps be refuted per se, there 
must surely be doubts as to its usefulness, 18 and even those seeing `form' or `style' 
simply as umbrella terms for the mechanisms of a literary text actually devise further 
categorisations within `style' to replace the roles which `form' and `content' played 
originally. Thus Barthes discusses `literary language' and `semantic levels or codes', 
while Eichenbaum talks about `non-aesthetic forms [emphasis mine]'. 19 
2.1.3 Discrepancies between theory and practice 
In many ways such shifts back towards the form/content distinction, even amongst 
sceptics, are unsurprising. For the interpretation of texts depends upon our ability to 
distinguish their meaning, and there is a marked theory/practice discrepancy amongst 
17 Eagleton, 1983,128-9. See e. g. Derrida, 1988,110: the 'rupture' of the 'concept of structure' took 
place at the 'moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the 
absence of ä center of origin, everything became discourse ... that 
is to say, a system in which the 
central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system 
of differences. ' 
1$ Cf. Erlich, 1981,188, summarising Kridl: 'one may question... the practicability of treating "form" 
as a generic term for artistic creation - an interpretation so broad as to become well-nigh useless, if not 
misleading'. 
19 Todorov, 1973,10. 
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those critics who deny the significance or existence of content or meaning. It seems 
that, whatever the theoretical stance, textual interpretation ultimately comes down to 
meaning. ° 
For example, Jakobson, discussing Poe's The Raven, comments on how `salient 
paranomasias interconnect both emblems of this everlasting despair', clearly 
identifying a stylistic feature and its concomitant meaning. 21 Similarly Barthes, 
demonstrating the `symbolic code' in Balzac, says that `the knife is a symbol of 
castration', thereby pointing out the verbal form's literal as well as symbolic 
significance -a double content, but content nevertheless. 
22 Even Derrida, the `arch- 
denier' of stable meaning, hinges his reading of Plato's Phaedrus on the multiple 
meanings of the word pharmakon - many signifieds, but signifieds nevertheless. 23 
Despite their denials of the importance of content, all these analyses use similar 
techniques of attributing meaning or content to certain aspects of style. For in order 
to show that structure is meaningful, it is necessary to attribute meaning to structure. 
2.1.4 Towards a working definition of style 
So style presents us with a puzzle. On the one hand, there are obvious problems with 
the separation of form or style from content or meaning. On the other, such 
separation is an underlying part of textual interpretation. However, a way out of this 
impasse comes from recognising two very different stages in textual interpretation 
which have, no matter how closely interrelated, clear qualitative distinctions. They 
are: the identification of a stylistic feature; and the analysis of how this fits into its 
wider textual context. 
20 See e. g. Erlich, 1981,185: 'Indeed, as the formalist spokesmen could not help but recognize, no 
poetry, however non-objective, can dispense with meaning; Sturrock, 1993,107 on the structuralist 
approach to Finnegan's Wake: 'What is "trans-sense" is never without sense'. 
2 Jakobson, 1988,51. 
u Barthes, 1971,5. 
2' See e. g. Derrida, 1981,97-98: 'when a word inscribes itself as the citation of another sense of the 
same word, when the textual center-stage of the word pharmakon, even while it means remedy, cites, 
re-cites, and makes legible that which in the same word signifies, in another spot and on a different 
level of the stage, poison (for example, since this is not the only other thing pharmakon means)'; and 
passim. 
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These two separate stages are visible in some of my earlier examples. In claiming 
that a single sign, pharmakon, stands for numerous signifieds, Derrida is identifying 
a stylistic feature, ambiguity. From this he infers that the description of writing as a 
pharmakon in Plato's Phaedrus is, at one point, positive, at another, negative, thus 
interpreting the feature's significance. Another example was Quinn's analysis of 
Catullus' famous `odi et amo': 
"odi et amo". It is the emotions and the fact that he feels both together that matter; a direct 
object is irrelevant. Note how word order and elision transfer the emphasis to amo: the 
hating is taken for granted..? ` 
The stylistic features identified by Quinn are the absence of direct object, and the 
way in which word order and elision lead to emphasis or prominence of amo. His 
comments on the irrelevance of a direct object and how `hating is taken for granted' 
make sense of these stylistic features within the wider context. In both examples, we 
can clearly identify two distinct stages. 
In identifying stylistic features one attributes some degree of semantic structure and 
significance to the microcontextual formal features of a text. Noticing that `odi et 
amo' have no direct object, for example, suggests semantic parallelism between the 
two terms and establishes their intransitivity. To point out pharmakon's ambiguity is 
to attribute alternative meanings to a single term. Neither of these examples describe 
purely formal aspects. Instead, they involve the semantic organisation of the text's 
formal components. In this way, style can be defined as the semantic structure of the 
microcontextual formal features of the text. As soon as we recognise style, we 
recognise content. 
The second stage of textual interpretation explores the implications of style and how 
stylistic points fit into a more macrocontextual level of meaning. Stylistic points are 
thus incorporated into the analysis of meaning, and this stage could be seen as the 
pure explication of content. As we have seen, it is normal for textual analysis to 
combine these two stages. However, because of people's failure to recognise the 
necessary semantic aspects of style, the first is commonly seen as the identification 
24 Quinn, 1973,422. 
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of form alone. Taken to an extreme, one might almost see the form/content 
distinction as stemming from such a misunderstanding. 
Even Aristotle, in the very same work where he proposes the `cis as opposed to 'a' 
notion of style, inadvertently suggests the semantic aspect of style. In his discussion 
of MVO Ln gaTa ('rhetorical syllogisms'), Aristotle discusses how a phrase which is 
not a genuine EvOvµ-qµa might be considered to be one on account of its style. In 
2.24.2 the fact that inferential conclusions (o1K dpa T6 Kai. T6, ävd-ffn dpa Tb 
Kai. T6) or antithetical and `enthumetic' statements can appear to be genuine 
Ev6vµrjµaTa, although unsupported by valid arguments, is attributed to the 
appearance of their style (Trapä T6 Q µa Týg X eu s') 25 For certain stylistic 
features are associated with EvOu n p. aTa: rl 'yäp TOMM' XEýic XWpa EQTIV 
EvOvoµaTOS. This implies that such stylistic features have a semantic force, since 
they are able to suggest particular logical relationships. 26 
How something is written is integrally connected to its meaning on the most 
microcontextual level. From this we can infer that it is style which provides the 
initial components of semantic structure. If, then, philosophical argument depends 
upon the semantic structure between verbal elements, clearly the analysis of style 
must be important for understanding its construction. 
u Cf. Strawson, 1952,52-53: 'Finally, we could speak... of a statement being made in a misleading 
verbal form, if the sentence in which the statement is made exemplifies a certain logical formula, but 
the constants occurring in the sentence, as used to make that statement, do not have the logical use 
which is standard for that system of rules'. 
26 On the 'logic' of the kvOvµijµa and what Aristotle means by calling it rtc avXoytQ t6c see 
Burnyeat, 1996,95ff. 
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2.2 Why discuss Plato's style? 
In 1967 Thesleff wrote 
Plato's mastery of style has been recognised since antiquity. It is no exaggeration to state 
that he makes use of a stylistic register far wider and far more subtle than any other ancient 
prosaist. This mastery ... seems to 
be.. 
. reflecting shifts 
in his thought. Thus the structure of 
Plato's style can be expected to afford a clue to Plato, both as a writer and thinker... It is, 
however, surprising how little has been done for studying Plato's stylistic practice 
systematically, except for the specific purpose of establishing a chronology for his writings. 
27 
Plato's stylistic mastery and innovation is uncontroversial. Moreover, if we take 
style to be essential to the construction of argument on a microcontextual level, as I 
have argued above, the importance of stylistic analysis for interpreting the dialogues 
seems clear. However, in terms of scholarship, the state of affairs described by 
Thesleff has hardly changed. There remains a lack of work on Platonic style and, 
even within the so called `literary' approaches to Plato, there is no substantial and 
detailed discussion of the Greek texts themselves. 
2.2.1 Works on Platonic style, ancient and modern 
There is little detailed analysis of Plato's style in ancient rhetorical works and much 
of what exists is directed at broad evaluation rather than in-depth discussion of 
particular features. Walsdorff outlines the main critical opinions in Die Antiken 
Urteile über Platons Stil and explains that, although views on the value of Plato's 
style varied dramatically, 28 certain key qualities were widely acknowledged, such as 
precision and particularity of diction; metaphor; and `figures': 
Vor allem findet die dichterische iKXoyrj, die eigentümliche Wortwahl im engeren Sinne, der 
Metaphemgebrauch, auch die Haüfung der Figuren und das dithyrambische Pathos zu mal in 
den rednerischen Werkern allenthalben Beachtung, von Aristoteles bis zu den 
Neuplatonikem. 29 
27 Thesleff, 1967,7. 
28 Walsdorff, 1927,125 claims that in antiquity there were essentially two opinions: his stylistic 
peculiarities were either dismissed as inappropriate or treated with sympathetic reverence. 
9 Walsdorff, 1927,120. 
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However, antiquity's praise of Plato was mainly confined to dialogues or parts of 
dialogues where short questions and answers predominated, as opposed to the longer 
speeches of his middle period, which were more often attacked. 30 
Interesting though these judgements may be, they are too general and vague to be of 
much use for analysis of individual aspects of Plato's style. Nevertheless, such is the 
force of antiquity's criticism that, even in the twentieth century, Norden used the 
chapter on Plato in his seminal Die Antike Kunstprosa to offer a defence of Plato's 
`poeticisms'. 31 He includes useful catalogues of Gorgianic figures, `high poetic 
diction', and creative use of rhythm'32 to show that Plato's critics failed to notice that 
Plato employs these features mainly for parody, irony, or playfulness. 33 
In general, modem works on Plato's style tend to focus on a particular type of feature 
and provide descriptive catalogues of instances, rather than any substantial collation, 
classification, or analysis of usage. 4 Campbell and Wilamowitz, seen by Thesleff 
as the `two good characterizations of Plato's language and style in general', treat 
Platonic style more extensively. However, Campbell, simply lists individual 
examples of varied phenomena, 35 while Wilamowitz makes a few interesting 
generalisations and points out certain recurrent features. 36 Neither considers how 
these examples fit their particular contexts nor, in any depth, the development and 
patterns of usage. In fact, until Thesleff's Studies in the Style of Plato, it seems that 
stylistic features are only treated out of context, without any attempt at either a 
comprehensive analysis of a particular passage or work, or a detailed study of how 
Plato combines different stylistic features. 
Thesleff sets out to `study the structure and function of style in Plato's writing'. 37 He 
distinguishes five different `types of exposition', loosely based on Greek genres, 38 
30 See e. g. D. H. Dem. 23 and See Norden, 1915,104, for a summary of these views and references. 31 Norden, 1915,104-113. 
32 Norden, 1915,106,107, and 110 respectively. 33 Norden, 1915,111; although this is less often the case with 'high poetic diction'. 34 See e. g. Louis, 1945 or Amman, 1953. Thesleff, 1967,10-11, lists such works and comments that 
'they only cover disparate parts of Plato's linguistic and stylistic usage. And what is more serious, the 
majority are purely descriptive'. 
35 Campbell, 1894,165-340. 
's Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1920,412-29. 
37 Thesleff, 1967,11. 
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and `ten generic classes of style', all of which have particular `style markers'. 39 
However, as might be expected with such a reductive schema, his categories and 
`style markers' are too broad to allow anything but a vague impression of general 
trends. Though dissatisfied with existing discussions of `those linguistic phenomena 
which have been traditionally regarded as "stylistic", e. g. imagery, sentence 
construction, antithesis... 9,40 he relies mainly on these as `style markers', adding 
certain syntactical features. Moreover, he does not define them and gives no detailed 
examples to justify their classification. 41 
The results of Thesleff s three page stylistic synopsis of a dialogue as complex and 
changeable as the Phaedo are predictably unsatisfactory. 42 For example, he sees 
both 63e-69e (Socrates' `apology') and 70c-72d (the `argument from opposites') as 
primarily composed of the `colloquial', `semi-literary conversational', and 
`intellectual' styles, with the only main difference between sections being a slight 
variation in how much each style is used. However, the `apology' and `argument 
from opposites' have major stylistic differences and, in Chapter 6, I will argue that 
the stylistic transition between them is not only striking and deliberate, but important 
for the dialogue as a whole. 
When Thesleff comes to make `observations on the relation of style to content', one 
of the main aims of his book, the functions assigned to particular styles are vague 
and simplistic. For instance, the `ceremonious style' is `mostly used ... to add 
loftiness to myths and visions', while the `semi-literary conversational style' is `used 
with a serious undertone from the earliest dialogues'. 3 Although Thesleff himself 
admits that `the present work can give little aid in details' and hopes for further 
38 Thesleff, 1967,35ff. For example, he claims that the 'question and reply' type is based on 'the old 
Greek arts of elenctic and eristic', although producing no actual textual evidence for the existence or 
characteristics of these literary genres. 
39 Thesleff, 1967,63. 
40 Thesleff, 1967,26. 
41 See Thesleff, 1967, WE What, for example, are 'climax', 'solemnity', and 'gnomic expression'? 
Does 'pairs' include oppositional pairs and how does it relate to 'antithesis'? How would Thesleff 
define 'imagery, poetical'? 
42 Thesleff, 1967,133-5. 
43 Thesleff, 1967,165-6. His analysis of interlocutors' characters is no better. E. g. Gorgias, in Gorg., 
is 'pompous and condescending'. He concludes with the highly unoriginal idea that 'to Plato, writing 
was play'. Cf. e. g. Norden, 1915,111. 
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research, 44 if we wish to develop an account of how style is used within the 
construction of Platonic argument, it is unlikely that his generalisations and vague 
methodology can be of much use 45 
Along with such accounts of Platonic style, there is also stylometry, which uses 
statistics for instances of particular features in various Platonic texts, in order to 
establish their relative chronology. Without entering into a complex critique of this 
practice, it is worth simply pointing out that such statistics are of little use for 
determining the character and importance of style within a particular Platonic 
passage 46 
So, in general, there seems to be, as yet, no satisfactory model for investigation of 
Plato's style, if our aim is to understand in any depth the contribution of style to the 
construction of argument in individual sections. Existing studies either concentrate 
on particular types of features in isolation from their context and from other stylistic 
phenomena or, in the case of Thesleff, sacrifice accuracy and depth for illusory 
comprehensiveness. Although these works do contain certain valuable observations 
it appears that we must, essentially, start from scratch. 
2.3 An alternative approach to stylistic analysis 
My aim has been to establish a methodological framework allowing us to investigate 
how stylistic features work together within individual passages. This framework 
needs to be comprehensive if it is to account for the entire range of stylistic 
phenomena which occur in the Phaedo. However, I have not tried to give a full 
analysis of the whole dialogue, an undertaking whose success would be highly 
unlikely, given its stylistic diversity. My main intention has been to understand the 
contribution of style to individual sections, as a starting point for the use of stylistic 
analysis in philosophical interpretation. I have therefore opted for detail and have 
chosen to concentrate on six very different short passages, so facilitating a relatively 
44 Thesleff, 1967,173. 
45 For an interesting critique of Thesleff, see Dover, 1987,74-5, who questions how he formulates his 
stylistic categories and establishes their 'markers' without reference to other Greek genres. 
46 Cf. Thesleff, 1967,8-9, especially n. 1, for criticisms of stylometry and references for key 
stylometric texts. For more criticisms of 'statistical' methods of stylistic analysis see 3.1.1, below. 
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complete picture of style within these sections. In turn, my investigation also 
facilitates a sense of stylistic range within the dialogue and some more general 
thoughts on Platonic style. In Part II, three of these passages will form a basis for 
case studies which explore their contribution to the argument in a wider context. 
2.3.1 Selection of passages 
The six chosen passages are of sufficient length to allow a substantial account of 
stylistic structure within an, extended section, but also short enough to permit a 
comprehensive study of their precise details. The six are very different and have 
been selected as reflecting the varied modes of discourse in the dialogue: 
Passage I: 69a6-e4 - This long speech is the `peroration' of Socrates' defence of his 
willingness to die. 
Passage II: 810-82c8 - Socrates discusses with Cebes about the fate of the soul after 
death and the principles of reincarnation 
Passage III: 97b8-98b6 - Socrates explains the disappointment he felt in his youth 
when reading the works of Anaxagoras. 
Passage IV- I05c8-106a11- Part of the proof that the soul is äOävaTos. 
Passage V. " 1100-1116 - The description of the `true' earth from the myth. 
Passage VI. " 117c1-118a17 - The final moments of Socrates' life and the end of the 
Phaedo. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology: stylistic categories 
3.1 Other works on style 
The analysis of style is a major facet of classical scholarship. Along with more 
general works such as Denniston's Greek Prose Style, Dover's The Evolution of 
Greek Prose Style, and Norden's Die Antike Kunstprosa, there are countless studies 
of particular authors or features. Nevertheless, no methodological framework can be 
extracted from these, either singly or collectively, which covers the full range of the 
Phaedo or other Platonic dialogues' stylistic features. Many use conventional 
classificatory categories derived from ancient rhetoric, such as period structure, 
antithesis, and metaphor. However, such categories, although useful, are by no 
means exhaustive and may involve methodological difficulties, as well as being 
suited exclusively for analysis of particular types of prose. ' Therefore a new 
methodology is needed, suitable for analysis of the entire dialogue. My scheme will 
take account of productive elements in existing studies, while offering a critique of 
some of their apparent weaknesses, which will help to explain the reasons for some 
of my own methodological choices. 
3.1.1 The `critical overview' versus `statistical' approach 
In very general terms, stylistic studies involve two main approaches, the `critical 
overview' and the `statistical', although a combination is used in some works. While 
both are used to classify, analyse, compare, and trace the development of style, they 
differ insofar as the latter relies upon statistics concerning instances of particular 
features as evidence for its claims. Each approach has its advantages and 
disadvantages. While a work of `critical overview' like Denniston, 1952, provides 
examples of important aspects of style and makes some claims about distributions in 
Cf. Thesleff, 1967,26. 
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different authors, it relies solely upon the author's knowledge of and ability to 
compare the Greek texts that are judged to be relevant. 
So it is easy to understand why critics should have turned to the `statistical' 
approach, aiming to depart from what they have seen as the arbitrary and 
impressionistic nature of `critical overview' analysis, by counting instances of 
particular phenomena, and so being able to back up points with numerical data. 
Nevertheless, this alternative involves its own problems? For a start, stylistic 
features are so varied that any system which simplifies them enough to see them as 
countable instances of a single phenomenon, risks compromising their 
distinctiveness, individuality, or development within a particular passage. In 
addition, `statistical' analysis often gives broad characterisations of style in an author 
or group of authors based, for reasons of practicality, on the number of instances 
found in small, though supposedly representative, random samples of their works. 
Yet the majority of authors, and especially Plato, are so varied stylistically, that a 
general picture cannot possibly be attained from statistics based on a short sample 
alone. Finally, it often seems that the results obtained by the `statistical' method 
could equally well be achieved through sharp observation without counting. 3 
However, the `statistical' method can be useful, especially when considering 
distributions of clearly distinguishable features such as particular lexemes or noun- 
forms. My own approach combines the `statistical' and `critical overview'. In line 
with the former I will consider short passages, broadly representative of the Phaedo's 
different stylistic modes, although I do acknowledge the speculative nature of any 
general conclusions about Platonic style emerging from assessment of the passages' 
similarities and differences. In general, however, my analysis tends towards the 
`critical overview' and, allowing for obvious practical constraints, I try to give as 
2 Cf. e. g. p. 43, below. 
3 If we consider Webster, 1941, on the 'devlopment of sentence construction between Homer and 
Dinarchus" the strength of these objections is clear. There are a number of difficulties in Webster's 
selection of passages. For example, how can the three short passages he chooses from Plato, 
Rep. 401b-404d, 614b-621d, and Leg. 624a-63lb, be felt to be representative in any way of a corpus so 
stylistically diverse? He also fails to take account of several important works, such as the Hippocratic 
Corpus or any of the extant Presocratic fragments. Moreover, his final conclusion is that gradually 
sentences increased in length and complexity, with more sub-clauses. Yet surely that much could be 
gathered simply from glancing through a selection from the authors in question, rather than relying on 
numerical data. 
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broad an indication of the distinctive features and generic background of stylistic 
phenomena as possible. Many individual features are so diverse and inextricable 
from their wider stylistic context that the usefulness of reducing them to countable 
categories is limited. Nevertheless, I do occasionally employ statistics, especially for 
analysing lexis, where usage is more readily quantifiable. 
3.1.2 Some preliminaries 
" Much of my analysis relies on comparison of the passages not only with the 
Platonic corpus, but also with archaic and classical Greek literature in general. 
Accordingly, my discussions of the distribution of a particular feature will draw 
on extant pre-Hellenistic texts. 
" The relevance of my stylistic categories for the passages in question does vary. 
Nevertheless, given that I have tried to provide a framework for analysing as 
comprehensive a range of features as possible and intend my methodology to be 
applicable to a wide range of texts, I will explain fully the classification of even 
those features whose occurrence within the six passages is limited. 
3.2 Unit Organisation 
The classification `unit organisation' replaces the conventional category of `sentence 
structure' and incorporates aspects of style such as word order and interconnection of 
clauses. 
4 In this, I follow Silk, 1974,82 '[Evidence] will almost never be later than fourth century: Menander 
and Theophrastus are my effective limits. Hence 'complete' is always to be interpreted to mean 
'complete as far as pre-Hellenistic Greek is concerned'; and such remarks as 'no extant parallel' mean 
'no parallel sufficiently early to count'. When citing usages from a composite 'author' like 
Hippocrates, I shall not go into questions of authenticity or dating when the usage belongs to a work 
generally ascribed to the fourth century or earlier'. 
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3.2.1 Generalproblems with classification of the unit 
In considering the particularities of Greek unit organisation, it is useful to compare 
Greek to modem languages, which generally provide the framework for discussions 
of this topic. For convenience, I will use English in most cases, although other 
languages would also provide suitable models 5 
Since there are certain differences between the organisation of phrases in Greek texts 
and the sentence structure of a modem language like English, it is helpful to use the 
term `unit' rather than `sentence'. 6 In general, individual clauses within units can be 
distinguished, as in English sentences, on the basis of syntax. Units, however, are 
themselves often far more difficult to delimit than sentences. In English the written 
(orthographic) sentence is clearly demarcated by both grammar and punctuation, 7 
whereas classical Greek texts were written without punctuation! 
Furthermore there are other differences which make it impractical to understand 
Greek in terms of the modem sentence. In Greek the same conjunctions are used to 
link both whole units and parts of units. For example, whereas formal English as a 
This is especially true when a certain part of speech is inflected in Greek and therefore has a more 
varied grammatical function than in English. See e. g. n. 12 on German participles. 
6 Cf. Dover, 1997,28: 'I propose to replace "sentence" by "main-clause-finite-verb unit" (MCF for 
short)'. However, there are significant problems with Dover's schema, which I will discuss below. 
7 Greenbaum, 1996,322ff. In grammatical terms, there are various exceptions to this rule: e. g. 
orthographic sentences which contain more than one grammatical sentence, separated by a colon or 
dash; elliptical sentences; and sentences deliberately flouting the conventions of sentence structure. 
Punctuation is generally thought to have been introduced by Aristophanes of Byzantium in the third 
century B. C. (see e. g. Sandys, 1921,126ff. ), although there is controversy over whether some sort of 
punctuation existed earlier, on the basis of Isoc. 15.59; Arist. Rhet. 1407b13 and 1409a21 (although 
see also Immerwahr, 1990,168, on the 'sporadic use of punctuation throughout the fifth century', 
used 'to separate words into groups'). Pfeiffer, 1968,178ff. cites these passages as evidence for some 
sort of punctuation as early as Isocrates. However, Isoc. 15.59 and Arist. Rh. 1409a21, suggest that 
even if the paragraphos was being used, punctuation, in the modem sense, was not an essential part of 
the written Greek text. Cf. e. g. Thompson, 1893,69-70, and Turner, 1987,8-10. By contrast, Wake, 
1957,334, claims that periods were clearly marked by a paragraphos representing the author's 
intentions. Yet, as Turner shows, it seems that the oldest papyri used the paragraphos only to 
indicate the end of major sections, changes of speaker (cf. Isoc. 15.59), or quoted verse from 
surrounding prose. Cf. also e. g. Lamedica, 1992,327, on the Derveni papyrus. Lamedica claims that 
the paragraphos functioned either to demarcate either a lemma or as the sole means of indicating 
quotation from other authors or works, both in the Derveni papyrus and other texts. Even the third 
passage, Arist. Rh. 1407b 13, provides no certain evidence for punctuation. While it uses Sraviitat, 
which later comes to be understood as 'punctuate', the term is only used three times in pre-Hellenistic 
Greek, all within this passage, and the final usage especially (1407b18) does not appear to denote 
`punctuation' in the modem sense, raising serious questions about its meaning: d8r1Xov yap T6 dec. 
TrpÖS 61roTEp . 
SLaaTIEat. 
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rule only uses `and' within sentences, Greek units regularly begin with the 
conjunctions Kal and U. Therefore, in terms of conjunctions as well as 
punctuation, Greek does not have formal markers to demarcate the division between 
units and individual clauses or groups of clauses within units, 9 so that it is often 
difficult to identify the boundaries of an individual unit with any precision. 
The peculiarity of Greek can also be seen in the role of specific parts of speech, such 
as participles. Verbless participial phrases or `clauses'10 are a prevalent and multi- 
functional feature of Greek writing. " Greek's use of the future participle to denote 
purpose or a participle to express the verb in certain types of indirect speech has no 
counterpart in a language like English. 12 Thus, analysis of Greek must take into 
account such differences in the range and function of the participial clause. 13 
3.2.2 Approaches to unit organisation, ancient and modern. 
Ancient rhetorical theories concerning the units of speech and their organisation are 
of limited use for my purposes, given that the exstant works provide no consistent 
9 The lack of clear division in written Greek can perhaps be seen to reflect the influence of orality on 
the structure of Greek prose. Cf. Greenbaum, 1996,322ff. on the difficulties of dividing up spoken 
English, in which 'neither intonation nor pauses signal unequivocally the ends of speech units that 
might be thought to correspond to orthographic sentences'. English grammarians use the term 
'clause-cluster' to denote the approximate equivalent of the orthographic sentence in spoken English, 
acknowledging its indeterminacy. This may be a useful notion to keep in mind when considering 
Greek. Cf. e. g. Chantraine, 1950,359, who talks about a phrase in the Republic as 'pas de periode, 
mais une phrase sinueuse qui reproduit le mouvement du style parl6'. On orality's influence on the 
structure of Greek prose, see e. g.: Demetr. Eloc. 1; and Arist. Rh. 1409b 15, on breathing as a factor in 
determining the length of cola and periods; Parkes, 1992,1, on punctuation as 'a phenomenon of the 
written language'; and Kühner-Gerth, 1955, I, 93,353, on Greek and modem punctuation as similar 
in principle, but based on natural pauses as opposed to syntax respectively. 
10 I follow e. g. Denniston, 1952,69, in using the term 'participial clause'. For although 'clauses' are 
generally understood in e. g. English to include finite verbs, Greek participles can fulfil many 
functions of a finite verb . Furthermore, even in English grammar, clauses with a participle as their 
verb are recognised as clauses (i. e. non-finite clauses). See e. g. Quirk, 1985,49ff. 
11 By comparison, the function of English participles is severely restricted. See e. g. Quirk, 1973,311, 
on the 'structural deficiencies' of participial clauses. Since participles are uninflected, the subject of a 
verbless participle 'clause' must supposedly be the same as the subject of the main clause, although 
this rule is often broken in normal casual usage. 
12 Even in German, which has inflected participles and participial verbless 'clauses', participles are 
restricted in terms of tense and voice, and 'clauses' are rare and restricted to 'formal written registers' 
(Durrell, 1996,270-5). 
3 The particularities of Greek can also be seen e. g. in the infinitives. For more on participles and 
infinitives see my critique of Dover's `MCF's', p. 43, below. 
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and clear definitions. 14 Aristotle uses the terms irep1oSos and KGXov to denote larger 
and smaller divisions, " while Demetrius adds a yet smaller division, the K6. Eta. 16 
They divide speech into Výtc etpo t&rl (`continuous' or `strung together'), 17 
characteristic of the old historiographers, and AEýts tcaTaaTpaµµivrl, speech in 
periods. Whereas the period bears certain similarities to the modern period, as 
Dover points out, the kolon is clearly not equivalent to the modem syntactic clause. 18 
Kolon divisions appear to depend on a combination of syntax, semantics, and length, 
while the period was primarily delimited by completeness of sense. 19 Numerous 
points, such as the two main types of XEýts, 20 Aristotle's view of kola as either 
antithetical or divided, 21 or Demetrius' description of the three different types of 
period, 22 are of great stylistic interest. Overall, however, the definitions of these 
terms are too vague and varied to use as precise terminology for stylistic 
categorisation. 
In spite of such difficulties, the unitary organisation of Greek texts is an important 
aspect of Greek style. and has been widely discussed. I have concentrated 
specifically on the detailed treatments of this topic in Denniston, 1952, and Dover, 
1997, which seem broadly representative of the major trends in modern works. 23 
Denniston takes into account the syntactic-stylistic differences between English and 
14 Dover, 1997,37-40, outlines the main differences between ancient theories and shows the 
difficulties of constructing firm definitions. See also Usher, 1973,41, on the 'unresolved question' of 
period length. 
s Arist. Rh. 1409b13ff. 
16 Demetr. Eloc. 9. 
'7 Although Demetrius uses the term &I. IprIµ&rl. - 18 See e. g. the first example at Arist. Rh. 1409b34ff., which contains two kola, but would be seen as one 
clause, in terms of English grammar. 
19 Fowler, 1982, claims that the Aristotelian period was defined 'logically' as opposed to 
'rhythmically', arguing convincingly against almost all of the main arguments in support of the latter. 
However, some care must be taken over using 'logical' to describe the Aristotelian/Demetrian period, 
especially in view of passages such as Demetr. Eloc. 32 on the differences between the period and the 
enthumema. See also Usher, 1973,41. 
20 Although the usefulness of this classification is limited, especially when dealing with the non- 
periodic style. See e. g. Fowler, 1987,54-5, on Aristotle's discussion of X L5 elpoµEvrl as 'a foil for 
the discussion of the periodic style'; Bakker, 1997,36 and 38: 'it [XICL5 etpoµEvrl] is negatively 
defined with respect to the positive qualities of the periodic style'. 21 Rhet. 1409b33. 
u Eloc. 19-21. 
u Other works include e. g. Webster, 1941; Norden, 1915, passim; comments in Chantraine, 1951; Des 
Places, 1951, and Humbert, 1953, who both concentrate only on specific aspects of 'phrase' structure 
in Plato. 
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Greek in his points about individual features like hendiadys24 Discussing unit 
organisation, however, he uses the terms `sentence', `clause', `period' and `kolon' 
without definition, 25 and his treatment is restricted to the categories and authors 
discussed in ancient rhetorical theory, as if these categories were clearly defined. 26 
Although he makes many interesting observations, he employs the term `period' in 
contexts where it is neither clearly applicable nor, if applicable, the most profitable 
way for a passage to be classified. A passage such as Symposium 182d-183c, 
described as a `period... almost too straggling to be called a period', 27 would benefit 
from a different framework of reference. Furthermore, those prose `sentences' which 
do not ostensibly conform to the restrictive ancient schemata find no place within his 
account. 
Dover goes to the opposite extreme. To avoid the difficulties involved in the use of 
sentences and punctuation to divide the Greek text, he replaces the sentence as a 
unity of analysis with the `MCF (main-clause-finite-verb unit)'. 28 However, while 
the `MCF' avoids problems associated with certain modem terminology, it is far too 
dependent on modem linguistic frameworks to be an adequate way of understanding 
the organisation of Greek. Dover himself considers the difficulties occasioned by 
constructions such as µEv and U clauses, which comprise two 'MCFs', but cannot 
be seen as entirely independent clauses. 29 Yet many other problems are passed over 
in silence and his schema often seems arbitrary. For example, `causal trrd(', with a 
finite verb, is seen as an `MCF', while participial clauses with a definite causal force 
are not included amongst the list of `MCFs'. 30 Thus, two semantically equivalent31 
constructions are treated as having radically different linguistic functions, without 
any stated reason. Similarly, when more than one infinitive follows a verb such as 
4aoi in indirect discourse, all but the first infinitive are said to be 'MCFs', `in order 
not to posit MCFs of extreme and unrealistic complexity'. 32 Rather than considering 
24 Denniston, 1952,61-5. 
25 Cf. Webster, 1941, on Greek 'sentence-construction'. 
26 See Denniston, 1952,60-75, on 'Sentence-structure and Antithesis'. See especially 66-74. 
27 Denniston, 1952,70. 
28 Dover, 1997,27-8. 
29 Dover, 1997,30-32. 
30 Dover, 1996,29. 
31 The sense of 'equivalent' here is loose and not intended to denote absolute synonymy. 32 Dover, 1997,29. Thus, in my Passage V, which is almost entirely in extended indirect discourse, 
all but the first infinitive, elvat(110c2/ V. 6), would, apparently, be considered as 'MCFs'. 
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the Greek linguistic feature per se, different syntactic status is being accorded to 
verbs with an identical syntactic function, without explanation, so as to fit a schema 
which is in effect imposed on the actual linguistic structure of the language. Dover's 
methodology takes priority over the data it has been set up to analyse and, even if the 
'MCFs' could be identified with certainty, it seems unlikely that a unit ill-suited to so 
many aspects of Greek can shed much light upon the organisation of Greek texts. 33 
3.2.3 Definition of the unit. 
It is not possible to distinguish individual units of the Greek text with absolute 
certainty and any system which claims to do so risks misrepresenting the structure of 
literary Greek. Units resemble modern sentences, insofar as they comprise a clause 
or clause cluster, which generally feature one or more main verb-clauses, often with 
additional subordinate clauses. 4 Furthermore, they have both completeness and 
independence on a formal, syntactic, and semantic level. 35 However, because this is 
not determinate, the decision as to what constitutes the unit must ultimately depend 
upon the level of completeness and independence in any given instance, so that there 
are no general criteria suitable for all cases. Thus the very identification of the unit is 
itself an element of stylistic analysis, dependent on the interpretation of each 
individual case. 
The fact that a sequence of Greek words in context is sometimes difficult to divide 
should itself be seen as an aspect of style, so that a unit which eliminates these 
difficulties provides an inaccurate picture of Greek organisation. While it is perhaps 
desirable to have a schema more systematic and inclusive than Denniston's, this 
should be based around features of stylistic interest rather than spurious scientific 
determinacy. Significant features are likely to include the way in which clauses are 
33 Cf. p. 46, below. 
34 Instances such as units featuring ellipse or exclamation, in which the verb is omitted, are exceptions 
to this. 
35 Although the syntax and semantics of linguistic features are heavily interdependent and often 
inseparable. Consider how difficult it would be to distinguish the syntactic from the semantic aspects 
of e. g. hypotaxis and parataxis. 
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connected, grouped and ordered; the extent to which discrete units can be identified; 
and whether both units and clauses are extended or concise 36 
3.2.4 Categories for analysis 
I propose to consider unit organisation in terms of three main categories, which 
constitute a framework amenable to all its aspects and calculated to elucidate its 
significant features. 
Structure 
`Structure' refers to the grouping and connection of clauses and units, both the extent 
to which units can be seen as discrete and the way in which individual clauses are 
linked. The relationship between clauses is categorised mainly in terms of parataxis, 
between clauses of equal status, and hypotaxis, between clauses of unequal status, 
where one clause is subordinate to another. 37 Hypotactic clauses will be classified 
within the functional grammatical categories: nominal; adverbial; relative; and 
comparative; as well as their subdivisions. Those participial clauses which fulfil 
these functions will be included as hypotactic. Apposition will be treated as a type of 
parataxis. 8 
36 The categories used by Webster, 1941, for the analysis of 'Greek sentence construction', are based 
on such factors. However, while his overall results and many individual points are of some interest, 
his categories are generally too broad to be useful for detailed stylistic analysis. 37 Webster, 1941, also uses these as his main categories, although he has different notions of hypotaxis 
and parataxis (see also n. 38). For definitions see Greenbaum, 1996,320ff. As discussed by Fowler, 
1987,55, some modern scholars extend 'parataxis' to cover the organisation of the text as a whole, as 
opposed to individual units. However, unless stated, I will be taking 'parataxis' strictly in its 
grammatical sense. Cf. Bakker, 39ff, and 62. e Given that apposition links items of equivalent grammatical status, its syntactic function is more 
akin to parataxis than hypotaxis. Thus I will treat it as paratactic, contra Webster, 1941,389, who 
calls apposition hypotactic and 'dependent on the main sentence'. See e. g. Quirk, 1985,1301, on the 
resemblance of apposition to coordination. 
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Length 
The length of units will be assessed on two separate grounds: a) do they comprise 
large groups of clauses? b) are the clauses themselves concise or expanded? 39 For 
the assessment of b) we shall take into account the use of interjections, adjectives and 
devices such as ellipse, asyndeton, and polysyndeton. 40 I have avoided attempting to 
analyse unit-length statistically in teens of numbers of components for various 
reasons. First, the importance of precise numerical data of sentence length for 
stylistic analysis is questionable, since length can generally be judged adequately 
without counting and raw data do not in themselves distinguish between different 
parts of speech, as is required for understanding the composition of the sentence. 
Then again, even if we accept that the comparisons which such data facilitate may be 
of use in determining differences between certain authors or periods, existing 
attempts at statistical analysis have been prone to methodological problems. 
The fact is that quantification depends on distinct units whose length can be 
compared. However, as explained above, Greek units cannot be demarcated with 
certainty. 41 Moreover, those who claim to have isolated distinct units have 
introduced dubious categories of inclusion and exclusion for counting components 42 
Dover's figures for `MCF' lengths are only based on `mobile tokens', so that large 
numbers of tokens are excluded from calculation 43 Effectively there would be no 
distinction in terms of length between items such as a polysyndetic and an asyndetic 
phrase . 
44 Thus, given the limitations of such methods, when considering unit length 
39 Here there may be some overlap with 'structure', since that also concerns the grouping of clauses. 
For example, des Places, 1951, talks about an 'extended' ('a rallonges') construction, comprising 
chains of e. g. relative clauses, and this could be seen as relevant to both length and structure. 
`0 This is similar to the category 'amplification' in Webster, 1941,388. 'Amplification' consitutes 
the number of elements added to a 'grammatical term' (e. g. adjectives added to a noun) and while this 
broad and countable category facilitates statistical analysis, it does not discriminate at all between 
different elements. 
41 Cf. Janson, 1964,27ff., who outlines the difficulties involved in trying to determine a certain and 
objective unit for analysis. He claims that the 'shortest syntactic entity' (i. e. the clause) can be used 
with a 'degree of objectivity', since only the quantification of pauses is controversial (31). However, 
even if this does give some degree of statistical legitimacy, his results would be of very limited 
interest, given that they would be unable to shed any light on the combination of clauses within units. 42 See e. g. Wake, 1957,334, who makes the arbitrary claim that ancient periods, established by the 
authors themselves, can be identified within the text with certainty. " Dover, 1997,51. 
44 Cf. the critieria used by Webster, 1941,386, which raise similar difficulties. 
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it is preferable to take into account not quantities alone, but a range of stylistic 
features. 
Word order and foregrounding 
Under this heading we shall consider unusual word order, hyperbaton, variation in 
order, and foregrounding of particular words or phrases. 
3.3 Parallel structures 
This category includes all types of microcontextual parallelisms within Greek writing 
and comprises small groups of individual words or collocations which form parallel 
structures on either a formal or semantic level, as well as structures such as 
antithesis, which affect the wider organisation of clauses or units 45 
We may distinguish four main classes: pairs and lists; repetition; pleonasm; and 
sound effects used as parallel structures. Each has various subdivisions, while 
certain examples, such as dT TOS' Kür " QTEXEQTOc (69c5f1.18), may also fit into 
more than one main class. For this phrase is not only a pair, but is also pleonastic 
and exhibits significant aural parallelism, both rhythmically and through repetition of 
initial and final syllables. 
It could be argued that some parallels discussed in this section are too uniform and 
prevalent a feature of Greek texts to be noteworthy. Yet the significant variance, for 
example, in the number and types of pairs which appear in different passages 
suggests that their variety and distribution is of stylistic interest. 
45 On the distinction between these types cf. e. g. Arist. Rh. 1409b33ff., who distinguishes between 
pairs of ivavrta within clauses and fi dVTLKELgivil (antithetical) >J ; and Fehling, 1969,295 and 
passim, who distinguishes between 'Antithese' ('Gegenüberstellungen mit (mindestens) zwei Paar 
Akzentstellen' and 'einfache Kontraste', in which 'nur ein Begriffspaar geneinandergesetzt ist'. 
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3.3.1 Other views on parallel structures: ancient and modern. 
Those features labelled here as `parallel structures' are not generally treated as a 
single group by ancient or modern writers on style 46 Although many of them were 
included amongst ancient rhetorical figures (with the exception of certain pleonasms, 
word-plays, and forms of repetition), rhetoric tended to focus on the parallel structure 
of kola, comprising figures such as Traptowats ('equality of kola')47 or dVTLaTpoýlj 
(the repetition of the same word at the close of successive kola) 48 Thus, while 
ancient rhetorical accounts provide interesting examples, they are of limited use for a 
more comprehensive treatment of parallel structures, and account for neither pairs 
and lists per se, 49 nor many of the types of repetition to be found in Greek texts. 
Although modern analysis is not restricted to the ancient rhetorical categories, the 
wide-ranging types of parallel structures under consideration are, in general, treated 
separately. A partial exception to this is Fehling, who examines all kinds of parallel 
structure as `Wiederholungsfiguren'. He expands the usual concept of repetition 
('Wiederholung') to include structures based on parallel meaning, " so that it 
includes antithesis" and only discounts features such as alliteration, where he sees 
the words as connected purely by sound, not meanings= However, since his primary 
interest is rhetorical figures, the range of pairs and lists included in his account is 
narrower than mine and, in general, he presents features mainly as a catalogue 
without explaining the essential differences between particular types. 
46 Cf. Fehling, 1969,7ff. Silk, 1974, from where I take the phrase 'parallel structures' and Silk, 2000, 
ch. 3ff. are noteable exceptions. 
47 Arist. Rh. 1404a24ff.; Demetr. Eloc. 25. 
'a Hermog. 1d2.36. This device was also known as im. oopd or conversio. See Martin, 1974,304. 
" Except insofar as these coincide with e. g. homoeoteleuton or polysyndeton. 50 Fehling, 1969,16ff.: 'Der Begriff der Wiederholung ist dabei aber weiter als gewöhnlich gefaßt, da 
er Strukturwiederholungen und damit auch die Antithese einschließt. ' 
51 Although his discussion of antithesis is mainly concerned with gnomic antheses alone. 
52 However, true alliteration creates a connection of meaning through sound. 
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3.3.2 Categories ofAnalysis. 
The four main categories of analysis are as follows. Basic figures for the incidence 
of each type of feature will be given at the beginning of Chapter 4, and all instances 
of parallel structure are listed in Appendix I. 
Pairs and lists 
This category includes any instance of pairs and lists, most comprising components 
with the same syntactic function. Further differentiation between types will be, for 
example, the classification of pairs as either oppositional and non-oppositional. Pairs 
and lists coinciding in a particular phrase will be included in both categories. Thus, a 
phrase like ý8oväs rrpös t 5oväs Kal Xünac rrpbs Xirrras Kal 060ov irpös 
460ov (69a7/I. 2) would count as three separate pairs and one long list. Similarly, in 
Kaeapot Kai OÜ KaTa6rl8ea1L&OL OÜ& SLE4eapILEvoL (110e3N. 23) all three 
terms form a list, and yet ov KaTa6T1&EQ41EVOL oü& SLE46ap thvoi also seems to 
form a significant pair because of the aural resemblance of its two halves, achieved 
through homoeoteleuton and identical rhythm. This unusual coincidence of lists and 
pairs is perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of these two examples. 3 
The category overall has certain similarities to Dover's `multiples', 54 although my 
classification is more broadly inclusive. It includes features excluded by Dover, like 
`multiples' where `a single mobile is co-ordinated with an expression composed of 
two or more' or `different forms of the same lexeme are co-ordinated'. 55 An 
example of the former is 6 &MagCOv TE Kal trävrwv, atTLos (97c2/III. 3) and, of 
the latter, trtvovTd TE Kai TrEtrWKöTa (117c7/VI. 7). 
33 It is in cases such as this that the limitations of a purely numerical analysis are especially apparent. 
For numerical analysis cannot take into account all the possible combinations of e. g. lists and pairs 
and so can provide only general indications as opposed to detailed characterisations of specific 
features. 
s` Dover, 1996,143: 'multiples... all stand in exactly the same syntactical relation to what lies outside 
the sequence'. 
55 Dover, 1996,144 and 145. 
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Repetition 
This category includes any repetition of a lexeme and its cognates, including 
instances where the cognate provides the root of a compound lexeme. So, for 
example, KaTaXXärreaOaL (69a8/I. 3) and d aTT6µeva (69b7/I. 12) are taken to be 
repetitions of dXAayfj (69a711.2). Four main types of repetition are distinguished 
which, apart from the third category, ring composition, are based not upon rhetorical 
56 57 figures, but on the proximity of repeated words. 
These four categories are: 
a) Juxtaposition (j): repeated words are either juxtaposed or separated by no 
more than a preposition (vel sim. ). E. g. ij8oväs Trpbs ý8ovds (69a7/I. 2) or 
TÖL ýv6ýtEva 4ü¬Q6ai (110d3/V. 15). 
b) Successive clause or unit (s): repeated words occur either in a successive 
clause or at least within the next unit. 58 E. g. ai trepl Tä ToLatTa 
dvayKdCovTaL rrAaPdaOac Stiv TtvovaaL Tjs npoTEpas 
Tpoýýs Kaicijs oüvns. Kal th pL ye Tovrov rrAav urac ... (81 d8- 
9/11.17.8). 
c) Ring composition (r): a unit or sequence of units features the same lexeme 
or lexemes at its beginning and its close. E. g. SpaTöv 81c9/II. 6 and 6pwvTaL 
(81 d4/II. 12). This category is similar to the ancient term KvKXOS 59 
d) Key word repetition (k): 6° a certain lexeme is'repeated at various points 
throughout the passage or a long section of the passage. E. g. the use of 
13 XTLara in Passage III. 
56 Ancient rhetoric also made distance-based distinctions between repetitions. However, these focused 
mainly on close repetition and repetition in significant places within kola. See Lausberg, 1998,274ff. 
57 Denniston, 1952, ch. V, considers a very wide range of types of repetition, although especially at 84- 
90 he relies quite heavily on ancient rhetorical categories. Cf. also Fehling, 1969,187-234. s' In instances where exact unit boundaries are uncertain, this category will be subject to questions of 
stylistic interpretation. 
s' See e. g. Denniston, 1952,90. 
60 The term 'key-word' is taken from Denniston, 1952,4. 
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Overlaps, especially between categories b) and d), are very common, when a lexeme 
which is repeated periodically throughout the passsage is also repeated one or more 
times within successive clauses or units. 
Pleonasm 
Pleonasm or semantic repetition comprises instances where a lexeme is conj6ined 
with a synonym or near synonym. Also known as auvwvvµ(a, amplificatio, or 
disjunctio, 61 it was one of the ancient rhetorical figures, where it mainly refers to the 
pairing of terms of very similar meaning rather than precise synonyms, thus 
including examples like dTLtAav TE Kal ä8oý(av (82c6/II. 52). Although 
pleonasm is essentially very different from the other, formal, features classified as 
`parallel structures', it is a phenomenon which establishes a parallelism between two 
or more terms, and is therefore included within this category. 62 
Sound effects used as parallel structures 
The sound effects which are included here are those which create or emphasise a 
sense of parallelism. These include relevant instances of word-play and assonance, 
with the latter comprising features such as homoeoteleuton, alliteration, and the 
repetition of prefixes. 63 
3.4 Imagery 64 
I will consider as imagery all tropes and figures, `based on analogy or similarity', 65 
or else on contiguity or association, classifying them formally66 within five 
61 Quintilian Institutio Oratoria, 9.3.45-47. For further references see also Martin, 1974,306. 
62 Moreover, examples of pleonasm almost always take the form of pairs or lists. 
63 On sound effects as reinforcing parallel structures, see Silk, 1996,193: function (d). 64 The definitions and classifications used here owe much to discussions with Michael Silk and to his 
treatment of imagery in Silk, 1974; 1996; and forthcoming. 65 See Silk, 1974,5: 'based... refers to the logical basis'. Cf. Day Lewis, 1947,18: an image is `a 
figure of speech expressing some similarity or analogy'; Black, 1981,70, on the general conception of 
metaphor. For the inclusion of metonymy (tropes based on 'contiguity') within imagery, see e. g. 
Ullmann, 1964,177. 
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categories: metaphor; metonymy; simile and comparison; analogy; and aural 
imagery. Metaphor, metonymy, and aural imagery are also categoriseable as 
`implicit' imagery, as opposed to simile, comparison, and analogy, which are 
`explicit', insofar as they are designated by a formal marker. 67 To distinguish 
between the verbal components of imagery I use the terms `tenor' and `vehicle'. The 
`vehicle' is the `deviant' and `extraneous' element, applied to the `tenor' ('non- 
deviant element') in a sense which deviates from its normal usage'68 and introduced 
for the purposes of comparison. 69 So, for example, in Tä EiOd6E EtvaL XpW LaTa 
WQrrEp 8ELyµaTa, 019 &r' oi. ypa4fc KaTaXpwvTaL (110bß-cl), SEtyµara is a 
vehicle term, while i-a EvOd8E ETvaL Xptµaia is the tenor. The types of imagery 
are defined as follows: 
Metaphor 
Those tropes based on analogy or similarity, including personification. 
Metonymy 
Those tropes based on contiguity or association, including synecdoche. 70 
Aural Imagery 
This comprises rhythmic or other sound effects71 which function like metaphor. 72 
66 In order to distinguish between metaphor and metonymy and to define aural imagery, however, it 
will be necessary to appeal to semantic and functional aspects. 
67 On the explicit/implicit distinction Ullmann, 1964,180, quotes Eluard's 'image by analogy' and 
'image by identification'. See also Silk, 1974,13-14. Cf. Soskice, 1985,18ff. on metaphor as having 
no 'particular syntactic form'; and Arist. Rh. 1406b25ff. 
68 Definitions taken from Silk, 1996,967. 
69 'Tenor' and 'vehicle', introduced by Richards, 1936,96, are widely used in discussions of 
metaphor. My own use of these terms follows Silk, 1974,8-14, and passim, insofar as I apply them to 
imagery in general and resist seeing them in terms of a 'literal/ figurative' opposition. 
70 See Silk, 1996,967. Cf. also Wellek and Warren, 1963,194, on 'contiguity'. 
71 To a certain extent sound effects used as parallel structures can be considered as aural imagery 
because of their 'associative function'. 
72 See Silk, 1974,177 n. 1, on the lack of an 'adequate typology of the poetic functions of alliteration 
or of sound patterning generally'. He includes a detailed discussion of 'aural interaction', but is only 
concerned with those examples where aural effects coincide with semantic imagery. 
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Consider, for example, the first lines of Tennyson's Tithonus: 
The woods decay, the woods decay and fall, 
The vapours weep their burthen to the ground. 
Here the falling cadence of the second line contributes to the impression of slow 
degeneration and melancholy decay evoked by this image and the poem as a whole. 
Gentle resignation is emphasised by the use of the soft archaic `burthen' rather than 
burden. 73 
Various critics have worried about this phenomenon, having mistakenly understood 
aural imagery as supposedly relying on the fixed or independent semantic force of 
phonetic elements of language. Since phonetic elements clearly do not have such a 
force they infer that aural imagery itself cannot exist 74 However, given that this 
phenomenon obtains a semantic force in conjunction with the meaning of the words 
in which it occurs, it remains unaffected by such anxieties. 5 The case for aural 
imagery is perhaps even more cogent in a classical context, in as much as aural 
effects are more readily appreciated within cultures accustomed to oral delivery. 76 
Aural imagery is, moreover, not limited to straightforward reinforcement of the 
semantic by given factors on the phonological level, but can also be significant 
insofar as they diverge. The `river' metaphor of Heraclitus fr. B49a - 
1TOT%LeL9 TOTS 6TdIg E[. l. ßatV%LEV TE Kat OÜK Eý1ßahV0iiEV, EE LV TE 
Kür. OÜK EI LEV. 
- seems to indicate the ceaseless flux and lack of stable identity in the physical world. 
Yet the symmetry and regularity of the repetitive structure creates an aural 
73 On aural imagery in general cf. e. g. Wellek and Warren, 1963,162, who give three levels of'sound- 
imitation', the third being 'the important level of sound-symbolism or sound-metaphor', which 
concerns the 'expressive effects' of certain sounds and is 'a sound-symbolism far more pervasive than 
onomatopoeia'. 
74 E. g. Ransom, 1938,93-4, objects to aural imagery for the reason that 'phonetic elements' have only 
a contingent semantic force, entirely dependent on the 'logical meanings' of the words. 
7s Cf. - Wellek and Warren, 1963,161-2; Richards, 1936,60; 76 Cf. Stanford, 1967,100 and 113. 
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impression of order and balance, which could be taken to suggest a more 
fundamental underlying principle of order, beneath the apparent disorder construed 
from the transience of the perceived physical phenomena. 
Simile and comparison 
Simile and comparison are figures based on analogy or similarity, which include a 
formal marker such as ws, WQTE, or a `comparative adjective and a noun in the 
genitive case'. 7 
Analogy 
`Analogy' here refers to `paratactic analogy', 78 an example being Virgil's 
Triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres, 
arboribus venti, nobis Amaryllidis irae 79 
This is comparison which lacks a formal marker, but is still explicit imagery and 
formally distinctive, insofar as both tenor and vehicle are fully spelt out 
grammatically, unlike in the case of metaphor. It is important to distinguish between 
this `(paratactic) analogy' and `analogy' in its broad sense, which can be defined, for 
example, as `any mode of reasoning in which one object or complex of objects is 
likened or assimilated to another'. 80 Although analogy in the broad sense provides 
the logical basis for metaphor, simile, and comparison, it is itself non-verbal and 
distinct from `imagery proper', having no essential association with deviant usage of 
terminology. 
77 Silk, 1974,19. He also discusses the relationship between comparison and short simile. 78 See Silk, 1974,14. 
79 Eclogues 3.80-1. 
8° Lloyd, 1966,175. Cf. Soskice, 1985,55, on analogy as 'describing a type of relationship' which is 
'non-linguistic'. 
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3.4.1 Difficulties in identifying imagery 
The points that follow are only a brief introduction to the numerous and significant 
difficulties involved in the identification of imagery. 
The formal recognition of an image depends on our perception of deviant usage. 81 
For example, a phrase like XwpiCöµeva & 4povi aECis Kai. dAXaTT6 LEVa dvT1 
dXXi Xc V µßj QKlayp#ia TLS ?1t TolavTr) ýipETtý (69b6-7/I. 11-12) is easily 
recognisable as imagery. QKlaypadia is the deviant element (vehicle), since there is 
no sense in which virtue can really be a QKLaypa4 a (`shadow-painting'): However, 
the case is not so clear in a phrase such as öir¬p 11µiv Tö liSWg ' TE Kcii., i OdXaTTa 
EQTL TrpÖs TT V ýj. LETEpav XpELaV, TOÜTO EKEL TdV dpa (111a8/V. 35), which 
describes how for those living on the truth earth (EKEL) air has an equivalent use to 
that served by water and the sea for us (i. e. the inhabitants of our earth). Whether 
this phrase is to be construed as imagery depends on the extent to which the role of 
air `there' (EKEL) can only be understood in different terms from the role of water and 
sea on our earth. 
Moreover, the situation is not helped by the lack of any agreed use of the term 
'imagery'. 82 It sometimes denotes not only the literary tropes or figures under 
discussion here, but various other categories, which frequently influence and confuse 
definitions of the former. 83 Particularly in the case of metaphor, which has always 
dominated discussion of imagery, there are numerous definitions, such as: the 
Aristotelian substitution model; 84 metaphor as generating a new meaning through the 
a12 See p. 52, above. 
°2 On the lack of adequate definition and the difficulties involved see e. g. Furbank, 1970,68ff. and 60: 
'The trouble with "imagery" is that it appears to refer to some technical feature in literature - like 
"rhythm" or "stanza" or "metaphor" - yet it is hard to discover what'. 83 These are, for example, the psychological phenomenon of mental imagery or associations with the 
image as presented in the visual arts. On the confusion of these ideas, see e. g. Furbank 1970,21-3; 
and Ullmann, 1964,176-7. See also Preminger and Brogan, 1993,559-66, on 'mental imagery; 
figures of speech; cluster criticism; and symbol and myth; ' as the four main classes of imagery as 
understood in the twentieth century. 
84 See e. g Arist. Po. 1457b6ff., although, cf. Soskice, 1985,8-11, who claims that the 'crude' 
substitution view actually belongs to the 'empiricist critics' of Aristotle and Quintilian. 
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combination of tenor and vehicle; 85 or Davidson's definition of metaphor as 
belonging to the `domain of use' and contained in a sentence understood as literally 
false. 86 
3.4.2 `Live' and `dead' imagery 
As well as such general difficulties there is also a practical problem of identification 
which centers on the specific terminology used in an image, especially a metaphor. 
The characteristic question that arises is: can an image be considered `live, ' insofar 
as it represents a `deviation from the terminological norm'? 87 For a spoken 
language, a sensible user's sense of usage is adequate. For a dead language, 
however, the question can be decided only by surveying usage of the word in extant 
literature. 88 For example, the use of QKO1r¬ty (97d2) to suggest `intellectual enquiry' 
would be taken as `dead' metaphor since, although the earliest appearances of its root 
QKOir- suggest a sense of visual observation, 89 its intellectual sense had, by Plato's 
time, become standard ' usage 90 By contrast, to assess whether a word such as 
papvvETaL(81c9/II. 7) constitutes live metaphor is less straightforward. It is 
important to establish which authors' usage of terminology can be taken `as 
operationally adequate evidence of "normal Greek" '. 91 A detailed list of `reliable' 
authors has been drawn up by Silk, and mainly comprises `prosaic prose authors' of 
the `classical or pre-classical period', although Homer, as a standard for later writers, 
is also included. 2 
as Soskice, 1985,31ff. labels these as `incremental' theories. See e. g. Black, 1981,79 and passim on 
'interaction'. 
86 Davidson, 1981,212. On theories of metaphor, cf. e. g. Soskice, 1985, ch. 3, who lists the 
'substitution', 'emotive', and 'incremental' theories of metaphor; and Johnson, 1981,24ff., on the 
`substitution', 'comparison' and 'interaction' theories. '7 See Silk, 1974,27ff. Cf. e. g. Soskice, 1974,83. Although there is a possibility that even a dead 
image may retain the force of both meanings simultaneously (see Silk, 1974,27). It is not helpful to 
speak of a dead image being 'revived', contra Louis, 1945,17, who talks about Plato's ability to 
recapture the forgotten metaphorical sense of a word. Cf. Soskice, 1974, WE on ideas about dead 
metaphor 'shaping thought', which have become highly influential in recent discussions of cognition. 
as Criteria should be assessed in terms of the quality, quantity, and period of usage (categories taken 
from Silk, 1974,34). For chronological parameters of the survey see 3.1.2, above. 
$9 E. g. Hom. I1.2.792; Od. 4.524; h. Hom. 2.62. 
90 E. g. S. Ant. 41; Ar. Eq. 264; Hdt 1.32; Th. 1.1.3; Isoc. 18.38. 
91 Silk, 1974,43. 
92 See Silk, 1974,41-8 and Appendix M. The over-riding criterion for normal usage, as Silk makes 
clear, is an adequate spread of evidence, preferably across 'reliable' authors. 
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3.5 Lexis 
My category of lexis subsumes various types of lexeme and idiom. Lexical 
phenomena are in many ways the easiest to analyse, given that we are dealing with 
discrete data which can be quantified and whose distributions can be established with 
the help of lexica and data bases. Nevertheless, compared to other stylistic 
categories, there are considerable difficulties in devising categories of analysis which 
will select significant phenomena from large quantities of potentially relevant data., 
The categories which I will use build on the systems employed in other works on this 
topic, but also reflect my own sense of which lexemes, idioms, or word-types are of 
particular stylistic interest 93 
3.5.1 Approaches to lexis, ancient and modern. 
Treatment of lexis in ancient literary theory is of little use for my purposes. Though 
extant examples give valuable insight into ancient intuitions about word- 
classification and contain isolated points of interest like the loan words of Aristotle 
Poetics 22, ancient theory offers no systematic analysis of stylistic tendencies and 
also merges confusingly with discussion of linguistics and with quite different 
stylistic features such as imagery. Thus, the discussion of diction in Aristotle's 
Poetics, which Halliwell reasonably calls `more linguistic than stylistic', 94 begins by 
classifying parts of speech and discussing phonology and types of statement 95 This 
is followed by definition of word-types, with reference to such miscellaneous 
considerations as register, morphology and imagery. 96 Finally, there is a series of 
prescriptive stylistic points about what constitutes suitable diction, with respect to 
those aspects of diction dealt with in the previous chapter. 97 Similar topics are 
considered by Quintilian under the heading of proprietas verborum, 98 which covers 
diction, insofar as it involves aspects of register and avoidance of obsolete and 
93 On the value of intuition, cf. Lyons, 1963,95. 
94 Halliwell, 1995b, 5. 
95 Po 1456b20ff. 
% Po., 1457a31 ff. 
97 Po. 1458a18. Cf. Rh. 1405a3ff. 
98 Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 8.1ff. 
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therefore incomprehensible archaisms. Yet it is also the heading under which 
Quintilian recommends the avoidance of other stylistic features as diverse as 
excessive hyperbaton, brevity, and over-extended periods 99 
There is by contrast an enormous range of relevant modern studies, varying greatly 
in both scope and aims. For example: Amman, 1953, traces the usage and 
background of -LK6g adjectives in Plato; Long, 1968, considers the distribution and 
function of various types of abstract nouns in Sophocles; Lyons, 1963, is an attempt 
to understand the meaning of various members of a certain lexical field, in terms of 
the linguistic relationships between them; studies such as those by Peppler, 1910, or 
Handley, 1953, aim to show that certain morphological forms are characteristic of 
particular genres of writing. Such works are enormously useful, both as collections 
and analyses of data, as well as indicating profitable criteria for lexical investigation. 
3.5.2 Categories ofAnalysis 
I will group lexical phenomena within two main categories, according to whether 
lexemes and idioms are analysed individually or as members of given groups. 
Distinctive individual lexemes and idioms 
This category consists of lexemes or idioms, whose occurrences in extant literature 
are either rare or limited to specific authors or genres. It is necessary to consider 
individual lexemes in terms of their generic background and distribution, since their 
distinctiveness can only be established-with respect to their usage elsewhere. Thus, 
they will be classified according to their distribution within Greek literature, 
although more detailed consideration of generic affiliations follows in Chapter S. 
Lexemes are grouped according to their attestation in: 
a) particular genre(s) 
" 8.1: 14; 19; and 17 respectively. 
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b) groups of specific authors 
c) prose authors exclusively or predominantly'00 
d) verse 
e) a particular period 
Unless otherwise stated, cognates and derivatives will not be taken into 
consideration. 101 As well as classifying lexemes according to the genres in which 
they appear, in instances where they are rare or restricted to a very limited group of 
texts, usage may be further categorised in terms of. specific authors; numbers of 
instances in particular authors; specific works. 
At various points I will outline the distribution of a particular lexeme (or idiom), 
listing the authors/genres in which it is found. When a lexeme is extremely rare I 
will list all intances, also stating the number of times it occurs in each author/genre. 
For more widespread lexemes, I will list authors/genres and cite a representative 
selection of instances. Finally, there are also several works which cannot be 
attributed to a particular author with absolute certainty and might come later than the 
period of literature I am considering. In many cases such texts only constitute a 
small sample of the works of an author in which a lexeme is found and have no real 
bearing on its spread, so that I will not comment on these specifically. However, 
when 'they contain one of only few instances of a particular lexeme I will indicate the 
problematic status of the text by starring and enclosing the reference within square 
brackets (e. g. [Arist. Col. *]). 
Lexical groups and variety 
This category incorporates different aspects of lexical variety and the distribution of 
lexemes from various formal, semantic and grammatical groups. 
10° Examples in comedy or possibly even in tragedy (especially e. g. Euripidean dialogue), when 
outweighed by a broad prose usage, are not taken necessarily to affect a lexeme's 'prose' status. 101 Cf. Silk, 1974,30. 
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`Lexeme-token ratio' 
The `lexeme-token ratio' calculation is introduced by Dover in order to measure 
variety in vocabulary. 102 It gives the number of different lexemes used in a passage 
as compared to the total number of tokens (lexemes), and is calculated by dividing 
the former by the latter. 
Variation and integration of `lexical fields 
`Field-theory' is an area of linguistics developed by German scholars in the 1920s 
and '30s and based on the idea that the totality of a language's vocabulary may be 
seen as a number of interrelated `lexical fields'. 103 These are semantic groups, 
comprising individual lexemes which are defined and demarcated through their 
relationship to other members of the `field'. In linguistics this theory is generally 
applied to testing diachronic, geographical, and cultural variations in language use 
and'has been challenged on a number of grounds. '°4 Nevertheless, the idea of 
`lexical fields' is useful in a stylistic context, insofar as it gives us a framework for 
considering the extent to which an author uses clusters of lexemes from particular 
semantic groups; combines lexemes from different groups; or intersperses his use of 
certain lexical fields with alien terms. 
So, for example, in Passage I, lines 69c3-dl/16-22 featurea cluster of religious- 
mystery terms, including lexemes such as CI L TT1TOS, KaOatpw, dTEXEQTOT, and 
TEXEW. By contrast, throughout much of Passage IV, different lexical fields are 
combined, as with the mixture of mathematical, ethical and educational/artistic 
terminology in 105d13-el/16-21: T6 dpTLOV, T6 S(KaLov, and µouaLK6T 
respectively. 
102 I have followed Dover, 1997,133, in taking into account the following categories of lexemes: 
'nouns (excluding proper nouns), adjectives (excluding pronominal adjectives, ir6%W and Trd , and 
numerals), regular adverbs in -wS, -(BT, 4, and verbs'; and excluding 'any part of the copula 
elvaL... unless it comes immediately after a pause or is negatived', 'the present indicative of OdvaL' 
and 'parenthetic IOrl'. Dover further develops the calculation, by introducing an 'index of 
recurrence', designed to measure repetitiveness. However, for my purposes the simple 'lexeme-token 
ratio' is sufficient, since investigation of repetition is dealt with in 3.3.2, and with respect of lexis, I 
am simply assessing variety of vocabulary. 
103 Lyons, 1977,253ff. and 1963,45ff. 104 E. g. Ullmann, 1962,249; Öhman, 1953; 127; Lyons, 1977,260. 
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Word forms and 'parts of speech' 
This category subsumes the distribution of certain word-forms, `parts of speech', and 
sub-divisions of 'parts of speech'. It involves a wide range of formal, grammatical 
and semantic aspects of style, '°5 such as: 
i) Morphology - Recurrent usage or distinctive individual examples of certain 
prefixes, suffixes and compound lexemes; such as the cluster of lexemes 
beginning with 4LX- (82b10-c8/II. 46-55) or the unusual compound 
auv¬TraKoXovOoüvTOS (81e1/II. 18). 
ii) Distribution and form of abstract nouns - Abstract nouns are `those 
generalizing nouns which denote concepts, qualities, actions etc., in contrast 
with nouns which refer to physical objects'. 106 Of primary concern are those 
nouns in -ctg, -µa, and -µ6s, and nominal formations which comprise Tö + 
neuter adjective or participle; since these are considered to be characteristic 
of particular periods and styles. However, notable tendencies involving other 
noun-endings will also be included. 
c) Quantity - Predominance or absence of particular parts of speech, such as 
the absence of adjectives in Passage VI. 
3.6 Final remarks . 
Stylistic analysis examines the microcontextual features of the text. Within this 
`microcontext' the different features can be loosely separated into three different 
categories of scale, ranging from those which involve whole units and phrases to 
those which involve single words. The widest level is, of course, unit organisation, 
including parallel structures such as antithesis, which affect the organisation of units 
ios Because of their structural role, particles are not considered here, but under 'Unit Organisation' 
(above). 
106 Long, 1968,12-13. Although, as Long points out, such a definition does have certain limitations. 
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as a whole. Moving down the scale, there are those features involving small 
collocations, such as parallel structures like pairs and lists. Finally, some features 
consist only of individual words or idioms. Thus, unit organisation is restricted to 
the first of these and lexis to the third, while parallel structures appear on both the 
widest and the median level. The scope of imagery can really only be decided for 
each individual feature, since its form and scope are so variable. As part of the 
analysis it will be interesting to examine the interaction of these levels, as well as 
discussing the separate classes, like imagery or unit organisation, by themselves. 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of passages 
4.1 Tables of data 
4.1.1 Incidence of parallel structures' 










I 26 5 5 12 0 3 5 16 
II 16 6 1 6 3 2 4 12 
III 11 3 2 6 0 6 2 4 
IV 5 0 1 5 0 5 3 3 
V 13 11 1 2 0 1 3 3 
VI 10 1 2 2 0 2 3 4 
4.1.2 Lexeme-token ratio 
Passage I H III IV V VI 
Ratio 0.73 0.68 0.52 0.69 0.73 0.79 
11 give a full list of these parallel structures, classified by type, in Appendix I. 
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4.2 Passage I: 69a6-e4 
69a6 J paKäpLE 2L, u (a, µý yap oüX abi-q jý öpOfl npas 
dpET1v dxxayA, i8oväs np65 f 8oväs Kai Xfrras irpös 
X 1Tac Kai 46ß0V 1TpÖc 46ß0v KaTaXdTTEOOaL, gE(C Trpds EX6. TTW dSQTTEp vopia taTa, aXX ij kKELVO 46V0V Tä v6iLaga 
10 bpe6V, dVTI OÜ 8E6 Trth/Ta TaÜTa KaTaXÜTTEUAai, ep6V71aLS' 5 
b Kai TOÜTOU gb TrdVTa Kai gET& TOÜTOU WVOÜ4EVd TE Kai 
TTLlTpaaK6l. LEVa TW ÖVTL A Kai dvSpE(a Kai aW4POO )VT1 Kai 
SLKaL0aiv11 Kai CrUUAß6riv dXrlOc dpET1i, gETÜ 4poV%- 
aEwg, Kai rTpoayLyvopEVwv Kai dTroylyvoI. LEVWV Kai 
5 1lSOVWV Kat 46ßWV Kat TCJV CIXXwV 1T(itiTWV TWV TOLOUTWV' 10 
XWPLC6IEva Sý ýpO1 EWS Kai äXXaTT6pEVa QVT1 äX Xuw 
µrß QKlaypa4ta TLS jh ToiafTll äpEA Kai T() S'TL äv8pa- 
1T0SW8T19 TE Kai OÜSb ÜyLýS o )S üXi1O S n, TO s' dXr Os 
C TW OVTL i KdOapa(c Tic TC)V TOLOÜTWV Tr(iVTWV Kai ii aW4pO- 
aÜVt1 Kai 8LKaL0UÜ" Kai 1 äWSpELa, Kai afTdj A 4p6vnaLg 15 
pI KaOapµ6s TLS A* Kai KLPSVYEVOVUL Kai OL TC TEXETag 
ýgV ODTOL KaTaari aavTES OÜ ýaÜXOL TLVES ETVaL, aXXQ TW 
5 &VTL rrdXaL aLVLTTEaGat ÖTL ÖS äv ägÜllT09 Kai ÜTýXEUTOS ELS 
"At6ou ü4LK11TaL EV ßOpß6pw KEdaETaL, 6& KEKaOapgEvoc 
TE Kal TETEXEQp. EVOS EKEIaE Q4LK6gEVOS gET2L eEWV OLK1 aEL. 20 
EICTIV yap STl, Sc (4aaiv O TrEpI Tag TEXETag, "vapO1 KO- 
d 46pol gb TroX O, ßdKXOL SE TE navpoL'" ob rot 8' EIOYP 
KaTG T71V EglV 86eav OÜK a"Uoi A of TTE4LX0004T1K6TES 
apes. (LV 6i Kai E'YW KaTd 'YE Ta SUVaTOV OÜS&V 
dTTEXLTTOV 
EV T(J ß(4) dX& TraVTI Tp61tt) TrpouOu 0I1V yEVEaOal' EL S 25 
5 6p0W5 TrpoUOU4T1011v KaL TL 1vüaaµev, EKEIQE EXe6VTES TO 
aa4 c Etc76gEea, CW 6E6v EeEX9, bXtyov TEpov, WS Eg0t 
80KE6. TaDT OÜV 24)i l, 
W ELµµta TE Kai KEß-qS, aTro- 
XoyoüµaL, WS EIK6TW9 üµas TE aTroXELTrWV Kai T0 EVedSE 
e 8EQ176TaS ob 4 pu oÜS, ayaVaKTW, 1ry0Üý. Eves. aXElTCOV 30 
Kai iKEL OU'UV 
ý 
TTOV A ived8E SEaTr6TaLS TE äya6o'Ls ivTEÜ- 
KEaOaL Kat ýTalpOLc' EI TL OýV ÜgV 1TLeavo TEp69 E14IL EV Tý 
dTTOXOyLC l TOLS ' AOTlvaLWV SLKaaTa c, EÜ aV EXOL. 
We can divide this passage into three stylistic sections (indicated in bold): W 
jICIKdpLE Elµµ(a... ýL. KaOapp. 6s TL9 ?1 (69a7-c311.1-16); Kai KLV8VVEÜOVaL Kal... 
PdKXOL sE TE Travpol (69c3-dl/1.16-22) and OÜTOL 8' EIQLV... 60 EXOL 
(69d1-e4/I. 22-33). The first two have many similarities, while the third is entirely 
distinct, although there is throughout a slight tendency towards prose lexis as well as 
many parallel structures, insofar as Passage I contains most pairs, `juxtaposed' and 
`close' repetition, pleonasm, and sound effects. 
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4.2.1 The first two sections 
Parallel structures are one of the most marked features in these two initial sections, in 
terms of number and diversity. Repetition mainly occurs here, 2 with unusually high 
quantities of both `juxtaposition' and `successive clause or unit' repetition, 3 like ov8' 
dXT Ohs 9X7,1, T6 6 avjetc or the repeated dpEi in 69a7/I. 2; b3/8; and b7/12. 
18oväs npbs ý8ovds ical Xvnas rrpös XiTras Kal 46ßov rrpbs 4i6pov 
KaTaXX6. TTEaOaL (69a7-8/I. 2-3) is also noteworthy, being a striking sequence of 
three parallel repeated pairs with parallelism intensified by the repeated Kat and 
Trp6s. 
Overall this passage has more pairs than the others, with most pairs and all lists in its 
first two sections. Of these, all but two are reinforced by other parallel structures, 
ranging from the common homoeoteleuton, like chvoü ievd TE Kai. TrLTrpavKöµEva 
(69b1/I. 6), to pairs such as KEKa8apltEV09 TE Kal TETEXEoIIEVOc (69c6/1.19), 
which combine homoeoteleuton, rhythmical identity, and pleonasm. An unusually 
high number of the pairs are also oppositional, such as: µ¬ttw rrpös AdTTW 
(69a8/I. 3); wvovievd TE Kai TrlTrpaaKbµeva (69b1/I. 6); and TrpoayLyvoµiVWV Kal 
drro7LyvoµEVWV (69b4/I. 9). 
Parallelism and opposition also occur on a wider structural level, the first two 
sections being predominantly antithetical, although with certain differences. The 
second section's two antitheses, unlike the first's, have highly symmetrical word 
order and form, and only the slightest syntactic variation: ös aV ä 1TOS... µETä 
OEwv olicýa¬i (69c5-c7/I. 18-20) and vapOJKOýöpoL µßv iroXXo(, ßaKXOI 86 TE 
TravpoL (69c8-dl/I. 21-2). 5 
By contrast the first section's two antitheses, w µaKdpLE ELµµia... 4pövrjaLc (69a6- 
1011.1-5) and Kal Toü-rou µßv trävra... ovS' dXrIO c xi (69b1-811.6-13), are 
2 Apart from irpovOujn Orly (69d4/25; d5/26) and 6pOwc(69d2/I. 24; d5/27). 
3Both these types of repetition are most frequent in Passage I (see Table 4.1.1), all the more significant 
ýiven that these repetitions are almost entirely restricted to two thirds of the passage. 
Cf. also ov&v irYLis ovS' dXr)6ES (69b8. /1.13) and dt nTTOS Kal dr XEaToS (69c5/1.18). 
The second of these is a misquotation of a hexameter (noXXot and vapOrlK46poL have been 
reversed here): see Rowe, 1993 a, 151. 
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unit and, to a certain degree, resembles the ancient period, because of antithetical 
structure6 and the strong syntactic and semantic completeness attained in their final 
words. 7 Though shorter and not antithetical the final unit of the first section is also 
similarly complete: 8 T6 8'&XIJUT... µý KaOapµbs TLS ý (69b8-c3/I. 13-16). 9 
The first part is, as well, markedly paratactic and generally extended. Simple 
apposition links many clauses with, for example, the second unit comprising three 
participial clauses, two in `explanatory apposition' to the subject. 1° Additional and 
adversative particles are prevalent, like Kal, SE, dAXd and µ&/U, while there is a 
general absence of inferential and confirmatory particles. ' 1 This contributes to 
extension, along with the polysyndetic lists, 12 appositional structure, features like 
pleonasm, 13 and, in one case (69a7-8/I. 2-3), the striking repetition discussed above. 
The most outstanding features of the passage as a whole are aspects of word order 
and imagery: 
µfi yäp ovX ab-n1 f f bpO wpbs apEThv (mayt h8oväs Wpbs 
i6oväs Kat X&TTas Trpbs X(rras Kai ý6 ov Trpbs 06pov 
KaTaXMTTEUeaI, gELCW 1Tp6S EXdTTW 6a1TEp voµla taTa, ü)1Ä 1. EKElVO 
6 Arist. Rh. 1409b36ff. and Demetr. Eloc. 32. 
7 E. g. Dover, 1997,38-9, on the ancient period as 'ended'; and Ch. 3 p. 42, above. ° My division of the units in this passage differs from the OCT, which punctuates all three units as 
one continuous sentence. There are, admittedly, certain difficulties in positing a clear divisions 
and T6 S' dXrOES, since the U of the latter provides a strong formal between ovS' äXn6Es IXT 
link. Nevertheless, the µßv/Si antithesis is complete at oW dXrlO s In.; and Tb 6' iii ees, 
although connected, introduces a new point. 
9 This unit could perhaps be seen as an example of Aristotle's 'divided (&1prlµ&vrl)' period 
(Rh. 1409b33). 
10 Geddes, 1863,36, says that XwpLC6gEVa 'appears to be in the nominative, being in explanatory 
apposition to fi ToLavTf dpei-4': cf. 6vo6geva above. Burnet, 1911,42, suggests that wvov teed TE 
Kal irLTTpaoxÖ. Le /a may be an interpolated scholium on Kai geT& Tovrou because (Mw is not 
attested significantly elsewhere in the present passive, and even when appearing in the passive in other 
tenses, it has an active sense. Finally, excision would also mean that 'the simile does not break 
down'. Yet contra Burnet there are examples of 6vEw in the passive with a passive sense (e. g. 
Is. 11.42; D. 19.209) and its use here is in keeping with the structure of the passage, making this part of 
the antithesis parallel with the use of XwpLCb eva. Moreover, the tenor/vehicle discrepancies of this 
image are very significant within its context (see Ch. 6) and should not be seen to imply its 
inauthenticity. 
11 In the first sixteen. lines of this passage (up to µßj Kaeap. t6S TLS i3), Kai is found 21 times, as 
compared to 9 in Passage III, 1-16 (97b8-d7). ydp occurs just once, with an assertive rather than 
causal force, and oüv; äv, El, and 8 not at all, unlike in the more hypotactic and logically connected 
section from Passage III (particles are classified as according to Denniston, 1950, xlvii-xlix). 
'2 E. g. 69cl-2/I. 14-15: Kal h au povvvrl Kal, h 6uKaloa, vr1 Kal h dv8peta. Cf. 69b4-5/1.9-10. 13 E. g. Tb 6' 4XrrRS TC;! 6VTI. 
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t. IÖVOV TÖ vöµlvµa bpOÖV, dVTI Ob &El Tr(iVTa aua KaTaX(LTTEUOaL, 
4 pÖVT1QLS' K&. TOÜTOU gh' 7T(iVTa Kat gETC TOÜTOU WVOÜgEV(i TE KaI 
TrL1TpaQK6p. EVa TW ÖVTL 1? j Kat C v6pELa Kai QWxpOQÜVT) Kai. 6LKaLOQÜVTr 
Kai. CTVXXAß8YIV aXr1&S äpET1i, gETa epov C7EWS, Kal npOayLyVo44vwv 




There are two striking instances of foregrounding through word order, with extended 
clauses broken by the short clauses #övrJoi (69a10/I. 5) and µ¬Tä 4pOV1 ¬C)s 
(69b3/I. 8). 4p6vrjQis comes at the very end of a long unit, highlighted by the 
prominence of its solitary positioning, 14 while LETä OpovtQewc forms a climax, 
surrounded by long clauses, with its effect intensified by similarity and proximity to 
the first Opövrlats clause. 15 Both instances of Opövrlvts are also hint at aural 
imagery, insofar as aural isolation creates an impression of uniqueness and 
significance. This is especially the case with µ¬rä 4povrjaews, a sharp contrast 
from the preceding list and subsequent clause, with its polysyndeton and mundane 
homoeoteleuton. 
This section begins with a simile, part of an antithesis, whose vehicle term 
voµtaµaTa functions as an analogue of the idea of virtue being attained by swapping 
pleasures, pains, or fears. Tö vöµna. ta is retained as the vehicle in the second part of 
the antithesis, although there is a formal change to metaphor, continuing in the next 
unit, where wvovµEVd TE icat TrlTrpacK6µeva acts as a vehicle for the implicit tenor 
of exchanging of pleasures and emotions. The initial statement of subject in both 
parts is further distinguished by the assonantal phrases aDT71 ý fj bpAij (Trpös 
ddpc-rjv dXXayý) and &Eivo µövov Tb v6µuaµa bpeav. Here the aural effect 
draws these two pivotal phrases together, suggesting both their importance16 and also 
14 Silk, 1974,68-9, points out that prominent positioning per se is not emphatic. However, here it is 
not just the fact that op6vrlvis stands at the end of a unit, conventionally a position of prominence, 
but factors such as its isolation and contrast to the other clauses, as well as how it confers semantic 
completeness on the unit, which all ensure that it is emphatic. . te rä opovtaewS in the next unit is 
similar. 
'S Another interesting example of word order, this time in the following section, is the quasi-chiasmus 
at the beginning and ending of... lj KdOapais TLS (69cl-c3/I. 14-16)... Kaeapµ6T Tts j. 
. 16 Pearson, 1975,144ff. has suggested that hiatus was sometimes used in Attic oratory to add weight 
to a particular phrase. One might see aiiTn t bpOrj as an instance of such usage. Although hiatus 
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connectedness. '7 However, such aural similarities also conflict with structure, 
insofar as antithesis opposes rather than likens them. 18 Overall the coin image is 
pervaded by significant discrepancies between the tenor and the vehicle, which I will 
discuss more fully in Chapter 6. 
Moving on to a new metaphor, Socrates expresses the suspicion that virtue, when 
separated from wisdom µßj QKtayp#ia TLS i (69b6/I. 12). While this is the first 
extant, literary appearance of vKLaypa4(a, 19 its established pre-Hellenistic usage 
appears to denote a form of painting. 0 Here it can be construed as live metaphor, 2' 
with implications of illusion and false imitation. 22 It may then also be tempting to 
see the next words as imagery, where virtue without wisdom is described as 
dv6pa1To8 8r1S. Yet, although this adjective is fairly rare, with this apparently its 
first extant use, 23 in the Phaedrus pleasures preceded by pains S&Katos 
d v8patro& ¬ts KEKXT1v'raL, 24 implying that, in an ethical context, Mparro8t8r s is 
dead metaphor, 25 a view confirmed by its extant spread of instances. 6 
The presence of imagery in the second section of this passage (69d1-e4/I. 22-33) is 
controversial and depends on whether the language of purificatory ritual which 
itself is not uncommon in this part of the Phaedo, this example is particularly striking because of the 
successive hiatus and repetition of 'r1. 17 Cf. Silk, 1974,176ff. on the 'expressive' and 'associative' functions of alliteration. 
18 Cf. Ch. 3, p. 53, on the divergence of the phonological and semantic level in aural imagery. 19 amaypa4ia appears only 8 times in pre-Hellenistic literature: 4 in Plato and 4 in Aristotle. Of these 
the Phaedo example is the earliest, according to conventional Platonic chronology. Its other instances 
are P1. Rep. 365c4,602d2; Criti. 107d1; and Arist. (4): Metaph. 1024b23; (Protr. *104.3]; Rh. 1414a9; 
Fr. 10a. 
20 According to e. g. Meautis, 1939,37 and Schuhl, 1933,9-13, the term denotes a new art form, 
dependent on the interplay of light and shadow, introduced by Apollodorus 'the Skiagraphe' at the end 
of the fifth century, although the term is only found in later sources. See also e. g. aKLaypa4(a in 
Arist. Rh. 1414a9. 
21 TLS might possibly indicate neologism and live metaphor. See Silk, 1974,52. 22 Cf. Louis, 1945,72-3. 
23 In our period there are only 26 extant examples of the adjective dv8parro& 8ns. Dating is, once 
again, dependent on Platonic chronology and whether the Phaedo is seen as definitely prior to e. g. 
Xenophon's Memorabilia. 
24 Phdr. 258e5. 
25 Although it may retain some degree of its original literal implications, in view of the Phaedo's 
recurrent depiction of the soul as bound to and imprisoned by the body. 
26 Along with Plato, the earliest examples are in Xenophon. 3 of Xenophon's 5 usages are in the 
Memorabilia (1.1.16 and 4.2.22) describing ignorance, suggesting that this was a commonplace of 
Socratic ethical discussion. If so, lack of extant Socratic literature might explain why so few instances 
of this adjective are found in fifth and early fourth century works. Xenophon's other examples are 
both philosophical, Hier. 5.2.3 and 5.2.7. Apart from Aeschin. 2.79, it only appears in ethical 
philosophy: Arist. (14): e. g. E. N. 1128.21; Po. 1334a39. 
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The presence of imagery in the second section of this passage (69d1-e4/1.22-33) is 
controversial and depends on whether the language of purificatory ritual which 
dominates it is taken as a metaphor for the processes of philosophical enlightenment, 
or as an accurate representation of what these processes involve. Does the 
acquisition of virtue through wisdom appeal to an existing concept of `purification' 
or appropriate religious language, in order to express a radically new conception? 
Yet the question is difficult to answer for various reasons. In a section which 
appears to consist largely of proverbs, 27 it would be plausible to claim that these 
proverbs themselves must be understood in a metaphorical sense, within which 28 
KdOapaLs and its cognates, which already cover a wide range of related 
conceptions, could be accommodated. 29 
It is also in this section that the passage's two other distinctive lexemes are found: 
vapOrJKO46pos (69c8/I. 21) and d 1I JT OS (69c5/I. 18). 3° Apart from this, there is 
little to remark on in terms of lexis. Use of abstract nouns is mainly limited to -71, - 
os, and -a t11 endings, with 4p6vrQts, KdOapaLs, and KaOapµtS the only -vis and - 
µ6S nouns. The distinction drawn between KdOapaLs and Kaeapµ6S appears to 
appeal to a semantic differentiation between these two endings: Tb 6 (WIR S' T@ 
ÖVTL KdOapaLS TLS TWV TOLOÜTWV TrdVTWV Kai 1 QW4poa yr Kai 1i 
SLKaLOUl VTJ Kai i dv6p¬(a, Kai airr ýt #6VT TLS [th KaeapýL65 TLS 
j"(69b8ff/I. 13ff. ). Apart from T6 aa4Es, 31 the few instances of the substantival 
neuter article and adjective or participle are either used adverbially, like Tb 8' 
27 8s dV dg1T1TOS 
... 11ET& 
0e v otIC1 EL (69c3-5/I. 18-20) and vapOrlKO$öpoL giV TroXXo(, 
IdKXOL sk TE 7raÜpOL (69c6-7/I. 21-22). 
28 Any ideas as to the context or usual application of these proverbs are pure speculation, since their 
source cannot be identified from extant literature. It is possible that, in spite of being introduced as 
sayings in the passage, they are in fact Plato's own words, since Plato's attribution of ideas to 
nameless sources is rarely straightforward; contra Loiiis, 1945,6, who excludes proverbs from his 
discussion of Plato's metaphors '... car ils n'ont, evidemment, rien de strictement platonicien'. 
29 The terms and its cognates used within this passage are found in many authors of various genres, 
within a wide range of contexts, including purification from spiritual impurities (e. g. Hdt. 1.35; 
And. 1.95; Lys. 12.5), religious rites (e. g. Hdt. 2.37), and medical cleansing (Hp. VM 14; Int. 18). The 
earliest uses suggest e. g. a religious context (so Hes. Op. 337); or simply 'empty' (e. g. Hom. 11.23.61); 
while the fact that Empedocles named his poem about the cycle of reincarnation and the possibility of 
escaping the cycle KaOap. Lo1 places it close to the concerns of the Phaedo. Cf. Halliwell, 1986, 
185ff. on the varied usage of the 'katharsis word-group' and, 187, on the difficulties of deciding 
whether its use in e. g. the Phaedo is metaphorical. 
30 Their distributions are as follows: vapel Ko46poc - X. (2): Cyr. 2.3.18; Cyr. 2.3.20. Pl. (1); and 
dj. i*nTOs - And. (2): 1.11; 1.12. Lys. (1): 6.51. Pl. (4): Tht. 155e3; Gorg. 493a7,493b5. Arist. (1): 
Rh. 1405a20. 
31 Occurring in prose and verse from the fifth century onwards, though with one example in 
Xenophan. B34. 
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These expressions reflect the general predominance of prose terminology throughout 
the passage. To gvrL, for example, only occurs in prose, not before the fifth century. 
It is most common in Plato and Aristotle, although also found several times in, for 
example, Thucydides, Xenophon, Gorgias, and Demosthenes, suggesting a broad 
intergeneric prose usage. 32 KaTa ... T6 
SvvaTöv , though less common, has a 
similar spread, appearing in Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes. 3 Finally, this 
sense of Tö dXr1O s is more difficult to analyse, since the words are common and it is 
not always clear whether specific examples represent adverbial usage. As far as I 
can tell, adverbial usage is fairly rare, with the clearest two examples coming from 
oratory, with T6 &Xr1Ms opposed to Trp64ac u' 34 
Various clusters of terms from distinct lexical fields are used here. Most of the first 
main section (69a6-b811.1-13) combines lexemes of ethics and emotion like 
6LKMoQÜV1I, dp¬ n, ý8ovrj, and Xvml with those concerning financial exchange, like 
d Xay , vbµLßµa, and WvEOµat. Only the ethical terms persist 
in the next part of the 
passage (69b8/I. 13ff. ), now mixed with religious initiation terminology, which 
continues throughout the middle section (69c3-dl/I. 16-22). 
4.2.2 The final section 
There is comparatively little to say about the final section's style, otrroL S' ETQiv... 
eZ äv 9XoL (69d1-e411.22-33). Most notably, it completes the transition from 
parataxis to hypotaxis which began in the middle section. Units and clauses are 
shorter, more varied and more interconnected, semantically and syntactically, so that 
discrete units become harder to delimit. Clause structure is dominated by hypotaxis 
and especially conditionals. This forges stronger logical links, augmented by the 
renewed use of a wider range of conjunctions and particles, including ovv and 8j. 
The lengthening devices used earlier are absent here, although this section is 
32 E. g. Th. 4.28.2; 4.126.4; X. HG 6.2.25; Mem. 4.2.8; Gorg. B3; D. 58.31. 
33 E. g. T1.2.89.9; D. 3.6; P1. Smp. 207d1. 
34 T1.6.33.2 (speech of Hermocrates); Lys. 13.12 
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punctuated and extended by short parenthetical phrases: e. g. KaTä rnv iµ1v 66ýav 
(69d2/I. 23); &v 6e6s man (69d6/I. 27); and ws ýµoi 6oK6t (69d611.27). 
There are no instances of imagery, no lists, and no unusual lexemes. Although there 
are seven pairs, making distribution of pairs fairly even throughout the passage, the 
final section's pairs differ greatly from earlier ones and are not combined with other 
parallel structures, the only exceptions being three instances of pleonasm, for 
example ov XaXerrWs ýEpw oi8' ddyavaKTw (69e111.30) 35 Furthermore, pairs in 
this section are also characteristically asymmetrical. 
On the whole, therefore, Passage I's most distinctive stylistic aspects are 
concentrated in the extended `coin' imagery of its opening section and in the parallel 
structures which pervade all levels of stylistic structure in the earlier part. By 
contrast, the final part constitutes a rather understated conclusion. 
35 Cf., also 69d5/I. 25 and 69d3/I. 24. 
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4.3 Passage II: 81c4-82c8 
81c4 ' AXId 8LEIXTIµL44n 'YE otµal {J1TÖ TOD QWgaTOELSODS, 5 
5 of r- A bgLX a TE Kat QUVOUQta TOD QWgaTOS 8Lä TÖ äE1 
QUVEIVaL Kai Sid 1-ýV 1TOXX V . LEX TT V 
iVE1TO(TlUE a 14UTOV; 
TIdiU -YE. 
' EgßpleeS 84 'YE, W 4tXE, TOÜT0 oteaOai Xpý EZvat KaI 5 
ßapv Kai yELJ8E9 Kai 5paT6v' Ö 8f Kai ixouaa A TOLaÜTT 
10 (VA ßap 1VETat TE Kai ZX}CETaL TTdXLV EIS T6V bpaTÖV T61TOV 
e6ßW TOD dl60ÜS TE Kai "ALsOU, WQ1TEp MEyETaL, TTEpt Ta 
d gVAýaTEt TE Kai. TOWS T#OUS KUXLV80V44v11, TTEpt a sn KaI 
W(PGI dTTa (UXWV QKLOEL8f (PaVTdcrp. aTa, Ota 1Tap4XolTaL 10 
al TOLCL Tal (UXal El&WXa, at gý KaOapwc thhroXuOe aai 
äXXd TOD öpaTOÜ p. eTi)(ouaaL, 8L6 )cal öpcZvTal. 
$ EIKÖS 'YE, (5 Z(hKpaTEV. 
ELKÖS gEVTOL, G) K4ßlIS' Kai OL TL 'YE TALS 763V dya6wv 
afTdc EtVaL, äXXCt TdS TLJV (PaÜÄWV, &. 1TEpt Tä ToLaiTa 15 
dVayKdCOvTal lTXaväaOal StKTIV TtVOuaaL T119 TrpoTEpac 
Tp0(PfS KaKfiS ota TS. Kai. 4EXpL 'YE TOÜTOU TTXav63vTaL, 9W5' 
e äv T1 TOD QUVETTaKoXOUOOÜVTOS, TOD awgaTOELSOÜS, ETrL- 
eUilt¢ 1TaXLV EV$EOWQIV ELS Qwµa' 4V8ODVTaL &E, GSQTTEp 
EI K69, EIS TOIatTa 7ý &TT01. ' dTT (IV Kai. ýLEI1EXETTTKUlal 20 
TÜXWQLV iv TCJ ßLW. 
$ Ta. 1TOla 8 TQÜTa XEyELS, CJ 2: t1KpaTES; 
OtOV TOÜS gV yaaTpL iapytac TE Kai DßpELS Kal 4)LXO- 
1TO9ta9 gE4EXETgK6TaS Kai g1 8L11UXaßnµeVOUS EIS TCl TWV 
82a to VWV y4V11 Kat TWV TOLOV'TWV OllpLWV EtKÖS Ev&'eaOai. fl OÜK O 25 
OIEL; 
I dvu µßv OÜV EIKÖS XE'YELs. 
TOÜS sE yE d6LKtaS TE Kai TUpavvt6as Kal dpirayäs TipO- 
$ TETlgl9KÖTac EIS Ta. TWV X KWV TE Kat tEpdKWV Kai T. KTLVWV 
yEVij' A 1TOl av dXOQE (Paii. ev Tdg TOLaÜTac ZEvat; 30 
' AgiXEI, g4i 6 KEßiic, Etc Ta TOLaDTa. 
OvKOVV, Aj S' öS, öfXa Sr Kai. T&XXa. l äv iKaoTa toi KaTd 
TGS a1T6V bRLÖTqTac TýS gEAET1mS; 
10 Af Xov 611, E4ýq' TttJS 8'0u"; 
OÜKOÜV EÜSaLI. LOVEQTaTOL, i4>T, Kai TOÜTWV Etat Kat Etc 35 
1EXTLUTOV T61TOV 16VTES ol. T1jV 811gOTLAV Kai TTOXLTLKýV 
b äpETrV ETTLTET1j6EUK6TES, fv& KaX0DaL UW4pOQÜVIjv TE 
Kal 8LKaLOa VTV, Ee EeOUS TE KaI i. teX c yEyOVULaV CWEU 
eLXoaO(P(ac TE Kai VOD; 
Ti 6f ODTOL El8aL40V9QTaTOL; 40 
$ "OTL TOÜTOUS EtKÖS EQTLV Etc TOLODTOV TrdXLV d(PLKVE aOaL 
TTOXLTLKÖV Kal fi iepov yEVOS, A' TrOU gEXLTT63V 1 Q(PTIKWV A 
4vp41jKWV, A Kai Etc Ta11T6V -YE 1TdXLV TÖ äVOpWirlvov yiVOS. 
Kai ytyvEQAai Ee ai)TWV dv6pac gETpLOUS. 
EtK6S. 45 
10 Etc & 'YE eEWV yiVOS {. 11ý (PLXOQO(PIiaaVTL Kat 7TaVTEXWS 
e KaeapW 
thrlL VTL Ob O LLS (PLKVELUeaL dXX A TW (PLXop. aOEt. 
' üxxa TOU TWV ZVEKa, W ETatpE Elµµta TE KalKEßiiS, of 
apO63c (PLÄÖQO(POL alTEXOVTaL TWV KaTa TÖ Qwµa ETTLOUI1LWV 
drraa6v Kat KapTEpOÜQL Kai ob Trapa&Lödaaly CLbTatc 50 
$ EauTOÜS, OÜ TL OtKO(PeOptaV TE Kai TTEvtaV eoßoÜgevoL, 
WQTTEp Ot 7TOXXOZ KaI (PLXOXp1gaTOL' of 6 ab dTLI. 1taV TE Kai 
Q8oiiaV µoXArlptac 8E6L6TES, WQ'TEP Ot (PtXapXot TE Kai 
(PLXÖTL4OL, ilTELTa. älT4XOVTRL CLbT63V. 
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This passage comprises long units spoken by Socrates, punctuated either by 
occasional questions eliciting brief replies from Cebes or by Cebes' short 
unprompted remarks. Cebes contributes only short affirmations or requests for 
clarification. The bulk of the passage has some degree of stylistic homogeneity, 
consisting of long continuous sequences of clauses, and featuring some interesting 
hyperbata. This continuity is broken by a middle section whose style differs 
considerably from the surrounding parts: ofov Tons p. v yaaTplµapylas... äv8pac 
µcTptovs (81e6-82b8/II. 23-44). Its units exhibit striking parellelism and are, 
stucturally, both shorter and simpler than those in the main section. 
Some notable aspects of the passage, like certain lexical features, are common to 
both sections. For example, as a whole this passage contains the greatest number of 
distinctive lexemes. Their usage ranges between those whose extant instances are 
exclusive to Plato, such as oLKOý6opia and several lexemes only appearing in prose 
or comedy. Many of the distinctive lexemes are compound nouns and adjectives. 
Lexemes appearing in Plato alone 
otKo4OopLa - P1. (1): Phd. 82c5. 
wvETraKoXovOEc) - Pl. (1): Phd. 81e1. 
4(XapXos - Pl. (2): Phd. 82c7; Rep. 549a3 
36 
Other rare lexemes 
QKLoEL8TIs - Ar. (1): Av. 686; 
37 P1. (1): Phd. 81d1; [Arist. (1): Col. *795a33] 38 
OLXotroata - X.: Mem. 1.2.22, Mem. 2.6.1; P1. (1); [Arist. (1): Pr. *872a6]; 
Theopomp. Hist. (1): Fr. 81. 
36 In both examples 4 ixapXos is paired with the adjective OLMTLµos. 
37 Interestingly, there are certain similarities between the context of the Aristophanic and Platonic 
example. 
38 See Chapter 3 p. 59, above. 
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yaa-rpgiapyta - P1. (3): Phd. 81e6; Phdr. 238b1, Ti. 73a6, Hp. (1): Int. 6; Arist. 
(1): E. E. 123 1 a. 19. 
o )IaToEL61 - P1. (9): e. g. Phd. 81el; Phd. 86a2, Rep. 532c7, Ti. 36d9; [Arist. 
(1): Pr. *936b35]; Ephor. (1): fr. 31; and Anaximen. Rh. (2): Rh. 31.3, 
36.16. 
Prose lexemes and idiom 
ye68-ng - History and philosophy: X. (1): An. 6.5.4/ Pl. (8): e. g. Phd. 81c9; 
Ti. 66b1; Hp. (1) VM24/ Arist.: e. g. PA 651a1, GA 735b36/ Theophr.: 
e. g. HP 5.9.1, CP 1.14.1/ Timaeus (1) Fr. 164. 
4 LXOXprjµaTOS - Oratory and philosophy: Is. (1): 2.21/ P1.: e. g. Phd. 82c6; 
Rep. 485e3, Leg. 832d2/ X. (1) Smp. 4.45/ Andoc. (1): Alc. 32.1 Arist.: 
e. g. Rh. 1389. a14; Pol. 1315a18. 
OLAoµaOr - Oratory, history and philosophy: Isoc. (1): 1.18/ X. (4): e. g. 
Cyr. 1.2.1, An. 1.9.6/ Pl.: e. g. Phd. 82c1, Rep. 376c2,581b9/ Arist. (1): 
EN 1175a14. 
6t¬vXaf EOµai - Oratory and philosophy: D.: (1) 19.119/ Pl. (11): e. g. 
Phd. 81e7.24; Phlb. 23c1; Rep. 536a9/ Arist. (1): HA 581b14. 
&vOptrrivos - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: 
e. g. Hdt. 1.86/ Th. 1.22.4/ And. 1.139/ Hp. VM 7/ P1. Phd. 82b7, Ap. 31b1/ 
Isoc. 10.59,4.60/ Ar. V 1179. 
8T tOTLK6T - History, oratory, philosophy and comedy, starting from the fifth 
century: e. g. Th. 6.29.1/ And. 2.26/ Lys. 20.13/ Isoc. 7.16/ P1. Phd. 
82a12/ Arist. Pol. 1266b22/ Ar. Nu. 205. 
TIOXLTLK6 - All prose genres, starting from the fifth century: e. g. Hdt. 7.103/ 
Th. 6.15.2/ Isoc. 4.113/ P1. Phd. 82a12, Ap. 22a8/ Arist. EE 1215a36. 
µoXOTpia - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e. g. 
X. Ap. 31.1; D. 19.186; P1. Phd. 82c7, Leg. 655c7; Ar. Lys. 1160; Ra. 421. 
ä8oýia - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e. g. 
Isoc. 1.43/ D. 1.12/ X. HG 7.5.9/ [Hp. Lex*1]/ P1.82c7/ Arist. EN 
1115a10. There is also one instance in Euripides: Fr. 362.16 (Nauck). 
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watrEp EIK6 - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: 
e. g. Is. 8.16/ X. HG 5.4.29/ P1. Phd. 81e2, Men. 70b7/ Ar. Th. 974, P1.662. 
There is also one instance in Euripides: Med. 1386. 
Clearly, there is a marked tendency towards prose lexemes, while the prevalence of 
compound nouns and adjectives, both unusual and otherwise, also stands out and is 
not matched in the other passages. 9 These compounds have varied prefixes, 
although there are seven 4iX- compounds, with five in the final paragraph, as well as 
the verb 4lXoao4Eiv. While the passage's abstract nouns have a very varied range of 
suffixes, endings in -La are most common, in accordance with the predominance of 
compounds 40 
The passage also incorporates terminology from a wide range of lexical fields, 
slipping from one field to another throughout. So, for example, in il ToLa mi OvA 
ßap(VETal TE Kai XKETaL irdXw E19 TÖV 6paT6V T61TOV 4)6ßW TOD dt8oOs TE 
Kai. "AL8ou (81c9-11/11.6-11) there is a sudden switch from terms associated with the 
physical world like EµppLOEs', ye68ES, and ßapvvETaL to the vocabulary of death 
and the afterlife: µv1 IaTa, 4avTdoµaTa, and Et& Xa. While `ethical' terminology 
appears throughout, especially in the second half of the passage, this is then 
interspersed with other fields, such as animal names and political terms like 
rvpavv(Sas and TroXLTLIaty. A final point is the absence of clear instances of verbal 
imagery. 
4.3.1 The main section 
The three longer parts of the main section; EµßpiOic & ye... S&ö Kat SpaVTaL 
(81c8-d4/II. 5-12), ¬LK6 µýv'rOL... TÜXoyLv & Tw ßLw (81d6-e411I. 14-21), and etS 
U ye 6ewv 'yEvos...? rrei'ra dTrEXot'TaL airrwv (82b10-c8/II. 46-54), form long, 
continuous, and loose sequences, not easily grouped into discrete units. 41 ' EµppiRs 
U ye... 816 Kal bpwLrrat (81c8-d4/II. 5-12) constitutes one long unit, being a loose 
" It contains 11 compound nouns and 6 adjectives. 
40 On -ta as a standard ending for compound nouns, see Chantraine, 1933,79. 41 82b10-cI is an exception and seems to form a self-standing unit, linked more closely, formally and 
semantically to the preceding section than to the unit which follows. 
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hypotactic sequence of mainly relative clauses, 42 without strong logical 
interconnection. Des Places suggests that this type of construction, which 
accumulates a number of clauses or phrases linked by the same device, is a common 
Platonic feature. He names it `ä rallonges' ('extended 9), 43 evoking the manner in 
which structure, as opposed to any particularly long clauses, is responsible for a 
general feeling of extension. EIK6T µEVTOL... TVXWULV & To PLO (81d6-e4/II. 14- 
21) is similar, though comprising a wider mixture of different paratactic and 
hypotactic clauses. While it could be taken as a series of three paratactic units (etKbs 
gthvTOL... KaKijs' otai (81d6-9/II. 14-17); Kd t XPL... ets' a6µa (81d9-e2/II. 17- 
19), and iVSoünTaL SE... Ev r ßiw, (8 1 e2-4/II. 19-2 1), the strong link between these 
makes the division less unambiguous 44 Likewise there are no strong divisions in 
EZ5' SE -YE eEWV 'YEVOS... EITELTa aTr XOVTaL airrwv (82b10-c8/II. 46-54). 
Clear division of units comes only from Cebes' occasional remarks and from an 
element of ring composition, which seems to signify a conclusion in all three parts 
and is exclusive to this passage. SpaTöv (81c9/II. 6) is picked up by -rov bpaTov and 
bpwv-raL (81d4/II. 12) at the end of its unit. Similarly, EIK6s (81d5/II. 13 and d6/14) 
is echoed by EMT (81e3/II. 20), and äTrL6VTL (81c1III. 47) and diTEXovraL 
(82c3/II. 49) by äTrEXOVTaL (c8/II. 54). There is, in general, a relatively large amount 
of repetition, found almost entirely in the main section45 and made up predominantly 
of `successive clause or unit' repetition, such as bpaTöv (81c9/II. 6 and c10/7). 
Along with repetition, there are also many pairs, most of them in the main section. 
Over half are reinforced by full or partial homoeoteleuton, 46 while two are also 
combined with repetition of a prefix: äTL Ltav TE Kai d8oý(av (82c6/I. 52) and 
4(XapXo( TE Kal 4 LX6TLµ0L (82c7/53). 47 The sole instance here of sound effects 
used as parallel structures (excluding homoeoteleuton) is an interesting etymology: 
Tov äiSotS TE Kal"ALSov (81c11/I. 8). 
42 There are also two participial 'clauses' (81c11-dl/II. 8-9 and d3-4/II. 11-12), although these fulfil a 
relative function. 
" Des Places, 1951,365. 
44 For example, there seems to be no reason why the passage should have been punctuated with a full- 
stop in d9, but only a semi-colon in e2, as in the OCT. 
`s With the exception of the 'key words' EtK6T in 82a1/II. 25 and b5/41 and tEIEXE1-nK6TaS in 
81 e7/II. 24. 
46 E. g. f bp. tXta TE Kal auvovata (81c5/1.2) and oiKOýAopiav TE Kal Trevlav (82c5/I. 51). 
47 See Denniston, 1952,129-31. 
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Finally, one of the most distinctive features is a pervasive use of hyperbaton. So 
6, T-fl is separated from vti. rrov (81c5-6/II. 2-3); iµßpi6ES from syntactic 
equivalents rapt Kal yew6E9 Kai bpaTöv (81c8-9/II. 5-6); 48 krriOvµ(¢ from its 
article in Tl TOD QUVETraKoXoue0ÜVTO9, TOO a4LaTOELSOÜS, kTROVv L(qL 
(81e1/II. 18). 
4.3.2 The middle section 
The units of the middle section, cloy roes tV yaQTpLµapy1aS... dv8pas 1ETpLovs 
(81e6-82b8/II. 23-44), are stylistically distinct from the surrounding passage, insofar 
as they are shorter, have fairly simple clause organisation, and are parallel to each 
other in structure. Toi, U "YE d5LKtas... Kat IKTLVwv 7EVTI (82a4-6/II. 28-30) 
replicates the structure of otov Tovs µiv yaCTpLµapy(as... EMG EV8ÜEQ6aL 
(81e6-82a1/II. 23-6), 49 and the organisation of the final passage in the middle section 
is once again similar: ÖTL TOÜTOUS E'LK6! EQTLV... ävSpac tETp1OVS (82b5- 
82b8/II. 41-44) so 
The parallelism of this section is instensified by four lists which, unlike the two lists 
in the main section, 51 all exhibit full or partial homoeoteleuton: d8LKlas TE Kal 
TUpavvC8as Kai apiraydc (82a4/II. 28); EIS Ta TWV Xi KWV TE Kai . EpdKWV Ka' 
bcr i. 'WV 'EVTI (82a5-6/II. 29-30); f TrOU gEXLTTCJV - a4T1KLJV Tj µUPRI KWV 
.1 
11 
(82b6/II. 42); and yaUTpLgapylag TE Kat iißpELS Kat 4LXonoa(as (81e6111.23). 52 
This repeated use of lists, together with polysyndeton, generates an impression of 
extension. 
48 Furthermore, k LppLe g is also foregrounded by occupying a prominent position at the beginning of 
its unit. 
'9 Exceptions are the omission of eiKbc &8I EaeaL and the replacement of the collective Twv 
TOLO&rwv @rlpiWv (82a1/II. 25) with three kinds of animals (82a5/II. 29). 
so ovKOÜV, fi S' ös... Kat voü (82a11-82b3/II. 35-39) is an exception and resembles parts of the main 
section. 
51 Kai. Papi Kal 'ye41SES cat bpaTÖv (81c8/II. 5) and dTTIXOVTaL TwV KaTB Tb aaga iTTLeVV1WV 
6Ltraawv Kal KapTEPOOaL Kai oü lrapaSL86avw airTats iatToCI (82c3/II. 50) have little aural 
P2arallelism and, in the latter case, no ostensible formal parallelism. 
The first (because of differing syllable lengths and pitch accents) and last of these examples have 
only partial homoeoteleuton. 
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To sum up, in both the main and middle sections, the passage's most striking aspects 
are structural, involving elements of unit organisation as well as parallel structures. 
Although there is a clear stylistic divide between the two sections, the passage is 
united by a tendency towards unusual prose lexemes, the variety of intermingled 
lexical fields, and devices which contribute towards evoking extension. Thus both 
Passages I and II, in spite of their differences, contain separate stylistic sections and 
are mainly characterised by repetition and other distinctive structural aspects. 
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4.4 Passage III: 97b8-98b6 
97b8 'AV äKo aa$' [lb 1TOTE EK ßLß>LOU TLVÖS, wS 901I, ' Ava-- 
c ayöpou dVayLyvc)QKOVTOS, Kal XEyOVTOs 69 dpa. VOÜS 
EQTLV b 8LaKOa 1(. JV TE Kai 1T6. VTWV aLTLOS, TaÜTa &r TTY a1. TL 
7iaOV TE KaI ? 6OýE p. 01 Tp6TTOV TLVd ED 9XELV T6 TÖV VO DV 
EýVaL TrdvTWV aLTLOV, Kai ýnadp. T V, EL. TOVOI OIJTWS 9XEL, 5 
5 TÖV ye VOÜV KOautO VTa TTdVTa K00.1. ElV Kai 9KaaTOV TLOEVaI 
Tar ro 'T äv (EÄTLQTa 9X7 ' EL OtV TLT ß0 1X0LT0 T1 v ahTLaV 
EÜpELv TTEpt EKC C TOU ÖTIii ytyVETaL " dM&AUTaL 71 E0TL, 
TOÜTO 5EIV TrEpt aÜTOÜ EÜpEIV, O'TTi f EXTLQTOV aÜTW icTLV f 
' d EtVaL 1"I dXX0 bTLOÜV TTQQ)(ELV fj 1TOLELV' EK sý &l' TOD XOyoU 10 
TOÜTOU OÜ&V äX0 QK01TEtV Trpoai iceLV dveptTr Kat 7TEpt 
arToD EKEdVOU Kai TTEpt TWV q. XXWV dXX f TÖ dplaTOV Kal TÖ 
PEXTLQTOV. ävayKaLov & EttaL TÖV ai. rbv TOÜTOV Kai TÖ 
5 XELpOV E1UVav' Tfpv aÜTlnv yap EtVai ETrLQTýýVJV TrEpt abTCOV. 
TaÜTa 6f XoytCöµevos äapEVos 1 bp1]KEVat wnv Ma- 15 
QKaXOV Tf s al. Tlas TTEpt TWV OVTWV KaT& VOÜV EµaUT4, TÖV 
' Avaýayöpav, KaL VIOL #daELV TTpWTOV 416 7T6TEpOV f yf 
e TrXaTEIO. EQTLV Ti QTpoyyvXT1, ETTELSTl & 4pdaELEV, iTTEK5LTi- 
yiaeaOaI TTv atT[aV Kai TýV äväyqV,, XEyOVTa TÖ dfIELVOV 
Kat ÖTL aV'TT V äp. eLVOV fV TOLarimv ELVai' Kal Et iv 094) 20 
4atTi EtVai a rn v, ETr¬K8LTyy1QEUeaI. WS d . ELVOV 
ýv a rrf v EV 
98 ý1 aq) ElVav' Ka. EL ýLOL TüÜTa dTro4)atvol, TTapEQKEVdaýL1jV 
WS OÜKETL iroOeagtEvog aLTias dAX0 E1809. Kai, 8f1 Kai TTEpt 
ýÄ(ov OU'TW ' TrapEaKEVaCT. l1jV WQafTWS TrEv(76.. EvoS, KaI 
aeXi v7jS Kai. T(JV CAXWV daTpWV, TCdXOUS TE TTEpi irpOS 25 
$ dXXijXa Kai. Tp01TWV Kai TWV dXXWV TTcxe-%L ITWV, 'din ? TOTE 
TaDT d . ELVÖv 
EQTLV ZKaQTOV Kai TTOIEIV Kai. lTdaXELVa 
TTdaxEL. OÜ yäp au 1TOTE al'JTÖV c . 
1.1TV, «LQKOVT6. 'YE VTr6 VOÜ 
aura KEKoa. IiaOat, d. XX: nV TLVCC aÜTOI, S aLT(aV E1TEVEyKELV 7l 
f/ It\1t 
OTL f EXTLQTOV aUTa OUf/TWS EXELV EU aTLV\ WQ1TEpl EXEL' EKdaTW 30 
b OÜV aÜTC V dTro8LS6VTa TflV a'LTLQV KaI KOLV1 TTdo I TÖ 
EKdaTCp IEXTLQTOV (ilpiiV Kai. TÖ KOLVÖV TTüQLV iTfEK&71y7'- 
aEaaal äyaOöv' Kai. OÜK äV dTrE5%LTIV TTOXXOÜ TÜS EXTTLSac, 
dX a iravu airou8f Xaß(A)v TdS ßt f XOUS CJS TdXLQTa ol6S T' 
5 dVEyCyVWQKOV, lV WS TdXLUTa EL8ELTlV TÖ 1EXTLQTOV Kai TÖ 35 
XE L pOV. 
This passage forms a stylistic continuum, especially in terms of unit organisation, 
with syntactic continuity conferred by the fact that it is written almost entirely within 
indirect discourse. It appears to fall into three major units, while further division into 
discrete units is difficult because of the strong logical connection and structural 
repetition between clauses. 
The three main units are: d[ äKo aas µtb... bnaT ýµrjv nEpt abTwv (97b8/III. 1- 
97d5/III. 1-4); Ta"vrra S& XoyL(61EVOS... ndaXEwv d ndaXcL (97d6-98a6/III. 15-27); 
Chapter 4 79 
and ov '1äp ACV TTOTE airröv wµrlv... Kai T6 XEipov (98a7-98b6/III. 28-36). In spite 
of overall logical continuity, there are various reasons to posit major breaks. First, 
the unit transitions mark the stages at which the argument develops into significantly 
new points, so that there appear to be semantic pauses. In addition, it is only at the 
beginning of each unit that the verbs which govern the dependent clauses are 
explicitly restated and thereby provide an explicit formal marker for a new unit: 
ýnadd jv (97c4/III. 5); wµýv (97d6/III. 15); and wµiv (98a7/IH. 28). 
Throughout the passage clause structure is semantically, syntactically and formally 
repetitive. There is a repeated pattern of a given condition or cause followed by 
reasoned inference, with two yap clauses being the sole exception to this pattern. 53 
As a whole the passage mainly consists of conditionals, such as Et TOÜA' oiiTW 
EXEL... 3 XTLQTa (97c4-6/III. 5-7), EL. Ot1V TLS.. "'R(iOXELV f TTOLEIV (97c6- 
dl/III. 7-10), Kal EL EV µEQC)... EV j4acp etvaL (97e3-98a1/III. 20-2), and Kai Et 
poL... eMo d8oS (98a1-a2/III. 22-3), 54 or simple reported thought, preceded by a 
short phrase denoting cause: Ta' Sý r a[Ttc fjGhV (97c2-3/III. 3-4); ýK 6 
ST' TOD X6yov... T6 3EATL(YTOV (97d1-d4/III. 10-13); and TatTa &? i 
Xoyl(öµevos... f aTpoyy1A11 (97d6-el/III. 15-18). The way in which reason or 
condition precedes inference throughout the passage leads to a straightforwardly 
deductive and repetitive overall impression, heightened by the frequency of particles 
and inferential and causal conjunctions. 
Along with unit organisation this passage's most striking aspect is the exceptional 
amount of `key-word' repetition, with six clear instances. Moreover, three of the 
repeated lexemes, vots, SLaKoa. Wv, and atTLos, also appear to be closely 
interconnected themselves. In most cases where one appears it is in close proximity 
to at least one of the other two terms. Often rräs, another lexeme of which there is 
`key-word' repetition, occurs in conjunction with these terms as well. These 
phenomenon can be seen in the following example: 
S3 97d5/14 and 98a7/28ff. 
S4 In addition the temporal clause and clause which follows, inctSr} U 4pdaELEV... ToLairrpv Elva,. 
(97e1-3/1II. 18-20), function like conditionals, both syntactically and semantically. 
Chapter 4 80 
110r$ 4UTLV b 8LaKOO72C 1/ TE Kai ird1'r. JV autos, Ta&ri & Tt alr(4z 
7SQeV TE Kai ? 8OýE ß. 10L Tp61TOV TLVa E? ? XELV T6 TÖV POOP CIVCXL 
TrdvrwP atriOV, Kai 1 YnGdRnV, EL TOW 'OÜTWS 9XEL, TÖV 'YE PoDv 
Koquo&ura irdi'ra Koo7lEiP 
(97c1/III. 2- c5/6) 
Apart from a reasonably large number of `successive clause or unit' repetitions, other 
parallel structures are unremarkable and distributed fairly uniformly throughout. The 
number of pairs is average, with few sound effects or instances of pleonasm 55 Of 
the four sound effects, three are homoeoteleuta. Two of these are almost identical 
and could perhaps be seen as examples of `dead' alliteration, 56 since the opposition 
which they present was clearly a platitude by Plato's time: 57 ndOXety ij Troiciv 
(97d1/IH. 10) and Kal rroi¬ty Kal TrdaXEwv & näaXEL (98a6/III. 26). The final 
sound effect is an example of word-play: ' Avatayopov dva yLyvct aKovros 
(97b8/HI. 1). 
Clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short and the word order is likewise 
unremarkable, mainly seeming to reproduce the logical order of the train of thought. 
Imagery is absent and there is little unusual vocabulary, with the only distinctive 
lexeme being the compound verbs EiTEK801'yEogm, used three times here, but 
appearing nowhere else in classical Greek. 
The passage also contains little lexical variation, having a `lexeme: token ratio', 0.52, 
noticeably lower than in the other passages. 58 Most terminology is not specific to 
any particular lexical field, with the exception of a series of cosmological terms. 
There are no compound nouns, adjectives, or adverbs, and comparatively few 
adjectives and adverbs altogether. The number of abstract nouns is also relatively 
small, amongst which the only outstanding point is eight examples of T6 + Xeipov or 
various degrees of dyaOÖS. 
ss There are four in total: e. g. Trd(TXeLv A Troteiv (97d11111.10) and nXaTetd EQTLV f aTp0Y UTA 
c97e1/III. 18). This number is only exceeded by those in Passage I. 
6 See Silk, 1974,174. 
"See Dover, 1996,145. Cf. e. g. Hdt. 1.36; X. Cyr. 7.1.43. 
58 See above, 4.1.2. 
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In general the lack of variation and austerity of lexis corresponds to the general 
character of this passage, as reflected in the repetitiveness of structure and absence of 
imagery and sound effects. Once again, as with the other passages, it is structure, 
from unit organisation down to the prevalence of a particular noun-form, which 
stands out as the most distinctive feature. 
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4.5 Passage IV: 105c8-106a11 
105c8 ' ATrOKpIVOU 611, A S, 8s, W äV TL EyyEVijTQL O I. LaTL CWV 
. QTaL; 
10 TOL äv 4SVXrj, Ein. 
d OÜKOÜV &EI TOÜTO OÜTWS ZXEL; 
Tk iý yap ovxt; A S' Ss. 5 I1U)(1i dpa ÖTL dv aiMI KaTdoX, (IEI lIKEL ETT EKElVO 
«pouaa CW1jv; 
5 "HKEL 4hVTOL, E4r . 116TEpoV S' ZQTL TL C(i EVaVTtOV A OWV; 
"EQTLV, 24ii. 10 
Tt; 
GavaTOS. 
10 OÜKOÜV ipU)(f TÖ iVQVTtov W ai rf i1TL4 pEL äE1 Ob i. 11I 
1TOTE SE&T)TaL, WS EK TCJv TTp6a0EV (LgoX6 ljTal; 
Kai µtXa Q468pa, i4ii 6 KEßrls. 15 Tt Ott/; rä 411 SEXÖgEvoi T1'V TOD dpTIOU 18Eav TL vUVSt 
Wvoµd(oiEv; 
15 ' AvdpTLov, 2471. 
Tä U S&KaLOV gý SEXÖi. IEVOV Kai Ö a"v 40UQLKÖV F11ý 
SEXTAL; 20 
e VA ouaov, i4 ii, TÖ Sý ä6LKOV. 
Et¬v' Ö 8' ÜV OCIVaTOV ý11ý SE)cT TaL TL KaXot Lev; 
' AOdvaTOV, E4Ti. 
OÜKOÜV LJJU)(f Ob SEXETa$ OdvaTov; 
5 Ov. 25 
'AeavaTov dpa 4v A. 
'AOdvaTov. 
EtEV, 2ý1i' Town gev &T ilTo8E8CLXOat eWi. LEV; 1i 'RCJ$' 
SOKEI; 
10 Kal µdXa 'YE IKaVWs, W UKpaTES. 30 
TL obv, A S' Ö$', il KEßT1S; EL T@ ccvapTtw ävayKaiov AV 
106a1 dvWAgepW Etvai, aýO TL Tü Tpta fl ävWAEGpa &v A v; 
ITws yap oU; OüKOÜV Et Kal Tb dOep iov avayKaiov 1jv dvtxEApov 
EtVal, 61T6TE TLS ETT1 XtÖva OEpgäV EiTd'YOL, iMEZ7ýEL CIV i XIWV 35 
5 o as QWS Kai aT1IKTOS; Ob yap CUV a7TWXET6 'JE, oUS au 
Ü1T0g9VOUQa i6EeaTO dv -v eEpg6T1ITa. 
' AXrlOfi, i ii, X4yEls. 
fps 6 atITW o1µaI Kdv EL Ta dgJUKTOV dV( E6pov AV, b1T6TE 41T1 TÖ tiÜp ýUXpÖv TL in EL, o iro aV Cl1TEQß¬VVUTO 40 
10 0115' älT(. i)ÄÄUTo, aUä UWv dV äTrCX6OV (; JXETO. 
' Avdyicr , gý-q. 
This passage consists of short questions and answers, making analysis of 
organisation seemingly difficult, since it cannot be based on the same classifications 
of unit organisation as used for the others S9 Nevertheless, its structural patterns and 
s' Cf. Wake, 1957, on the unsuitability of the statistical method for measuring sentence length in the 
analysis of dialogue. 
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parallelisms are still very interesting. The most striking feature is its conciseness, in 
part achieved through pervasive ellipse, and also reinforced by the absence of lists 
and of large numbers of pairs, which are characteristic of the other passages. While 
these types of parallel structures are missing, there is much parallelism on a wider 
structural level which, together with ellipse, is a key feature of the passage. 
Sequences of units are varied, with some becoming increasingly elliptical: 
JJuxj... 6ävaTos (105d3-9/IV. 6-12)60 and o1KOÜV OuX i... aedvaTOV (105d10- 
105e7/IV. 14-27). Their length decreases as components of the previous units are 
omitted. Finally, all that remains is the solitary noun 6ävaTOs (105d9/IV. 12) or 
adjective dOdvarov (105e7/IV. 27), marking the end of the sequences and 
foregrounded by their isolation and final position. To some degree this is similar to 
the way in which Op6vi i: (69a10/1.5) is positioned alone in a clause and at the 
very end of a unit 61 
This condensation of structure in the first and second units, probably the most 
interesting aspect of organisation in Passage N, is not created by `rhetorical' devices 
such as asyndeton, but by a subtle increase in ellipse, which works in the following 
way. The stages of the second sequence appear parallel and symmetrical, an 
impression strengthened through lexemic repetition and word order. However, first 
of all Tjv TOD äpT(ov 'SEav (105d13/N. 16) is replaced by Tb S&Katov 
(105d16/N. 19), rather than a corresponding r)v TOD SLKatov i. 6Eav, and then, by 
µovoLK6v (105d16/IV. 19), which even omits the article. In addition, E4rj 
accompanies all of Cebes' replies, except the final two, ob (105e5IIV. 25) and 
dOävaTOV (105e7/IV. 27). Similarly, in the first sequence Z4 rl occurs with every 
reply, apart from the final and climactic OdvaTOs (105d9/IV. 12). 
Conversely, the other long sequence of units, Ti otv... dvdyia (105e11-106a11/31- 
42), expands on the initial point made in the question Tt oüv... c vacepa äv ýv 
(105e11-106al/IV. 31-2), so that the two units which then echo this question serve to 
develop the point further. There is much continuity and repetition between this first 
60 Although this sequence could be seen as a continuation of earlier points. 
61 See above, p67. 
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question and the next two main units, o. KOÜV EL... Trv OEpµöriyra (106a3-6/IV. 34- 
7) and OG 6 aOTws... dv titrcXOov WXETO (106a8-10/IV. 39-40), on all levels. 
Notwithstanding different subjects and other minor omissions or syntactic 
differences, the first clause of each of these units, a conditional protasis, is almost 
identical. Structural and lexemic repetition persist throughout the second and, to a 
lesser degree, the final clauses of the two longer units, while parallelism is also 
enhanced by the repeated d-privatives: 
TL otUV, A 8' SS, w KEßils; El Tw dMaprlw dvayKaiov AV 
dP wAeepQ Eival, äXo - TL Tä Tpta A dvWAFOpa &v 
A v; 
IIws yap obi; 
OAKOÜV El Kal Tb äOEpuov dvayKaiov AV ditAFBpov 
EttaL, &TTÖTE TLS iTrt XLÖVa OEpµav ETr yOL, ÜTTEe EL aV 71 XLWV 
otaa ac3s Kai dn7KTOc, OÜ yap äv d1T(XET6 'YE, OUs' at bTrO EVOUaa 
E8EeaTO dv AV Ocp to TTITa. 
' AkgeI, E4TJ, XE'YELS. 
OS 6' aüTWS otii. aL Kd. V Et TO doVKTOV äV45jA Bpov AV, 
ÖTT6TE ETT1 TO TTÜp i UXpÖV TL E1T, EL, OÜTTOT LIV äITEQß&VVUTO 
oW QTrwX, \UTO, dLU QWV dv aTIEXOOV (70XETO. 
(105e11-106a10/IV. 31-41) 
In other parts of the passage there are, with one exception, 62 no sound effects or 
pleonasm. Here by contrast, as well as a-privatives, there are also three pleonastic 
phrases, the second of which comprises a pair sharing a common prefix and 
homoeoteleuton: Q@!; scat 6L7KTos (106a5/IV. 36); oiiTroT dv d 1TEQI&VUTO 
oü6' ärrcMvTo (106a9/IV. 40); and dTreXe6v 6XETO (106a10/IV. 41). 
In addition to these clusters of a-privatives there is an abundance of a-privative 
nouns and adjectives throughout the passage, making this noun-form the most 
distinctive lexical feature. While almost all the terminology appears fairly standard 
and generically widespread, a few of the a-privatives are very rare, some found only 
in Plato: ' 
62 äµovvov, IýTj, T Si dßLKOV (105e1/N. 21). 
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d4JUKTOS - Pl. (1): Phd. 106a8. 
dvdpTLoS - Pl. (4), all in Phd.: 106a1,104. e. 5,105d15,106c3. 
deep. tos - Pl. (1): Phd. 106a3. 
thi XcOpos - Parm. (1): B. 8/ Pl. (15)63 /Arist. (2): Ph. 203b. 14,64 
[Mu. *396a. 31]/ Theophr. (3): HP 3.12., 12.9,15.4. 
Concordant with its tight internal unit parallelism, the passage is highly repetitive 
throughout. There is significant repetition of only a few lexemes, Ovx'j, OdvaTOs, 
UXo. tat, and ävtXEApos, all four of which appear a number of times throughout and 
function as both `successive clause or unit' and `key-word' repetition. For example, 
while there are scattered occurrences of c vX in the earlier part (105c10/IV. 3; d3/6; 
d10/13), it then appears twice in close succession at the climax of a unit: 
OiKO"vv A ov UXETaL OdvaTOV; 
Ov. 
' AOdvaTOV dpa c vXii. 
(105e4/IV. 24-e6/26) 
Similarly, ävtXe6pos, as shown above, appears three times in close proximity in 
106a1-3/IV. 32-4 and is repeated once again in 106a8/IV. 39. 
Another point about unit organisation is that the vast majority of clauses are 
conditional, 65 such as those in the sequence just discussed. However, there are 
occasional breaks from the conditional, notably in the middle sequence, where there 
is a final change to a definite sense in the climax of the sequence: O KOVV OVA Ob 
&XETaL OdvaTOV (105e4/IV. 24). 
63 Of which 12 are in the Phd., with 10 found in 106a1-107al. The others are Ti. 52a2; Leg. 904a8; 
LEpin. *981e7] 
Although Phys. 203b14 attributes this term to Anaximander it is generally acknowledged that only 
Anaximan. Bl is genuine. See e. g. Kahn, 1960,11; KRS, 117. 
63 In fact, other types of subordinate clause are absent from this passage. 
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Finally, there are two other distinctive aspects of lexis: large numbers of varied 
neuter substantives comprising Tö + an adjective or participle, 66 and a mixture of 
distinct lexical fields, as in 105d13-el/IV. 16-21- 
Tt oZv; TÖ ß. 11j 6EX6. IEVOV T1 V TOD dpTLOU I. SEaV Tt VVV8f 
wvopic%LEv; 
' AvdpTLov, E4lj. 
Tb & 8(Kaiov µßj &E t¬VOV Kal 8 &v µoucLKöv µßj 
6EXETaL; 
"AµoUVov, E411, TÖ & (1SLKOV. 
- which combines mathematical, educational/cultural and ethical lexemes. Similarly, 
in 106e9-106a6/IV. 31-37, while the structure of the question is repeated, there is a 
transition from mathematical terms like TCJ aväpTLQ and Tä Tp(a to those 
describing physical properties, such as Tö dOEpµov and 6EpµöT, Ta. 
Repeated structure emerges once again as the key stylistic feature in this passage, 
with the conciseness and lexemic and structural repetition causing the structure itself 
to be foregrounded. 
" This passage contains 7, as opposed to Passages I, II, V and VI, which contain 4,3,1 and 0 
examples respectively. 
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4.6 Passage V: 110b5-111c3 
110b5 AE7ETaL TOLVUV, iýTJ, W ýTalpE, TTpWTOV g, V EtVQL TOIafT11 
1i y'f) aÜTl1 t&EIV, El TLS dVWOEV OEWTO, WQ17Ep at SWSEKdI- 
UKUTOL Q4aipal, TiouctXTI, Xpu aale SLEIXTIµ t vrI, 
WV Kai 
Tä Evome EZVaL XpWµaTa Wv1TEp SELyµaTa, OtS Sý of 
c y a4f s' KaTaXpWVTaL. EKEL Sý irdaav T7 V 7i V kK TOLOÜTWV ý 5 
E Vai, Kat lTO iTL eK XagTrpOTEpWV Kai KaOapWTEpWV 
TOÜTWV' TýV gV yap äXoupn- EZVat Kai OavµaaT? jv Tä 
KhXO$, T1 v& XPUQOELSfl, TT'iV Sý 8011 XEUA 'YÜ J 0U 
5 XLÖVOS XEUKOTEpaV, " Kai 
EK T(. JV CI>XWV XpwµdTwv QUYKEL- 
gthVflV WQa&TWS, Kai ETL 7TXEL6VWV Kai KaXLÖVWV A öaa, 10 
f IE c iwpdKagEv. Kai yäp afTÜ TaiTa Tä KOLXa anTfi$', 
ÜSaTÖS TE Kai aEpoc EKTAea ÖVTa, XpcSLaTös TL EtBOc 
d TrapEXcaOaI UTLRßoITa iv Ti TWV dtAXWV Xpwµ4TWV TTOL- 
KLXCc, WATE 9V TL aÜTCis EIS09 QUVEXýS TTOIKLXOV 4aVTdCEa- 
Oal. EV S& Taf nl OÜO'U TOLaÜTTj äVä XÖyOV Tä 4U6Eva 15 
cÜEaGai, SEVSpa TE Kat "I h Kai TOl1s KapTTO1 ' Kai a TCL 
5 Öplr (JQaÜTWs Kai TOÜS xteouc ixELV dvci TÖV a&TÖv Ä670v 
T7gt TE XELÖTTlTa Kai -rf v SLa4dvelaV Kat Ta XptµaTa KaX- 
XLw' WV Kat Tä EVAQSE XtOLSIa ElvaL Tama rä ayarrchpeva 
µbpla, odp&a TE Kai. täatTLSac Kai a aphy6ouc Kai rrävTa 20 
e Ta TOLaÜTa' EKEL & OÜSýV ÖTL 011 TOLOÜTOV Eitat Kai ZTL 
TOUT(V KaAXLw. Tä S' dLTLOV TOU'TOU Eltai ÖTL EKELVOL Ot 
XLOOL Etat. KaOapot Kai OU' KaTES1j8cag. VOL OÜS& SLEýeaP4. LE- 
VOL WQtTEp Ot EVOd8E i M6 Kat . Xi. tiis {PITÖ T(. JV 
$ SEÜpO UUVEppUTIKÖTWV, ät Kai XLOOLV Kai yii Kai TOLS dXOic 25 
CWOLc TE Kai 4UTOLS a crXTI TE Kai VÖaous TrapExEL. T71V & 
yfiv a&AV KEKoOitf aOQL TOÜTOL5 TE a'TTa(TI Kai ZTL XPUCT) TE 
lllal Kai (ipyvpu Kai. TOLS aXoi$ a'U TOLS' TOLOÜTOLV. iK4avf yap 
afTC 1TE4UKEvaL, 6VTa 1TOXX& TTXIjOEL Kai IEydXa Kai TTaV- 
TaXOÜ Tflc 'Y1iS, are abTr v t66V Eivat eEap. a Ei. l6aLRR6VWV 30 
eEaTWV. CWa S' ETT afrr EIvaL Ma TE 1T0XXX Kai äVepth- 
5 1T0U9, TOÜS gV Ev euoyaC4l O'LKotvTQS, TOÜS & TTEpt Täv 
aipa WQrrEp ýgEls TTEpt Týv OdXaTTav, TOÜS 6 EV VTjaOLS aS 
trEplppELv Täv dpa TrpOS Tfj ATTELpW OÜUaS' Kai Evt XÖyW, öiiep 111. LLV TÖ 118Wp TE Kai ý 0aXarrä EQTL TrpO$' Tip/ 1 gE- 35 
b TEpav XpELav1 TOÜTO EKEL Täv dCpa, o" Sý f . 
Llv ä p, kKE(VOLS' 
Täv at6Epa. Täv Se ciipac ai TdtS' KpäQLV XELV TOlafT1ly CJQTE CKELVOUS dVÖQOUs Etvat Kai Xp6V0V TE Cf V 1TOXÜ TrXELW TWV 
CvOdBE, Kai S(JSEL Kai dKOA Kai 4povi aEL Kat TTdai TOIs TOL- 
OÜTOIs ýgWV ä eOTdvaL TTY al1TA älTOQTdaEL AlTEp ap TE 40 
{JSaTOS CcEQTTIKEV Kai aC&? p dCpoc TrpOS KaOapöTflTa. Kai 
Sý Kai OEWV dXCn TE Kai tepä ailTOls Elvat, CV 015 TW öVTL 
OiK1)Tä5 OEOÜc Elval, Kai eAgac TE Kai gavTELac Kai ataGA- 
aELS TWV OEWV Kai TOLa&TaS auvouatas ytyveaOal airrols 
c npOS al ToÜv* Kai TÖV 'JE 1 XLOV Kai a XAv v Kai &QTpa bpa- 45 
aOal {J7i a&r6 v ota TUyXClVEL ÖVTa, Kai Tv Mily EÜSalµo- 
v(av TOÜTWV dKOXOUeOV EiVal. 
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This passage is in extended indirect discourse, 67 within which the organisation is 
fairly loose and broadly descriptive as opposed to explanatory. This effect is 
strengthened by the slightly arbitrary connections between the main units. As a 
whole, the composition of the passage could perhaps best be characterised as a 
catalogue and is loosely paratactic, emphasised by a general absence of particles 
other than 8&, TE and the prevalent Kat, 68 and also reflected in its other stylistic 
features. As in Passage HI, it is possible to identify individual groups of clauses 
which appear to form units, such as Täs & c3pas... rrp6s KaOap67Ta (111b2- 
6/V. 37-41), but which cannot always be clearly divided from preceding and 
subsequent units 69 
Within the indirect discourse construction, the syntax of the passage is fairly simple, 
and mainly involves coordination, apposition such as SEVSpa TE Kai &Oi1 ical 
Toüs KapTrovs (110d4/V. 16) and ßäp&ä TE Kat IäaTrL6as ital a iapdy8ovs Kai 
TrdVTa Tä ToLairra (110d8N. 20), and relative clauses, although there are several 
consecutive clauses: dSaTE Ev TL... 4atrrd(EaOaL (110d2N. 14); WATE aim v 
L8EIV... eEaTQJV (111a3-4N. 30-3); and WATE EKE(VOUS'... TCOV EVOC18E (111b2- 
4N. 37-39). Simplicity is also reflected in the word order, which is straightforward 
and unremarkable. The presence of a large number of lists, together with the mainly 
paratactic structure, also creates a certain feeling of extension. Kal ö Kai dKOý 
Kal 4, povrjaEL Kai. Trda. TOLS ToLoirroLs (111b4/V. 39) is a good example of 
polysyndeton, 70 while the prevalence of Kai, together with the lists, makes the 
passage generally polysyndetic, notwithstanding one notable asyndeton at 
110b7N. 3. 
Numerous lists, 71 along with very little repetition, enhance the impression of this 
passage as catalogue and description. There is also a comparative lack of pleonasm 
and sound effects, which seems to be in keeping with the simple paratactic 
67 See Tarrant, 1955. 
63 Cf. Des Places, 1951,365. 
69 For example, although the OCT has punctuated with only a colon after n T06TWV (11 Oc2N. 7), but 
a full-stop after t Ct EWpdKaiev (110c7N. 11), there seems to be no clear reason for advocating a 
different length of pause. Cf. e. g. 110e2, where it is not entirely clear that a full-stop is needed after 
T06TWV KaXXLW. 
70 Cf. Des Places, 1951, on the accumulated Kai's in 111b4-c4. 71 There are 11 lists; almost double the largest number in any of the other passages. See Table 4.1.1, 
above. 
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arrangement of the units as a whole. For example, there is a marked absence of 
homoeoteleuton amongst the pairs and lists. Only three of the twelve pairs show this 
feature: X%nrpoTEpWV Kat. KaeapWTEpWV (110c2/V. 6); KaTESTJSEQII. EVOL o& 
SiE46apµL&OL (l lOe3/V. 23); and Xpvaw TE Kal dpyvpcq (110e7/V. 27) 72 The 
single homoeoteleuton amongst the ten lists is only partial, since the phrase Kal 
X Oois 
... Kal Tots 
ÖXXOLS (cboL9 TE Kal 4vTO2s (110e5/V. 25) is interrupted by 
the discordant yi and also includes different final pitches. This is very different to 
lists in other passages. In Passage I, for example, three out of four lists have 
homoeoteleuta; in Passage II, four out of six. 
Lexis also varies widely, with no particular outstanding features. Most lexemes have 
a very wide usage, although a few can be narrowed down to certain author groups, 
mostly in fifth and fourth century prose: 
8La4 dv¬La - Pl. (1): Phd. 110d6. 
Xpuao¬t8i T-X. (1): Cyr 7.1.2/ P1. (1): Phd. 110c4/ Arist. (4): HA 627a2, 
[Col. *793a13; 793a16; 793a26]/ Theophr. (4): HP 6.3.5,9.11.1, 
9.11.1,9.19.3, Sens. 76.3. 
µEQÖyata - Various historians: e. g. Hdt. 1.175/ 4.101; X. HG 7.1.8/ Scyl. 98/ 
and P1. (1): 111a5. 
o-9-rrE86v - Technical prose and philosophy: e. g. Hp. Ep. 3.3, Prorrh. 2.1373/ 
P1. Rep. 609a2, -Phd. 96b2,110e4/ Arist. Ph. 193a13/ Theophr. CP 6.1.5. 
KaOap6T I!; - Technical prose and philosophy: e. g. Hp. Morb. Sacr. 1/ 
X. Mem. 2.1.22/ P1. Phd. 111b6/ Theophr. CP 4.16.2. 
ßriXßw - Verse and philosophy: Epic: e. g. HomJ1.3.392, Od. 6.237, 
h. Hom. 32.5/ Lyric: e. g. Bacch. 18.55. (Snell)/ Tragedy: e. g. 
E. Phdr. 194/ Comedy: e. g. Ar. Av. 697; Philosophy: e. g. Pl. Phd. 110d1/ 
Arist. APo. 78a. 34/ Theophr. Sens. 26.3. 
The range of compound nouns and adjectives is varied, as is the large range of 
abstract nouns. Apart from a small cluster of four -QLs nouns in the lines 110b2- 
72 Homoeoteleuton in this last example is only partial, because of the different pitch accents. 73 Jouanna, 1997,407, on the authenticity and fifth century composition of Hp. Prorrh. 
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5/V. 37-40, there are no prominent morphological forms. There is also a diverse 
mixture of lexical fields, with a number of terms from fields concerning physical 
features and appearance; such as colour, geography, and cosmology. 
A general absence of logical connections, such as causal or inferential, between the 
units also deepens the `catalogue' impression. However, another prominent aspect, 
an emphasis, on contrast (of the `true' earth to our own), adds some degree of 
structure and is achieved in a variety of ways, like parallel structures. In 110b8- 
cl/V. 3-5,110d7-e1N. 19-21, and 110e2-e4/V. 22-24, for example, there is a loosely 
structured EKCL/Eved&E antithesis, 74 of which the first two are combined with 
similarly structured relative clauses expressing comparison ( wv Kai Tä E'Od8E... 
and Wv Kal Tä EvOd8E... ). A further double instance of antithesis sets up a similar 
contrast: Kal Zvi X6yq, örrEp 11itv T6 Ü&i p TE Kai ý 6äXaTTd EQTL TTpOS Tf V 
i1 ¬TEpav XPELaV, T0ÜTO EKEL TÖV ci pa, 0& -n' LV Chip, EKEIVOLS TÖV aleEpa 
(111a7-b2/V. 34-37). Its parallelism is, however, the exception within this passage, 
in which antithesis is in general loosely structured and where there is a lack of the 
pairs and symmetry characteristic of the other passages 75 In addition, comparison 
using comparatives and f is found in the two similarly structured phrases Kai, troxb 
? TL EK XaµnpoTEpWv... (110c2N. 6) and Kat ? TL 7TXELÖVWV... (110c6/V. 10). 
Imagery also contributes to this effect, with üiaTrEp expressing comparison in 
110b6/V. 2 and 110b8N. 4. In these two short similes, the true earth is said to be 
(SQtrEp at 8W8EKdaKUTOL a4aipal, while its colours are described as WQTrep 
SEIyµaTa, ots Sr} 01 ypa4is KaraXpWVrraL, in which 8&/p. aTa and ypaýis are 
usually translated as `samples' and `painters' respectively. The second of these 
similes requires a little discussion. Instances of Sdypa in classical prose and verse 
are quite common and usually convey the idea of * accurate `representation', 
`testimony', or `outline', within a variety of contexts. 6 Here, however, unlike its 
other usages, the context dictates that 8EtyµaTa must indicate some type of `sketch' 
74 The last of these is actually expressed as an EicEivoi of/oi h'OdSe antithesis, although the semantic 
force of the contrast is still the same. 
73 The only striking exception is found within one clause, oü KaTaSTISevµAVOL oü8E SLEOeapgivoL 
(110e3), where there is a great degree of phonological, formal, and rhythmical resemblance between 
the two parts. 
76 E. g. E. Supp. 354; Isoc. 1.11; Ar. Ach. 988; Arist. Rh. 1415a12. 
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used by ypa4 ýs, and the image as a whole implies that our earth is a pale imitation 
of the true earth, conveying a fundamental idea of inadequacy. 77 
The comparison i- v [träoav yijv] & öoTj XEUKd yü(SOV i X(OVOS XEUKOTEPaV 
(110c4-5/V. 8-9) also seems to be another example of imagery, fitting in with the 
general tendency towards comparison of the true earth to our own. However, it is 
uncertain whether the comparison could be seen to constitute live imagery, given that 
examples in both early verse and prose, such as Homer's description of Rhesus' 
horses as XEUK6-repoL Xi6voc, suggest that this `imagery' is cliched 78 There are no 
similar instances of yip os found in conjunction with XEUK6s, so that it is possible 
that this is `live'. Yet, neither this comparison nor the preceding similes are 
particularly striking, and seem to do little more than help to stress the contrast 
between the `true' earth and our own. 
The difference between the true earth and our own is also expressed by an analogy: 
Kat 6ýEL Kai &KOý Kai opOV1'QEl Kai TTQQI TOLS TOLOÜTOLS 7jý1(JV 
CIOEQTdIIaL TTY afrri ü1TOQTaaEL jeep Up TE ti8aTOS aoEQTTJKEV KaZ 
at6hp .U POT ITp69 KaOap6TTITa. 
(111b4-6/V. 39-41) 
Here, in order to convey the difference in `purity' between the faculties of those on 
the true earth and ourselves, an analogy is drawn with the respective differences 
between air and water and aether and air. While these terms function as a vehicle 
and are, in that sense, extraneous to their immediate context, such boundaries are 
blurred by their role in the part which precedes this analogy. Here the uses of air and 
aether for the true earth dwellers are compared to those of water and air for ourselves 
(111a8-b2N. 35-7). 
As a general comment this passage could be called an extended description, in which 
structure is fairly loose, but with a clear tendency to (almost exclusively 
asymmetrical) features expressing contrast. 
77 It may be of interest when compared to other similar uses of 'art' imagery in Plato. Cf. on 
aKLaypac 1a, p. 68 above, and Louis, 1945,27-3. 
'S 11.10.437 and see Lloyd, 1966,184, on other 'white as' expressions. Cf. e. g. S. Ant. 114; A. Fr. 193c 
(Mette). 
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4.7 Passage VI: 117c1-118a17 
117c3 Kal 
äß.. l ELTrtV TaÜTa ETTlaxÖiiEvoS Kai tdXa EÜXEpCJS Kai 
5 EÜKÖXWS EýEITELV. Kat 1L() OL 1TOXX0I TEWS ýtb ETTLELKWS 
O10C TE i aaV KaTEXELV TÖ j. 1.7ýj SaKpÜELV, WS & ELS%IEV 
? TLVOVTC TE Kai. TTETTWKOTa, OÜKETL, CLAÄ' EI. IOD 'YE 13 Ci Kai. 5 
afTOÜ aaTaKTZ E)(tpE1 TÜ BdKpUa, L YTE E'YKaXUýdýtEvoS 
CITTEKXaOV EýtavTÖv- Ob yap &r &EILv6V 'YE, CLXX L TI V 
d E4. taUTOÜ TÜ)(7]V, ÖLOU dVspOs ETaLpOU EQTEpfjJLEVOS Et7JV. 6 
& Kp(TWV ETL TTp6TEpO9 EýLOÜ, E1TELs7ý OÜX otÖS T' 1V KaTE- 
XELV Ta 8dKpVa, EýavEQT1j. ' ATroXXö8Wpos & Kai EV TW 10 
ZýLTTpoaeEV XpÖvq Ob8ýV EttaÜETO 8aKpvWV, Kai &r Kai. TÖTE 
5 aVaßpvTaä tevos KXC WV Kai. äyaVaKTG3V OV'UVa O'VTLVa OÜ 
KaTEKXaaE T63v TTap6VTWV TXV yE aÜTOÜ ZWKpdTOUS. 
' EKELVOS SE, Ota, Eý7j, 1TOL¬LTE, W 6avµaaLOL. E'YW ýI. EVTOL 
OÜ)( 7tKLOTa TOV'TOU EVEKa T&9 'YvVaLKas cmr Tr q4ia, LVa ß. 1 15 
e TOLaÜTa TrXqµµEXotEV' Kai, yap &K1 KOa ÖTL EV Evý1 t Xpl'1 
TEXEUTüV. d X' uuXLaV TE CIyETE KaL KapTEpELTE. 
Kal ý[LELS dKOÜQaVTES 7 (TXUVftLEV TE Kal ETrkX%LEV TOD 
8aKpÜELV. 6R TrEpLEXOO'W, E1TEL6i1 OL ßapnVEßeal E4ii Ta 
5 OKEXlj, KaTEKXCVTI ÜTTTLOS- OÜTW yap EKEXEUEV 6 6LVepW- 20 
? TOS- Kai äµa E4alTT6pevoS a. ÜTOÜ OÜTOS 6 8oÜS TO 
4äpµaKOV, 8LaXLTTWV Xp6VOV &TrE(7KÖTreL TOÜS TTÖSas Kal Ta 
QKEkt1, KCLITELTa oý 8pa TTLEO"ac aV'TOÜ - 
TÖV TTÖsa 7J'pETO EL 
118 aLßOdVOLTO' 6 8' OU'K E411. Kai p. ET& TOÜTO aZ)OLS Tag KV1'JI1as- 
Kai ETTaVLW' V OÜTWS 1 [CLV ETrE8E1KVUTO ÖTL i bXOLT6 TE Kal 25 
TT11yVUTO. Kai aÜTÖS TjTTTETO Kai EITTEV O'TL, ETTEL8 V TTpOS r 
Kap& c YEVTlTal a1TW, TÖTE 0'L 'QETaL. 
5 NHSlj OZN UXE86V TL aV'TOD 11 V Tel TTEpt Tb ýTpOV LJivx6ptEva, 
Kai EKKCAVt l tEVOS- EVEKEKaXUTrTO yap- JTrEV- Ö Sý 
TEXEUTaLOV oeEyýaTO- 'Q KpLTWV, Zýlj, T(. J 'AaKX1VTLW 30 
64ELXOp. Ev aXEKTpUÖVa" (XXä thr68OTE Kai ß. 11j %lEX1 C TfTE. 
'AWL Tairra, E4lj, EQTaL, 6 KpCTWV' &V Spa EL TL ÜXXO 
10 XEyELS. 
TaÜTa EpOiIEVOU aÜTOÜ OÜ&V ETL CLTTEKpCVaTO, CLA' ÖXL- 
yov XpOVov 6LaXLTr v EKIV elj TE Kai 6 ävOpu"rros EýEKa- 35 
XVgJEV aÜTÖV, Kai. ÖS Ta öµµaTa EQTTIQEV' 1.. $WV Sý 6 KptTWV 
QUVEAaßE TÖ QTOpa Kai TOWS 04)0aX[LO69. 
15 "HSE 11 TEXEUTTj, CJ ' EXEKpaTES, TOD ITatpOU ý CLV EyE- 
VETO, ävBpös, (JS 7 [IELS OGCL . 1. EV 
(I. V, TWV TÖTE WV E ITELpdO11- 
VEV apf. QTOU Kai CIAXWS 4pOVLýUATdTOU Kai. SLKaLOTdTOU. 40 
One of the passage's most noteworthy characteristics is actually the absence of 
outstanding features. For example, there are no instances of imagery and there is a 
moderately, though not exceptionally, low incidence of sounds effects and pleonasm. 
With the possible exception of the final words, 4p0V4 IÜTdTOV Kai &KaLOTdTOU 
(118a17NI. 40), the three other sound effects used as parallel structures are fairly 
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weak homoeoteleuta such as gSVXoLTö TE Kal m'pyvvTo (118a2/VI. 25). The 
passage also differs from others insofar as it contains no compound nouns or 
adjectives and an exceptionally low number of adjectives and adverbs. 
Most of the passage is narrative, although this is interspersed with three short 
passages of direct speech. The narrative parts form a loose continuum, in which 
there is temporal sequentiality, but no strong logical connection between clauses, nor 
any sense of enclosing structure. In general, they seem close to the ancient 
definitions of the `continuous' or `strung-together' style, AEýts elpoµh", which 
Aristotle describes as `united by.. connecting particles' and having `no end in itself 79 
The passage presents Phaedo's narration of the final events of Socrates' life and, 
through its structure, seems almost to achieve a `stream of consciousness' effect, in 
which narration is apparently artless and takes its form from the way in which the 
recollections stream into the narrator's mind. 
Although the passage could be divided into units, throughout the narrative sections a 
strong degree of continuity between phrases on all levels makes any strong divisions 
debatable. 80 Links between clauses are mostly paratactic and even examples of 
hypotaxis are loose in terms of logical connection. Moreover, there is a marked 
absence of genitive absolutes and complex constructions such as conditionals, while 
many of those hypotactic clauses which are present appear to function as explanatory 
parentheses: e. g. Eira8f ob X Ol6 TfV KüTEXELV TGt SdKpva (117d2/VI. 9). 
Parentheses themselves are common, 81 as are `interrupting quotatives'; words or 
phrases which interrupt a phrase to indicate the use of direct quotation. 
82 
Individual clauses provide a minimal account of events, and are stark and concise, 
with a striking absence of adverbs and adjectives in much of the narrative, apart from 
occasional temporal descriptions. There is a small cluster of adverbs in 117c4- 
79 Arist. Rh. 1409a24ff. 
80 E. g. the OCT has punctuated with a full-stop after EaTepIjµ&VOS etrIv (117 dlIVI. 8) and itaviai 
(117d3/VI. 10). However, for syntactic, semantic, and formal reasons the phrases which follow these 
" Foints could easily be seen as part of the unit beginning Kai. ilµwv of troXXol (I 17c5M. 3). 
E. g. 117c8M. 6ff.; 118a6M. 29ff. 
82 Bers, 1997,193. 
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adjectives are in the final line: dp(aTOU Kal dXXu s #ovq. IWT6TOU Kal 
B&KaloTaTov. 
Apart from the slightly emphatic positioning of the final sequence of adjectives, 
äp(oi ov Kai dXXws ()povLµLWTdTov Kai 8&KaLOTdTOu and hyperbaton with 
äv8p6s (118a15NI. 38-40), the word order is unremarkable. One point of slight 
interest is the repetitive way in which a finite verb is so often preceded by a 
nominative participle, in instances such as Kal i . t¬LS 
dKOÜQaVTES 1aXüv6rJµEv 
(117e3NI. 18); EyKaXvJäµEvos ärrEKAaov E iavTÖV (117c8NI. 6); rrLEVas aiTov 
T6V 1T66a 1PETO (117e8NI. 23); Kai ETTavi w OÜTWS ' [AV ETTE8E(KVVTO 
(118a2/VI. 25) and L8WV 8ý 6 KpLTWV awEXaße TÖ QTöµa Kai TO) 64aXµovs 
(118a13-14/VI. 36-7). 83 
Only two main lexical fields are explored here. The first of these involves terms 
concerning mourning and lamentation and ends abruptly with the words EiriaxoµEV 
Tov 8aKp1ELv (117e3NI. 18). Subsequently, terminology to do with body parts and 
bodily reactions predominates until the final words at 118a15NI. 38, with no mixing 
of fields. This is different from the way in which several lexical fields, often 
overlapping, enter into the other passages. 
Repetition is rare and fairly unremarkable, with SaKpvELV (117c6/VI. 4 c8/6; d4/1 1; 
e4/19) constituting the only really noticeable `key-word' repetition. The passage's 
vocabulary is also the least repetitive, having the highest `lexeme-token' ratio, 0.79. 
There are, however, two examples of `juxtaposed' repetition, both of some interest. 
EKKaXV& %tevos EVEKEKdXUTTTO (118a6NI. 29) is one of only two instances of pure 
juxtaposition in the passages, 84 while TRVOVTd TE Kal TTEITWKÖTa (117c7/VI. 5) 
stands out as the unusual juxtapositional pairing of two parts of the same verb. 85 
Finally, some distinctive lexical points are an unusually high number of compound 
verbs and, with the exception of dc raKTI, found only here and twice in Sophocles' 
83 Cf. also 117c4NI. 2; 117d5NI. 12; 117e6ff. NI. 21; 118a6NI. 29; and 118al2NI. 30. 
4 Along with Tä 4u6µeva o6eaOaL (I 10d3N. 13). 
83 A possible comparison is KovµoOvra Trdvra KoQ LEiv (97c5/III. 6). 
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Oedipus at Colonus, 86 a number of distinctive lexemes found only in prose or 
comedy dating from the fifth century onwards: 
dvaßpu doµat. - Plato (1): 117d5. 
EÜK6XWS - All prose genres and comedy: e. g. X. Mem. 4.8.2/ Hp. Morb. 1.21/ 
Isoc. 12.31/ Lys. 4.9/ Anaxandr. 3.196/ Arist. EN 1100b31. 
E6XEp6T - All prose genres: e. g. Hp. Fract. 30/ Aeschin. Tim. 179.10/ 
P1. Phd. 117c4, Rep. 364a7/ Arist. EE 1231b12, EN 1121b8/ 
Menandr. Mon. 1.707. 
ETTLELKnT - All prose genres and comedy: e. g. Is. 6.18/ Isoc. 10.5/ X. HG 
5.4.50/ Scyl. 65/ Hp. Coac. 91, Morb. 2.38/ P1. Phd. 117c5, Crito 43a10/ 
Arist. EN 1180a8/ Theophr. HP 3.17.1/ Menandr. Dysc. 8, Aspis 24. 
On the whole, the temporal sequentiality, combined with an absence of logical 
sequence and of any pervasive structural features apart from parenthesis, contributes 
to a `stream of consciousness' effect, reflecting the thought-patterns of the speaker in 
this context. 
4.8 Conclusion 
From the analysis of these six passages we can clearly see the enormous variance 
between them and their distinct stylistic construction, which extends to all three 
levels of scale discussed at the end of the last chapter: unit organisation; small 
collocations; and individual words or idioms. 
With the exception of a feature like Passage I's vöµtaµa imagery, it is, by and large, 
the cumulation of repeated stylistic features within the passages which constitutes 
their distinctive stylistic character and separates them clearly from other sections of 
the work. These key stylistic features are repeated throughout each passage, or, in 
the case of those passages which themselves contain distinct stylistic sections, 
throughout these individual sections. 
86 S. OC 1251,1646. 
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Repetition is found on all three levels, from the use of large numbers of a-privative 
terms in Passage VI or 4A-compounds in U, to, in terms of broad organisation, the 
repeated conditionals of III or the predominant parataxis in V. Nevertheless, what 
seems to stand out most from each passage singly and therefore also from them 
collectively is repeated patterns of unit organisation which determine the general 
stylistic structure. 
We have also seen that in some of the passages there is a certain degree of 
correspondence between features on the three different levels of scale within the text. 
For example, in Passage I, the predominance of parallelism and antithetically 
structured units is accompanied, on a more microcontextual level, by large numbers 
of pairs, many of which are oppositional. In Passage III stylistic continuity and 
repetition is enhanced by features like, the structural repetition of unit organisation, 
key-word repetition of significant terms throughout the passage, and a lack of lexical 
variation. A final example is Passage VI, where syntactic simplicity of unit 
organisation seems to match the stark conciseness of some individual clauses, 
achieved through features like the comparative absence of adjectives and adverbs. 
The main stylistic traits which have emerged from the analysis at this stage therefore 
seem to be repetition of structure, distinctiveness of individual sections and, in some 
passages, a degree of correspondence between different types and levels of stylistic 
features. The structure of the individual, passages (or sections of these passages) 
therefore attains a degree of prominence through internal repetition as well as 
contrast to other parts of the text, and may also be enhanced through internal 
correspondence on different stylistic levels. 
One point I emphasised, when explaining the framework and rationale of my 
methodology, was the necessity of taking into account several stylistic features 
which either do not appear or are covered only partially in conventional stylistic 
analysis. Interestingly, several of these features, most notably certain aspects of unit 
organisation and parallel structure, not only occur within the six passages, but can in 
many cases be seen to constitute their most striking features. 
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The clear and distinct traits within the different sections will provide a useful starting 
point for tracing the generic affiliations of each passage's style. In addition, the 
ways in which stylistic analysis can be integrated into analysis of the arguments is 
also becoming more evident. In the Preface I proposed to show the contribution of 
verbal features to the semantics of the argument. For this purpose the recurrent 
structural patterns which have emerged from this chapter provide a clear and 
substantial structural basis to be assessed in terms of its contribution to the process of 
argumentation. 
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Chapter 5 
Generic Affiliations and Innovation 
In this chapter I trace the generic affiliations of the distinctive stylistic features 
identified in the previous chapter. Such affiliations range from usage of features 
most commonly associated with a particular genre or author to specific allusions. ' 
Along with those features which have stylistic models, I will point out those which 
appear to be Platonic innovations and have no clear generic background. Evidence 
for usage of stylistic features will be limited to examples within extant pre- 
Hellenistic texts. 
5.1 Genre 
For practical purposes I assume the following broad genres: 
Verse - Epic; lyric; drama, divided into comedy, tragedy, and satyr play. 3 
Prose- Historiography (including geographical texts); philosophy; oratory; technical 
prose (esp. ) medicine. 
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware, especially from a stylistic point of view, 
that there are many problems involved in assuming such generic categories, however 
useful and indeed indispensable they may be. 
On types of allusion see e. g. Nightingale, 1995,8, although her interests are not primarily stylistic. 
2 See 3.1.2, below. 
3 The familiar modem versions of a tripartite epic/lyric/drama distinction date back to the sixteenth 
century (but were institutionalised in the nineteenth), although generic distinctions between classes 
such as tragedy, comedy, elegy, epos, lyric, threnos, idyll, pastoral, and satire had been posited (but 
without clarity: see Conte, 1996,630-1) in antiquity from the Alexandrian period onwards. Explicit 
distinction between literary types is also, of course, made in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Poetics, 
although not in the sense of more modern genres (see e. g. Conte, 1996,630-1; Preminger and Brogan, 
1993,457-8) 
There is no clear model for the division of prose into generic categories, since, especially in the case 
of ancient genre, theories are usually concerned solely with verse or oratory. I have divided prose into 
four main groups. However, given the huge variation within individual genres and the overlap 
between genres, together with the lack of clear formal markers like verse form, these categories must 
be treated with caution. For discussion of more specific difficulties see below. 
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5.1.1 Brief analysis of the problems: 
While the problematisation of genre itself in modem literary theory is not very 
relevant to my project, s I will briefly introduce a number of problems specific to the 
study of Greek genres. There are numerous difficulties in attributing stylistic 
features in Greek literature to particular genres of writing, many stemming from the 
stylistic heterogeneity of some Greek genres as well as the tendency of stylistic 
features to be inter-generic. Generic heterogeneity may be perceptible between 
particular authors, such as Aristophanes s-and Menander; between works by the same 
author, as is the case with Plato's middle and late dialogues; and even within the 
same works, as occurs in the Phaedo or in the contrast between the rhetorical and 
narrative parts of Thucydides. 6 
Among the specific difficulties, relevant to particular authors or genres, one might 
note the following: 
" Many of the key features of artistic prose, sophistic, or Gorgianic prose, are 
widely and plausibly taken to be a development of verse features, which ? 
often makes it difficult to establish to what extent particular stylistic 
phenomena can be seen as a prose innovation or derivative from a verse 
background. 
" There are a number of overlaps between technical and philosophical writing. 
" As well as dividing drama into tragedy and comedy, a distinction between 
song and dialogue (or even, song, recitative, and dialogue)8 would also be 
s Genre has become a major area of interest in modem literary theory. Genres are arguably 
retrospective categories used to classify literary works, while they themselves and generic markers are 
entirely based upon the features of the existing works themselves. Yet, in using them for 
classification and evaluation of literary works, some critics have treated them as if they were fixed and 
self-standing. This has, in turn, led other critics, most notably in the twentieth century, to object to the 
reification of genres, and to call for their abolition, or even suggest their non-existence. See e. g. 
Preminger and Brogan, 1993,458; Conte, 1996,630-1. Certain Greek genres were definable through 
performative context - the epithalium implies a wedding etc. Yet, as this example shows, these genres 
are not necessarily the same as those we focus on today within Greek literature. Cf. Silk, 2000,64-70. 
6 See e. g. Finley, 1942,256. 
7 See e. g. Norden, 1915,63 ff. and passim. 
See. e. g. Silk, 2000,1041L 
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very relevant to stylistic analysis, since there is often such a discrepancy 
between the style used in these two (or three) sections. 
" Philosophical texts include both verse (e. g. Parmenides), prose (e. g. 
Aristotle), and writing which seems to lie between poetry and prose (e. g. 
Heraclitus) 
" In oratory, there is often a marked discrepancy between the style used within 
the different parts of a speech, as also between different kinds of speech 
(forensic/epideictic etc. ) and between different orators ('plain' Lysias, 
`ornate' Gorgias). 9 
" Even in works traditionally seen as having a certain stylistic character (e. g. 
early historiography is renowned for being plain and paratactic) there is often 
a great deal of variation. 10 
" Socratic dialogues. Even though these are treated by Aristotle, " for example, 
as a whole genre, so little survives that it is difficult to say which features are 
Platonic and which are Socratic. 12 
5.2 Passage I. 
This speech is presented as the `peroration' to Socrates' `defence' of the 
philosopher's willingness to die. " At the very beginning of the `defence' Socrates 
explicitly likens his apology to one given in a law-court, 14 and the `peroration' 
certainly shows a stylistic affinity to oratory, with many of its features most closely 
affiliated to this broad category. 
As shown in Chapter 4, Passage I can be divided into three distinct stylistic sections, 
of which the first two have much in common: w LaKdpLE EL 4Lta... µn Kaeapµös 
The staple of ancient (discussions of) rhetoric. See e. g. Russell, 1981, ch. 9. 
10 See e. g. Lilja, 1968,132-5. 
1 Arist. Po. 1447b4. 
12 Apart from Plato and Xenophon, there are no surviving texts which provide generic evidence of the 
Socratic writers, with the exception of some short fragments of Aeschines, which are certainly not 
substantial enough to establish any firm impression of his style. See e. g Vander Waerdt, 1994,2, 
Nightingale, 1995,4; and Giannantoni, 1990. 
13 Cf. Rowe, 1993a, 149. 
14 Phd63b1-5. Cf. 63d2-3 and e8-9. 
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TLS (69a7-c3/I. 1-16); KaI KLV8VVEÜOUQI KaL... f dKXoL SE TE lTavpol (69c3- 
dl/I. 16-22) and oirroL 8' EiaLV... Et av 9Xol (69d1-e4/I. 22-33). 
In structural terms it is parallelism and opposition which dominate the first and 
second sections, with antitheses and large numbers of pairs reinforced by other types 
of parallelism. The first two units of the initial section, W µaKdpLE 
Zi (a... 4pönals (69a6-10/I. 1-5); Kai Toirrov µEV rrdvTa... ov6' dXrlOET Ex 
(69b1-8/I. 6-13), are reminiscent of the long periodic and asymmetrical antitheses 
found in much Attic oratory. 15 Although not exclusive to any particular author/s, 
such periods are probably most characteristic of Isocrates, the principal mode 
involving p. v/8E or otK/dXXd antitheses, 16 the types used in these two Phaedo 
examples. 
Nevertheless certain differences also distinguish the Phaedo examples from such 
`Isocratean' periods. While both types are characterised by their length, '7 the latter 
derives extension from inclusion of subordinate clauses, 18 whereas the former attains 
it mainly through paratactic structures, such as apposition. Combined with the 
prevalence of copulative or adversative particles, like Kat, SE, 6Aä and t v/SE, as 
well as a general absence of other inferential and confirmatory particles, 19 the 
structure of Passage I brings it closer to Gorgianic works. In the Epitaphios for 
example, with the exception of initial and final units, there are no particles and the 
unit organisation is almost exclusively paratactic. ° 
Moreover, this passage resembles Gorgias in a number of other respects, such as its 
exceptionally large number of pairs, all reinforced (in the first two sections) by other 
_,.: _.... _ parallel structures 
like homoeoteleuton or pleonasm. Amplification through pairs,, 
especially in conjunction with sound effects, is common to many writers. Used to 
excess, however, it is viewed as a Gorgianic/sophistic feature, 21 so that its frequent 
15 Cf. Denniston, 1952,73. See e. g. Th. 2.35.1. 
10 See Mathieu, 1924, WE Cf. e. g. Usher, 1973,43, on 'parallelism, antithesis... ' as 'characteristic 
features of the Isocratean period'. 
Usher, 1973,40 and 43. 
ý$ See e. g. Mathieu, 1924, WE 
' See Denniston, 1950, xlvii-xlix, for classifications. 
20 Gorg. B6. Cf. the beginning of Gorg. B11. 
21 On the difficulties concerning categorisation as 'Gorgianic' or 'sophistic' see above, p. 100. 
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occurrence in, for example, certain early Hippocratic treatises has been taken as 
evidence of sophistic tendencies. 2 
The first section also stands out for its use of repetition, the most striking example 
being a sequence of three pairs of repeated words: f 8oväs Trp65 f 8oväs icd 
Xvtras Trpös X&nas Kai 4ößov Trpös ý6ßov (69a7-8/I. 2-3). The closest parallels 
for this are found in Hesiod, Empedocles, Gorgias and the Hippocratic Ancient 
Medicine: 
Kd KEPCLý1 ÜS KEpa tEt KOTEEL Kai TEKTOVL TEKTWV, 
KGB 7TTWX6S TTTWX(.; ) ýOOVEEL Kal dOL86S äoL50. 
ÜPpLaTQZ E''S TOES ÜßpLQTa , KÖai. LLOL EtS TOWS KOQýitOUS, 
CLýOßOL EtS 
TO) #6ßouS, SELVOL iv TOLS 6ELVOLS. 
23 
Admittedly, these lines, unlike the Phaedo example, feature repetition of a different 
form of the lexeme or cognate and include four pairs rather than three. Nevertheless 
the distribution of examples suggests that the use of multiple pairs of repeated words, 
with parallel syntactic functions between pairs, was one of those poetic features 
adopted by certain prose writers which could be characterised as Gorgianic/sophistic. 
The striking foregrounding of 4pönQis (69a10/I. 5) and RETä OpovrjaEWs 
(69b3/I. 8) appears to have similar generic affinities. Positions of prominence, such 
as the beginning and end of lines of verse, clauses, or periods in prose, are frequently 
used for foregrounding in Greek literature. 24 Highlighted by their solitary emphatic 
positioning the Phaedo examples are perhaps similar to foregrounded and thus 
isolated runover words, when used for emphasis in enjambed lines of verse. So, for 
example, Edwards cites Homer Iliad 9.330-41, in which runover words end clauses 
'-' See Appendix II p. 28 1. Cf. Earp, 1944,102, who sees the large number of 'doublets' in Sophocles' 
early work as indicative of sophistic influence. 
23 Hes. Op. 25-6 and Gorg. B6. Cf. also Emp. B. 90; Hp. VM 14 (and Xenophan. B15.3, although there we 
rind only two pairs of repeated lexemes). 24 Cf. e. g. Denniston, 1952,44-7, for examples in Greek prose; Silk, 1974,68, on positions of 
prominence being those 'that are preceded or followed by a pause' and on the ancient sources for 
these views. 
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and are `carrying heavy emphasis'. 5 In prose too such features occur and, once 
again, it is Gorgias who provides one of the most pronounced examples, when 
i 6a ios and its opposed derivative d. KOGµda begin and end the first period of his 
Helen: K6Qµos Tr6XEL µßv Eüav8p'La, ßwµaTL & KäXXos, 4SVXj & aoýLa, 
1Tp&YýtaTL 81 dpETT,, X6yq & ameELa' TCl & EvaVT(a TOVTWV (IKOapia. 26 
Here K6apos- and äKoapia are highlighted, not only through position, but also by 
contrast to the long sequence of repetitive pairs between them. Nevertheless, the 
cumulation of features surrounding the foregrounding of 4p6vrlaLs and µETä 
ýpovijaEWs still makes the Phaedo example exceptional. 27 Moreover, given the 
thematic importance of 4p6vrlcL9, the effects here seem far more striking than those 
associated with many of its possible stylistic models. 
Another interesting aspect of word order is the chiasmus in Tb 8' dXr1%s Tw 6vTL 
KCIAapaL9 TLS TWV TOLOÜTWV TTgYTWV Kal 7 QW, pOQÜV1J KaI 11 6LKaLoa 1V 1 
Kal -q' äväpda, Kai avTý ý #önQLS µßj KaOapµös TLs i (69b8-c3/I. 13-16). 
While chiasmus is common in oratory, 28 examples like this, where the two parts are 
separated by - an entire unit, are rare. In some ways it is perhaps closer to the 
combination of husteron-proteron and ring composition associated with early 
`paratactic' verse. 29 
Thus, in terms of unit organisation and parallel structures, this part of Passage I 
appears to combine features closely associated with oratory, with others most 
commonly found in early verse. The use of verse features in prose is often linked to 
Gorgianic/sophistic writing, and many features here recall that stylistic tradition. 
However, unlike Gorgianic rhetoric, where their use is often excessive, the Phaedo 
-"ý - passage mixes them with elements like the loose antithesis that is more common in 
later orators. 
25 Edwards, 1991,42. 
26 Gorg. B. 11.1. 
27 Denniston, 1952,69, cites other Platonic examples of 'emphatic' single words or short clauses. 
None of these, however, is so important or striking, as the Phaedo examples. 
28 Lausberg, 1998,355ff.. E. g. And. 1.147: ov6' r [idprfTaL 0ü8EV Oi TE ýµiv ELT {µäs oüTE vµiv 
etc fiµäs; Lys. 1.18; 12.57; and 30.2. On chiasmus in early prose, see, e. g. Lilja, 1968,133. 29 Thalmann, 1984, WE Cf. e. g. Hom. Od. 392-465, quoted in Van Groningen, 1960. 
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Plato continues both to combine aspects of various genres and add distinctive 
elements throughout the passage, not least at its most striking moments. This is true 
not only of the foregrounding of 4p6vrais, but also of the section of extended 
imagery which surrounds it. This `coin' imagery appears to synthesise certain 
aspects of the extended similes characteristic of early verse and philosophical writers 
with those of the extended metaphor, particularly associated with such poets as 
Aeschylus and Pindar. 30 It switches from simile to metaphor and occupies much of 
the first two units, presenting virtue in terms of monetary exchange: 
µrß yap OUX c. d ni ýj rý 6pO nPbs äpETýjv äXXaytj, ýjSoväs Wpbs 
ij8oväs Kai. X iras Trpbs aüiras Kai ý60ov 1rp6s 46ßov 
KaTaXXdTTEQAaL, ýLELCW irpbs EXdTTO W"aTTEp V%L'L(7 LaTa, cIXX EKELVO 
ýIÖVOV Tb vöpLQµa o'pe6v, dVTL 0t1 SEL nävTa TaiTa KaTa). 
XdTTEaOaL, 
#ovTjßls' Kal TOÜTOU ýLEV TrdVTa Kal RETä TOU'TOU 6VOV' LEVa TE Kai 
TTLTrpaaKÖ va Tci ÖVTL Kat C(. VSpEIa Kai 6w#00'ÜVT1 Kai SLKaLOQÜVTI 
Kai (II)WO87iV dXT1OS dPETý, R¬Ta 4pOVT CrEWs', Kai trpoayLyvoµEVwv 
Kai ärroyL'YV%l Vwv Kal 118OV(. JV Ka), 06PWV Kat T@V 
C! )1XWV 1TCLVTWV 
Twv TOLD rrwV (69a6-b5/I. 1-10) 
A number of this image's key features can be traced individually in terms of generic 
affiliations: the clear similarities between tenor and vehicle; extended metaphor; 
thematic allusion of the vehicle to other parts of the text; exploitation of contrary 
associations of the vehicle, with possible ironic implications; 
31 and the combination 
of different formal categories of imagery. 
The first of these, a clear and direct tenor/vehicle correspondence, is most frequently 
ý.. w associated with the developed `explicit' comparison of similes 
in epic and early 
philosophical texts. Their function is to clarify particular situations or processes, 32 
30 Thus Plato's imagery here appears to have elements of all the main types of imagery in Greek 
literature (see further below). For, as Silk, 1996,967, says, 'the significant use of imagery is in poetry 
and poetic prose'. In other genres imagery is rarer. On the scarcity of live imagery in some orators 
like Lysias see e. g. Edwards, 1999,7; and Carey, 1989,7 (and 85 on &OXa). On oratory in general, cf. 
Silk, 1996,967. Among the orators, live imagery is most common in Gorgias: see e. g. B 11.8. 
31 Cf. Silk, 1996,967. 
3= Cf. Silk, 1996,967, function no. 1; and Silk, forthcoming. Cf. also Lloyd 1986,183ff. on the 
explanatory function of the Homeric simile. 
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and suggested tenor/vehicle parallelisms are often quite elaborate. 33 While Homer's 
similes have diverse roles, the straightforward diagrammatic function is especially 
prominent in Presocratic similes. 34 On the whole, `live' imagery in extant 
Presocratic texts is fairly rare and, with the exception of the more 
Pindaric/Aeschylean metaphors in Heraclitus, 35 the notable surviving examples are 
Empedoclean, arising in connection with physiological processes, as in his image of 
the eye as a lantern. 36 These involve Homeric-type similes `in an explanation of an 
extremely obscure and complex phenomenon' and emphasise tenor/vehicle 
similarities, while discrepancies in correspondence are incidental. 37 Similar is the 
comparison at Hp. Flat. 8 of the steam and condensation produced by boiling water 
with the yawning and sweating coming from a fever. 38 In the Platonic image there is 
clearly some direct correspondence, especially at first, where exchange of items in 
33 Lloyd, 1966,191ff.: 'What is interesting and important here from the point of view of the later 
history of analogy in Greek philosophy, is the fact that already in Homer we find some quite elaborate 
comparisons in which the correspondences in form and content between the two parts have clearly 
been worked out in considerable detail. As we shall see later, detailed points of similarity between the 
two parts of a comparison are a feature, and an important one, of their use in Greek philosophers, and 
these similarities are sometimes stressed, as in Homer, by the repetition of key words and phrases'. 
34 A passage like Ar. Nu. 96-7, ... 
dvaireieovcty ()S EUTLV TTVVyEÜS K&YTLV TrEpl. fi tds OÜTOS, 
ý teis S' dvOpaKEc, which seems to satirise the philosophers' tendency to express physical and 
cosmological principles in terms of comparison to everyday objects, suggests a trend towards imagery 
in such writers. Yet, even though the importance of comparison and analogy in early philosophical 
writers is widely acknowledged, and is also indicated by ancient commentators on the Presocratics 
(see Lloyd, 1996, e. g. 306,309), analysis in the secondary literature tends to focus on analogy in its 
broad, logical sense (see ch. 3 p. 54), as opposed to imagery proper (see e. g. many examples given by 
Lloyd, 1966,341ff; Adrados, 1992,37, on comparison in Socratic writings. Cf. e. g. X. Mem. 1.2.37 or 
Smp. 5.5; Hussey, 1896,331. 
35 E. g. Heraclit. B52. The question of whether certain terms such as Empedocles' NEtKOs or 
Parmenides' ALKS involve genuine imagery (i. e. personification) is more vexed and can only be 
determined by a detailed study of prior and contemporary usage. The anthropomorphized O(Kn, for 
example, is already familiar from e. g. Hes. Op. 220-4, and seems to reflect an archaic tendency to take 
personified virtues as deities, rather than the type of personification which constitutes 'live' imagery. 
Cf. Padel, 1992,157. At the very least it seems that such works have clearly naturalised the idea of 
ALO as a personified agent before Parmenides. Although Lloyd, 1966,211-2, acknowledges the 
difficulties in determining 'whether or in what sense the Presocratics recognised the political and 
social notions which they used in their cosmologies as images', he supposes that their status depends 
upon their function within the various contexts rather than on distributions of usage, and proceeds to 
consider them as imagery without allowing that it is unlikely that many constituted 'live' imagery 
within the works he describes. 
36 Emp. B84. Cf. B100 on the comparison of respiration to a clepsydra and the 'painter' simile in B23. 
37 Lloyd, 1996,326,327 and 331. 
78 Cf. Hp. VM 9 and see Lloyd, 1996,346. This extended simile is exceptional in the Hippocratics, in 
whom imagery is generally restricted to 'short explanatory comparisons' (cf. Silk, 1996,967). Lloyd, 
1966,. 241ff., also discusses analogy in Herodotus. Yet none of his examples (e. g. Hdt. 4.36 or 2.33) 
actually constitute imagery proper. 
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financial transaction provides, for example, a parallel for how the so-called self- 
controlled simply forego one pleasure for another. 39 
Yet this is just one level of the many-layered image in question. In the lines which 
follow it switches from simile to metaphor (69a9/I. 4) and incorporates certain 
features of the characteristically Aeschylean/Pindaric extended metaphor, 
exemplified by Aeschylus' image of the fleet subjected to a storm as `cattle': 
... at R KEPOTVTrO@EVaL I3icx 
XEL. LCOVL TIJ (J (TÜV CdXia T' '1LPPOKTÜTrW 
40 WXOVT Q&QVTOL TTOIýLEVOS KQKOÜ QTPÖf W. 
In Plato, as in Aeschylus, the vehicle term is not restricted to a single word or phrase, 
but extends throughout the first part of the following unit with the terms of buying 
and selling, chvoi wE TE icaL 1TLrrpaaK6µeva. Another point reminiscent of 
Aeschylean metaphor is the vehicle's thematic allusion to ideas prominent elsewhere 
in the text. 41 In the Phaedo money itself has already been an explicit topic of 
discussion in a passage shortly before the present one 42 
This leads to a further point shared by the Phaedo example, Homeric similes, and 
Aeschylean/Pindaric metaphors: the exploitation of tenor/vehicle discrepancies, as 
well as correspondences. A number of discontinuities between the two notions of 
exchange described in the Phaedo image serve to highlight the exceptional value of 
OpövrraLc itself and take the image beyond straightforward parallelism 43 A 
"See Phd. 68e2-69a4. 
40 A. Ag. 655-7. See Stanford, 1942,95; Fraenkel, 1950,11.324. On the Aeschylean tendency to 
sustain a metaphor, see e. g. Headlam, 1902,436: 'it was the particular habit of Aeschylus to sustain 
his figures. Other poets are content with transitory metaphors...; no one but Aeschylus has his 
habitual practices - no one, perhaps, but Pindar had his power of pursuing a similitude, of carrying a 
figure through'; cf. Stoneman, 1981,134 Stanford , 1942,94. 
Cf. also Steiner, 1986,24, on Pindar: 
'(a single metaphoric motif] may dominate an entire ode'. Such extended images are not, of course, 
exclusive to these two authors. See e. g. E. Or. 698ff. 
'1 Headlam; 1902,438: 'in Aeschylus a (figurative] conception will run through a whole play'. As an 
example he gives the legal imagery in A. Ag. e. g. 41; 58 etc. On this, cf. Silk, 1996,967: 'the 
implication that the Trojan war is somehow a legal event prefigures the way the whole cycle of 
conflict is eventually resolved in Eumenides'. Cf. e. g. the painter simile at Pl. Rep. 377e, and the 
importance of art as a theme elsewhere in the Republic. ' See below, n. 46. 
43 The tenor/vehicle discrepancies of this image will be discussed in greater detail in 6.2.3, below. 
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paradigmatic example of such discrepancies in poetry is the famous Homeric simile 
which compares the slain Gorgythion to a poppy weighed down by fruit and rain, and 
presents a `poignant contrast of death with life and growth' 44 Similar implications 
arise from A. Ag. 658ff., where the Aegean sea is pictured as `flowering with the 
corpses of Achaean men' (& Ooüv rrEXayos Atyaiov VEKpot$/tVSpWV ' AXai(Zv) 45 
In both these images there is an ironic or subversive tenor/vehicle contrast, just as the 
Platonic image derives irony from contrasting virtue with coinage, since money itself 
has already been named as the object whose desire makes us turn away from the 
pursuit of wisdom. 46 Moreover, this contrast also appeals to a notion of money as in 
some way amoral or immoral, found within other Platonic works as well as certain 
previous and contemporary literature. 7 
In the Phaedo imagery there is also a formal change from simile to metaphor, 48 a 
phenomenon with parallels elsewhere in Plato and in Xenophon. 49 In Plato's 
Euthyphro, for example, Socrates' description of Meletus changes from a simile 
(warrEp yEwpy6v) to a metaphor: Kal Sri Kai. MEXTITos LAWS Trp(ýTOV µhv ßµäs 
EKKaea(peL TOÜS T(i)V VEWV TüS' iXdaTas' 8La4eE(poVTas, WS 4IqQLV (2d4ff. ). 
The suggestion that Socrates actually harms the young is, of course, heavily ironic 
and irony is also found in other composite images of this kind. 50 
44 Silk, 1996,967, on Hom. R. 8.306ff.; and 1974,161-7 in general. Cf. Edwards, 1991,27. 45 Cf. Silk, 1974,162 and 161-6, in general, on 'imagery geared.. . to explicit antithesis'; Silk, forthcoming, on Heraclit. B. 52 and 'the paradox that "life" (and the Greek alai has clear connotations 
of life- span, i. e. age) should be a "boy" '. 
46 Phd. 66c6ff.: Kal yap TroV Louc Kal aTdaels Kal VdXas oüShv d)Ao napiXEL A Tb o is 
Kal at TOÜTOU i7ft6Uj1aL. SLä yap Tr}V TWV XpfµdTWV KTi aLV TrdVTET of tr6XE. OL 
ytyVoVTaL, Tä & Xp1gctTa dvayKaCöµeOa KTda6aL 5Lä T6 aZ ia, 8ouXe iOVTES T1, TOÜTOU OEpaTre1 Kal kK T06TOU daXoxtav &Cyoµ¬V 4LXoadlaS nhpl &l trdiTa TQÜTa. Cf. Rep. 484c, 
where a simile presents painters as those etc TO thlOEaTaTOV CL7TOPXe'ROVTec, in spite of Book X's 
famous view of art as working at a third remove from reality. 47 Cf. e. g. Smp. 173c. Cf. e. g. Democr. B40; 50; E. E1.371-2; SAnt. 295-301; and, on this idea in 
Feneral, see Seaford, 1998. 
Contrast the phenomenon of 'mixed metaphor', most commonly associated with Aeschylus and 
Pindar, in which it is the vehicle that changes ( `to take arms against a sea of troubles'), as opposed to 
a switch between different formal categories of imagery. Cf. e. g. A. PV 174-7; Stanford, 1942,95; 
Dornseiff, 1921,66-8; and P1. Rep. 365cff., which Shorey, 1982,167, describes as `a Pindaric mixture 
of metaphors'. Cf. also the succession of similes at Rep. 495cff. 
49 For Xenophon see e. g. Mem. 1.3.12-13, with its combination of analogy, comparison, and metaphor. 
Given the lack of extant Socratic writing, it is uncertain whether such a feature was particular to 
Socratic dialogues or a Platonic feature adopted by Xenophon'. 50 In X. Mem. 1.3.12-12 (referred to above) Socrates uses imagery to draw an ironic analogy between 
looking at a beautiful person, conventionally a pleasant experience, and being bitten by a scorpion. 
Chapter 5 108 
Finally, the imagery's prominence is ensured through striking aural effects. The 
repeated vowels of at )T71 6p" (Trpös äpE V aMayrj) and of the antithetical 
EKEuVO µövov Tö v6µLo. ta 6peov are extremely unusual, and the phrases are also 
foregrounded by their being positioned at the beginning of the first unit's two 
opposed parts. Assonance adds to imagery already striking in its complexity, which 
is certainly unusual. Overall, it is the conjunction of so many distinct stylistic 
features, associated with a range of genres, which makes this image exceptional, 
even within a Platonic context. 51 
As the passage progresses, virtue separated from wisdom is dismissed as illusory in 
the second metaphor: x(pLCO EVa 8ý 4povrjaEw9 Kai, IXXaTT6µeva ävTt 
aXX Xwv µr} QKLaypaýLa TLS > ToLaÜTiI dPETrj... (69b6-7/1.11-12). The 
terminology of finance thus gives way to that of painting, though hardly in the 
manner of the shifting vehicle so often found in Aeschylus and Pindar. 
A final point about this part of Passage I is the pervasive p. i + subjunctive rather than 
the indicative, which is apparently a characteristically Platonic construction 
signifying `doubtful' or `cautious assertion'. 2 The grammarian Smyth suggested 
that it is often used `with a touch of irony', and many examples do indeed suggest 
irony or caution. 53 However, such an analysis seems unsuited to this particular 
passage, given that here the idiom articulates essential points in Socrates' case, 
strengthened through other forms of emphasis. In addition, here the construction 
also spreads over a number of successive units, unlike many instances where irony is 
apparent. A parallel is perhaps Crito 48c2-d3, where the idiom is used to dismiss 
unworthy considerations and state the genuine values on which Socrates' moral 
51 Berg, 1904,1-14, outlines the major tendencies in Plato's use of metaphor. He suggests that its 
frequency increases over time, so that, with the exception of Prm. and Leg., the greatest number of 
instances are found in the later dialogues. He also claims that the most striking examples occur in the 
middle dialogues, owing to the dictates of subject matter. However, Berg's account has limitations for 
the analysis of Plato's imagery because of a lack of detail and his failure to distinguish between 'live' 
and 'dead' imagery. Cf. also Pender, 2000, an interesting study of the imagery Plato uses to describe 
the gods and soul. However she, like Berg, does not distinguish `live' and `dead' imagery. 
52 Cf. 67b2 and Rowe, 1993a, 144. The terms are those used by Smyth, 1920,404, and Goodwin, 
1889,92, respectively. 53 E. g. Ap. 39a6: dXXQ glj o6 Tor XaXETTÖV, C. 6Lv6pES, OdVaTOV IK4tryEIV, dXXQ TTOXÜ 
XaXEirtTEpOV Trovrlptav. Although this construction is mainly found in Plato, Goodwin does give a 
couple of examples from other authors where it is used (D. 1.26; Arist. NE 2.4). In these cases it also 
has an ironic sense. 
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deliberation must be based. The fact that both these passages appear to assert points 
central to Socrates' main argument suggests that this construction may, for Plato, 
have an alternative function of emphasis rather than irony or caution. It is perhaps 
similar to Plato's common use of questions to introduce key points, as with apa µßj 
(M0 TL rý rrýv rýjs vXýjs drrö TOD vwµaros &naýayrjv; sa 
In the middle section, from Kai Kuv3uvEÜouaL Kai to ßdKXOL 6E TE TravpoL (69c3- 
dl/I. 16-22), the most distinctive features are two pairs of antithetical clauses, 
reminiscent of the gnomic antitheses associated with such authors as Hesiod, 
Theognis, Heraclitus, and Democritus, 55 because of symmetry and aural parallelism 
between their two halves. Moreover, both pairs of clauses here are linked by more 
than one pair of corresponding terms, a key feature of gnomic antithesis 56 
The existence of a parallel antithesis in Sophocles which, like the Phaedo examples, 
describes the comparative fates of the initiated and uninitiated in the afterlife 
suggests that such structures might be a common trait of language to do with the 
mysteries: 57 
... LJS TPLUÖXPLOL 
KELVOL IPOTWV, OL TaUTU SEPXOEVTES TEXT 
[. t6Xwa ES "AL6OU. TOLQ&E 'YCtp ýLOVOLS EKEL 
s$ Cfl EUTL, TOLS 8' dXXOLQL 1TdVT EKEL KaKd. 
Furthermore, since Plato's alleged quotation, vap&rlKO4öpoL µhv troXXoL, PdKXOL 
8E TE travpoL"(69c8-dl/I. 21-2) is, as I noted in Chapter 4, a misquotation of a 
hexameter, it is possible, even likely, that it is either a direct quotation or Platonic 
parody of a religious verse. 
54 Phd. 64c4-5. Cf. e. g. 64c6-8; Crito 49b2-5; 48c2-d3. 
55 See e. g. Fehling, 1969,94, on the significant role of gnomic antithesis in Greek literature and 
gnomic antithesis as a Hesiodic innovation. Some examples are: Hes. Op. 311: lpyov V oii&v 
ÖVELSOs, dEpy(rj SE Tr 6v¬tSoc; 342; Thgn. 17; Heraclit. B61; 53; 111; Democr. B 40; 86. For more 
examples see Fehling. 1969,297-8. 
56 Fehling, 1969,296. 
" If this is the case, the association has perhaps influenced the description of Sophocles at Ar. Ra. 82: 6 
V EÜKOXOS 1. liV Ma8E EÜKOXOS 6' iKEL. 
58 S. fr. 753 (Radt. ). Cf. h. Hom. 2.480-2 and Richardson, 1974,313-4. 
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The final section, from OtrrOL 6' edatv... (69d1/I. 22) to the end, is entirely different 
stylistically from the earlier parts of this passage, insofar as it includes neither 
striking parallel structures nor imagery, and is predominantly hypotactic rather than 
paratactic. In some ways it resembles the less periodic parts of Lysias. 59 Yet, it is 
especially unusual, given that it represents the very end of a speech. For it is this part 
which, even in `plainer' oratory, characteristically incorporates, for example, varying 
types of parallelism, in order to give weight to the conclusion. 60 
Of all my passages it is Passage I's first two parts which show the strongest tendency 
towards the stylistic features conventionally treated within rhetoric or poetics 
(ancient and modern). It is no surprise then that its generic affinities seem to be with 
verse and oratory, and especially Gorgianic/sophistic oratory, known for its inclusion 
of poetic features within prose writing. Yet it is also clear that Plato's `imitation' of 
such genres is not straightforward, but combines and builds on a mixture of different 
stylistic sources, producing effects which are often distinctive per se. 
5.3 Passage II 
Passage II, including its stylistically distinct middle section, otov Tons tV 
yaQTpgtapyias... dv6pas µETpLovs' (81e6-82b8/II. 23-44), is most notable for its 
unit organisation and, to a certain extent, its parallel structures. Although many 
individual features have strong affiliations with other genres, their use here and 
combination with other more novel features make this passage's style distinctive in 
many respects. 
The lexis of the main and middle sections shows common features. There is lexical 
variety, in terms of both the range of lexical fields and many distinctive lexemes. 
The distribution of these lexemes is limited, almost exclusively, to prose and 
s`' See e. g. Kennedy, 1963,135; Demetr. Eloc. 190. 
60 E. g. Lys. 1.45 and 48: KivSuvov IKIV86veuov and (1, µiaLc Crlµu aouoi; 3.47: {snip hic 46 
Tr0XXObT KLV86VOVS KEKLV& IvEUKa Kal, 7r0XX11S X1)TOVpyIaS XEÄTIToÜpy 1Ka; 4.20: LKETECW t . tQc 
Kal dvrt3oXc ; 6.55: eLVTLaoXýaEL Kal IKETe aEI tPQS' V1 EXEELTE. 06 yäp OL 6LKaiWS 
dtroOvn'aKOVTe ' IXA' OIL d8iKWS dELOI etcu' AEetaOaL; 12.100: QKTIKOaTE, EOpdKaTE, 
TreTr6veaTe. IXETE' SIKd[ETE. Usher, 1999,117 remarks that a 'quiet ending seems to have been 
characteristic of most Greek oratory', but appears to be referring to the absence of pathos as opposed 
to particular stylistic effects. 
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Aristophanes. Most often they stem from technical, historical, and philosophical 
writing, although a number are also found in oratory. Lexemic variety itself is 
probably most closely associated with Aristophanes, who tends to combine terms 
from many different genres and registers. 61 
Most of these distinctive lexemes are also compounds, especially 4LX-compounds. 
There are two instances of hapax legomena, otKo4 Oopta aulErraKOXOUO u, while the 
word 4 [XapXos only appears here and in one other Platonic passage. Compound 
nouns and adjectives, including those with non-prepositional stems, are common in 
Greek literature. 62 Aeschylus, in particular, tends to use such compounds and they 
abound in his plays, either singly, or in matching pairs 63. Yet, even in Aeschylus, 
clusters are rare, 64 and the most significant clusters of O LX-compounds seem to be 
found in Plato alone. 65 A notable exception comes in Aristophanes' Wasps, 66 where 
a group of 4LX-compounds are playfully proposed as possible illnesses afflicting 
Philocleon. 
5.3.1 The main section 
In very broad terms, the style of the main section seems close to what Denniston 
describes as the `loose texture' of Platonic periods, comprising a long `string of 
loosely connected clauses', unlike the `Demosthenic period'. 67 The looseness of 
logical sequentiality between clauses has certain similarities to the narrative parataxis 
(XEýis Elpo. thvq) of early logographers or the loose Thucydidean period. 68 Yet, 
there are also considerable differences, since these styles are typified, respectively, 
by simple coordination and temporal sequentiality or by a preponderance of 
61 See e. g. Dover, 1987,224-36. 
62 See e. g. the tonal range of compounds in Ar. Pax 788ff. and 810ff. and the disscussion in Silk, 2000, 
113-6; Earp, 1948,6. OA-compounds are also common throughout all genres, with pairs especially 
common in oratory (e. g. the cliched 4 LXavOpwlria and C LXOTLV[a at D. 8.71 or the more unusual 
4LXa(T1os wv, ßapü ydp, µ 6E O1Xe LT1. u rtS at Isoc. Ad Dem. 31.10. 
63 E. g. 4iXoair6v6ov (A. Ch. 292); OLMd taaTos (A. Ag. 719); 6rlXUKT6vw and @riXüvlropos (A. PV 855 
and 860); Travav rlov and TravepyETa (A. Ag. 1486). 
64 See the lists of compounds in Earp, 1948,18-38. 
65 E. g. Phd. 68c1; Parm. 128d7; Phdr. 248d3; Alc. 1.122c7; Lys. 212d. 
"Ar. V 75ff. 
67 Denniston, 1952,68ff. 
68 See e. g. Denniston, 1952,66-7 
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participial clauses. 69 By contrast, the Platonic units here are long and mainly 
hypotactic, including a variety of subordinate, and especially relative, clauses. As I 
have mentioned in Chapter 4, their style seems close to the characteristically Platonic 
'ä rallonges' (`extended') phrase, named by Des Places to evoke the impression of 
extension generated by its structure. 70 
This style has no clear parallels. There is perhaps a certain likeness in the long 
verse-invocations at the beginnings of archaic hymns, which consist of a similar 
mixture of short and loosely connected subordinate or participial clauses. 7' The 
appearance of such clauses, especially those connected by relative pronouns, is 
widely discussed in the secondary literature. 2 
Although hyperbaton, another key element of Passage II's style, is very common in 
oratory and verse, 73 especially in its milder forms, the pervasive hyberbaton in 81c5- 
el/II. 5-18, is unusual for various reasons. Hyperbaton is often used for emphasis, 74 
but examples are usually isolated, unlike the clustering in this passage. Moreover, 
some of the individual examples here are also unusual, such as the (comparatively 
rare) separation of article and substantive in raj Toü vwEtraKoXouOovvTOs, TOD 
O) taTOEL6otS, EtrL6vµtq (81e1/II. 18), 75 or the (highly unusual) interposition of a 
long phrase between av and cn 4w-rov (81c5-6/11.2-3). Regarding the latter, 
69 Cf. Denniston, 1952,67. 
70 Des Places, 1951,365, who, however, discusses only those units whose clauses are, unlike those in 
this passage, connected throughout by the same conjunctions or different forms of the same part of 
speech. So P1. Leg. 699c1-d2, which Des Places, 1950,364, calls 'le meilleur exemple de phrase "ä 
rallonges" ', contains a series of five relative clauses, all of which begin with the relative pronoun. 
Although this is striking in itself, it can be clearly differentiated from the present Phaedo example, in 
which there is a greater syntactic complexity and variety of connectives. Cf. Denniston, 1952,70ff. 
" E. g. h. Hom. 2.1-10; h. Hom. 5.1-6 (also has ring composition with repetition of i`pya. See Porter, 
1949,252); h. Hom. 16; h. Hom. 17; Ar. Eq. 581-90; although the examples from Aristophanes and the 
Homeric hymn to Aphrodite (h. Hom. 5) differ slightly, insofar as the same grammatical subject is 
retained throughout all the clauses. 72 See e. g. Davies, 1991,78, on 'relative style' in hymnic invocations; Race, 1990,86, on participles, 
apposition, and relatives as a form of expansion in hymns; and 18, on hymn openings. 
7 Gagarin, 1997: 29: 'mild hyperbaton, where only a word or two intervenes... is quite common in 
classical Greek'. Cf. e. g. Stevens, 1953,203, on Pindar and lyric; Fraenkel, 1950,94 and 687, on 
common types of hyberbaton; Usher, 1993,23; Denniston, 1952,52; Lausberg, 1998,319. There are 
also numerous examples, especially in verse, of longer separation between elements. See e. g. 
Fraenkel, 1950,13; Denniston, 1952,52ff; and Breitenbach, 1934,243, for statistics for instances of 
hyperbaton in Euripides, classified according to the number of intervening words. 
"See e. g. Denniston, 1952,58-9; Fraenkel, 1950,13; Usher, 1993,24. 
's See e. g Denniston, 1952,52ff. A very similar example occurs at Phd. 83e1, another phrase 
describing the associations of the soul: Tfc Too AElou TE Kai KaGapoü Kal µovoEtSoüs 
avvouvtac. 
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even though `interlacing' is particularly frequent in Plato, 76 it is very rare to separate 
a substantive from a prepositional compound on which it depends. The closest 
Platonic parallel seems to be the separation of a' - and TrEpLTri#Kev in: VTTI 
ti f Cl VÜV au'! CITE yýv EQTLWýIEV7I yE1jpa Kai. TTETPWSll TTOWL Kat dypla 
TrEpLTTE4, UKEV iM6 T(. 3V EÜSaLgOVWV XEyo i iiWV iQTLdaEWV. 77 
Interestingly, just as in the Phaedo example, this phrase describes the corruption of 
the soul by its association with the body. 
Another of the main section's distinctive features is recurrent ring composition. Ring 
composition, an important feature of early verse and prose, 78 was used to mark off a 
short section of text by repetition of the same words at the beginning and end. 79 
Certain differences distinguish its use in these early texts from the Phaedo passage. 
In the former, ring composition often encloses very long sections, which may 
constitute digressions from the main narrative, 80 while in Passage II it is the 
individual main paragraphs which are enclosed in such a way. More importantly, as 
with hyperbaton, probably the most distinctive feature of ring composition here is its 
recurrence. Rather than having one isolated example, as is normal in other genres, it 
is used in all three of the longer units. 
In the main section of this passage, Plato therefore seems to combine distinctively 
Platonic features of unit organisation with those associated predominantly with early 
verse and artistic prose. Moreover, in spite of their generic affiliations, the 
accumulation and, to a certain extent, structure of these features differentiates their 
use here from their models. 
76 I. e. the separation of logically cohering words, without affecting the order of the other words. See 
Denniston, 1952,54ff. 
77 P1. Rep. 612alff. 
78 See e. g. Edwards, 1991,44-8, on importance and frequency of ring composition in the Iliad; 
Fowler, 1987,62; Van Otterlo, 1944,2, (following Fränkel) on ring composition as characteristic of 
epic poetry and XECiS EtpoµEvr. For examples, see Van Otterlo, 1944. Cf. also Van Groningen, 
1960,51M. 
" This can be distinguished from the rhetorical figures in which a word is repeated either at the 
beginning and end of a period (see e. g. D. 25.88; Lys. 34.1 1; Adams, 1905,355; Denniston, 1952,90) 
at the beginning and end of a text (see e. g. Carey, 1989,85, on Lysias); and also from structural ring 
composition, in which a certain theme or episode recurs after a long intermediary section (see e. g. 
Edwards, 1991,47, on Homer). 
80 See Van Groningen, 1960,55. 
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5.3.2 The middle section 
Describing the process by which souls are reincarnated into animals corresponding to 
their behaviour throughout life, the middle section's main units provide parallel 
examples of how this process affects different types of people. In keeping with this, 
its distinctive feature is the high degree of parallelism between all the units. 81 
'Parallelism ofstructure' in Plato 
Close parallelism between units is a pervasive element of Platonic stylistic structure 
and recurs throughout the dialogues with no clear generic affiliations. 
Unit-parallelism in Plato often occurs when a speaker enumerates examples or 
provides analogies for a general thesis, 82 and frequently involves a repetitive 
structure, in contrast to other genres, where such close unit-parallelism is rare. 83 
81 ObKOOV EüSa1µovE=TOL... 4LXoao4ias' TE Kai. vo"v; (82a11-b3/II. 35-9) is a possible exception. 82 More common, however, is the structure of argument where each unit adds a new step or 
explanation, rather than outlining cases analogous to the previous unit. This is especially true of the 
long speeches in the middle and later dialogues such as the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, 
where sequences of analogous examples are much rarer (it is also true for the Sophist, although the 
early sections, where the 'method of division' distinguishes between two opposed parallel cases, 
include many groups of two analogous units or two parallel clauses: e. g. 222a5-1 1; 220b4-8, _E. Kai. 
TOD irr i'oÜ Výv -yEvou rrdaa ij Ctv t Opa X yeTa1 1rO6 TLS 6pvLOEUTLK. / 6EAI. X eTai. 
yap oüv. / E. TOD 81 kv66pov UXESbv T6 o voXov tXLEuTUCi'j. ). Nevertheless, even this type of 
structure often involves a certain degree of verbal or structural repetition (e. g. Tht. 189a6-b5). 
83 The closest example is a passage like the comparison of ship's captains to doctors in Hp. VM 9, 
where the two examples given have some degree of structural similarity and are of roughly similar 
length (cf. VM 16). As Lloyd, 1966,385ff., has shown, analogical arguments can be found throughout 
early Greek literature. However, those he cites from Homer generally focus on a particular case, as 
opposed to general principles, with emphasis falling on the example for which the analogous case is 
adduced by way of explication (Lloyd, 1966,385ff. ). Other examples in early verse and 
historiography are mainly very similar. Some examples in later verse include more general cases, and 
unit length between parallel cases is sometimes close (e. g. S. Ant. 715ff.; E. Andr. 479ff. ). In addition 
there are instances of symmetry within individual lines or between symmetrical lines (see e. g. Fehling, 
1969,295ff. ), as well as some examples of very close parallelism between strophe and antistrophe 
(e. g. A. Ag. 763). However, often in these cases formal parellelism derives from a direct contrast, 
rather than from analogy. In oratory, rather than parallel units with corresponding clauses, parallelism 
is more common within an individual period/unit and between clauses, especially antithetical ones 
(see e. g. Denniston, 1952,71-3, on symmetrical antitheses and cf. Gagarin, 1997,30). The most 
striking type is parisosis or isocolon (see e. g. Arist. Rh. 1210a22ff.; Lausberg, 1998,320ff. ), which 
comprises two balanced kola which contain a near or exactly equal number of syllables. This feature, 
employed mainly by orators, is often combined with parallel structures such as repetition or rhyme 
(see e. g. Adams, 1905,353-4, on Trapoµof Wals and 6 toLoTEXEVTOv), and is used to excess by Gorgias 
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Given the amount of such parallelism in Xenophon's Socratic dialogues, 84 it is, 
however, possible that it was typical of the Socratic dialogue per se, 85 although the 
paucity of surviving evidence means that this cannot be established with any 
certainty. 86 
In Plato, parallel units are normally punctuated by short replies from the interlocutor, 
as in this passage. Apart from this common feature, the patterns of parallelism are 
extremely diverse in terms of unit length; amount of ellipse; repetition; and the 
number of parallel units in each instance. So, for example, a sequence at Charmides 
167c8-168b3, comprises nine short parallel units, all of very similar length and 
structure. 87 Similarly, Republic 335c9-dlO features seven short units, extremely 
alike in these respects, although comprising two stages, with three analogous 
examples followed by a group of four. Both passages include very strong structural 
and verbal repetition. 88 Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum are passages like 
Ion 538b7ff., which contains two longer parallel examples, with significant verbal 
variation. 89 
Notwithstanding this variety, certain key features in this part of Passage II can still be 
isolated as characteristic of parallel unit structure in Plato and, to a certain extent, in 
Xenophon's Socratic dialogues. These are: 
in phrases such as EiTrety Suvalwjv a ßoü, \%=, POVXO(µrly S' CA Set, XaOwv µßv Tjv Ae(av 
v4µeaw, c Uywv SE T6v dvepwlrLvov Oe6vov (Gorg. B6). 
84 E. g. X. Mem. 2.1.3; 2.3.11-13; 2.9.2;. 
eS X. Mem. 1.5.1-3, seems to suggest that such stylistic parallelism in analogical arguments was a 
typical part of Socratic ethical discourse, even though the example he proceeds to give is contained 
within the form of a continuous speech rather than dialogue. 
86 The only really substantial fragments of other Socratic dialogues are frs. 9 and 12 of Aeschin. Socr., 
in Giannantoni, 1990,11.607 and 609 (cf. p. 101, above). However, these both involve an extended 
speech and, though fr. 12 contains an example of antithesis (610), offer no noticeable stylistic 
parallelism. ; 
Although the first unit is longer than those which follow. 88 Cf. e. g. Lach. MOM a9 Eli. Tl Sý STS, ÖTav "Oµrpos XEyil, WS TETp(il. IEVW TW MaXdO /L ' EKap. 18rl h NECTopos 
iraXXaidi KVKEtZVa TrLVELV SISWQL; Kal VyEL TrwS OÜTf. WT*... Ta Ta FITE 6pOci X yeL "O. Tlpoc 
FITE I. L I. Tr6TEpOV laTpLKf T EaTI SLay%/CwaL KaXL4 f paý 6uci c; / I ON. 'I aTpLKf s ./ 
EO. TL U. 
ÖTQV XEyTI "O Lr1poc ... Ta1JTa tr6TEpOV 
OWixEV aLEUTLKT T EZVQL TiXVrlg' p. dXXov Kp(VaL f 
p#4&K , iiTTa XyEL Kai FITE KaXcils CITE µßj; Cf. e. g. Men. 72d4-e8; Rep. 444d3-1 1. 
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i) The parallel structure of units, enhanced by verbal repetition of 
terminology common to all examples, such as E15 T& ... y&tI90 
ii) A certain degree of ellipse and variation, such as the fact that ELK6S 
Ev8 ieaOaL (82a1/II. 25) is not repeated in the second of the three units (82a4- 
6/11.28-30) and is replaced by ELK69 EQTLV ... 
dýLKVELQAaL in the third 
(82b5/II. 41). 91 
iii) The punctuation of parallel units by short answers from the interlocutor, 
restricted to brief words of affirmation or denial, or short questions, like Ta 
1TOla &r' TaÜTa X yELS, W ZdKpaTES; (81e5/II. 22); TTdvu 4LýV OÜV ELK6S 
MyELS (82a3/II. 27); or simply edKös (82b9/II. 45). 92 
iv) Some variation in length of units,, so that the key unit is either 
significantly longer or shorter than the others. 3 This passage differs slightly 
from the majority of examples, in which analogous cases are adduced in order 
to validate a point made in the central unit. Here, parallel cases do not 
provide analogies, but all illustrate different parts of the same process. 
Nevertheless, as Socrates moves on to describe the metempsychosis of the 
more virtuous souls, the unit (82b5-8/II. 41-4) is slightly longer and is also 
preceded by an additional and formally distinct paragraph (82a11-b3/II. 35-9), 
which seems to suggest its special significance. 
v) Often a unit in the middle of the sequence outlines the general principle, 
and especially when preceding the unit which contains the key point 94 Here, 
however, the general principle is described at the outset and is only slightly 
similar in form to the parallel units which follow: MovvTaL SE, 3aMp 
EtKÖS, ELS TOLaÜTQ TOTS bTTOI' CdTT QV KQZ ýLEýLEAETTjKULm TÜXWQLV EV 
T({I PUP (81e2-4/II. 19-21). 
90 Phd. 8le7-82a1/II. 24-5; 82a5-611I. 29-30; and, with yivoc in the singular, 82b5/II. 41.2; 82b7/II. 43. 
Cf. the repetition of riot Ti dtro&&Soüaa TiXvri in Rep. 332c5-d3 or of ITepOS in Chrm. 166a9-b6. 
Cf. also e. g. the repetition of ei 1 0o6Xoto, ri äv notoII)S, SfIXov ört; or of 6Tr6re in X. Mem. 
2.3.11-3 and Mem. 4.2.10, although the repetition in each of these passages is a little more uniform 
than is usual in Plato. 
91 Cf. e. g. Rep. 410e10-a3. Cf. the alternation between ßovXet and Emevµeis in X. Mem. 4.2.10. For 
ellipse see on Passage IV, n. 125, below. 9' See p. 123, below. 
93 Cf. e. g. Gorg. 460b1.5. Cf. also Thesleff, 1967,38, on Plato's expansion of a question in order to 
make an important point. 
94 E. g. Phd. 82a9. 
Chapter 5 117 
Finally, in spite of the many similarities, the main feature which differentiates this 
passage from the usual structure of such passages in Plato is that much of its 
parallelism derives from lists, whereas other types of repetitive structure and/or the 
95 use of polyptoton are far more normal. 
This conjunction of tripartite lists with pervasive homoeoteleuton is extremely 
unusual, though certain aspects could be seen to stem from particular genres. Sound 
effects used together with tripartite lists are perhaps most closely associated with 
oratory, but do also appear in verse and other types of prose. 6 Tripartite lists, albeit 
more usually unaccompanied by sound effects, are also very common in Old 
Comedy, and the clustering of this feature in Passage II might perhaps be slightly 
reminiscent of the Aristophanic tendency towards such clusters. 97 
Overall, this passage is also notable for lexical variety, both in the range and fluidity 
of lexical fields, as well as its many distinctive lexemes. These lexemes have an 
almost exclusively prose and Aristophanic background, especially technical, 
historical, and philosophical writing. Lexemic variety is itself is probably most 
closely associated with Aristophanes, who is known for his tendency to combine 
terms from various different genres and registers. 8 
5.4 ' Passage III 
Passage III uses extended oratio obliqua, a distinctively Platonic construction, 
although one which more usually governs longer sections 99 In addition, all three 
main units begin by stating a verb governing the dependent clauses: ýygadju v 
(97c4/III. 5); c'Aµrly (97d6/III. 15); and c µiv (98a7/III. 28). Yet it is rare for Plato to 
restate the introductory verb, especially in such a regular and systematic way, and 
elsewhere in Plato the syntax of this construction is in general far more fluid. 
'°° 
's E. g. Chrm. 167c9ff.; Tht. 188e11-189a1l. 
96 See Appendix II p. 282. 
97 See Appendix II p. 283, below. 
98 Cf. n. 61, above. 
" Cf. e. g. Tarrant, 1955, whose examples of 'extended oratfo obliqua' in Plato only include longer 
Passages or entire dialogues. 
00 On the inconsistency of structure in Plato's use of oratio obliqua, see e. g. Thesleff, 1967,50. 
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The passage describes Socrates' expectations when reading Anaxagoras and its most 
striking stylistic feature is clear stylistic allusion to Anaxagoras himself and, to a 
certain extent, to other Presocratic physicists. 1°' However, despite the presence of 
numerous features found in these authors, together with the passage's explicit 
concern with Anaxagoras, the Anaxagorean or `Presocratic' quality of the writing 
has not been noted by commentators. 
The most outstanding features of the passage as a whole are: extensive key-word 
repetition; systematic structural repetitiveness of unit organisation; and lack of 
lexemic variation. The use of key-word repetition is subtly reminiscent of 
Anaxagoras' own style, in which it is widely acknowledged as a pervasive 
characteristic. For example, Denniston comments on Anaxagoras B 12: 
One notices how certain key-words, voüs, nEpLXwp¬iv, throKpivea0aL, and their cognates, 
run through the passage with a recurrent emphasis. Their repetitions flood and permeate, 
rather than strike, the ear. 102 
As outlined in the previous chapter, notable examples in the Phaedo passage are: 
vows; KOQýLEW and its compound &aKOßµEW; Trän; atTLoc and its cognates; and 
ßE XTLQTOS/dpELVWV. 103 Of these, all but atTLos and its cognates and 
f EXTLQTOS/ciIiE(vot are also key terms in Anaxagoras. voDg, KOUI. LEW, and Trän are all 
repeated a great deal in the extant fragments of Anaxagoras, 104 while SLaKo J.. W 
occurs only once, but in the programmatic TrävTa SLEKÖa. LIlaE voüs. 
105 In the 
Phaedo passage it appears shortly after Anaxagoras is named, in a phrase bearing 
many similarities to the Anaxagorean exemplar: voüs EQTLV 6 SLaKOQµwv TE Kai 
Träv-rWv atTtos (97c1-2/III. 2-3). 
01 As the passage progresses, more general allusion to Presocratic physicists becomes apparent. "= Denniston, 1952,4. Cf. also e. g. Deichgräber, 1933,351-2; and Schofield, 1980,6-9. 1"3 Although some instances, such as the repetition of voDT in 97c1,3, and 5, also provide examples 
of 'successive clause or unit' repetition, it is the way in which they are repeated throughout the 
A°assage that makes them exceptional. 
4 See especially Anaxag. B12. 
i05 Anaxag. B 12. 
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As well as the `Prädikationsstil', which incorporates `key-word' repetition and which 
is linked to hymnic style, 106 Deichgräber also identifies the `Argumentationsstil' as 
one of three key styles in Anaxagoras' writing. 107 This seems close to what Thesleff 
describes as `the scientific style' in early Greek prose, found in Anaxagoras and 
other Presocratic prose, and many features of this `Argumentationsstil' or `scientific 
style' also appear in the Phaedo passage. 
First, the organisation of the Platonic passage is reminiscent of this writing. 
Hypotaxis prevails; clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short; while the word 
order is likewise unremarkable and seems 'largely to reproduce the order of the train 
of thought. These features comply with what Thesleff calls the `systematic structure 
of exposition'. Moreover, the passage is differentiated both from the simple 
narrative sequentiality of historical prose narratives by its syntactic complexity, and 
from the periodic structure of Attic oratory by its repetitiveness, its overall 
continuity, and a lack of, for example, antithesis and sound effects. In combination, 
these aspects of Passage III surely evoke the Presocratic prose of Anaxagoras, and 
others. 
Thesleff claims that a key feature of the `scientific style' typical of such writing is 
`explicit argumentation', dependent not on formal logic, but on recurrent `explicit 
patterns'. 108 Many of these can be found in the Phaedo passage. As we have seen, 
its prevalent pattern of argumentation is conditionals, interspersed with a couple of 
explanatory yap clauses. Such structures, introduced by El, tav, or ijv, used widely 
for theorising, appear to be the main tool of systematic explanation and 
argumentation within the Presocratic prose tradition. 109 Notwithstanding specific 
details of individual arguments, certain "broad formal/semantic patterns are 
recurrent. 11° For example, Melissus B8.2 begins with a condition followed by a 
necessary inference (et yap fv rroXXd, TotatTa Xpr airrä EtvaL) and then 
106 Porter, 1949,257, on thematic repetition as an 'integral part of the technique of the hymn style'. 
107 Deichgräber, 1933,353. The third, the 'purely descriptive style' ('rein beschreibenden Stil'), is not 
really relevant here. 
108 Listed in Thesleff, 1966,89, n. 1. 
109 My analysis here is not concerned with the specific logical form of individual arguments used in 
this tradition, but simply with the very broad formal/semantic classification of certain types of 
conditionals. 
1 10 See Thesleff, 1966,89, n. 1 and 93. 
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repeats a similar pattern. The end features a similar construction, "' as do several of 
his other fragments. 112 Such patterns are even more pronounced throughout Zeno 
B1-3,113 and are present, though to a lesser extent, in Anaxagoras and Diogenes of 
Apollonia. 114 Diogenes' Kal Tä äXXa, EL TLS ßovXETaL &vo¬taOaL, EÜP(QKOL &v 
oiiT) &aKELµeva ws ävvcTbv KdXXLVTa... 1115 offers a very close parallel to EL 
otv TLS ßovXoLTO... in Phd. 97c6, verbally and in terms of general context (insofar 
as both sequences state the necessity of discovering the best disposition). Of course, 
conditionals are an important element of many other kinds of writing. Yet in oratory, 
for example, which uses conditionals a great deal, the prevalent types and patterns 
are different from those within the sequential argumentation of philosophical prose, 
not only in context and subject matter, but also in structure. 116 Moreover, within the 
`Anaxagoras episode' the conditionals are also accompanied by other features 
recalling this tradition. 
Other common types of argumentation in the Presocratics and this passage are 
appeals to necessity, such as dvayKaiov & EdvaL... (97d4), "7 and phrases which 
give explicit indication of the reasoning process. "" For example, EL Toü6' o&rwc 
EXEL (97c4) is paralleled in Anaxagoras' TO rrwv & ovTws EX6VTwv, 119 while the 
111 Meliss. B8.5-6. 
112 Meliss. B6,9, and 7.1-2. 
113 In spite of the controversies surrounding its authenticity Gorgias' ITepI TOD µr} 6VTos. provides 
some interesting parallels for such a style. While it is doubtful whether either of the two surviving 
versions, Sext. adv. math. VII. 65ff. (B3) and About Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias (Buchheim, 
1989), preserve the exact wording (Wardy, 1996,9), it nevertheless seems probable that the 
argumentative method they embody is authentic, since throughout both texts, the argument progresses 
by stating a condition in the protasis, followed by the inference from this in the apodosis: e. g. ek- et 
d1LSLOV taTL T6 6V, dTTELp6v EQTLV, EL SE dTTELp6v kQTLV, o 8aj. oD taTLV, ¬1. & tT8aµoü 
iaTLV, O{JK EUTLV. (Gorg. B3.70). 
114 Anaxag. B12, Et µßj ydp...; Diog. Apol1. B2 contains a sequence 'of conditionals, while there are 
other single examples in 3 and 4. 
113 Diog. Apoll. 3. 
116 Even where sequences of conditionals are found in oratory and elsewhere these are most often 
antithetical conditionals: e. g. the two pairs of antithetical conditionals in Lys. 13.75-6; D. 22.28; 
Hp. Aer. 10; Hdt. 3.62.4; or single pairs of antithetical conditionals in Antipho. Ttr. 3.2.6; Lys. 15.8. 
Another common type is the use of a counterfactual past conditional, followed by a statement of the 
true state of affairs (see Usher, 1997,17,19 and passim, on 'hypothetical inversion') which, in spite of 
certain similarities to the counterfactuals used by the Presocratics, can in fact by distinguished from 
these by their formal qualities as well as context. In addition, there is also the common pattern of 
condition given in the protasis with an order, suggestion, or request in the apodosis (e. g. Lys. 13.92; 
Gorg. 11.6; S. E1.585; S. Aj. 187; E. Med. 355; and see Wakker, 1994,263ff. ). 
"' Cf. ZenoB1 and 3; Meliss. B7.2 and 7.10. 118 Cf. Thesleff, 1966,92ff. 
1 19 Anaxag. B4. 
Chapter 5 121 
use of Xöyos in phrases such as Kal Trepl TOO TrpoUXOVTOS 6 atTös Xbyos'2° 
might be compared with && Sri Toü Xöyou Toirrou... (97d1). 
As characteristic of the `scientific style' Thesleff also identifies stylistic austerity, 
`consistent terminology', and `abstractness of expression' such as `wide use of 
abstract nouns', 121 all of which are prominent in Passage II. It contains no imagery, 
no elaborate antitheses or periods, no rare diction, and a comparatively sparse range 
of vocabulary, reflected in its exceptionally small `lexeme-token ratio' of 0.52. With 
respect to word forms and `parts of speech', there are very few adjectives or adverbs 
and an absence of compound nouns, adjectives, or adverbs. 
While abstract nouns in general are obviously not restricted to such prose, the 
particular form which consists of the definite article and neuter adjective is 
noticeably common in Anaxagoras himself, 122 and others. For example, Anaxagoras 
talks about Tb 6ý iKpÖv and TÖ ýWyd, and TOD TE 6LEPOÜ Kai. TOD ýTJpoD Kai 
TOD " 
O¬pp oD Kat TOD LJJUXPOÜ Kai TOD Xaµ1TPOD Kai TOD CO#POD. 
123 This 
noun-form has been labelled as particularly Platonic. 124 Yet its frequency still varies 
and, in this passage, it occurs far more than on average in the dialogue, although all 
examples are either -r6 + (various degrees of) äyae6v or + XELpov. 
Overall, the conjunction of distinctive stylistic features is reminiscent in many ways 
of the type of writing associated with Anaxagoras and, more generally, with 
Presocratic prose. In this way it is a good example of the scope and variety of 
Plato's allusiveness. 
120 Zeno B1. Cf. also Meliss. B7.6. 
121 See Thesleff, 1966,89. 
122 Webster, 1952-3,24, claims that, 'in its full development' this noun-form is found in 'the early 
Hippocratic writings, Anaxagoras, and Thucydides'. Cf. e. g. Hp. Aerl2; Other scholars, e. g. Kühner 
and Gerth, 1955,267-8 and Denniston, 1952,36-7, note the preponderance of such nouns formed 
from adjectives in Plato and from participles in Thucydides, but do not include the Presocratics. Cf. 
e.. Finley, 1942,262. 
'2 Anaxag. frs. B3 and 4 respectively. 
124 Cf. Long, 1968,14. 
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5.5 Passage IV 
The general stylistic character of this passage is peculiarly Platonic, with no strong 
affiliations to any particular genre or 'author, apart from limited similarities with 
Xenophon's Socratic dialogues. In certain respects, the passage is even exceptional 
within the context of Plato's own style. 
The two key features are increasing ellipse in the first part, together with the 
structural parallelism associated with the last two main units. Ellipse and 
parallelism, often in combination, are, as discussed above, characteristic of many 
passages of short questions and answers in Plato125 and, to a certain extent, in 
Xenophon's Memorabilia. 126 However, for a number of reasons the first parts of 
Passage IV stand out among such parallels. 
The structure of the ellipse is much tighter here than elsewhere, subtly increasing 
within the first two sequences, and culminating in the final, single word responses, 
OdvaTOS and ae vaTOV, respectively. This prominence through isolation slightly 
resembles the foregrounding of 4p6vTjQic in Passage I (69a10/I. 5). ' 27 Yet, even 
though the prominence of ýpövTaLs there is exceptionally striking, it is also 
accompanied by a nun4ber of features associated with the types of verse and prose in 
which similar foregrounding is usual, so that its occurrence fits into a broad generic 
affiliation. By contrast, outside Plato, one cannot find even a vague parallel for the 
occurrence of this phenomenon in a passage like IV. 
In addition, the interlocutor's answers here are also exceptional, differing from other 
Platonic dialogues, where the short responses of the interlocutors in such sections are 
usually restricted to a choice of brief and often formulaic words of affirmation or 
denial, or short questions. 128 This is true throughout Platonic dialogues of all three 
periods and, even in the Philebus, in which Protarchus' role is fairly active, his 
''-S Found in all periods: e. g. Euthphr. 10a I O-e9; 13a5ff.; Chrm. 174b1-10; Lys. 213b5ff.; Gorg. 460a5ff.; 
Rep. 410e10-a3; Phdr. 261c4ff.; Tl: t. 189a2-6. Cra. 387b5ff. 
126 E. g. X. Mem. 2.7.5; 3.8.3; 3.9.4; 4.2.14. 
1=7 See p. 103ff., above. 123 Cf. Thesleff, 1967: `Plato employs a wide register of brief confirmative and negative formulae and 
other types of reply'. 
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answers are rarely more than vat or dvdyicri. 129 These short formulaic responses 
may well be a feature of Socratic dialogues in general, given that similar patterns are 
found in Xenophon's Memorabilia, where Socrates' interlocutors often respond with 
phrases such as Kai, µäXa or iTavv iv otv. 130 By contrast, in this Phaedo 
passage, the interlocutor's answers, though short, depart from the stock phrases of 
response and form a vital part of the argumentation and its content. '31 
At the end of this passage the point made at 105e11-106al/IV. 31-2 is expanded into 
two units, with marked parallelism on semantic, syntactic, and formal levels. 
Between these two units there is repetition both of structure and of the lexemes 
äiröXXvµL (106a5 /IV. 36 and 106a10/IV. 41) and ävc5XE6pos (106a3 /IV. 34 and 
106a8/IV. 39). Together with the elliptical omission of d. vayKaiov (106a3 /IV. 34) in 
the second unit, the composition of these two units resembles typical Platonic 
parallelism, outlined in my description of Passage II. 132 
The two distinctive features of lexis here are the large numbers of nouns formed 
from TO + adjectives or participles and of a-privative nouns and adjectives. The first 
of these features is, of course, also prevalent in Passage III, and appears to have a 
broad technical or philosophical prose background, associated as it is with reflective 
passages in Thucydides, the Hippocratic Corpus, and the writings of Presocratics like 
Anaxagoras and Melissus. 
The generic background for the a-privative compounds is more difficult to trace, 
since this noun form is an important feature of Greek, common to all genres. 
Clusters of a-privative compounds are found in varied contexts, such as the 
rhetorical display used to conclude Socrates! outline of the five lives at Rep. 580a 
129 E. g. Phlb. 21a3ff. Cf. Rep. 583c1ff. 
130 See e. g. X. Mem. 3.3.12ff. and 3.10.7ff. However, in the Mem. there is also more of a tendency for 
the interlocutors to mix these responses with longer answers (e. g. 1.2.44; 1.3.9; 3.6.6; and 3.10.2) or 
solely to give longer answers (e. g. 1.4.7ff; 2.2.7 and ff. ). Moreover, it is also common for the 
interlocutor to repeat the same response in successive sequences (e. g. 2.1.2ff.; 2.2.12; 3.2.1-2; and 
3.2.6-7), which hardly ever occurs in Plato. 
I3 There is, of course, the famous episode in which Socrates questions the slave at Meno 82bff. Yet 
even here the majority of answers are simply phrases of affirmation such as vat or Trdvu ye, 
occasionally interspersed with numerical answers. 
132 See 116, above. 
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(&ntaTq, ä&&KCw, d. 4 (Aw, ävoatcP), 133 or Aeschylus' äµaXov d8äµaTOV 
drröXE Lov. 134 Yet one such cluster seems particularly relevant here, from 
Parmenides: 
... TaL" 
8' ETrl crý taT EUQL 
rroXXä µäX', WS CIyEV71TOV Edv KQI ävwXEOpöv EQTLV, 
35 9 QTL yap OÜXOý1EXES TE Kai aTPEýLiS' f 8' CITEXEQTOV' 
This programmatic Parmenidean passage involves not only a group of a-privatives, 
but also the first extant usage of dvtXE6poc, a word then used a small number of 
times, exclusively by Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. 
In keeping with the general distinctiveness of the passage, three of the a-privatives 
also appear to be neologisms: d&JUKTOS, ä6Epµos, and äVdpTLO9. Moreover, within 
extant classical and pre-classical Greek texts ä vKTOS and ä6Epµos are instances of 
hapax legomena, while äväpTLos appears only four times, all in the Phaedo, twice 
within this passage (106al/IV. 31 and 105d15/IV. 18) and twice in close proximity 
(104e5 and 106c3). 
5.6 Passage V 
The composition of this passage is, on the whole, loosely paratactic, emphasised by a 
general absence of particles other than SE, TE, and the prevalent Kai. Thus it has 
certain similarities with historical prose, 136 although there structure is usually 
associated with narrative sequentiality, whereas both temporal and logical 
sequentiality are generally absent from this passage. 
133 Cf. P1. Prt. 321c, in Protagoras' speech: Kai. dvvn6811TOV Kai. daTpwTOV Kal dolrXov. 134 A. Ch. 55. Cf. Heraclit. B50. 
13S Parm. B8.2-4. Athough the text of this fragment is controversial, and dTEXEVTOV has been 
questioned, there does seem to be general agreement over the inclusion of dvoXEBpov, dY VY1TOV, and 
chTpe s. Cf. e. g. KRS, 248. 
136 Although it bears more of a resemblance to Herodotus or Xenophon than Thucydides. 
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Des Places picks out 111b4-c4 as an example of characteristically Platonic `ä 
rallonges' phrasing. 137 He mentions the proliferation of Ka( and compares it to 
certain other Platonic passages, although these feature sequences of relative clauses. 
While the looseness of logical connection in his cited passages is comparable, our 
passage's striking parataxis is a crucial aspect of its composition and puts it at odds 
with these other passages, which share its looseness, but are, nevertheless, 
predominantly hypotactic. 138 
In this passage's elaborate `geographical' description varied parallel structures, used 
to contrast the `true' earth to our own, represent (with the exception of parataxis), the 
only recurrent aspect of unit organisation. It also contains an exceptionally large 
number of lists, and these are not reinforced by other parallel structures. In relation 
to both Plato and extant Greek literature in general, the passage presents a highly 
unusual appearance, with no clear stylistic parallels. 139 
In part this may be due to the loss of early geographical texts. Of Hecateus, the 
`father of geography', '40 the extant geographical fragments comprise little more than 
a few groups of names, '4' while the extensive works of many other key geographers 
are lost entirely. 142 However, some idea of common stylistic traits and how these 
compare to the Phaedo passage can be derived from what does survive. 
Extant early geography is perhaps best represented by certain passages of Herodotus, 
although a work such as the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places may also be useful. In 
addition to this, the Periplus of Pseudo-Scylax, '43 thought to have been written 
between 360 and 347 BC, also provides evidence for the stylistic features of these 
137 Des Places, 1950,365. 
138 Cf. 5.3.1, above. 179 Kingsley, 1995, chs. 7-8, suggests that the myth's geography is based on that of Sicily, though he 
does not focus on style. He points out aspects of the Phaedo myth which are common to later 
geographical works, but the correspondences are not stylistic and the attested writers, Diodorus 
Siculus and Strabo, are much later than our period. Furthermore no primary sources survive to 
validate his proposal that the `mythical material' has Pythagorean origins, so that, apart from a slight 
verbal echo of Empedocles (86), there is no earlier or contemporary verbal evidence for the tradition 
to which the Phaedo myth is ascribed. 
140 Tozer, 1935,75. 
141 E. g. Hecat. frs. 271; 274; 276. See Warmington, 1934, xxxviii; Tozer, 1935,71. 
142 Warmington, 1934, xlvii.. 
143 Müller, 1882,1.15-95. 
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early topographical works. 144 The structure of the sections on geography in 
Herodotus is mainly paratactic and often very simple, although occasional moments, 
where certain places, peoples, or geographical features are contrasted with each 
other, might seem comparable to the Phaedo passage. 145 Nevertheless, on the whole, 
Herodotean geography is very plain and lacking in detailed description, parallel 
structures, imagery, distinctive lexis, or structural complexity, 146 and many passages 
comprise simple catalogues of location or distance. 147 The style of Pseudo-Scylax's 
Periplus is even plainer, with short clauses linked by simple and highly repetitive 
coordination, and a pervasive cataloguing of locations and names. '48 
There is a certain degree of similarity between this descriptive tradition and the 
Phaedo passage, insofar as both are predominantly paratactic, and share, for 
example, an absence of the same particles and the predominance of 8E, Te, and 
(especially) Kat. Nevertheless, Passage V has complexity and variety absent from 
the geographers, in its use of imagery and parallelism and its diverse stylistic modes 
of contrast. The Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places perhaps provides a closer model, 
in that it offers a detailed geographical account of Asia and Europe, 149 including 
some parallel structures and comparatives used to show the contrasts between the 
two continents. Parataxis is predominant, but is accompanied by a certain amount of 
loose hypotaxis, so that, as in Passage V, there is no logical or temporal sequentiality 
interconnecting the units, but also not the same repetitive simplicity as found in the 
other geographical texts. 
144 As well as Pseudo-Scylax, there is also the periplus of Hanno the Carthiginian, a work translated 
from the original Punic inscription, which is said to date some time around 480-470 BC (Tozer, 1935, 
104; OCD 1996,666). The style is similar to that of Pseudo-Scylax, although with more elements of 
simple hypotaxis. However, it would be risky to use this as evidence, since the dating and background 
of the surviving translation is uncertain. 
145 E. g. 2.10 and 4.50, in which the phrase describing the balance of complementary processes, which 
keeps the height of the Danube constant, arguably bears a very slight resemblance to Passage V: TOD 
I. l! `V XELýLWVOS EUTL ÖQOS TiEp taTl, 6XL'YW TE VICWV T? S WUTOÜ 06QLOS 'y(VETav' ÜETaL 
yap 11 yf aÜTlj TOD XELiLWVOS näµrrav 6Äiyq, VL4ETW & iidvTa XpäTaL. TOD s& 6 pEoc f XLWV EV TGW XELVWVL TreaoOaa, EOÜQa dµoAaOAj , 7KOI1ýVrl TrdVTOOEV IQ&Lßot 4S TÖV 
"I aTpov... 
146 The most descriptive detail occurs at e. g. 4.47: ij TE yap yf koDaa Tre&L S aDTn nol68rls TE 
Kai. EÜUSpOS EUTL, lTOTaIiOi TE 8L a. rrT c OODUL Oll T oXXti TEW dpLO116V Wor over T(. JV ! `V Al. yirrW Swp1Xwv. Cf. 4.185 or 2.7. 147 E. g. 4.85: TOD TÖ LIEN giKOS and&a EIQL EKaTÖV, Kai XIXLOL Kai. µvpLOL, Tb Si EÜpoc, TTY 
EÜpÜTaTOS afrrbs EWUToD, aTd&LOI TPLT1K6QLOL Kai. TpLQXIXLOL. Cf. 2.6ff; 4.36ff. 
148 A typical passage is e. g. 46: EIQL sE Kai. ÜXAaL TroXXal 7r6XELS AaKESaLg6vlwv. hV 
I. teaOyelq S EQTi ETrdprrl Kai. &Ual TTOXXai. napdrrxouc & TýS AaKe8aLI. LOVCWV XWpac 
TtEPWV TPLWV. 
9 Hp. Aer. 12ff. 
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Various aspects of Airs, Waters, Places bear similarities to Passage V. The 
Hippocratic treatise has, for instance, a certain leaning towards comparison, '50 
juxtaposed repetition, and other parallel structures, as in: 
TTOXÜ yap KaXXIOVa Kai, i ECova TraVTa ytveTaL iv Tý AQ(7y T"I TE 
XWplj Tfic X6pTIS 71ýVpWTEpTl Kai Ta 7eEa T(Jv ävOptTrwv T1TTICi)TEpa 
Kai EÜOpyT TÖTEpa. 151 
As in Passage V, unit organisation is loose and predominantly paratactic, but 
nevertheless includes a variety of clauses, especially relative. A comparison of Asia 
to the spring- 
ELKÖS TE 7V X( PTV Ta1TflV TOD 1jpos E'Y'y(TaTQ EtVaL KaTÜ TT'V 
41')QLV KdL TTjV gETPLÖTTTTU TWV d)PEWV. 
- is interestingly similar to some of the analogies drawn in Passage V. The Phaedo 
passage draws an analogy between the relationship of, on the one hand, air and water 
and, on the other, aether and air. Although this reads like imagery, the boundaries 
are confused by the fact that air, aether, and water are themselves explicit subjects of 
discussion elsewhere in the passage. The analogy is preceded by another which 
compares the function of air and aether for those who live on the true earth with the 
function of water and air on our 'earth'. 152 Likewise, the Airs, Waters, Places 
comparison of a region to a season raises the question of whether to take it as 
imagery, with spring as the vehicle, when the seasons themselves constitute an 
explicit topic in the treatise! 53 
ISO Formal devices of comparison, however, do not feature widely in the Hippocratic work: 
significantly its description of Asia is simply followed by that of Europe, with no point by point 
contrast. 
51 Hp. Aer. 12. 
152 See ch. 4 p. 92, above. 153 See e. g. Hp. Aer. I. Moreover, one of the treatise's key premises is that the nature of a people 
assimilates itself to the geography of its country, so that, against this background of correspondences 
between different natural phenomena, it is conceivable that there might also be actual correspondence 
between season and geography. 
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Finally, the emphasis on contrast in Passage V recalls a short Anaxagorean fragment, 
B4, which appears to discuss the existence of another parallel world. Although 
Anaxagoras, unlike Plato, is emphasising the absolute correspondence, both passages 
nevertheless list features of another earth, using phrases like wQrrep trap' fl itv, in 
the former, and Warrep fµ¬is and worrep of bed8e, in the latter. 
One feature that serves to distinguish our passage from other extant geographical 
descriptions is imagery, the clearest example being the painting simile at 110b8- 
c1N. 4-5. As stated above, 154 the meaning of the vehicle term 6eLyµara here 
appears to be different from' its usage elsewhere. Furthermore the simile is also 
extended by a relative clause, ots Sf} ol ypa4fc KaTaXpWVTat. In all pre- 
Hellenistic literature there seem to be only three other images involving ypa4ls, two 
of them in the Republic, and the third and perhaps the closest in Empedocles. '55 As 
in the Phaedo, the Republic examples are concerned with accuracy, '56 although the 
accuracy at issue in the two Republic passages is poetic and epistemological 
respectively, whereas the Phaedo simile belongs to a discussion of geographical 
phenomena. It is, in this respect, much closer to the Empedoclean example, which 
compares the coming into being of all the earth's creatures to the act of artistic 
creation and the mixing of colours: 
ws S' STrOTav ypa4EE9 dVaO LaTa TrOLK(XALQLV 
ävEpEs äµßi TEXV11S ÜTTÖ [U TLOs EÜ SE8cU TE, 
01 LT' E1TEI oliv µ. äpjsoai rroXvXpoa 4äpµaKa XEpo(v, 
äpµov(, I1d avTE Tä µßv rrXEw, äXXa S' Waac, 
EK T(3V EL8Ea 1TdaiV a'X('YKLa TTOpaÜVOUQL, 
SEVSpEQ TE KT(COVTE Kal dvEpas i8 yUVatKas 
Opas T O'LWVOÜs TE Kal t18aT06pEgiiovas txO s 
KQ( TE eE0l1s SOXLXa(WVas TLS 
. 
JUL OEp(QTOUS' 
See Ch. 4 p. 9 t, above. 
iss Emp. B23. 
136 Rep. 377e and 484c. 
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It is therefore possible that the Phaedo simile involves a direct allusion to 
Empedocles. '57 This may be of particular interest if, as Kingsley argues, the Phaedo 
`myth' is in some way connected to Empedoclean ideas. 158 
5.7 Passage VI: 117c3-118a17 
Passage VI exhibits no outstanding uses of parallel structures, no particular patterns 
of unit organisation, and no imagery. Its vocabulary is differentiated from the other 
passages by containing no compound nouns or adjectives; a much greater number of 
compound verbs; and a marked lack of adjectives and adverbs. The structure of the 
passage is based on simple temporal sequentiality, so that it has a vivid, almost 
`stream of consciousness' effect. 
In very general terms, then, Passage VI appears to be most clearly affiliated to 
historiographical narratives and the most simple of the first person narratives in 
Lysianic oratory, with distinct likenesses, for example, to certain aspects of 
Euphiletus' speech in On the Murder of Eratosthenes. 159 Common to all these works 
is a narrative sequentiality, while they are also characterised by an absence of 
periodic unit organisation and a clear lack of all but temporal and spatial adjectives 
and adverbs. '60 
The passage also has certain similarities to verse narratives, although these tend to be 
far more descriptive, with copious qualitative adjectives and adverbs as well as 
imagery. This is true both of epic narrative and of passages like messengers' 
speeches in tragedy. So, for example, Homeric narratives have a simple temporal 
structure, 161 but do contain numerous descriptive terms and similes. '62 Euripidean 
's7 This might be supported by a possible echo in Empedocles' TroiKLXX aw in the Phaedo's 1rOLKLXI1 
110b7N. 3). 
58 Kingsley, 1995,112ff. 
59 Lys. 1.6-28. See e. g. Edwards, 1999,7, on simple sentences in Lysianic narratives (and 58ff. on 
the possible relation between simplicity and the'simple character of Euphiletus. 
160 On the plain style of e. g. early historiographers, see D. H. Th. 5 and 23, although, as Lilja, 1968,132 
and passim, has shown, there is significant variance between such authors, and their style may have 
been more elaborate than generally assumed. 161 Cf. especially those Homeric narratives of the the greatest intensity, e. g. I1.24.468-479. 
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narrative sometimes shows slight similarities to the Plato passage, 163 with temporal 
sequentiality'" and a lack of the complex subordinate clauses associated, for 
example, with Sophoclean narrative. 165 Yet, Euripides still has a greater diversity of 
word order and supplements the action with far more descriptive terms and 
imagery. 166 
Returning to prose narratives, we may note, in Passage VI, its marked absence of 
genitive absolutes. It shares this feature with the `vivid' parataxis found in early 
historical narratives! 67 In later historiography, especially Thucydides, narrative 
passages abound in genitive absolutes and other participial clauses, which often. 
convey elements of the main action. Herodotus and Xenophon use these 
constructions similarly, albeit to a slightly lesser extent. 168 Like Passage VI, Lysias' 
simpler narratives, such as Euphiletus' narrative, also contain few genitive absolutes 
and, when these do occur, they usually only give general surrounding circumstances 
for the main stages of events. 169 
Passage VI's most repetitive structural feature is clauses beginning with a finite verb 
preceded by a nominative participle. This pattern is common in prose narratives, 
and, when repeated, seems characteristic of earlier writing, like vivid narratives in 
162 E. g. in the narrative at 11.15.358-9ff., the length of the pathway cleared by Apollo is said to be öoov 
T ETi. 8ovpÖc EpW71I'fL'YVETai, 6 rrr6T dv p QOEVEOS 'RELpL . LEVOT 
AAL. Cf. 11.17.262-5 and 281- 
3. 
163 Cf. Barlow, 1971,73 on the 'leanness and economy of Euripides' narrative'. 
164 Cf. Barlow, 1971,61 
165 See e. g. E. EL74 and lph. T. 260. Cf. S. Tr899 and OT 1237ff. 
" E. g. E. Bacch. 1066-7 and Hipp. 1198. See Barlow, 1971, on the 'descriptive imagery' and other 
'devices' in Euripidean messenger speeches. 167 Russell, 1991,74 n. 24 and 114. Cf. Lilja, 1968, whose findings suggest that the lack of genitive 
absolutes is characteristic of the earliest narrative prose, with none in Hecateus or Charon (76,85), 
and only an occasional 'temporal' genitive absolute in the other early historiographers (82,88). 
168 E. g. Th. 2.67.4: d4LKO1. LEVWV & allTWV 8E(aavTES Ol' A9rlvatOL Töv' ApLVTEa µil atALT Q$äS 
ITL TrXEiW KaKOVP'Yý SLaOU'16V, ÖTL Kat TrpÖ TOÜT(ZV T& TTT T10TELsa[aS Kal TIZV ETft 
ep4Krls näVTa E4aiVETO ttpdýa$', dKp1TOVT Kal ßouX041EVOVT IaTLV a ciTrEty all riLep6v 
dtlTEKTELvav 7rdvTas Kal IS Odpayya Ia paXov, 8LKaLOÜVTES TOTS alrrotS dµvvEaOaL of rep 
Kai. 01 AaKESaLµ6vtOL rmjptav, Toi) iµrr6pouc 6T EXaßov'A6rlva1WV Kal Twv tvµµdXWV IV 
&xdaL iiepI fleXotr6vnaov 1TXEOVTaS dTrOKTE[VaVTES KQL IT Odpa-Nas iapaX6vrec. Cf. e. g. 
Hdt. 1.82 and X. HC 2.2.9-10. 
169 E. g. Lys. 1.15: µe rä & TQOTa, w äv8peT, Xp6vou µETaty SLayevogivou Kai i 1Oü iroX6 
änOXEXELVIAVOU Twv k. LauToü KaKwV. Cf. also e. g Lys. 3.5-14, in which there is only one, 
circumstantial, genitive absolute (at 6: v6ov Ovawv Ti c TE d8EXcijc Ti1S i? LFT Kai. T(Zv 
d8EX4L84v); and the account of the actions of Andocides in 6.21-30. The same is even true of the 
more 'sophisticated' narrative in Lys. 12.4-22. 
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Herodotus and the early historians. Once again, it also appears in the `simple' 
narrative of such orators as Lysias. 170 
Other narrative features here appear to have similar affinities. For example, there are 
the formal aspects of the introduction of direct speech into the main account. While 
direct speech is common within most types of narrative, there is great variation in the 
formal markers used to distinguish it from the main narrative. '7' In Passage VI both 
sequences of direct speech are indicated by what Bers calls `interrupting quotatives', 
a word or phrase indicating direct quotation: for example EKEivos SE, ota, 
TTOLELTE w 6avµäaiot... (117d7/VI. 14). Although `needless iteration of quotatives is 
a familiar feature of naive narration', 172 it seems that interrupting quotatives like 
those used here are a later innovation, found in narrative passages of Andocides, 
Lysias, Isaeus, and Aeschines. 173 In earlier oratory, such as Antiphon, direct speech 
itself is avoided. 174 While Xenophon features a mixture of quotatives which interrupt 
and which precede direct speech, 175 neither Herodotus nor Thucydides use the 
former, and both keep to introductory phrases such as Herodotus' b 81 E11TE or 
Thucydides' XEywv ME. As support for the view that interrupting quotatives are 
associated with `plainer' or more colloquial style, we might note that they are used in 
comic verse, with occasional examples in Aristophanes and a large number in 
Menander. 176 
170 E. g. Hdt. 1.115: dKo aaS SE Kal t& v'AQTvdy T, 0EXWV TLµwpfaaL TQ 1TaL51 TL11fS Ti S 
'ApTEgßdpEOS EIVEKa, gETETtýLTTETO TÖV TE a0UK6XOV Kai T6V 1TQL8a. 
iTTE(TE 81 rrapfaav 
d 14ÖTEpOL, fXE rac npbc Tbv Küpov 6' Avrvdyric 9071"""" Cf. e. g. 3.89 A number of such 
constructions are to be found in the lists of participial constructions in e. g. Pherecydes and Hellanicus, 
given by Li1ja, 1968,82 and 88. For oratory cf. e. g. Lys. 6.27. dTro8päs S& k TO&rOU TOD' 
KLVUVOU KaTETrXEUaEV Etc TT V EaVTOÜ 1T6XLV EA TWV TETpaKOa[WV" <Toaabnv yap 6> 
Oe6c XV 9$WKEV, (iicTE EIT TO; 1i8LKgg&OUS ai)TObT 17EO f71QEV d4LKEQeaL. 
d4LK6ltevoS sE E&0Tl & Kal 1 KtUBTj, &TTWXETO s& ObXL, dXX Wffij. Kai d61K11QaS EtpXOi" 
thro8päc &...; 1.18; And. Mysteries 38. 
171 Direct speech is found within narratives in most genres. Bers, 1997, proposes that: the language 
used by Homer in direct speech is different from his other language (10); that in both epic and lyric, 
poets alert audiences to the boundaries between third person narrative and direct speech (15); and that 
in non-comic verse there is always an explicit verbal introduction (116). 
172 Bers, 1997,193. There is also an example of direct speech without introduction in Hecat. fr. 30 See 
also e. g. kussell, 1991,4, and Lilja, 1968,70 and 100, n. 15. 
1" E. g. Lys. 1.16; And. Mysteries131-2. See Bers, 1997,182 and 193. 
174 Bers, 1997,131-2. 
175 It seems that Xenophon uses these with shorter (e. g. 1.7.6; 5.4.32; 6.1.11) and longer (e. g. 
1.7.16ff. ) passages of direct speech respectively. 
176 E. g. Ar. Pax. 76-7 (see Bers, 1997,116) and Menand. Samia242. 
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Another feature of Passage VI associated with oratorical and also historical 
narratives is explanatory parenthesis. These occur a number of times in this passage, 
ranging from those like WATE EyKaXv(äµEvos dinEKXaov t tau röv - ov yap 6ý 
EKetv6v ye ... 
(1 17c8NI. 6ff. ), where the parenthesis is inserted at the end of a phrase 
and a pause seems fairly natural, to Kal EKKaXviJJd.. IEVOS - EVEKEK(AtmTO 'Yap 
E11TEV -Ö& TEXUTaLOV EýOEy aTO -W KPCTWV, Eý11... (118a6NI. 29ff. ), in 
which the inserted clause divides two closely cohering elements, and is then 
immediately followed by another parenthetical phrase. The majority of writers tend 
towards the first type of parenthesis, using it at fairly natural unit divisions and, 
although it is difficult to establish absolute patterns, the more usual type of 
parenthesis appears to be found, for example, between the two parts of a p. v/SE 
sequence. '77 More drastic divisions, like Xenophon's of µßv (IxxoL KpfTES, 
äXlaKEaOaL yap E4aaav To 8p6µ4, EKTTEQOVTES.... 178 are less common and 
usually occur as a feature of `vivid' narration within the `plainer' styles of narrative 
in writers such as Lysias, Xenophon, the early historians, and Andocides. 
179 
Finally, a few elements of this passage could perhaps be seen as reminiscent of 
Homer or tragedy. 6aKpiELv and its cognates (117c6NI. 6 c8/8; d4/13; e4/21), the 
only noticeable example of key-word repetition here, is, as might be expected, a term 
much repeated in (though not confined to) such works. 
180 More specifically, 
however, Phaedo's final description of Socrates, äv8p6S... TG V TOTE wV 
ilTELPdffil1LEV dpLQTOU Kat dXXws 4pOVLýtWTdTOU Kaa SLKaLOTdTOU (118a16- 
7NI. 39-41), evokes an Iliadic or tragic topos of posthumous praise and bears certain 
similarities to phrases similar to the Iliad's tiE4aTaL S' (SpLQTOS' AXalc73v, 18' like the 
Trachiniae's description of Heracles just after his death: trdtTwv dipLQTOV dv6pa 
182 T@V tTrl XAovl/..., 5noLOV äXXov OiK ö rTOTý. 
1" E. g. D. 01.2.18. See McQueen, 1986,42, on this and similar examples. Cf. Aeschin. 3.172; X. An. 
5.2; Lys. 1.19; P1. Rep. 615a; AntiphoHerodes21. 
'78 X. An. 5.2.31. 
19 See e. g. Lys. 3.10; 12.15; And. 1.111; Aeschin. 3.148. On the informality of the narrative in And. 
Msteries see Usher, 1999,48 and 56ff. on the simplicity of the narrative in e. g. Lys. 1. 
'go E. g. H. 11.6.455,459,484,496; E. E1.181: S6KpuaL vuXevw, 6aKp6wv 8k µoL JAXEL. Cf. e. g. 
S. Tr. 848-52. 
181 Hom. I1.17.689. Cf. e. g. Nagy, 1979,26-33. 
182 S. Tr. 811-2. Cf. e. g. E. Helen1686-7. 
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Notwithstanding these few points, it seems that the style of passage VI is most 
similar to the plain narratives found in historiographical and rhetorical prose, with 
perhaps the closest parallel being the first-person narratives of Lysias. 
5.8 Summary 
From the analysis of these short passages alone, it is clear that Plato's reputation as 
an extraordinary stylistic innovator is well deserved. Not only does he create 
unusual combinations of elements taken from a full range of genres, so as to create 
unusual elements within his discourse, but he also innovates beyond these in 
apparently unprecedented ways, producing various stylistic effects which seem 
unique to Platonic discourse. 
The stylistic analysis in the previous chapter not only revealed enormous variety, but 
indicated that every passage had its own distinctive stylistic character. 
Correspondingly, in terms of generic affiliation, prominent stylistic features are taken 
from a very wide variety of generic backgrounds, while individual passages each 
have entirely different generic characters. 
As a whole, Platonic style appears to represent a diverse fusion of all Greek 
genres. 183 While some sections, such as Passage III, are tied to one particular genre, 
most actually combine different generic features to produce distinctive stylistic 
structures. One might say their typological distinctiveness (apparent from the 
analysis in Chapter 4) is enhanced by the diversity of their generic affinities, as well 
as the uniqueness of some items. 
For example, Passage II combines: loose hypotaxis, for which hymnic invocations 
provide something of a model; ring composition, a phenomenon most closely 
associated with early verse and prose; and a large number of instances of hyperbaton, 
which is most commonly found in classical verse and oratory, although the Platonic 
examples are distinctive, both individually and for appearing in clusters. 
183 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 14. Cf. Nightingale, 1995,2. 
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Furthermore, the main section is interrupted by a sequence whose units share none of 
these stylistic features, but have an entirely different stylistic character of their own, 
with separate generic affiliations. On this evidence, Plato's style appears to involve a 
mixture of generic affiliation and innovation, which uses and combines generic 
features in unusual ways and adds stylistic elements with no clear generic 
background. The latter is most obvious in Passage IV, which lacks stylistic models 
on all levels, from the parallelism and ellipse of the unit organisation, to the number 
of distinctive a-privative terms. 
By contrast, the stylistic affiliations of Passage III are so clear and specific that it is 
clearly allusive. The text alludes both to Anaxagoras and, more widely, to 
Presocratic prose. This is apparent on all levels of textual organisation, from the 
structure of units to the prevalence of lexemes with a particular noun-form. 
All six passages can be broadly categorised in terms of affiliation and innovation. 
While III is the most allusive, V and VI also have fairly clear generic models, evident 
on all levels of stylistic structure, from the selection of individual lexemes to the 
types of unit organisation. At the other end of the spectrum comes N, differentiated 
from the other passages by its lack of generic affiliations. The remaining two 
passages fall somewhere in between these two groups. Passage I is perhaps closer to 
the first group, innovating within a framework of clear generic models, while 
Passage II, with its unusual and distinctively Platonic unit organisation, tends slightly 
more towards Passage IV. 
5.8.1 Selection of passages for case studies 
The passages selected for the case studies in the chapters that follow include one 
from each of these three groups. III, the most allusive of the passages, exemplifies a 
stylistic mode with clear generic affiliations; IV is representative of a distinctive 
style lacking obvious models; while I lies midway between these types. In the case 
studies I will put these passages back into their wider contexts to explain the 
significance of their stylistic character, as it has emerged from the last two chapters. 
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I have also selected these three partly because they can be taken to represent different 
questions and attitudes within scholarship on the Phaedo. Passage IV comes from 
what is known as the `final argument'. Of all parts of the Phaedo this is the section 
which has received probably the most critical attention, especially within those 
readings characteristic of the twentieth-century `analytical' approach. By contrast, 
Passage I, the `peroration' of Socrates' `apology' has had little comment, and is not, 
as a rule, incorporated in any substantial way into modern philosophical discussions. 
Finally, there is Passage III, the part of Socrates' `intellectual autobiography', in 
which he describes his reactions to reading Anaxagoras. The standard interpretation 
of this passage reduces it to a single point, while critics have puzzled over how its 
demands for a teleological account of causation can be reconciled with the rest of the 
dialogue. This is a passage whose significance is sometimes recognised, but never 
fully explored. 
Thus, in terms of their style, their generic affiliation, and their critical reception, 
these three passages provide a varied and representative basis on which to examine 
how style contributes to argument and can affect our interpretation of the dialogue. 
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Partli: Case Studies 
137 
Chapter 6 
Stylistic transition: from Socrates `apology' to the `argument from 
opposites' 
Stylistic analysis, according to my definition of style in Chapter 2, has revealed the 
`semantic structure of the microcontextual formal features of the text'. We can now 
consider its role within the argument and how it affects philosophical interpretation. 
This chapter is the first of three case studies exploring such questions by examining 
the function of distinctive stylistic traits in argumentation. Each study focuses on 
one of the earlier six passages, broadening the discussion to incorporate aspects of its 
wider context. 
6.1 Introduction 
I concentrate here on the end of Socrates' `apology' (my earlier Passage I, 69a6-e4), ' 
whose style, like the `apology' in general, makes it by modern standards an unlikely 
vehicle for philosophical analysis. Thus, despite the current consensus that all the 
dialogue's parts are philosophically relevant, it is still difficult to develop an 
interpretation of any complexity or substance. There is very little detailed critical 
literature on the `apology', the main exception being the imagery in 69a6-c3, 
discussed by several commentators. Nevertheless, they still fail to follow through 
the full implications of its stylistic structure, as I will show below. 
Best described as `expanded explanation', style in the `apology' mixes clear generic 
affiliations with innovation. By explaining how its elements move towards a number 
of reasoned conclusions I aim to demonstrate that it is an argument, albeit one whose 
style differs substantially from conventional philosophical modes. I will discuss the 
`peroration' (Passage I) together with some other parts of the stylistically similar 
`apology', looking at key stylistic features and their generic affiliations. 
Socrates' `apology' refers to Phd. 63c8-69e4. Cf. Hackforth, 1955,57, on this section as Socrates' 
` "defence", his second Apology'. 
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I shall consider the `apology' both by itself and in relation to the subsequent 
`argument from opposites' (70c4-72e2). The transition between them constitutes one 
of the most dramatic stylistic changes within the Phaedo and draws attention to their 
contrasting features. In Chapters 4 and 5 we saw that the stylistic distinctiveness of 
individual sections is a prominent characteristic of the Phaedo. These two 
juxtaposed and very different passages provide an interesting forum for investigating 
key aspects and possible motivations for this distinctiveness. 
Not only is style in the 'argument from opposites' radically different from the 
`apology' but, unlike the much neglected `apology', it has been the focus of much 
critical discussion. 2 By contrast to the `apology', its style, as with the other three 
`main arguments', can be assimilated to some degree to modern models of 
`philosophical argument', 3 laying out premises and conclusions fairly clearly and 
unambiguously, and therefore lending themselves easily to philosophical 
interpretation and critique. 
This transition between sections is therefore also a good focal point for comparison 
of, in modem terms, (ostensibly) `non-philosophical' and `philosophical' styles and 
for discussion of what constitutes `philosophical style' within a Platonic context, 
with reference to its difference from, or correspondence with, modern paradigms. To 
answer these questions I will conclude by examining: whether the differing stylistic 
constructions affect the role of argument in either of these sections; their relationship 
with each other and other parts of the dialogue; and finally, whether distinctions 
between them might signify some difference in evaluative status. 
6.1.1 From Socrates' `apology' to the 'argument fron opposites': a moment of 
transition. 
The move from Socrates' `apology' to the `argument from opposites' marks a 
fundamental shift between stages of the dialogue, which is accompanied by a striking 
stylistic transition. There is a dramatic change from the `peroration', a long speech 
2 Cf. Introduction, p. 15, above. 
3 With the possible exception of the 'affinity argument'. 
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speech with many traits of elevated rhetorical discourse and verse, to short 
repetitively structured questions and answers in the `argument from opposites'. My 
aim is not a comprehensive analysis of either of these sections, but rather to point out 
and classify their most prominent features, examining their contribution to the 
formation of argument. 
Structure and value: some key differences 
The `argument from opposites' exhibits clear logical sequentiality in moving 
between individual units and sections and this is reinforced by large numbers of 
inferential particles. It is divided into distinct steps by its short question and answer 
format and the main sections comprise individual units with highly repetitive 
organisation and vocabulary, all of which helps to establish firmly the processes 
being described and makes it relatively easy to distinguish and paraphrase the 
argument's main stages. I will refer to these predominant structural features as 
`verbal minimalism', borrowing `minimalism' from a musical context. This terms 
applies to pieces developing through repeated structural elements and very slight 
variation, so that structure is foregrounded and changes within individual stages are 
minimal. 
By contrast, the `apology' mainly contains long speeches which, though connected, 
do not have similar logical sequentiality to the `argument from opposites'. In 
Chapter 4, I explained how most of the `peroration' (69a-e5) can be seen as 
`expanded explanation' through: predominant parataxis with much apposition; 
prevalent copulative and adversative particles, combined with a general absence of 
inferential and confirmatory ones; repetitively structured lists with polysyndeton; 
extended imagery; many pleonastic pairs; and distinct lexemic as opposed to 
structural repetition. Although most pronounced in the `peroration', many of these 
4 Schwartz, 1996,9: 'Minimalist music is based on the notion of reduction, the paring down to a 
minimum of the materials that a composer will use in a given work. In the classic minimalist 
compositions of the 1960s, practically every musical element - harmony, rhythm, dynamics, 
instrumentation - remains fixed for the duration of the work, or changes very slowly. And the chief 
structural technique is unceasing repetition'. Cf. 11, on Reich: 'Reich emphasized that the structure of 
the music.. . must be audible to the listener'. 'Minimalism' may be a useful term here. However, it is important not to push the musical analogy too far, since the structure of the argument here is directed 
at establishing certain principles and conclusions. By contrast, in music the 'structure', to a great 
extent, simply is the music (see Schwartz, 1996,9). 
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features also occur elsewhere within the `apology'. So, for example, we find 
polysyndetic lists and pleonasm at 66c2-3 and 66c5-6. Moreover, the long speeches 
throughout have an absence of inferential particles like otv and dpa .5 
Traditional methods of philosophical analysis make it difficult to establish any stages 
of `argument' here, beyond paraphrasing its main claims. Yet even if most of the 
passage does not lay out clear patterns of inference, we can still isolate connections 
between particular individual words, phrases, or structures which, both individually 
and cumulatively, come together to form an argument. This proceeds by exploiting a 
variety of verbal associations, which extend both backwards and forwards on all 
levels of the text and can be called, collectively, a `nexus of associations'. The 
phrases `nexus of associations' and `verbal minimalism' encapsulate some 
predominant stylistic tendencies, but are not comprehensive characterisations. Their 
meanings and appropriateness will become more apparent through detailed analysis 
of the distinct parts and features of the two sections. 
The passages also differ greatly in respect of evaluative language. Whereas the 
`apology' is very rich in such language and uses it to forge links between the 
evaluative status of its components, the terminology of the `argument from 
opposites' is, by contrast, almost exclusively neutral, with explicit normativity only 
in occasional evaluations of the argument, like Cebes' µo1 8oKei9 travTdiTaaLv 
dA? 7O1 VyeLv (72d4-5). 
6.2 The end of Socrates' `apology' (66b1-69e5): argument and value through a 
'nexus of associations'. 
In the `apology' Socrates offers a defence of the philosopher's willingness to die and 
confidence that a philosophical life will lead to the greatest goods in the afterlife (e. g. 
63e8-64b9), claiming that death and the philosophical life which aspires to be like 
death will bring the individual closest to truth. He justifies his views by arguing that 
s They are, however, found within the occasional shorter speeches, such as 67b7-c3 or 68b8-c3. 
Moreover, they are very common in 68c5-69a5 which, I argue below, p. 168, is a stylistic anomaly 
within this section. On the general uses of dpa and oüv in argument, see Sicking and Ophuijsen, 1993, 
102ff and WE 
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the philosophical life itself attains value through emulation of death, while also 
leading to better conditions after death itself. 
Accordingly, his explanation of what constitutes the philosophical life is inextricably 
intertwined with a demonstration of its value. Yet this involves a radical redefinition 
of the very way in which value itself is conceived and he must distinguish this 
carefully from its conventional conception. Throughout the `apology' he achieves 
this by using conventional techniques which invest phenomena with value, while 
often undercutting their very basis. In doing so he constructs a value system and 
simultaneously depicts the faults of the alternative system, despite relying heavily on 
its language. The following sections concern the O main techniques used in the 
arguments for, and explanation of, a 4pövTTQLS-based morality. 
6.21 The value of Opöi. 7Qts and a Op&Tms based system 
The `apology' culminates in the description of 4p6vilms-, claiming its central 
importance for the philosophical life with striking metaphor, simile, aural imagery, 
and other devices, the cumulation of which all seem to suggest its extraordinary 
value. In this way it addresses the speech's initial aims, to justify both the 
philosopher's confidence when dying and hope of attaining the greatest benefits after 
death: pEylvTa otoEaOaL ayaea EITELSCUJ TEXEUT1 ati (64a1-2). For in the 
`apology' Socrates presents ýpövrlvls as the philosopher's aim in life which he 
acquires fully after death, 6 while the `peroration' itself stresses its value. 
To support such claims Socrates must establish the value of 4p6vgais. Yet, what 
reasons are given for its value?. It is not enough simply to agree that philosophers 
strive towards this. For this shows that philosophers value 4p6vr atc, but not why. 
According to traditional readings, which appeal to the conventional `Socratic' 
wisdom/virtue connection, 4, p6nQtc' normativity appears to derive from its relation 
to virtue. What I intend to show is that, rather than simply stating the value of 
4pövrlais, either in itself or through its connection with virtue, the `apology' actually 
6 E. g. 66e2ff. and passim. 
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uses the `nexus of associations' which constitutes its stylistic structure to provide a 
number of reasons for the intrinsic value of 4p6vrlcis 7 
Unraveling these associations is by no means simple, given a number of clear 
difficulties. Yet both their problematic and straightforward implications lead to 
further understanding of the character of 4pövrlvis, as well as of the reasons for its 
normativity and for rejecting the alternative value system. In this way, a full 
interpretation depends on uncovering the steps of what can be seen as argument, 
despite its unconventional appearance. 
6.2.2 Value through direct association 
One way in which Socrates explains and argues for 4p6vTlaLs' value is by using 
style to suggest a number of characteristics which, taken together, seem to imply its 
normativity, so that value derives straightforwardly from different stylistic features. 
For example, Opövrlais is called µövov T6 vöµiaµa o'p06v (69a9-10). First and 
foremost an immediate. sense of value comes from the idea of financial wealth 
implicit in this metaphor's vehicle, coinage .8 This positive evaluation of 
4p6v-naLT 
accords with its earlier depiction in the . `apology' and is furthered 
here by other 
stylistic features which suggest points which could be taken as reasons for 
normativity. 
Briefly to recapitulate and add to my earlier analyses, the initial antithesis of the 
image, comparing the false exchange of pleasures to the `true coin', 4p6vi ais, marks 
the contrast between them, and this is further highlighted by the two corresponding 
and striking phrases of vocalic repetition: (oüx) av nl 6p91j ttpös ccperýv 
dxxayy (69a6-7) and EKEivo µ6vov Tb vöi w p. a 6p06v (69a9-10). In addition 
#övrlvic is twice foregrounded through word order, standing alone in a clause 
surrounded by longer clauses. This reinforces its unique importance, heightened in 
the first instance by its final positioning in the unit (69a10), and in the second 
perhaps even more so by the surrounding lists (69b3), lengthy and repetitive with 
See section 6.2.4, below. 
° Cf. Louis, 1945,27; Bluck, 1952,5. 
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homoeoteleuton and polysyndeton. In particular the mundane homoeoteleuton and 
aural regularity of Kai rrpoayLyvoµEVwv Kal dTroyLyVO1 Vwv KOl ý8ovwv Kal 
46ßwv Kat TWV a"XXwv TrdvTWV TWV TOLo)TWV (69b4-5) reflect the comparatively 
meaningless flux of emotions, and are in stark contrast to the preceding short isolated 
clause, µETa 4povi a wc. Moreover, a precedent has already been set by a very 
similar occurrence of 4p6vqQLs, a couple of pages earlier: 
... Kai TÖTE, 
WS EOLKEV, [V gaTat Ob a1TLOUg0VgEV TE Kat 4agEv 
EpaaTat Elvat, OPOII-jU6k15', ETTEL8QV TEXEUT1IQW4. LEV, WS 6 X6'y0 
arlµa(vEL, CWQLV & oü (66elff. ). 
There is also the repetition of ids (69a10; bl; b5), which helps to clarify the idea 
every type of `transaction' within our lives, concerning all emotions, must be 
governed by 4pövrgais. Finally, and more generally, the very introduction of these 
distinctive stylistic features, especially such strikingly complex and elaborate 
imagery, might itself be thought to draw the passage into prominence. 
9 
Thus the stylistic depiction of 4pövrioL9 seems to suggest certain key 
characteristics. These are: its uniqueness, deriving from µbvov, its solitary 
positioning, and also the switch from voµtvµaTa to v6 ttaµa; its separateness or 
distinctness from the emotions, through word order and overall prominence; its 
continuity by contrast with the flux of emotions (Kal TrpoayLyvoµEVwv teal 
thro'yvyvop. vwv); its comprehensiveness, from the repeated nag along with the 
dominance of 4p6vraLs' over the whole passage; and finally, its relation to truth, 
through the antithetical repetition of öpObs, first negated and then, in conjunction 
with 4p6vr atS, positive. These characteristics can all be normative but, ý with the 
possible exception of 6po6s, are not so per se. However, when attributed to 
4pövi-aic within a passage claiming its value, their cumulation can be seen to appeal 
to their positive sense and give reasons for its value. 
In addition, the metaphor's extension gives further explanation of the normative 
characteristics of #6v-qQi9 through direct tenor/vehicle correspondences. For all 
9 Cf. e. g. Edwards, 1991,39, on the function of similes. 
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things can be bought with #ö ii ats and, given that a coin's importance lies in its 
buying power, 10 nothing could be more valuable than a coin for which such power is 
comprehensive. 
Conversely, repetition and aural imagery also highlight and expand upon the 
negative features of the competing and false common conception of dpe n which 
Socrates has already attacked. Here he describes this `pseudo-virtue' as n8oväs 
TTpbs 118oväs Kat Xviras rrpös Xvrras Kal 06ßov Trpös 06ßov KaTaXMTTEaOaL 
µE(Cw rrpbs EXdTTw cSaiiEp voµtap. ara (69a7-8). Previously he criticised its 
spuriousness because it relies on opposites causing opposites: TO 8¬& . 'aL 
äpa Kal 
&EEL äv8p6ot ELUL... (68d11). 11 In these instances, however, repetition and 
symmetry suggest processes whose outcomes are not significantly different from 
their starting point. So stylistic structure provides a new reason for negative 
evaluation, by implying the futility and worthlessness of the result. 
This `pseudo-virtue' is said to be an exchange WairEp voµißµaTa. In this simile, 
contrary to the associations of coinage and #6v-qais in the subsequent metaphor, 
the vehicle, `coins', seems to imply notions of falsehood and worthlessness, perhaps 
appealing to a conception of coins as exchanged back and forth without achieving 
anything, with no real value in themselves. This impression is enhanced by the final 
µE(ýw, Trpbs EXdTTw cSQTrEp voµ(QµaTa. For the usual point of exchange 
involving coins is that items can be exchanged for other items of equivalent value, 
not greater for lesser or vice versa. This incongruity might suggest that although, 
according to common perception, the exchange of e. g. fears swaps greater for lesser, 
such fears are so intrinsically valueless that exchange actually results in no 
substantial alteration, 12 an idea supported by. the inclusion of coins and the striking 
repetition. 
10 Greek coinage had some intrinsic value, but much less than its value as currency. See Weiss, 1987, 
66, n. 33. 
11 of TroXXot's understanding of ävßpe(a and aw4povvvrl are described as äroTros (68d3), dXoyov 
(68d12), and d86vaTov (68e3). 
12 Cf. Weiss, 1987,58: 'pleasures, pains, and fears have no genuine value, thus no sum of them can 
possibly amount to arete'. 
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6.2.3 The exploitation of multivalent associations and tenor/vehicle discrepancies 
In the previous examples value derives straightforwardly from the style: 
foregrounding suggests uniqueness, coins evoke worth, symmetry implies lack of 
true productivity, and so on; providing reasons for a 4p6vrlais-based system. Yet 
both here and in other parts of the passage, there are several features whose 
significance can only be fully understood through recognising their multiple and 
often conflicting layers of associations. 
The clearest example is, once again, the coin imagery. This exploits both the direct 
positive and negative associations of coinage, first invoking the futility and 
worthlessness of vöp LvµaTa, and then the value of vöµiaµa. Evidently coins are not 
seen as unequivocally valuable and Plato's choice of coinage as vehicle for 
suggesting 4pövtloLs' value therefore seems surprising. Moreover, whereas the 
implications of the coinage terminology in each part of the antithesis are fairly 
straightforward individually, its double use seems strange, because it establishes one 
thing's value with the very same term which just conveyed the worthlessness of 
others. 
Such strangeness does not end with the clash between these direct tenor/vehicle 
correspondences, but is picked up and intensified in a number of tenor/vehicle 
discrepancies. Some of the most marked discrepancies remain unnoticed in the 
secondary literature and even those which have been spotted are usually seen as 
problems to be eradicated, rather than as containing a viewpoint to be incorporated 
into Socrates' account. Accordingly, critics try to explain them away or dismiss 
them as immaterial or even muddled. Forexample, commenting on difficulties 
resulting from the vehicle, coinage, being both differentiated from (69a6-9) and 
likened to ýpövrjQLS (69a9-10), Annas calls the passage `tangled' and says: 
Phaedo 69A-D. The passage has caused much trouble, partly because of the fact that coinage 
serves, rather ineptly [emphasis mine], as the metaphor both for the inferior attitude 
(weighing up pleasures and pains) and for the better attitude (turning to wisdom and ignoring 
the relevance of pleasures and pains). '3 
13 Annas, 1999,61 n. 26. 
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If, however, we look closely at these inconsistencies, beyond any initial appearance 
of confusion, they actually appear to present further arguments for conclusions about 
the nature of the #6vrIa. s-based and opposing systems. Surely then it is far more 
likely that such clear and deliberate discrepancies have söme significance, rather than 
merely being the result of carelessness or confusion. 
At 69a9 voµtaµaTa represent the false exchange of emotions and sensations. In the 
very next line vö t aiia is 4p6v-qais itself, the aim and means of the true exchange 
for virtue. As we have seen above, the latter stresses the value of Opö i ans and the 
former the worthlessness of an opposing value-system. 
Admittedly, the description of false exchange as 6v1rep voµtaµaTa involves a short 
and simple simile, overshadowed by the subsequent extended metaphor, so that the 
latter might seem to override the earlier negative sense and detract from its possible 
significance. Yet, even if this were the case, there is still an earlier passage which 
heightens the idea of coinage as a false and worthless conception of virtue and 
strengthens the case for seeing the incongruities as deliberate and significant, rather 
than muddled or immaterial. In a connection unnoticed by commentators, only a few 
pages prior to this section the need for money or material possessions in order to 
satisfy bodily desires is depicted as the cause of numerous evils and, especially, as an 
impediment to the acquisition of cpö rgois itself (Phd. 66c6ff. ). Thus the initial 
voµivµaTa in the `peroration' accords with the pejorative status of wealth in the 
earlier passage, while µövov T6 vöp. u to bpOöv which then depicts cpönaic as 
the genuine principle and goal of all actions seems even stranger, given that up to 
this point money is clearly viewed as having a negative status and deleterious effect 
on philosophy. 14 
So although 4p6vioic certainly seems to retain the positive value gained from the 
coin imagery, coinage's negative dimension is also evident here. Moreover, these 
conflicting valuations of voµ(QµaTa, arising from its consecutive oppositional uses, 
are then joined by further tenor/vehicle discrepancies. At the same time as financial 
" Moreover, as I have suggested in Chapter 5, a formal change from simile to metaphor, as occurs 
within the antithesis, is often associated with ironic implications. 
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exchange terminology stresses 4p&'1 Ls' value, Plato fills the passage with 
incongruities, revealing their differences and drawing attention to the unsuitability of 
transaction as a model for 4p6vrjQLs. 
In financial exchange coins are exchanged for other coins or item/s of equivalent 
value. 15 On this understanding we have already seen how likening the exchange of 
supposedly lesser for greater pleasures etc. to coins (µe(Cu rrpbs EXdTTW warrep 
voµtaµ. aTa) suggests that such pleasures are actually of equal worth(lessness), as is 
consistent with the repetition of, for example, i6ovag rrpös- 115ovds. 
This idea of equivalent exchange is in every way inconsistent with Opövrrais here, 
as indicated by various tenor/vehicle incompatibilities. First, there is the singularity 
of 4p6vi aas, highlighted by the shift from plural, voµ(ßµaTa, to the Op6vTjQis 
metaphor's singular T6 v6µUa a. True virtue is then said to be attained when 
OpövriaLc is that `for which and with which all things are bought and sold'. 
'6 
TO'TOV (69b1), like ävTi oü 8¬t trdvTa TaVTa KaraXXdTTEaOaL (69a10), implies 
that #6n mg is not yet present, but must be aimed for in true virtue; while µETä 
TO1TOU (69b1) suggests that it must already be present. Moreover, with 4pövriaLs as 
the only true coin, how can transaction exist at all? So if we resist the attempt to iron 
out these difficulties, we can see how these inconsistencies imply that 4p6vrrais 
defies the notion of coinage and is incompatible with the principles of currency. 
With 4p6nCfts as an overridingly valuable and powerful single coin, underpinning 
all transactions, the exchange of pleasures etc. associated with the ordinary 
conception of value evidently cannot have any genuine worth. Furthermore, with the 
discrepancies within the exchange imagery Plato argues that the value of 4p6viiQtS 
does not derive from what it is used to attain, but is intrinsic. '7 Clearly, 4p6vrrai9 is 
not valuable because it can attain pleasures, pains, or fears, since their presence or 
absence makes no difference (69b4-5). Moreover, any consequentialist connotations 
13 See Sandywell, 1996,112ff., on the importance of 'monetary exchange' for the formulation of 
Greek thought. Cf. Arist. NE 1133a19ff. 
10 For this translation cf. e. g. Hackforth, 1955,55: 'if all our buying and selling is done for intelligence 
and with its aid'. 
17 Cf. Gallop, 1975,102: 'In treating wisdom as the only 'right coin' (a9-10), Plato assigns to it an 
intrinsic worth that he denies to pleasure', although Gallop's overall interpretation of this passage 
differs from my own. 
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in Wvov ievä TE Kal TrlTrpaaK61icva are undercut by the fact that cp6vnais is not 
just the means, but the result, implying that 4p6vrlats' value cannot be seen simply 
to lie in its product. In these ways Plato can be seen to argue through the stylistic 
structure against conventional consequentialist ethics, and therefore, for an anti- 
consequentialist model of 4p6vrlaLc. '8 
To reinforce the norms of his own radical vision Plato appeals to the value system he 
himself dismisses. Invoking the conventional worth of coinage, the imagery ascribes 
value to 4pövnoi9 with the language of a morality simultaneously undercut and 
discredited by recalling the earlier explicit rejection of wealth-orientated system. Yet 
it is also discrepancies between vehicle, financial exchange, and tenor, Opöv-qQts, 
revealed by the stylistic structure, which provide reasons for a 4p6vr ais-based 
system to supplant one which holds coinage valuable. Points like the double use of 
vopiaµa and the switch from plural to singular indicate that 4pö ois' value is 
intrinsic, unlike that of coinage or pleasures etc. Thus the tenor appropriates the 
vehicle's value, but also exploits its contrary associations to provide reasons for its 
own value and for the rejection of the vehicle model. 
Finally, there is the relationship of 4pövrIQi9 to virtue, the question which dominates 
the secondary literature. Here, in his `apology', Socrates is trying to justify the 
philosopher's `love', `desire', and confidence in 4p6vgais. Accordingly, it might 
seem strange if his justification lay not in the value of acquiring 0pövnoLs itself, but 
indirectly, in its leading to something else, virtue. If, instead of thinking in terms of 
the wider Platonic/Socratic debate and assuming virtue's key importance, one 
concentrates more on the immediate context, one may well arrive at a surprising and 
somewhat unconventional reading of this section. 
1$ A number of passages in Plato suggest the idea of a consequentialist ethics, in which a thing's 
goodness is assessed in terms of the state of affairs it brings about, rather than intrinsically. Most 
notable is the Protagoras' idea of knowledge as a 'measuring art' (Prot. 351bff. ), according to which 
there is nothing stronger than knowledge, since this leads men to make the correct choice about 
pleasure and pain. The Phaedo's rejection of exchanging pleasures for pleasures etc. seems clearly to 
recall parts of the Protagoras, such as lines which actually advocate this type of exchange: Eäv µiv 
yap hS a irp6g Yl3Ea LarnS. TeL VE[CW de KQL 1TXEIW XIlTTTEa' t'QV SE i1U1rripQ trpöc 
XuTfpä. Tä EXdTTW " Kai aµLKp6TEpa (Prot. 356b). Because of the Phaedo's anti-consequentialism, 
this passage can be seen not only to attack the value accorded to pleasure in the Protagoras, but also 
the very structure of the 'measuring art' itself. Cf. McCabe, forthcoming, on the way in which 
Euthyd. 28lb-e makes us question the idea of consequentialism in Meno87e6-88d3. 
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Socrates' idea of 4p6v-gULs dominates the `apology'. The virtues, by contrast, 
appear to slip in almost incidentally towards the end, when Socrates claims that the 
common conception of, for example, bravery, is most fitted to philosophers, who 
genuinely lack the fear of death. 19 Others, by contrast, only face their fears to escape 
greater ones (68c5-13). Given the prominence of Op6vrlo .s compared to virtue it 
seems unlikely that the conclusion would give the latter priority over the former. 
Furthermore, the `peroration' can be seen to imply that virtue, far from being the 
reason for 4pövi aas' normativity, itself depends on this for its positive evaluative 
status. 
`Buying and selling all things for this and with this (i. e. 4p6vipis) is, in truth, 
bravery, self-control, justice, and all true virtue' (69b1-2) implies that virtue consists 
of using as well as aiming for 4p6v-gatc in all actions. This suggests that virtue in 
fact has an instrumental role in procuring Op6nQLs, rather than vice versa. Virtue, 
then, becomes that which the philosopher, having attained some degree of 4p6V71ms, 
uses in his continuing search for 4pövqQLS. 
The view of the virtues as instrumental is corroborated in 69c1 where they are called 
KäOapaic TLS' Twv 1-oLo n-c)v Träv-rwv, while #6vrroic itself is called KaOapo!; 
Tic. 20. Clearly this draws a distinction between 4p6vr)QLS and virtue by the 
contrasting -µ6S and -QLc suffixes. Although usage of these suffixes was slightly 
flexible in meaning and both forms sometimes denoted either process or product, two 
such nouns, derived from the same verb, were frequently used in contradistinction 
within the classical period, with -QLc denoting process and -µös resultant state? ' 
Accordingly, as in the transaction imagery, the virtues appear to represent a process 
19 This is not to suggest that Socrates shares such common conceptions. For they imply that 
acceptance or avoidance of particular fears etc. has some merit in itself, whilst Socrates clearly states 
that their presence or absence makes no difference (e. g. 69b4.5). 
20 The use of KdOapats are Kaeapµ6S here is usually described as a `medical' or 'purification' 
metaphor in which e. g. 'medical language is used with religious overtones' (Gooch, 1974,154). 
However, as I have argued above, religious or spiritual purification appears to be a well enough 
established sense of KdOapaLc to preclude seeing it as live metaphor. See Ch. 4 n. 29, above. 
21 Long, 1968,18-19; Browning, 1958,70. Moreover, this seems to fit in with other uses of these 
terms (e. g. 67c5) and even with 82d6 which e. g. Weiss, 1987, n. 65, (following Burnet) has seen as 
providing evidence for the contrary viewpoint. 
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leading to Opövrla. s and this makes sense if we understand these lines as showing 
what virtue would be in a 4p6vrlais-based ethics. 
So it seems that in the `apology' Socrates justifies the normativity of #6vrlviS by 
its own characteristics and the failings of its rival value system. Unlike a 
conventional reading of this section, where 4p6vgaLg' connection with virtue 
guarantees its normativity, this normativity actually appears to derive neither from 
pleasure nor material benefits, nor even from virtue. On the contrary, virtue itself 
has instrumental goodness because it leads to 4p6vrlais, while op6iii ais is only 
instrumental insofar as it leads to virtuous actions which procure more 0p6nQis. 
If this is the case, the implications of this section constitute a very surprising 
departure from the conventional account of Platonic/Socratic ethics, in which the 
value of wisdom seems clearly to stem either from its identification with, or role in 
procuring, virtue. Nevertheless, it does seem that the passage can be read in this way 
and, furthermore, that such a reading is not inconsistent with its immediate context. 
In section 6.2.6 I shall outline some more reasons given by Socrates for the 
normativity of the 4p6vrlatc-based system. Before doing so, however, I shall briefly 
examine the secondary literature on this passage to show how interpretations differ 
when certain stylistic aspects are missed or dismissed. 
6.2.4 `Ironing out' a metaphor: critical readings of this passage 
Considerable critical debate has focused on Phaedo 69a6-c3. When reading this 
passage, commentators appear to bring in issues and views from the Meno, 
Prota; oras, and other dialogues explicitly concerned with virtue's relationship to 
wisdom, but overlook the immediate context. 22 They take virtue as self-evidently 
normative, 23 while 4p6vrrais' normativity remains to be proved. Moreover, 
although certain attention is paid to the imagery, this only goes so far, with many 
22 In spite of claims like Gooch, 1974,155: 'the larger context of this passage must be kept in mind'. 
23 Cf., e. g. Burnet, 1911,68-9, who actually uses the term 'goodness' rather than 'virtue' here. 
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points neglected because of what seems to be a desire for the imagery to `work' 
neatly. 
For the commentators the primary concern is whether the passage is concordant with 
the `Socratic paradox' that virtue is - knowledge, which would make #önQis 
intrinsically good, or whether #övr-aLs is in fact instrumentally good, insofar as it 
leads to virtue. 24 Virtue's normativity is simply assumed, and the question at issue is 
felt to be how this normativity impinges on 4p6n(TLs. 25 
Commentators do notice a number of discrepancies in the `coinage' imagery, or 
`economic metaphor' as they call it, 26 and discuss and attempt to `solve' various 
aspects of these difficulties. 27 They focus on two key points, the first being the 
incongruous simile and metaphor in which voµtvµaTa evokes both the exchange of 
pleasures constituting `pseudo-virtue' and then 4p6v1jvi9 itself. 28 Rather than 
question the evaluative status of coins per se, they see pleasures, pains, and fears as 
false coins, simply accepting the value of coins themselves. 29 Without any idea of a 
possible negative sense of coinage they see no reason to be suspicious of coinage 
itself and do not notice points like the relevance of earlier material or the 
vopioµaTa/v6Iw is switch. The difficulties of µe(Cw trpbs EAdTTw are not 
24 So e. g. Hackforth, 1955,193, says that, ultimately, it is the 'the conception of Op6vrois as a 
means... to virtue' which 'prevails'; Luce, 1944, equates the two; Gooch, 1974, comes to the 
conclusion that 4p6vgaLS is both instrumentally good, insofar as it leads to virtue, but also 
intrinsically, since it is itself one of the virtues; Weiss, 1987, claims that virtue is achieved through 
4p6vrlo. when 4p6vr oLc is the aim, so that somebody can be virtuous in life, even if their goal, 
4p6vrlaLs', is only attainable after death. To a certain degree, Weiss' position is similar to my own, 
since virtue aims for wisdom. However, unlike me, she still sees virtue as intrinsically normative and 
attainable without wisdom, and wisdom as instrumental (even though only through being an aim and 
not actually present) to the acquisition of virtue. For arguments against specific points see below. 
u E. g. Hackforth, 1955,192-3; Luce, 1944,62; Gooch, 1974,153; Weiss: 1987,57. 
26 The fact that the imagery in 69a6-b8 is generally 'known as the 'economic metaphor [emphasis 
mine]', in spite of including both simile and metaphor seems symptomatic of the inattention to detail 
which pervades critical readings. 
27 Although cf. e. g. Bluck, 1952,5, who suggests that the issue throughout 'is purely a question of 
values - what one regards as of sterling worth, and therefore tries to obtain in everything one does. As 
for the discrepancies, he adds that 'there is no need to press the metaphor so far'; Louis, 1945,27, 
who simply cites this passage as example of Plato's tendency to assimilate things of value to 'monnaie 
de bon aloi'. 
'' Cf. Annas, 1999,61 n. 26, quoted above, p. 147. 
29 E. g. Weiss, 1987,59 on the 'popular misconception' that 'pleasures, pains, and fears have real value 
(as coins do)'; Gooch, 1974,156. Luce, 1944,62, does suggest the antithesis actually contrasts barter 
and the more sophisticated and therefore more valuable coinage. However, as Bluck, 1952,5, rightly 
objects, the terminology clearly indicates that coinage is depicted in both antithetical phrases, and 
there. is no evidence to support Luce's position. 
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interpreted, but avoided by the addition of various supplements such as Weiss' 
explanatory parenthesis'[in the case of pain and fear]' or Gooch's expanded: `but this 
is not the right exchange for virtue, to exchange one small pleasure like a coin for a 
larger one, or larger pains and fears like coins for smaller pains and fears'. 30 
The main difficulty is generally acknowledged to be in Ecal TOUTOU iv rrdVTa icai 
IET6 Toirrov Wvovµevä TE ital. 1 LTrpavK6µEVa (69b1-2), where they feel that 
To&Tov (`for this') implies the idea of 4pövriaic' identification with virtue and 
intrinsic goodness, whereas LETä Toirrov suggests that #övnaLS is instrumental in 
acquiring virtue. 31 Commentators worry about apparent inconsistencies arising from 
the same thing being both instrument and product of a process, and also about the 
idea that using Opövrlvis in transactions suggests a depletion of stock. 32 
Consequently, often by adding, removing, or changing the sense of certain elements, 
they so interpret the lines as to eliminate any difficulties. 33 
Another point taken as clear justification for seeing an intrinsic/instrumental divide 
between virtue and #övrraLS is, strangely enough, the very same 
KdOapaLS/KaOapµöS distinction which I interpret as evidence for the opposite. In 
calling the virtues KdeapaCs TLS and #övilvis KaOapµös TLs it is usually assumed 
that Plato invokes a product/process distinction. This view of #övrJaLg as 
instrument and the virtues as product then informs and determines most critical 
30 Weiss, 1987,58; Gooch, 1974,158. 
31 See e. g Hackforth, 1955,193: 'This running together of the two ideas is... the chief source of 
difficulty both in this particular sentence and in the passage as a whole'. 
32 See e. g. Gooch, 1974,155; Hackforth, 1955,193. 
33 E. g. Burnet, 1911,67-8, dismisses T06TOU µhv iTdvTa, along with wvovµevd TE Kal. 
mnpaaKöµeva, as interpolated, partially on linguistic grounds (see Ch. 4 n. 10, above), but also to 
prevent the 'simile' from 'break[ing] down'. Weiss understands µETet Toirrou at 69b1 as 'with 
phronesis (as one's value, aim, or concern]' (59), supposedly making it consistent with the earlier 
Toürou. She gives Ap. 32b8-c 1 as a parallel for this use of µeTd (65 n. 18), despite a lack of evidence 
that µETd there definitely means 'for the sake or as opposed to 'with. Moreover, in Ap. 32b9 µETd 
is clearly in opposition to µeTd in 32c1, where 'for the sake or would not make sense. Gallop, 1975, 
14, translates the ToüTOU and µET& Tovrou as 'for that, or rather with that'. However, the text gives 
no evidence for seeing µr. rc TO TOU as correcting rather than complementing the earlier roirrou. Cf. 
also Rowe, 1993a, 150, who also makes a similar move. Bluck, 1952,5, ignores the difficulties (see 
n. 27, above). Gooch, 1974,157-9, seems to be the only commentator who accepts straightforwardly 
both 'with' and 'for' 4p6vnots here. Nevertheless, he then explains 4p6vrla. as intrinsically good 
because it is one of the virtues, even though the passage as a whole, together with specific points such 
as the KdOapaLS/KaOapµ6S distinction, argues against such a reading. 
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readings of the earlier `coin' imagery. 34 According to my reading based on classical 
Greek usage, the distinction is reversed, with KdOapaLs/KaOapµös as process and 
product respectively. Accordingly, it gives no reason for taking virtue as goal and 
we can arrive at a reciprocal understanding of the `coin' imagery and 
KdOapaLS/KaOapµös distinction, rather than using the latter as a guide for eradicating 
the difficulties of the former. 
In conclusion, commentators often seem to sacrifice close attention to the full range 
and significance of tenor/vehicle discrepancies and other nuances of the passage, in 
order to reach neat solutions which avoid, iron out, or misinterpret key elements. 
Their approaches appear largely motivated by both a desire to make Plato 
comfortably and easily consistent, and the urge to see this passage as simply making 
claims which relate to preoccupations of other Platonic works rather than arguing for 
a different and context-dependent viewpoint. 
6.2.5 Further multivalent associations and tenor-vehicle discrepancies 
The vbµiaµa imagery's significance lies in its negative and positive connotations, 
the discrepancies between them, and difficulties of reconciling vehicle with tenor, 
4p6wICrLc. 35 Other less extended imagery can be similarly analysed, most notably 
perhaps two instances which present the body as imprisonment or slavery: 
EKXUOýLEVT V CJQTTEp SEa116)V EK TOD ac taTOS (67d1) and 80UX6011TES Tl 
Toirrou [i. e. Tov uwS t !; ] 6EpairE(q (66d1-2). These contribute to the Phaedo's 
portrayal of death as releasing soul from body and are echoed later, when Socrates 
calls those having led a righteous life EXEVOEpovµevot TE Kai &TraXaTT6ýLEVOL 
d arrEp 6Eaµwrrjp(wv (114b8-cl). 36 
sa See e. g. Weiss, 1987,61, on 'the purification-metaphor's assertion that phronesis is but means to 
the end, the end being arete'. Cf. also e. g. Gooch, 1974,154, for this viewpoint and references to 
other adherents; Annas, 1999,61. 
35 In some ways this is similar to Empson's fourth type of `ambiguity' in which 'two or more 
meanings of a statement do not agree among themselves but combine to make clear a more 
complicated state of mind in the author' (Empson, 1953,136ff. ). 
36 See Rowe, 1993,288, for this and other examples of this image. 
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The vehicle's (release from chains). positive value ascribed to tenor (soul's release 
from body) derives from a conventional negative conception of chains caused, no 
doubt, because they restrict physical freedom, 37 and therefore, stems from a body- 
orientated system. Immediate tenor/vehicle discrepancies arise, given the vehicle's 
dependence on valuing physical comfort, whereas the tenor's value comes from a 
soul-orientated system, where physical concerns are immaterial. 38 However, there 
are also larger discrepancies. As I said, the chain's capacity to restrict freedom must 
constitute the vehicle's negative aspect. Yet the body itself is responsible for 
restricting the soul's freedom, so that the imagery presents a reason why the body is 
bad, even though the vehicle (release from chains) depends upon seeing the body as 
valuable. In this way, Plato suggests not simply the worth of the unrestricted soul, 
but also creates a tension between two value systems and pushes us to assess their 
relative values and see them as oppositional. Just as with the coin imagery, tenor 
appropriates the value of vehicle, but also uses the vehicle's associations contrary to 
itself to justify its own value in terms which simultaneously reveal why the vehicle 
model must be rejected. Specifically, the consequence is that value is conferred on 
the soul's freedom (i. e. on incorporeality) in contradistinction to the body's so-called 
freedom. 
Likewise there are the terms `loves' and `desires', EptTwv S& Kal E1OvµLwv 
(66c2), although these introduce a contrast not through imagery and tenor/vehicle 
discrepancies, but by including the same terms within two different contexts, one 
conventional and pejorative, one unconventional and positive. First, they describe 
yearnings caused by the body for material things conventionally regarded as 
valuable. For Socrates, these `loves' and `desires' hinder our quest for knowledge. 9 
Then, shortly afterwards, with cognates, of the very same two words, he says our 
purified soul will, after death, obtain the wisdom which we `desire' and `claim' to 
love,: l pXv 9QTai 0D ErriOvµovµhv TE KaL 4aµEV ipaaTal ¬tval, OpOI, ' jGewg 
(66e2-3). 40 Like the coin imagery, the first instance devalues these terms, whereas 
37 Cf. Rowe, 1993, on X'ouoi 59e6: 'i. e. from his chains, for the sentence to be carried out (but that 
will 'free' him in another sense: cf. 62b, 67d; also e. g. A. PV97 and Hdt. 3.145. 
38 Cf. e. g. 69b4-5 or Socrates' almost flippant attitude to chains, imprisonment, the poison, and, in 
general, to physical discomfort: e. g. 63e3ff. 
9 Cf. Phd 68c9. 
40 Cf. ' Ph i 66b7. 
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the second appropriates their usual sense of `aiming towards' something considered 
to be `valuable' in order to outline an alternative value-system. 41 
Socrates' vision of philosophy here is often criticised for its sterility and absolute 
rejection of pleasures which we `love' and `desire', as well as for failing to account 
for the possible `pleasure' of philosophy itself. 42 By using these very-same terms to 
depict the feelings which the philosopher will have for 4p6in aas, Socrates suggests 
that philosophy will not replace conventional pleasures with a pleasureless 
alternative. Instead it will engender the same depths of feeling within us, the 
difference being their true worth as opposed to the valuelessness of those rejected 
emotions. 
6.2.6 Normative terms and their effect on other terminology 
I have proposed that Plato uses the `apology' to argue for 4p6vrlaLs' normativity, 
and this can be corroborated by the role of normative terminology throughout the 
`apology'. The quantity and variety of such terminology is one of the most 
prominent features and it describes different aspects of either the philosophical or 
conventional viewpoint. For example, the body is called an evil: 9WT äv Tb Qwµa 
EX( LEV Kai QUµnE4UpµEVi1 >Tj ýµwV ii 4JuA IJ. ETC TOLOÜTOU KQKOD (66b5-6). 
Conversely, in the `peroration' Socrates claims that pursuing the philosophical life to 
his best abilities will lead him to 6Earr6TaLs TE dyaOotc 
EVTe1 EaOaL Kai 
Era(pois (69e2) in the afterlife. 
Terminology denoting truth or genuineness is also common, such as ws dX716WS, Tw 
övTi, and to a lesser extent 6p6ws. While this `key-word' repetition is most striking 
in the 'peroration' it also appears throughout the `apology'. Often these terms are in 
close conjunction and, in a couple of places, even appear as pleonasm, the two 
41 The same terminology soon recurs with similar implications when Socrates says: philosophers 
avrrjv 8E KCL6 aurýv EteUµIOD M r- v ýuXhv ? XeLv (67e7-8); even normal lovers are willing to 
enter Hades in order to see again the ones wv EneOvµouv (68a6); and 4povIaEwS R äpa TLS Tw 
6V TL spiv (68a7) should not grieve at death. 
'= E. g. Gallop, 1975,102-3, on `this stark and misleading opposition between wisdom and pleasure'. 
Cf. e.: g. Bostock, 1986,32ff. 
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'equivalent' terms being juxtaposed: c1S dXTIOws Tw ÖVT% (66c4) and T6 6' dXrlRs 
T( 6VTL (69b8). 
A very notable example is the repetition of 4LXöao4os, 4iXoao0la, or 4 LXoaD w, 
combined with various adjectives or adverbs signifying truth or genuineness. First, 
in the introduction to the `apology', Socrates associates true philosophy with seeing 
death as good: 
W9 µoL 4aCLETaL ELK6TW9 ä4p rw ovrc cm OtAoaoolcr Starploac rbv 
ßiov 6appEiv µ, Wwv ärroeavEtaOaL Kal EÜEATTLS ElvaL ket L 7LQTa 
ota¬a6ai dLya0a ErrEL8äv TEXEIJT71911 (63e9-10). 
The dialogue contains many similar collocations. 3 In the `apology' we find: Tots 
yviial s 4LXoa64oLs (66b2); rrävTas TOil 6pOw9 4 iXoµaOets (67b4); of 
4LX0004OÜVTES' 6pO (67d8); TW 6VTL... Ot 6pe@g 4LXO00cOÜVTEs C TroOvT oKELV 
ýLEXET()QL (67e5-6); OLEUeaL YE xp7I, ECLV TW ÖVTL 'YE i ... 4LX690#s (68b2) and 
O. TTE4LXoaOý116TE9 bpO@S (69d2). Moreover, no examples of `philosophy' terms 
are unaccompanied by `truth' terms within this passage. 
Near the beginning of the Phaedo Socrates offers a radical redefinition of 
philosophers as those orientating their life around practising for death. This 
distinguishes them not only from those not claiming to be philosophers, but also 
from people like Euenus who, though purporting to be a philosopher, would be 
unwilling to die and therefore has no legitimate claim to philosophy. 44 Thus the 
continual collocation of philosophy and truth terms recalls and emphasises that the 
`Socratic' notion of philosophy, a preparation and willingness for death, is at issue 
here. This notion is referred to explicitly several times, 45 so much so, that even 
where it is omitted, this understanding of true philosophy still appears to be implicit. 
Thus, repetition contributes to clarifying the Phaedo's reconceptualisation of 
philosophy. Furthermore, this repetitive stylistic structure quite clearly suggests and 
43 Phd. 64a4-5; 64e2; 80e6; 82c2-3. 
µ Phd. 61b7-c9. 
45 E. g. 63e9-64a2; 67d7-10; e4-5; 68b1-3. 
Chapter 6 157 
draws our attention to the idea that the Socratic notion of philosophy is genuine. 
This being so, a claim of philosophy's normativity comes from the inherent 
normativity of terms like 6pOwc and To 6VTL in this context. Nevertheless, simple 
repetition of these terms in conjunction with philosophy terms foregrounds and 
implies a connection, but does not actually give reasons for accepting this conception 
of philosophy to be true. 
A reason lies in those phrases describing #6vgaL9' object with truth terms and so 
immediately implying links between these objects and the philosophy which seeks 
them 46 It is this connection which gives reasons for Socratic philosophy's claims of 
truthfulness: namely, that the object towards which it aims is truth itself. For how 
could an activity which examines truth itself be anything but a genuine search for 
wisdom? This connection also works the other way, with the descriptions of 
philosophy providing reasons for taking truth, the object of knowledge, as normative. 
From the usage of, for example, 6p&c1c and Tw 6VTL, it is clear that they are seen 
here as inherently good, so that predicating truthfulness or genuineness of something 
confers normative status. Given that truth is then intrinsically good, the 
terminological connection shows why knowledge's object, truth, can be seen as 
good. 
The case is similar for qualities such as simplicity, singularity, distinctness, and 
uniqueness which, as we have seen, are all associated with 4p6t ais. Although 
none are unequivocally normative, in their cumulative usage in the `peroration' they 
clearly seem to be viewed as conferring value. So, they not only provide reasons for 
Opövrlats' normativity, but in doing so produce reason for their own. 
Such ideas are also supported by the association of distinctness and truth arising 
from, for example, how the soul which retreats into itself as much as possible comes 
closest to reality (e. g. 65c5-10) 47 This suggests a further connection between 
46 The disembodied soul is able to grasp 'truth' or 'reality'. See e. g Phd. 66b5-7: go-)T äv Tb QWµa 
EX(41EV Kai au L1rE4)upp vn t1. U V il U IETeL TOLOÜTOU KaKOÜ, oO ILi 7TOTE KTTra( tEAa 
LKavws oü kTrLAvµoüµev Oagem 61 roüro Elvat -r6 dAgft-, 65b9; 66d7. The objects of 
knowledge are also described as Ta 6vra, recalling the recurrent TW öv ri, at e. g. 65c3; c9; 66c2; 
"Cf. 
-e. g. 64c7-8: dTraXXayEtaav a&Týv Kae' arTnv. 
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4p6naLs, the soul, and the objects of knowledge, the Forms, which are described 
by phrases like atT6 Kae' afT6 dXLKpwVý9 9KQUTOV... TWV 6VTWV (66a2-3). 
The case is similar for purity, as seen from EIALKpLVý T in IXX' afTij Ka6' afTrnv 
EIXLKpLVEL Ti 8LaVO'Lq XpwµEVOS avT6 Kaff aUT6 E. XLKPLVi'S 9KaaTOV 
ETrLXELPOL eTjp¬ÜELV TCOV ÖVTWV (66a2-3). Similarly, KaOapWS describes the 
knowledge attained by souls free from the body (e. g. 66d8 and e5) because pure and 
unadulterated, 48 while the `peroration' presents virtue as KhOapo{s 'rig and 
4p6vrais as KaOapµös Tic (69c1-3), so that KäOapoic and its cognates make a 
connection between intelligence and its objects 49 
Conversely, terms denoting mixture or plurality, such as au ni¬4vp t t. 'i (66b5) or 
iravTo3arrCjv (66c3), are linked to bodily evils and their concomitant needs, so that 
they acquire a negative sense. This is perhaps enhanced by two tripartite pleonastic 
phrases describing the adverse effects of body on soul: Kai, yap noXEµovs Kal 
QTäaEL9 Kai, µäXac... (66c6-7) and lrapatrL'rTOV 66pvpov TrapEXEL Kai. Tapa) r? v 
Kai EKTTX7 TTEL (66d5-6). This semantic repetition might also be seen to evoke the 
plurality bound up with the body. 
Other features here create a similar impression. The body causes the soul pvplac 
dcXoX(as (66b8) and 4Xvapiac... v'oAA s- (66c3-4), while the noun 66pv(3os (66d6), 
describing the body's effect on intellectual inquiries, could have certain connotations 
of plurality from its usual association with the clamour of a crowd. Even the phrase 
aüµnavTos Tot O aros (66a5) might indicate the body's composite nature, 
given that Qüµrras implies a whole composed of parts. Within the later `argument 
from affinity' the body's composite nature is one of the primary reasons given for its 
destruction after death, unlike the simple and incomposite soul (78clff. ). So here 
plurality and complexity seem to substantiate the body's negative status, implying 
therefore that they are being understood as pejorative per se. 
08 Cf. KaOapWTaTa at 65e6. 
" Cf.. Scharnagl, 1994,118. Although primarily interested in mystery terminology, she says that the 
association of icaOap(rara and &dvoLa at 65e creates a connection between icdOapaLS and reason. 
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6.2.7 Drawing these associations together 
Although the patterns of association emerging from the `apology' appear to be of 
great importance, most are bypassed by conventional philosophical readings of the 
dialogue. I have suggested that this is largely because the mode of expression here 
does not conform to modem paradigms of philosophical argumentation. In fact, the 
only part of the `apology' whose style is at all close to this conception of 
`philosophical argument', 50 the section where Socrates attacks the ordinary 
conception of virtue, is also the only part of the `apology' which receives substantial 
comment, apart from the beginning of the `peroration'. 51 
The `apology' does not proceed in ordered steps that clearly lay out the reasoning 
process. Instead its stylistic structure makes certain elements prominent and reveals 
interconnections between them, even if their purpose is not immediately evident. 
Consequently, a `nexus of association' emerges between elements which can be seen 
to signify through interconnectedness, fitting together to form arguments. These 
depend not simply on tracing a linear progress of argumentation, but on a series of 
additional moves. Effectively the reader is drawn into a type of dialectic with the 
text and forced to move backwards and forwards, bringing together the associated 
elements in order to understand the prominence of particular features as well as 
apparent incongruities or multivocity. 52 
From these interconnected associations within the `apology' other significant points 
emerge which complement, challenge, or augment standard accounts. The `apology' 
constructs and argues for a 4, p6vnQis-based value system, based upon its opposition 
to the conventional values which it both appeals to and then displaces, by revealing 
50 See below, p. 168. 
51 See e. g. Gallop, 1975,98-102 and Hackforth, 1955,56-7. There is also some discussion of. the 
concept of death as release of soul from body at (e. g. Hackforth, 1955,49); the question of how far 
terms like [T6] S&KaLov and [To] KaXdv (65d7) introduce the 'Theory of Forms (discussing 65d4-e5, 
Gallop, 1975, comments that 'the so-called Theory of Forms', is introduced at this point', and launches 
into a detailed discussion of the 'Theory'. However, cf. Rowe, 1993a, 141); the devaluation of 
pleasure (see n. 42) and how the absolute withdrawal from the sensible world squares with, for 
example, the later 'theory of recollection' (e. g. Rowe, 1993a, 139; Hackforth, 1955,49; Gallop, 1975, 
91-2). 
52 Cf. Prier, 1976,151 on 'archaic logic': 'archaic logic does not move from a to b but from a to a or a 
to A through a series of symbols or words that appear both different and the same'. 
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their inadequacies. Plato introduces normativity through terms that possess a 
conventional or intrinsically normative sense, and gradually links these to other more 
neutral terms, so that the former confer an evaluative status on the latter. The final 
result is a group of entities, processes, and qualities which are all interrelated by 
sharing common attributes and values. 
Thus, Plato constructs much of the value system by appropriating conventional 
evaluative terminology. As was the case with the coin or chain images the new tenor 
retains the value associated with particular features or terminology partly by 
discrediting their conventional evaluative status. Moreover, as well as individual 
features, it seems possible to draw the passage together into a basic opposition 
between the Opövrrats-based and body-orientated value systems, the former 
comprising qualities such as purity, simplicity, singularity, intrinsic goodness, virtue, 
uniqueness, comprehensiveness, truth; and the latter, their opposites. This reflects an 
underlying dualistic metaphysics, insofar as the OpövTIaLs-based system depends on 
the Forms, entirely different ontologically from the sensibles towards which the body 
is orientated. 
6.2.8 Generic affiliations 
I have already argued that innovation and expansion of stylistic models evokes the 
distinctiveness of 4p6v7lais. However, certain similarities between some features 
and their generic models are also significant here. Several examples combine 
likenesses with discrepancies between the style and function of Plato's usage and 
that of their generic models. As with other stylistic features in the `apology', in 
many of these cases Plato appears to appropriate a particular phenomenon's 
evaluative dimension, while discrediting the rest of its conventional usage. 
So, for example, the `apology' is presented as a defence speech, a characteristically 
normative type of discourse, in which the defendant relies on the alleged truth of his 
claims and morality of his actions. This evaluative dimension is clearly used here to 
set up the normativity of the 4pöv aic-based system. Yet Plato simultaneously 
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shows the illegitimacy of the values appealed to when such features are used in their 
normal generic context. 
For instance, there is antithesis which, like the examples in the `peroration', 
juxtaposes a false or immoral view with a true or moral one, making clear each 
view's distinct characteristics, while also emphasising the discrepancy between them. 
This is especially familiar from forensic oratory, like Lysias 12, where the speaker 
contrasts the murder of innocent men without trial with the lawful trial of those 
accused of having committed this crime: 
Kai OÜTOL [. LýV TOÜS o , 3Wv a8LKODVTas cLKPLTOUs &1TEKTELVaV, 4tEls & 
TOÜS dTroXEaaVTas T1 V TT6XLV KaTa TÖV v6[iov dlýLOÜTE Kp(VELV, Trap 
wv ov8' äv Trapav6µws ßovXö tEVOL 8LKi1v Xa4aVEly ä av Twv 
ä8LKTT[L(iThV wv Tryv tr6XLV 1 &KrjµaaL Xd OLTE. 
Likewise, in the Phaedo's `peroration', false exchange of pleasures is contrasted to 
4, p6vrlais' genuineness; while similarly, the second antithesis differentiates true 
virtue acquired with 4övT Ls from virtue which lacks this and is therefore illusory. 
Yet there are also significant differences between the Phaedo's use of antithesis and 
others. For, from the viewpoint of the `peroration', only those antitheses appealing 
to a 0pöv ais-based value system for their conception of moral truth could have 
legitimate claims to establishing a genuine right/wrong opposition. Separated from 
4pövrIQLs, justice and virtue are mere illusions, so that the conventional antitheses of 
oratory would simply be seen to present two opposing viewpoints within the same 
body-orientated value system, and therefore to lack the necessary elements for a 
genuine moral/immoral opposition. 54 
This becomes clearer if we compare the `peroration' antitheses to those used earlier 
to explain the common conception of self-control (QW4povüvrj): 4oßovµevoL yap 
ETEPWV i 8OV(V QTEp-qe Vvm Kal ETTLOv tot'vTEs EKE(VWV, d). \WV dTrExovTQL ÜTT 
13 Lys. 12.82. 
54 Cf. Nightingale, 1995,3 on genres as forms of thought; 7, on Platonic 'parody'; and 91, 'Plato 
criticizes his model even as he imitates its themes and structures'. 
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(IXXuw KTpaTOÜµevoL (68e5ff. ). Here, individuals refrain from certain pleasures 
only because overpowered by desire for others and fear of not acquiring them. This 
notion of self-control in fact amounts to the very same submission to pleasures which 
is supposedly its opposite, implying the falsity of the common virtue/vice distinction, 
with respect to virtues like self-control. " By contrast, only the Platonic 
virtue/pseudo-virtue antitheses of the `peroration' present a genuine true/false 
opposition. 
Likewise, other patterns of argument are imitated within the `apology', once again 
with clear differences between originals and their Platonic imitations. For example, 
crucial to the structure of associative connections in the `apology' was an 
oppositional scheme. The importance of oppositions within early Greek argument 
has been discussed extensively, most notably in Lloyd's Polarity and Analogy, which 
presents them as one of two main principles of argument. 56 Even Hesiod's 
genealogy in the Theogony is centred around corresponding oppositional groups, 57 
and many Presocratics depict the physical world or what is perceived as the physical 
world in terms of oppositions. 58 As well as this, in Presocratic discourse oppositions 
are not only appealed to between different entities or processes, but also between true 
and false opinion or reality and appearance. 59 Both of these contrasts motivate the 
oppositions within the `apology' and Phaedo as a whole. Nevertheless, in all the 
other cases, oppositions concern only one ontological level and, whatever their focus, 
they arise from oppositions between elements on this level. Conversely, in 
presenting a dualistic ontology, 60 just as with other features, Plato appropriates 
oppositional argumentation, but presents it as a genuine and distinct. opposition, 
unlike those found in his predecessors. 
ss Cf. 68d11-12 on 'bravery'. 
so Lloyd, 1966. Cf. e. g. Havelock, 1983,34-5; and also Prier, 1976, who talks repeatedly about the 
use of oppositions within 'archaic logic' in writers like Hesiod, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although 
he also posits the use of a 'third term', which imposes unity, e. g. Heraclitus' logos (75-7). 57 See e. g. Prier, 1976,40. 
58 E. g. Parm. B8.53-61; Heraclit. B88; Meliss. B8; Cf. Lloyd, 1966,26-7 and passim. 
s' E. g. Heraclit. B 1 and 2; Parm. B6. 
60 Lloyd, 1966,23-4, on how Plato's Being/Becoming or Forms/particulars oppositions differ from 
Presocratic and Hippocratic oppositions: 'This is, then, a different type of opposition, one between 
two distinct worlds, not between members of a single world of reality'. 
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As we have seen, the `apology' frequently draws upon the conventional value of 
certain features or terminology to establish new values which displace them, just as 
financial terminology evokes the value of a #6vtnats-based system completely 
detached from economic concerns. Outside Plato there are numerous parallels 
where, as with the Phaedo's v6µtap. a, the evaluative ambiguity of particular terms 
represents a conflict between competing moral claims. For example, in Aeschylus' 
Choephori the term vtc in Orestes' dCrrXa v(I qc ßa6' EXwv tLda LaTa reflects 
the `triumph' of avenging his father, but also has ironic implications since the very 
same act brought the Rldap. aTa of matricide. 61 Thus the ambiguity within vtK 
represents the clash between two conflicting moral imperatives, the prohibition of 
killing one's parent, as opposed to the necessity of avenging them, and one could 
interpret much of the play's other `justice' terminology in the same way. 62 Moral 
terminology within the Antigone has a similar ambiguity, this time reflecting the 
competing demands of loyalty to the polls and to one's blood relatives. According to 
the former, terms like KaKä and 8iic7j, describing respectively Antigone's actions and 
Creon's decrees, 63 carry their conventional values. Yet, if some element of justice is 
also attributed to Antigone's actions, the evaluative status of these terms is 
problematised. 
However, these examples still represent opposing imperatives within conventional 
morality, while the Phaedo sets out to replace this entire system. Consequently, the 
clashing `philosophical' and conventional understanding of evaluative terminology 
in the `apology' represents not a simple conflict between two aspects of the same 
value-system, but the opposition of two alternative systems, the genuine and false, 
and the absolute displacement of the latter by the former. 64 
Although not strictly relevant to `generic affiliations', interesting parallels for this 
Platonic manoeuvre are found in philosophical writers of various periods, who try to 
displace a conception of morality by language in which that conception is 
61 A. Ch. 1017. 
62 Cf. e. g. A. Ch. 1027 and similar examples in E. EI: e. g. 1189. 
e' E. g. S. Ant. 495 and 854. 
04 Cf. Nightingale, 1995,191, who says that, while Plato appropriates comedy's 'voice of criticism', 
'the writers of Old Comedy... speak from within the Athenian democracy' and accept its structure, 
whereas 'Plato's philosopher is an outsider who is disembedded from the social and political economy 
of the city' and speaks a truth which is independent of the democratic system. 
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conventionally expressed. For example, Lucretius describes Epicurus, the very man 
who freed mankind from a belief in religion, as a god: `deus ille fait' 65 Epicurus is 
pronounced worthy of being counted amongst the gods, and Lucretius talks of his 
`divina reperta'. 66 Thus Lucretius employs evaluative terminology associated with 
conventional religious beliefs to emphasise the values of an opposing system. 67 
Similar strategies are used, for instance, in the modern era by Nietzsche, as with his 
description of Also sprach Zarathustra as an `inexhaustible well' of `gold and 
goodness' ('Gold und Güte'), 68 although this work represents an absolute challenge 
to the conventional understanding of goodness. 
In all of the Phaedo examples, Plato relies on similarities in order to appropriate an 
evaluative dimension or strategy of argumentation, while also drawing attention to 
the differences. The reader must work through the passage's structure in order to 
understand where the differences and similarities lie, and it is the very structure 
leading us through these stages which can be seen as argument. 
6.2.9 The ramifications of these points for the dialogue as a whole 
One of the key points in the `apology' for the Phaedo as a whole is the importance of 
oppositional systems. I have already suggested that the opposition between a 
4p6vrlais-based and body-orientated value system can be seen to reflect the 
underlying dualistic metaphysics of the entire work. Pairs of qualities associated 
with the different sides of the opposition, like simplicity/complexity or 
singularity/plurality will also play crucial roles in the subsequent `affinity argument', 
while oppositions in general pervade much of the dialogue's argumentation. 69 
Already, in the `apology', we are given some idea of how these pairs can be 
understood in terms of a hierarchical structure, rather than symmetrical opposition, 
°S Luc. DRN5.8. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Menoeceus135. 
66 Luc. DRN 5.51 and 6.8. 
67 Cf. Gale, 1994,191-207 and 192: 'This is ironically inverted by Epicurus, for Lucretius makes his 
denial of divine intervention in the world (5.52-4) the basis of his divinity. 
6$ Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Foreward, 4. 
69 See e. g. the 'argument from opposites' (throughout); the 'affinity argument' (especially 74a9ff. ); 
and the 'second sailing' (102dSff. ) 
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and the way in which the different pairs fit into a wider system will become clearer 
as the dialogue progresses. 
The normativity of particular qualities, argued for in this passage, will also be 
relevant elsewhere in the dialogue, particularly in the later stages. Connections 
drawn here between Forms, soul, and 4p6naic, in terms of attributes like simplicity 
and distinctness, imply a qualitative link between the Forms and wisdom. Forms are 
described with terms evoking purity, distinctness, uniqueness, and truth, while it is 
also the attribution of these characteristics to op6vtlais which are fundamental in 
establishing its normativity. Given the connections which they therefore appear to 
forge between epistemological method, object, and value, these particular qualities 
appear to be presented as valuable for intellectual inquiry in themselves. One might 
therefore understand the `apology' as laying down, indirectly, certain criteria for 
desired features in philosophical argumentation. These can then help in 
understanding what constitutes correct philosophical method, a question hanging 
over the whole dialogue both implicitly and explicitly in, for example, sections of the 
`intellectual autobiography'. More generally, it also suggests the philosophical 
significance of different types of affinity between qualities of entities and/or 
processes, a point which will be very important in the later `affinity argument'. 
6.3 ' The 'argument from opposites' (70c4-726): 'verbal minimalism' 
The style of the `argument from opposites' is very different from the `apology', 
comprising clear steps with an easily traceable logical progression. Many of its 
stylistic aspects make it far more readily assimilated to modem conventions of 
philosophical discourse than the `apology' and it is, unlike the `apology', discussed 
extensively in the secondary literature. 70 In this section, I now examine precisely 
how its construction differs from that of the `apology', and then move on to consider 
the significance of these differences and whether the `argument from opposites' is 
presented as a more `philosophical' or 'better' argument. 
70 E. g. Bostock, 1986,42-59; Gallop, 1982; Rowe, 1991b; and, in general, the attention paid to this 
argument in commentaries and other works on the Phd. 
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6.3.1 Stylistic features and the construction of the argument 
In contrast to the `apology', the `argument from opposites' is dominated by repetitive 
structures and can be said to be characterised by `verbal minimalism'. This phrase 
indicates a stylistic construction featuring significant structural repetition between 
individual units or clusters of units and usually involving a strong degree of lexemic 
repetition along with a tendency towards ellipse. Characteristically, certain other 
features are involved, including short question and answer format and an absence of 
imagery and extended description, the latter enhancing the impression of conciseness 
and helping to foreground the structure. 7' 
Whereas the `apology', especially in its final stages, could be seen as higher order 
reflection on the nature and status of philosophy itself, the `argument from opposites' 
constitutes a lower order argument to prove the immortality of the soul, containing 
no self-conscious reflection on its own method. Interestingly, however, the one 
section in the last part of the `apology' that provides a slight stylistic precedent for 
the `argument from opposites' and stands out stylistically from its immediate 
context, is also an example of lower order reflection where Socrates argues against 
the common conception of courage and self-control (68d2-69a4). This short passage 
has features such as structural and heavy lexemic repetition: e. g. To 6ESLEVaL dpa 
Kai UEL dV8p¬l0'L ELM TrdVTES' iiXýV 01.4LX6a040L' KaCTOL dXoyöv -ye 8EEL 
TLVa Kai SELX(q aVSp¬iov EtvaL (68d11-13). Its first half (68d2-el) is also 
written in the short question and answer format common to passages of `verbal 
minimalism', but very uncharacteristic of the later sections of the `apology'. The 
second part (68e2-9a5), even though a continuous speech, is still divided into short 
units which largely follow the structure of the first. One can see this example as 
lower order reflection within the higher-order `apology', establishing the 
inconsistency of the `pseudo-virtues' because they violate the principle that opposites 
cannot cause their own opposites. 72 With this linked by order, as well as style, to the 
71 In view of these features it has many similarities with parts of Passages II and especially IV of the 
'Stylistic Analysis' chapters, with many features classified above as particularly Platonic (Socratic) 
ways of establishing parallelism (see ch. 5 p. 116ff., above). 72 Cf.. Sedley, 1998,121. 
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`argument from opposites', it seems that Plato is inclined to connect particular styles 
with their degree of reflectiveness. 
Unlike the 'apology' which outlined points like the particularities of 4p6v c ts, the 
relation of body and soul, and a conception of philosophy, the `argument from 
opposites' posits a general principle of generation of opposites from opposites, which 
holds for an entire group of different subjects, including the soul. Clearly it is seen 
as a comprehensive principle, applicable to all generated things without exception73 
and, as the argument's final stage makes clear, it is also an unceasing process 
(72a11-d5). 
The `argument from opposites' itself, unlike the `apology', is explicitly presented as 
an argument and its main principle, the generation of opposites from opposites, is 
introduced as a i. icavbv TEign piov that souls exist in Hades: Kai TOTO . Kavbv 
TEKWIpLOV Toü TaDT EtvaL (70d2). This phrase is also echoed within the 
argument's conclusion: TOÜTOU 8E ÖVTOS . KaVOV ? TOU E56KEL TEKýL1 PLOV 
ETvaL... (72a6). 
Division into steps 
The argument's division into clearly demarcated steps is very different from the long 
speeches of the `apology' and emphasises logical sequentiality. It is achieved 
through various means, most markedly the short question and answer format, which 
predominates in all but the last section. As is typical of this stylistic mode in Plato, 
questions are separated by the interlocutor's short formulaic answers, restricted 
mainly to brief words of affirmation and denial or short questions, like vat, ithvv ye, 
and tr 3s yap ov. 
Although I would not deny the importance of Cebes' presence as an interlocutor and 
of his responses, these responses could also be seen to function as punctuation, given 
that they contribute no new substantive information. For example: 
73 E. P. eLXX Kat KaTC Cc WV 7rdPT'tJ i Kal 4UTWV, Kal auXXT pSTrv Svairep IXEL yEVeaw fept 
7rdz'm. n' t&4LEV &p Ot)TWQI y(yVETaL irth'ra (70d7-el) and TIQI? a OÜTW yiyVETaL, it 
EVaVTL V T& EVQVTIa lrpdyµaTa (71ä10). 
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X yc 8ij µoL Kai Qv, Z4Tj, oUTw nEpl (wis Kal OavdTOV. OK 
EVaVTIOV ghV 4l To C7 V Tb TEevdvaL ElVal; 
Eywye(71 d5-7). 74 
Even when, later in the argument, Cebes actually provides information, rather than 
simple affirmation, one might still argue that his responses are entirely conditioned 
by Socrates. So, for instance, having established with Cebes' acceptance that the two 
opposite processes, Tb Cfj and Tb TE6vdvaL, come about from each other (71d8-9), 
Socrates then asks what comes about from the living and what from the dead. 
Cebes' two answers, Tö TEeVgKO ' and dvayKat ov... öµ0Ä0yE v ÖTL TO CWV 
(71d10-13), simply cite the opposite processes fully articulated by Socrates in order 
to supply the answer the question already suggests. Cebes' acceptance of Socrates' 
assumptions leaves him with little scope for personalised content, so that the primary 
purpose of his replies can perhaps be seen to be division of the argument into short 
steps. 
In contrast to the `apology', again, there are also large numbers of particles at the 
beginning of individual points. These aid the division of the argument into 
sequential steps and provide an initial suggestion of how each particular point fits 
into the argument's progress. So, for example, TE 8E can suggest that the point 
shares the previous point's principle, 75 while often dpa accompanies the conclusion 
of a section. 76 
Parallelism, repetition, and ellipse. 
Socrates mainly argues by induction in this passage, using the applicability of certain 
processes to various pairs of generated opposites as a basis for establishing a general 
principle from which to argue that these processes are equally applicable to life and 
'" Although the question of why Socrates is concerned about what Cebes 'says' may be of some 
interest. 
's E. g. 71a6 and M. Cf. Denniston, 1950,175-6, although he also points out that this is not its 
commonest use. 
76 E. g. 71e2 and 72a4. Cf. Sicking and Ophuijsen, 1993,103 ff. 
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death. Parallelism of points and units within individual sections is evoked by 
lexemic and structural repetition, often combined with ellipse. 
The first stage of the argument, showing that things come to be from their opposites, 
provides the best example. A stylistic pattern is established at the end of Socrates' 
short introductory speech, where he claims that this principle applies to all living 
things and gives the example of the larger coming to be from the smaller: otov öTav 
gCLCOV TL yLyVETaL, äväyKq TTOV Eý EXdTTOVOS 6VTOS Trp6TEPOV ? TrELTa 
µEt(ov y(yvEaOaL (70e6-8). A series of questions then follows, sharing a very 
similar structure and developing the principle within a group of parallel cases. First, 
Socrates asks whether the inverse of the `larger from smaller' idea also holds: otKO"vv 
KCW EXaTTOV yLyvrrTaL, EK ýLELCOVOS ÖVTOS Trp6TEpOV ÜQTEPOV 9XaTTOV 
yev1 cJETat; (70e10-71a1). The question retains the basic pattern of neuter 
nominative adjective + the verb yiyvoµaL, followed by EK +a neuter genitive 
comparative + yLyvoµaL. In addition, the process's first stage is still described as 
rrpö-rEpov, although the equivalent taTepov replaces the ZtrEL ra of the preceding 
question. As well as very slight differences between syntax and conjunctions in the 
two units, the second omits certain elements, dropping the Tt in the first clause and, 
more significantly, the äväyici Troy, implying that necessity is now simply assumed. 
As the passage progresses, the ellipse increases and much of the original unit 
structure is omitted: 
Kat PI Eý LQXUPOTEPOU 'YE TÖ daOEVEQTEpOV Kat EK ßpaSUTEPOU TÖ 
Odrrov; 
nä vv ye. 
(71a3-5). 
Here, Socrates asks about two analogous pairs of processes, using little but two pairs 
of adjectives together with Erc. He mentions only one side to each process and not its 
inverse, although the two stated examples `from the stronger, the weaker' and `from 
the slower, the faster' are perhaps in some way `inverse', insofar as the first depicts a 
change from more to less powerful while the latter reverses this. 
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After Cebes' reply, Socrates introduces two more paired processes, also elliptical. 
Once again, he gives only one side to each process, with the first going from positive 
to negative and the second vice versa. The original particle dv reappears, with Ti 
and ytynTaL stated in the first case and assumed in the second: 
TL 8E; (IV TL XEIPOV ytyVrrTaL, OÜK Eý gtEtv0V09, Kai CaV 
ÖLKaLÖTEPOV, Eý CL&IKWTEPOU; (71 a6-7). 
Although the omitted aspects are clearly implicit, the structure has essentially been 
reduced to its most significant components, so that the principle is effectively 
encapsulated by the EK + neuter genitive comparative, followed by the nominative 
neuter adjective which represents the process' result. The adjectives change from 
general to physical to evaluative/ethical. Finally, the general principle is reiterated 
(71 a9-10). 77 Meanwhile, the key elements of the structure remain, giving an 
impression of an invariable principle, no matter what its subject. 
With its mixture of parallelism and ellipse, one might therefore see the argument's 
structure as mirroring the structure of inductive reasoning itself, insofar as each step, 
in which the content of the principle changes, increases its scope and so its cogency. 
Furthermore, it also has a dialectical role, increasing our understanding of how the 
process works, by causing the reader to supply its missing aspects, ensuring that the 
full principle is absorbed and comprehended. As I outlined above, the first instance 
omits ävä-y" Trou. While it is clearly essential to the principle that necessity 
remains a factor, its explicit omission causes us tacitly to supply it, thereby bringing 
it into our minds as an aspect of the principle to contemplate and perhaps even 
question. The same process could also be seen to occur when Socrates, after spelling 
out explicitly the two way process of µ¬tCov' it WTTOVOS and its reversal, states 
only a uni-directional process of change between subsequent pairs of opposites. As 
the argument progresses the necessity for change to be two-directional becomes a 
77 Cf. the reiteration of 71a13-b2 at c6-7. 
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crucial point. 78 Finally, the omission of, the temporal qualifiers TrpöTepov/EtreLTa and 
TrpöTEpov/baTEpov after 71a1 can be seen as part of this same dialectical move. 9 
Although these features are most pronounced in short isolated units, similar instances 
are also present within longer units. For example, in the next stage of the argument a 
long and fully elaborated example illustrates the principle that transformation 
between opposites is effected by a complementary pairs of processes: LE(Covos 
ý1 V Trpäy. taToc Kai AdTTOVOS ýLETaýÜ aDýT)aLS Kat 4A(QLS, Kai KaXot4tEV 
OÜTW TÖ p iv yap avväveaOal, T6 & 46(vELV; (71b2-4). Once Cebes has 
assented to this proposal, however, Socrates gives two more examples, which omit 
all but the verbs which name the processes: oiKOVV Kai 6LaKp(vEaeaL Kal 
UVTKp(VEQeaL, Kat tPxEaOaL Kai OEP4. la(VEQeaL, Kai 1TdVTa o rrw (71b6-7). 
Once more the elliptical structure highlights the aspect of the process most central to 
this stage of the argument, but also necessitates the reader's active involvement in 
the argument's progress. 
Another variation on this pattern comes in 71c9-72a2, where the initial short 
continuous speech (71c9-d3) lays out a principle in the case of `sleeping' and 
`waking-up', developed in successive clauses within one long continuous unit (71 c9- 
d3). Socrates then expands and breaks' this down into a series of short questions 
dealing with the parallel cases of `dying' and `coming back to life' (71d5-72a3). 
Once again, these feature a great deal of repetition and ellipse, and this could be seen 
as a dialectical mode which shows how to break down an argument and assess it in 
terms of short individual steps. 
The repetition throughout this section features a number of `key' terms, such as 
ytyvoµai and its cognates, while short sections also contain repeated terminology 
like the many occurrences of Tb TE6vdvaL and related terms in 71d5-15. Although 
clearly important, these terms are repeated so intensively throughout so long a stretch 
of argument that they seem to be simply an element of the repetitive structure itself, 
'$ See 71e8ff. 
79 On the importance of the temporal dimension of this argument, see Gallop, 1982,211, summarising 
Barnes. 
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rather than having the independent prominence of less frequent `key-word' 
repetition. 
6.3.2 Generic affiliations 
The theme of transition between opposites connects this section to a major area of 
Presocratic thought, which is reflected in affiliations to elements of Presocratic, 
especially prose, style. In very general terms, aspects such as tight logical 
sequentiality between short units, enhanced by connectives and particles; the 
repetition of key terms and patterns; and the prominence of particular noun-types, 
link this passage to certain Presocratic writings. Barnes, for example, taking 
Melissus as a `paradigm' of `the argumentative [as opposed to aphoristic] style of 
some of the Presocratic writings' talks of his `clear and articulate prose' which 
'forms a systematically articulated body of doctrine' and `is regularly pointed with 
the linguistic marks of reasoning'. These are the `inferential connectives and 
particles' such as `for', `since', `because', `therefore', and `necessarily', which also 
abound in the `argument from opposites'. 80 There is also a general absence of 
normative terms, characteristic of much Presocratic writing, especially the works of 
Melissus, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes of Apollonia. 
More. specifically, the argument features pairs of opposite abstract nouns, many of 
which are formed from T6 +a neuter adjective or participle, such as T6 
daO¬v oTEPOV (71a3) or TÖ TEev11KÖS (71d11). This noun-form, especially to 
denote pairs of opposites, is very common in Presocratics such as Anaxagoras and 
Melissus, 81 while groups of other forms of oppositional pairs are also frequent, for 
example, in Heraclitus. 82 
The `argument from opposites' recalls the views of various thinkers. For example, 
the idea of change depending on necessary, ceaseless, and circular transition between 
opposites is highly reminiscent of Heraclitus and Empedocles, for whom the 
80 Barnes, 1983,94-5. 
$' For examples, see Ch. 5 p. 122, above. 82 E. g. Heraclit. B67 and B111. 
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balanced and continuous -reciprocal change between opposites is - essential. 83 
Conversely, the passage could also be seen as a counter-argument to Melissus' denial 
of the existence of plurality, the text which provides the closest stylistic parallel. 
Melissus claims that, because of perception, men believe in both the existence of 
unchanging things and a process of universal change between opposites. He uses 
their incompatibility to show the impossibility of plurality, and presents transition 
between opposites as a false belief attained through perception. 84 His language bears 
many similarities to the idiom of the Phaedo, in terms of noun-form and pairs of 
opposites connected by y[yv¬aOaL: 80KEL & iµiv Tö TE OEpµbv UXpbV 
'IVEaOaL Kai TO' 4VXp6V eepJ. aV Kai Tb QKX7lpOV ýLaXeaKÖV Kal Tb IiaXeaKbv 
QKXTIpöv. Moreover the final example of change between opposites is that the living 
become the dead and vice versa (Kal, Tb CCJOV- CTTOenO'KELV Kai, k µßj C(ZVTOS 
y(vEQAaL), the very process whose existence is established within the Platonic 
`argument from opposites', uses the same EK + neuter genitive + yLyvoµaL 
structure. 85 
Equally, one might also see the passage as alluding to a close parallel in Heraclitus, 
which describes the unity of opposites: TafTÖ T' EVL C@V Kai TEeVTIKÖ$' Kat [TÖ] 
Eyp71yop69 Kal KaeEÜsov Kai, VEOV Kai y1 paLov' Td8E *yap 1ETatrEa6vTa 
EKELVd EQTL KaKELVa TTdXLV ItETaTTEßoVTa TaÜTa. 86 As Hackforth points out, 
Heraclitus' examples of change between opposites include ' "waking and sleeping" 
alongside of "living and dead" ', two of the key pairs in the `argument from 
opposites'. 87 Another close analogue is found in Anaxagoras: tress yap dv EK µý 
TpLXds yEVOLTo Opis Kai. Qäpý EK µßj aapK6s; "88 
Here he argues against 
generation from opposites, once again using pairs of opposites and similar 
87 See e. g. Heraclit. B38 ,B 10, and B67 (on interconnected opposite processes); B51 (on balance); B80 
and B53 (on the necessity and continuity of change) and cf. Gallop, 1975,110: `The examples of 
complementary processes have a Heraclitean ring about them'. Cf. e. g. Emped. B17 (on the 
changeless cycle of birth into death). 
84 See Meliss. B8. 
85 E. g. Phd. 72a4-6: 6VoXoyEtTaL dpa 1 . LtV Kai, Tarn TOÜS [(ZVTaT 
k TWV TEOVEtTWV 
'yE'YOVEVaL OWV frrTOV T TOÜS TEeVEWTQS EK TWV C(LVTWV. 
16 Heraclit. B38. 
87 Hackforth, 1955,63-4. 
88 Anaxag. B 10. 
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terminology. In general, Plato therefore seems to incorporate elements of Presocratic 
style to challenge and supplant their ideas on change between opposites. 
The case is similar with Plato's y(yvoµat which departs from a conventional notion 
of 71yvoµai as `coming-into-being' from nothing. In the `argument from opposites' 
ytyvoµat represents a process of transition between opposites in entities such as 
animals, plants, and the soul, and the argument relies upon the existence of a 
continuous underlying entity in which these changes take place. Empedocles has 
likewise used yiyvoµaL to describe cyclical change between opposites, making clear 
that nothing ever comes into being to join the opposites, and that the opposites never 
perish. 89 
It is Empedocles' novel usage of ylyv¬aOaL to which the Phaedo example comes 
closest. Nevertheless, despite apparent similiarites, especially between Empedocles' 
theory of change and the `argument from opposites', Plato goes on to show that 
change between opposites is limited to particulars and that for change to take place 
an entirely different ontological category is necessary: the Forms, which could never 
undergo such a process. This, then, bears similarities to the appropriation and 
rejection of generic models in the `apology', although here one needs to go beyond 
the immediate context (i. e. the `argument from opposites') to understand the reasons 
for rejection of the model. 
6.3.3 Ramifications for the dialogue as a whole 
In terms of its wider context, the `argument from opposites' is clearly important. Not 
only does it explicitly introduce the theme of opposites which will ' be significant 
throughout the dialogue, 90 but it is depicted as just one stage of the proof of the 
soul's immortality, together with the recollection argument and others. 91 In addition, 
g' Emp. B17.27-35. He also attacks man's belief in generation from nothing or absolute destruction, 
using and even criticising the conventional use of ytyv¬aOat, KaTa&vrjaKEty, and itdXXuaeaL: 
Emp. B 11 and B9. Cf. B8, where he claims that there is no birth (4 CIc Lc) or death (GdvaToc), although, 
as KRS, 292, points out, he uses cognates of these terms, e. g. in B17, to describe change resulting 
from the coming together and separation of the elements. Cf. also Anaxag. B 17. 90 To a certain extent, this picks up on its implicit introduction as a theme in the 'apology' and perhaps 
even earlier. See e. g. 60b3-c7. 
91 See e. g. 77c6-d5, which explicitly links the arguments 'from opposites' and 'from recollection'. 
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it furthers the conception of death established in the `apology' by presenting life and 
death as opposite transitional processes of `embodiment' and `disembodiment'. 
In structural/stylistic terms the `argument from opposites' can be seen to start a 
progression of arguments. It deals with transition between opposites in sensibles, 
reflected in the even reciprocity of the Eý AdTTOVOS OVTOS rrp6TEpov gTrELTa 
i.. tELCOV yLyv¬aOai and EK ýi¬(COVOS ÖVTOS 1Tp6TEpOV iJQTEpOV EXaTTOV 
yEVr GETai structures. Nevertheless, the case of the soul suggests that existence is 
not limited to the sensible world and, as the dialogue continues, it emerges that there 
is a higher ontological category, amongst which such transitions could never take 
place. A proper formulation of the relation between two levels is essential to proving 
the immortality of the soul and this is gradually provided in stages within the four 
arguments. 
Hence the `recollection' argument clearly shows that there is a type of being distinct 
from sensibles, 92 towards which the imperfect sensibles aspire and in comparison 
with which they are deficient. The evaluative language describing the relationship 
between sensibles and Forms, consisting of terms like EV8EEQTEpWS (74e4,75a3 
etc. ) and 4ai; MTEpo9 (74e1,75b8 etc. ), establishes an ontological hierarchy and 
stresses the Forms' priority. In the `affinity' argument, differences between the two 
levels are clarified, with detailed descriptions of the contrasting qualities inherent in 
the two types of `being'. Finally, the `second sailing' brings together all these 
aspects to show how the qualities of the Forms allow them to cause the process of 
change on the level of particulars. Thus, one could see the `argument from 
opposites' as a necessary step in an argumentative process leading up to a clearer 
understanding of the two ontological levels, their respective characteristics, their 
relationship with each other, and how the soul fits into this scheme 93 
92 On the importance of Forms in the 'recollection' argument for the dialogue as a whole, cf. Rowe, 
1991b, 174. 
" Rowe, 1991b, also sketches the connections between these arguments. For Rowe the connection 
hinges primarily on their being a demonstration of philosophy in practice. Contrary to my reading, he 
sees the `second sailing' as the only truly important/correct argument, whereas the argument 'from 
opposites' and `from affinity' are taken as deliberately flawed, so that, in terms of content, only the 
'recollection argument', actually makes any constructive contribution. 
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6.4 The relationship of the `apology and argument from opposites' 
6.4.1 Stylistic differences between the two passages 
Many of the specific differences between the `apology' and `argument from 
opposites' are clear from the foregoing analyses, 94 and can be summed up by their 
classification in terms (respectively) of `nexus of associations' and `verbal 
minimalism'. Along with this there is the widespread use of normative terms in the 
former as compared to the latter, where they are restricted to very occasional words 
describing the status of a particular point, such as ä8(Kws (72a11), or the use of 
XE1pwv/d LEtvwv and 8LKaL6TEpos/ä8LKtTEpos as oppositional pairs to exemplify the 
principle of generation of opposites. The differing quantity of normative terms also 
enhances the impression that the style of the `apology' draws attention to certain 
qualities, while the `argument from opposites' focuses on process and structure, as 
opposed to the characteristics of entities undergoing this process. 
This difference is encapsulated in their claims to comprehensive applicability. In the 
`apology' the frequently repeated trän shows that 4p6vrjaL9 should govern and be 
the goal of all actions, as well as contributing a further reason for its normativity. In 
this way, it is used to establish a characteristic of a central single phenomenon. By 
contrast, the `argument from opposites' derives an impression of comprehensiveness 
explicitly from the repetition of näs in nept näv-rwv 18wp. ¬v &p' oirrwx. 
ytyvei-at. 1TdVTa (70d9-el), as well as from the broad range and scope of examples 
given to demonstrate the principle of generation of `opposites from opposites'. So 
the latter describes a principle applicable to all entities of a certain kind, as opposed 
to the former's single phenomenon with universal value. 
94 Rowe, 1993b, 159ff. minimises the differences between these two sections, claiming the distinction 
between them is not 'hard and fast' but simply constituted by the different proportions in the mixed 
'logic and rhetoric' which they contain. Yet, as I have shown, the very considerable stylistic 
differences 'between them outweigh any similarities and should not be overlooked. Moreover, 
conventional terms like 'rhetorical' or 'logical', though useful in some respects, are too limited and 
laden with presuppositions to explain fully the function of style within the argumentative structure of 
these passages. Cf. Rowe, 1991b, 170. Here, discussing the same passage, he suggests that Socrates, 
Simmias, and Cebes, clearly do not see the 'apology' as 'rhetorical rather than philosophical' because 
it 'merges seamlessly [italics mine] into, and provides the starting-point for, the arguments for 
immortality that follow'. 
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6.4.2 The status of the arguments 
'Philosophical'style? 
Without a doubt the `argument from opposites' comes far closer to the conventional 
style of modern `analytic' philosophical writing which I discussed in my Introduction 
and which, stereotypically, tends towards the type of simple, `neutral', 95 prose 
favoured by the sciences. Points are set out in clearly demarcated steps, 
accompanied by an absence of variation combined with repetition of structure and 
language, almost leading to technicalisation. In addition a wide variety of different 
spheres are reduced to one common process. 96 The impression of neutrality is 
furthered by the absence of normative terminology, except insofar as it is applied to 
method, resembling the way modern philosophical writing reflects a drive towards 
scientific objectivity. 97 
Up to a point, such practices can be traced back to Aristotle, both in terms of his 
formalisation of argument and the style of his extant writings, and they present a 
marked contrast with the stylistic features of the `apology'. Prier's contrast between 
Aristotle's philosophy and the `symbolic' method of certain Presocratics can perhaps 
be seen to reflect some of these differences: 
The progressive or directional relationships by which the former (i. e. Aristotle] defines his 
world stand out in sharp contrast to the essentially symbolic and structural "premises" the 
earlier period observed at all levels of experience. The difference in "method", of course, is 
the most striking. Aristotle created his own and forced it upon language, elevating 
particularly sympathetic patterns to the level of "reality" and suppressing, or more often 
discounting, vast areas of experience as untenable. The pre-Socratics, on the other hand, 
came to language and its natural symbolic functions in a much more direct and 
comprehensive manner' 9a 
While this above account presents far too restrictive a picture of Aristotelian 
philosophy, it is interesting in its depiction of the historical development of 
95 Although the idea that any writing can have neutrality is, of course, highly controversial. 96 E. g. ethical and physical: SLKaLdrepoS (71a7) and ppa8irrepoc (71a4). Cf. Nussbaum, 1990,19. 
Cf. e. g. Rorty, 1979,8: 'analytic philosophy is still committed to the construction of a permanent, 
neutral framework for inquiry, and thus for all culture'. 97 On the drive towards objectivity and scientism in philosophy see e. g. Nagel, 1986,3-8. 98 Prier, 1976,149. 
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`philosophical style'. Yet, pace Prier, 99 it seems that such features were already 
emerging in some Presocratics, so that even before Plato, they were clear 
characteristics of `philosophical' style. Barnes talks about Melissus B7, for example, 
as `a subtle and intricate piece of prose' which `hangs together as a continuous 
logical progression' and employs many of the features classified above as typical of 
`verbal minimalism'. Deichgräber identifies similar traits in Anaxagoras' 
`Argumentationsstil' and Thesleff discusses the `scientific style' in early Greek 
prose, found in certain Presocratic prose. 10° Not only does the `argument from 
opposites' engage with such thinkers on a broad thematic level, but also has very 
strong generic affiliations to their style of writing. 
Margolis, discussing Plato's place in the `emergence of philosophy' says that, 
although the dialogues contain `no syllogisms' they nevertheless exhibit: 
... a clear sense of an order of 
formal argument that Socrates guards that is on its way to 
syllogistic form, that is entirely accessible to a largely pre-literate but intelligent audience. It 
is a form of argument that schematizes and regularizes the very form of conversational 
argument, without disturbing its spontaneity at all. 101 
This suggests that Plato's dialogue form creates quasi-formalisable argument, an idea 
fitting in with my earlier comments about the suitability of the `short question and 
answer' mode for dividing a passage into clearly demarcated logical steps. 
Margolis' characterisation seems an apt description of the `argument from 
opposites', and would allow us to see Plato as a final transitional stage in the 
historical development of Aristotelian syllogistic and `philosophical style'. 102 Many 
see this as a more or less teleological progression towards a language suitable for 
99 Prier, 1976,149: 'The "pre-Socratics" represent a culmination and reflection of language that must 
be traced back into the roots of Greek and not ahead into the narrowly linear and causal modes of 
Aristotle'. 
100 Deichgräber, 1933,353; Thesleff, 1966. Cf. Matson, 1983, on Presocratic writing as 'impersonal 
and objective', although he is not making a specifically stylistic characterisation. 101 Margolis, 1983,240-1. 
102 Cf. e. g. Havelock, 1983,62, on phthora and genesis: 'but the abstraction phthora, 'destruction', 
used philosophically in antithesis to genesis, is Platonic, and as such became naturalized... within the 
Aristotelian vocabulary'. 
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`conceptual analysis. 103, For example, in his discussion of Melissus, whom he 
views as a key innovator in the development of such a style, Barnes states: 
Whatever the philosophical merits of Melissus' arguments may be, his linguistic achievement 
is surely noteworthy: Parmenides' verses are indeed as rigorously articulated as anything 
Melissus wrote; but, for all that, the lines of his thought often remain dark and obscure; 
Melissus freed Eleatic metaphysics from the straitjacket of bad verse, and in doing so he 
invented a prose style uniquely adapted to the ends of logical and philosophical thought. 104 
Such a progression, as I have said, is often seen as culminating in Arisotelian style. 
Yet it is difficult to assign a place to Plato, given passages such as the 'argument 
from opposites', which apparently fit into this account, and those like the `apology' 
which are clearly very different. 
6.4.3 How `good' is the `argument from opposites'? 
If we accept the idea of the teleological development of an `ideal' philosophical 
style, the `argument from opposites' may seem of more philosophical value than the 
`apology', a view no, - doubt reflected in the greater attention it receives in 
contemporary philosophical accounts of the dialogue. So can the `argument from 
opposites' be seen to fit into this stylistic movement and do its differences from the 
`apology' reflect a higher value? 
The `argument from opposites' is never explicitly criticised or rejected within the 
dialogue and, as I have indicated above, plays an important role in the dialogue as a 
whole. 105 Nevertheless, it is usually regarded as weak, so much so that it has been 
taken as an intentional example of flawed argumentation. ' 06 Most significantly, it is 
103 See e. g. Havelock, 1983, passim and 29, on the development of 'linguistic counters' such as 
verbalised concepts of matter, body, and change etc., which are 'shared by all philosophers'. From 
their 'original Homeric, imagistic reference and their original narrativistic context' these moved 'into 
the thought world of conceptual science' with the Presocratics, although: 'in their philosophical or 
conceptual sense, none of them occurs in Greek literature before the end of the fifth century B. C. and 
some of them come into existence only in definitions supplied by Plato before being used by 
Aristotle'. Cf. also e. g. Margolis, 1983. 
104 Barnes, 1983,96. 
105 Cf. e. g. Gallop, 1982,219, who concedes 'nor is the Argument [i. e. 'from opposites] ever directly 
attacked', even though he suggests that certain of the interlocutors' comments imply its 
unsatisfactoriness. 
106 See e. g. Rowe, 1991b, 172: 'that he [i. e. Plato] knew there was something wrong with it (i. e. 'the 
argument from opposites' is.. . reasonably well established. It is here, perhaps, as a deliberately 
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accused of confusing contraries with contradictories and mistakenly assuming that 
the former are necessarily subject to the same processes as the latter. 107 For it seems 
that the principle of generation of opposites from opposites is only true for 
contradictories; for contraries, generation could take place from something else (from 
some tertium quid). Socrates, however, presents the principle as applicable to being 
alive and being dead which, commentators claim, are only contraries. 108 
Yet, instances of things which can be neither dead nor alive, given by commentators 
as counter-examples to Socrates' point, actually raise no serious difficulties for the 
argument. Bostock, for example, suggests that entities such as stones and his `first 
grandchild' are neither dead nor alive. 109 Yet, neither of these examples are relevant 
to the `argument from opposites'. Firstly, it is clearly 'not involved with inanimate 
objects such as stones; its scope is explicit: Kal auXXi f3Srly baatr¬p ? XEL yEVEaLV 
rrEpi. TrävTwv t&w iev &p' oirrwaL yLyvETaL rrävTa (70d9-el). 110 Moreover, the 
hypothetical unborn grandchild either does not exist and so is not an individual who 
EXEL 'YEVEaLV, for whom this argument would be applicable, or is a soul, awaiting 
reincarnation (rb dvaf3Lc aKEQ9aL) in the form of Bostock's grandchild, and 
therefore in a state of being dead. 
If we see the terms `life' and `death' as states which occur in the soul, and 
correspond to the soul being inside or outside of the body, there is no in-between 
state. The soul will either be in or out of a body and it seems that `life' and `death' 
are, unproblematically, both `mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive', thus 
satisfying the criteria required of a contradictory. "' So even if the `argument from 
unsatisfactory first attempt, which will call for replacement'; Gallop, 1982,217, who says that 'its 
weakness will emerge in the ensuing discussion', although it is not 'trivial'. 
107 E. g. Bostock, 1986,52ff.; Rowe, 1993a, 156; Gallop, 1975,107ff. 
108 Cf. e. g. Bostock, 1986,52: 'The most obvious fault with this argument is that its second premise is 
false. We have noted that if the first premise is to be true, then the relevant kind of opposites must be 
properties that are contradictories of one another, and the properties of being alive and dead are not 
contradictories: some things are neither alive nor dead'. 
109 Bostock, 1986,52. 
"0 At this point in the argument alone, it seems that -Y EV1S is being used in the conventional sense 
to refer to 'birth', since the examples given of those things which have ylvevtc are men, animals, and 
plants. One might argue that this does not, strictly speaking, include the soul, since the argument 
itself presents the soul as having permanent existence, and the cyclical point implies that this must 
always have been the case. Nevertheless the soul can, in a certain sense, be said to have 'birth' insofar 
as it enters the human body at the time of birth. 111 For this definition of contradictories, see Gallop, 1982,213. 
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opposites' does not provide conclusive or comprehensive proof of the soul's 
immortality, as long as we take account of its explicitly restricted scope it can be 
defended against accusations of fallaciousness through confusing contraries with 
contradictories. 112 
The kinds of criticism detailed above have usually come about because the notion of 
things like life, death, properties, particulars, and the soul, appealed to within the 
argument are not yet clearly established. ' 13 Yet this in itself indicates an important 
point about the argument's omissions. For, in order for the argument to be both 
properly understood and defended, it is necessary to have a detailed understanding of 
the ontology and qualities of the entities involved in the process it describes. A way 
in which this is suggested is the `anonymous objection' within the second sailing, 
where an unnamed interlocutor questions Socrates' assertion that opposites `in us' 
can never become their opposites, thinking that it contravenes the `argument from 
opposites' (102e6-103a10). Socrates responds by pointing out that this earlier 
argument concerned opposite rrpdygaTa, whereas his new principle applies to Forms 
(103b1-c4). However -the `argument from opposites' simply specified that all 
generated things come to be from opposites, and it is only when taken together with 
the rest of the dialogue, which describes the different ontological levels and their 
qualities, that the type of entities to which the `opposites from opposites' principle 
applies is made clear and justified. 
So it seems that, while the `argument from opposites' is not fallacious, it cannot be 
clearly understood or defended in isolation, but only against the background of 
distinct ontological categories, their qualities and values, which is built up 
112 One could argue that this still does not exempt the earlier examples, such as 'larger/smaller' and 
stronger/weaker' from the accusation that they are relations rather than properties (see e. g Hackforth, 
1955,64) and that, even if we take them to be the properties 'large' and 'small', it is certainly possible 
for something to have neither of these qualities. However, if we look ahead to Socrates' analysis of 
'larger' and 'smaller' at 102b3ff., we can see that these are viewed in terms of one of a pair of 
contradictory property-instances being present in the individual. For, if Simmias is larger than 
Socrates, this is because he has largeness in him. If Socrates were to become larger than Simmias, we 
can assume, that smallness would then enter Simmias, meaning that largeness could no longer remain. 
It seems that either one or other of these property-instances must be present in the individual and, as I 
will argue below, in Ch. 7, they do not vary by degree. On this analysis, being 'larger' and 'smaller' 
can be seen as contradictories. Of course, one might see the restriction of scope as, in itself, leading to 
further questions about the principle's applicability to soul. 
113 Cf. e. g. Gallop, 1975,107: 'The scope of "all things subject to coming-to-be" (d9) is not very 
clear... '. 
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throughout the dialogue, as well as the definition of death as the `separation of the 
soul from the body' established in the `apology'. Arguments such as the `apology', 
the `affinity argument' (usually judged to be the weakest argument in the Phaedo), l14 
and the `second sailing', all contribute to the understanding of distinctions between 
Forms and particulars, their inherent qualities, evaluative status, and relationship to 
each other, as well as the place of soul within this opposition. 
By contrast, in its style of `verbal minimalism', the `argument from opposites' 
foregrounded the structure of a process, but gave no clear description of the type of 
entities to which it is applicable, apart from specifying all `generated things'. Even 
though its style makes it closer to ideals of `philosophical argument' and suggests 
comprehensiveness, in order to be understood fully it depends upon other arguments 
such as the `apology' or `affinity argument', so as to clarify its processes and 
possible problems. 
6. S Conclusion 
Plato's outline of the process of `opposites from opposites' imitates certain aspects of 
Presocratic style which can be seen to be part of a stylistic movement towards 
Aristotelian style. These kinds of features are now treated as paradigmatic of 
philosophical argument. However, far from suggesting that such a style occupies 
some privileged philosophical status, the rest of the dialogue shows that it does not 
consider the nature of the entities involved and therefore cannot be fully understood 
independently. 
Both the `apology' and the `argument from opposites' can be seen to make important 
contributions to the dialogue. The latter contains insights into particular processes, 
attained through `verbal minimalism', but is dependent on the antecedent `apology' 
'" See e. g.. Rowe, 1991b, 163 (the affinity argument] 'is by common consent, one of the weakest'. 
Elton, 1997, argues that the 'affinity argument' is intended to show 'the pitfalls of analogical 
argument' (316) and that Simmias' later criticisms of his own 'harmony' analogy (92cllff. ) are 
intended to imply Plato's dissatisfaction with this type of argument (314ff. ). However, Socrates' 
response to Simmias shows that Simmias' argument fails because it does not account for the qualities 
and values of soul, the very points on which the 'affinity argument' is based. Cf. Bostock, 1986,119- 
121. 
. 
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and the understanding of qualities and values which is built up within its `nexus of 
associations'. Moreover, far from the `apology' being less important than the 
`argument from opposites', the latter actually appears to fall within the scope of the 
former. For the `apology' is a higher-order argument concerning the nature of 
philosophy itself, while the 'argument from opposites' is a lower order enquiry into a 
particular philosophical principle. In addition, the `apology' clearly sets out an 
opposition between the different levels of being, and shows how philosophy fits into 
this view, while the argument from opposites implicitly relies on this ontological 
divide, but does not discuss it. 
This therefore suggests not only the importance of both these sections, but also the 
need for a holistic reading of the dialogue which accounts for their relationship to 
each other and to the other parts of the text. In conclusion, it seems that the 
transition to the stylistic mode of the `argument from opposites' does not suggest that 
the style of the latter is more valuable and `philosophical'. Instead, it presents a 
movement between two necessary and complementary types of philosophical 
discourse. 




vows EQTIV 6 SLaKOVµwv TE Kal nävTwv aLTLos (Phd. 97c1-2). 
Little is ever made of the detailed critique which follows these words, and it seems 
that for most readers these lines represent the limit of Anaxagoras' particular 
importance in the Phaedo. ' Seen as just another physicist whose material causes fail 
to explain causation, his special significance here is felt to stem from his conception, 
albeit fallacious, of causal vows which, in the context of causation, can be usefully 
appropriated and reinterpreted by Plato. By contrast, I aim to show that Anaxagoras' 
presence and importance in the Phaedo is far greater and more complex than has 
been noticed, and extends beyond sections where it is clearly and explicitly 
signposted. 
In the previous chapter we saw how the generic background of particular features can 
be bound up with certain arguments or points of view. For example, antitheses in 
oratory often oppose true to false or moral to immoral, while ambiguous terms 
sometimes represent alternative moral conceptions. By including these features in a 
system incompatible with their usual underlying viewpoint, Plato appropriates 
aspects of their function, while simultaneously challenging and replacing the beliefs 
with which they are conventionally associated. 
In this chapter I return to my earlier Passage III in order to explore Plato's strategy 
for using generic affiliations in a more detailed, complex, and specific context. That 
passage had the clearest generic affiliations of those discussed, with a varied range of 
allusions to Anaxagoras and Presocratic prose writers, which pass without comment 
in the secondary literature. I suggest that by appropriating Anaxagorean language 
1 Although there are some notable exceptions: e. g. Sedley, 1989, who shows that there is a point by 
point correspondence between the aspects of cosmology dealt with in and the features of the 'true 
earth' in the Phaedo myth; and Ooms Renard, 1999,113ff., who takes the details of this passage as 
being central to the Platonic theory of explanation. 
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through allusion, sometimes -clear, sometimes subtle, Plato mounts a far more 
complex and extensive attack against Anaxagoras than has been acknowledged in 
interpretations of the dialogue. Moreover, the purpose of such attacks is not only to 
dismantle, but also to displace his opponent's system, and so provide Plato with a 
basis on which to formulate and establish central features of his own philosophy. 
In the first section of this chapter I shall consider the use of the Anaxagorean 
quotation in the `argument from opposites' and how this sets the scene for the 
Phaedo's ongoing concern with his ideas. I then move onto the famous passage in 
Socrates' intellectual autobiography where he recounts his expectations and ensuing 
disappointment when reading Anaxagoras. This passage, 97b8-99d2, is the central 
focus of this chapter, and will from now on be referred to as the `Anaxagoras 
episode'. The normal interpretation of the passage is that Socrates' expectation of 
finding normativity in Anaxagorean cosmology stems from Anaxagoras' inclusion of 
the term vows, together with Socrates' belief in the integral connection between 
goodness and the intellect? Lennox, for example, states that Socrates' 
`presupposition' depends on `the conceptual link in his thinking between intelligent 
agency and the explanatory effect of goodness'. Accordingly, allusion to 
Anaxagoras' view of vows as an ordering cosmological force allows Plato a 
fortuitous opportunity to connect physics with the intellect and thereby introduce the 
notion of teleological causation, while Anaxagoras himself is rejected simply 
because he fails to recognise and take into account the normativity of vo"vs. 
Given that, as we have seen, the Phaedo's idea of the intellect as moral is usually felt 
to stem from an unargued claim of its association with virtue made in the `apology', 
the traditional reading of the `Anaxagoras episode' is unsurprising. If this reading is 
correct, the Anaxagorean catchphrase is tised merely to extend this unproven 
assumption, and the morality of vovs paves the way for a notion of teleological 
causation which itself seems problematically detached from the rest of the dialogue's 
argument. Contrary to such an interpretation I shall argue that the source of the 
normativity which Socrates attributes to Anaxagoras' principle actually derives from 
'Cf. 6.2.4, above. 3 Lennox, 1985,198. Cf. Bostock, 1986,143; Rowe, 1993,234. 
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the idea of universal order, 6 &aKo I6 v TE Kal TrävTCwv atTLos, rather than voüs. 
By then presenting vows as the structure which orders the cosmos and showing why 
this is so, Plato is not just relying on vows' normativity but, as with #ö i ais in the 
`apology', actually mounting an argument for its normativity which could be seen as 
an attempt to validate the desired connection of epistemology, ethics, physics, and 
metaphysics, posited throughout the dialogue. Following this, I outline the 
significance of the rest of the `Anaxagoras episode', explaining the detail and 
importance of stylistic allusion both to Anaxagoras himself and to Presocratic prose 
in general. 
The final section argues that there is an underlying engagement with Anaxagoras in 
the sections of the dialogue before and after the `Anaxagoras episode', offering a 
way to overcome the puzzling discontinuity which this episode apparently creates. I 
suggest that, even after this episode, Anaxagoras' ideas are still at issue and that their 
absolute rejection only comes with Socrates' ultimate denial that pure opposites can 
ever tolerate each other's presence. 
7.1.1 What is the relevance ofAnaxagoras for the Phaedo? 
As a preliminary to the more detailed account to follow, I shall briefly outline some 
of the reasons why Anaxagoras might be singled out as especially relevant to ideas 
discussed in the Phaedo. The first of these, as shown by the `Anaxagoras episode', 
must surely be his view of vows as the primary cause of universal order. Indeed, 
how could such a notion fail to be attractive to the Phaedo's Socrates, a philosopher 
who claims that the best life is attained through the pure rationality of the soul free 
from bodily disturbances? It is in his role as the innovative proponent of the 
5 intelligent universe, that Anaxagoras is also referred to elsewhere in Platos 
Also of relevance are Anaxagoras' views on the opposites. For, despite their 
centrality to much Presocratic physics, it is Anaxagoras himself who explicitly states 
4 This will be discussed further below, 194ff. and passim. Cf. also Lennox, 1985,197 and 200. 
5 Laws967bff. Cf. Phlb. 30d. 
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their inseparability. 6 This idea bears some superficial similarities to the Phaedo's 
`compresence of opposites' in sensible particulars: that is, that `some properties, 
notably relations and values, always occur in an individual particular along with their 
opposites'. However, Anaxagoras is not simply talking about the compresence of 
qualified opposites in particulars, but opposites in themselves, and this is directly 
opposed to the Phaedo's conception of mutually exclusive pure and distinct 
opposites. 
Furthermore, Anaxagoras also proposed `like into like' generation, a distinctive 
viewpoint, given that even his fellow believers in change, such as Heraclitus and 
Empedocles, saw generation as preceding from opposites to opposites. Yet, 
notwithstanding superficial similarities to the `like into like' notion of causation in 
the Phaedo's `final argument', for Socrates causation actually depends on a notion 
which contradicts a fundamental Anaxagorean principle, the absolute separateness of 
true opposites. 
The way in which Anaxagoras' positions are both similar and oppositional to those 
of the Phaedo's Socrates is indicative of his role in this dialogue: on the one hand, a 
thinker whose ideas are in certain ways attractive to Socrates; on the other, one 
whose foundational principles seem to be at odds with the basic premises on which 
Socrates' arguments depend. 
In keeping with this characterisation is the way Anaxagorean physics appears to tend 
towards a mind/matter duality, in which the primary entity, vows, is distinguished by 
its absolute purity, 8 so that it seems to anticipate the Phaedo's metaphysical dualism 
of Forms and particulars .9 Nevertheless, with both vo"vs and matter corporeal, 
6 Anaxag. B6. Vlastos, 1974,473, says that, although the belief in the 'commixture' of opposites was 
the 'traditional assumption', it was Anaxagoras who stated it explicitly. He suggests that Anaxagoras 
was responding to Empedocles' direct challenge of this belief. However, cf. Lloyd, 1966,81, for the 
opposite viewpoint. 
7 See e. g. Phd. 74b7-9 and 102b3ff. This formulation is taken from McCabe, 1994,25, and the term 
`compresence' is often used within Platonic studies to denote the simultaneous presence of opposites 
within a particular. Cf. e. g. Owen, 1957,175 and 177; Irwin, 1977,9. 8 Anaxag. B12. 
His description of what appears to be another parallel world in B4 might be seen to set a precedent 
for the other societies depicted in the Phaedo's myth, which live on the earth, although outside of 
what we understand as the world. 
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Anaxagoras posits only one metaphysical level, 10 while his principle of bµov -ndvTa 
also seems incompatible with dualism. 11 .' 
So, in spite of any apparent similarities, there is always Anaxagoras' fundamental 
bµov rräv-ra, a notion which Socrates could never accept and with which I shall 
begin my analysis. 
7.2 Anaxagoras in the `argument from opposites' 
One of Socrates' arguments supporting the `argument from opposites' is the view 
that one-way generation, which has no corresponding reversal, is impossible, since it 
would eventually result in all things reaching a certain state from which no chance of 
change existed. If the living were not generated from the dead, just as we see that the 
dead are generated from the living, Socrates says, then generation would cease. 12 
For further clarification he adds two parallel arguments, one being a direct reference 
to Anaxagoras which includes the very opening words of his book: 
KaV El au'yKpLVOLTO thv TfciVTa, 6LaKpLVOLTO sý glj, TaXÜ CLV Td TOD 
' Avaýayöpov yEyovbs Eir1, "' 0µov irdVTa xp1n aTa. " (Phd. 72c3-5)13 
Like the later `Anaxagoras episode', Socrates' `argument from opposites' is, as we 
saw in Chapter 6, suggestive of the views of a number of thinkers. Given the 
centrality of opposites in so much Presocratic physics this is unsurprising. 
Nevertheless, it is only Anaxagoras who is named and cited directly, establishing 
him as an important figure in the Phaedo. This is just one of a series of connected 
allusions to Anaxagoras, both implicit and explicit, and yet the significance and 
connectedness of these allusions is, as far as I am aware, unnoticed within the critical 
literature on the dialogue. 
10 Cf. KRS, *365. 
1 Anaxag. B6. See Sven-Tage, 1982,68. 
ýZ Phd. 72a11-b6. 
'3 Apart from the reversal of trdvra and XprjµaTa and the omission of ý v, this is a direct quotation of 
Anaxag. B1 which, on the testimony of Simplicius, is generally assumed to be the opening of 
Anaxagoras' book. See e. g. Sider, 1981,43. 
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How does Plato use Anaxagoras' words here and what further relevance does this 
have? As elsewhere, in his treatment of other thinkers, Plato takes a short 
programmatic statement detached from its original context as representative of 
Anaxagoras' views. 14 He then inserts this representative statement into an argument 
based on the very impossibility of what Anaxagoras takes to be a self-evident and 
foundational metaphysical truth. ts For Anaxagoras, the phrase bµov Xp1jp. aTa 
Trävrra ijv describes the primordial state, from which physical entities came into 
being, 16 while bµov TrdvTa is also used to describe the present state of the 
universe. 17 In Plato the jv has been dropped and 5µov XprjµaTa TrävTa is the 
apodosis of a counterfactual conditional, whose self-evident impossibility is used to 
imply that the process which would lead to such a state, the unidirectional change of 
opposites, is also impossible. From this it can then be inferred that transition 
between opposites must be a two-way process. 
To some degree Plato seems to be using not only Anaxagoras' words, but also his 
argumentative strategy, given that Plato's omission of fjv from Anaxagoras' 
programmatic statement is very similar to Anaxagoras' own treatment of 
Pannendes. By changing EQTLV to ýv in Parmenides' vvv EQTLV 5µoü TäV ..., 
18 
Anaxagoras appears to have given his cosmos an origin in the past whose existence 
Parmenides has just denied (ov6E 1rOT' iv ov8' EQraL). 19 For Plato the removal of 
ýv is one way of challenging Anaxagoras' claim that bµov XpijµaTa trdtrra was a 
prior and original state and of criticising the temporal order of his cosmology. This 
is a good example of how Plato employs Anaxagoras' own verbal techniques to 
criticise him, while also constructing a new viewpoint. 
So, although at first glance the fact that Socrates uses Anaxagoras' words to argue 
for his own case might seem to suggest some degree of support for Anaxagorean 
physics, the more closely the context is examined, the more evident it becomes that 
1; Cf. Tht. 152a2-4; Soph. 237a8-9. 
15 Schofield, 1980,33. 
16 Anaxag. B 1. 
'7 Anaxag. B6: dX,, V örrmvnep äpx v Eivag. Kal vüv lTdvra 6 oü. is Parm. B8.5-6. 
19 In addition, Anaxagoras' substitution of the plural for Parmenides' singular also suggests a 
commitment to pluralism rather then monism. On Anaxagoras' use of Parmenides B8.5-6 , see e. g. Schofield, 1980,64; and Sider, 1981,44. 
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these doctrines are in fact being seriously undermined. This is certainly the case with 
the vVyKpivoLTO/ 6LaKpLVO TO opposition here which, especially given the context, is 
extremely reminiscent of Anaxagorean terminology. 20 Socrates follows 
Anaxagoras' view of Q1'yKp(vELv and SLaKptvELv as complementary processes, when 
proposing that vtryKpLVELV must be accompanied by the corresponding 81aKpLvELV. 
However, for Socrates, the result of pure vvyKPLVEIV would be 5µoü TrävTa 
XpIj taTa, since everything would be vvyKpivö Ieva. This is impossible, since 
nothing could arise from such a state. The argument represents a serious departure 
from Anaxagoras on two counts. First, for Anaxagoras 5µov XpijµaTa ITdVTa was 
the original state of the universe, while T6 QvyKptVELV only came later, once vo"vs 
had initiated the first motion (rrEpLXwpf aal or KLVEiv), from which the initial 
separation (Tb äTroKpivELv) began. 21 Yet the difference between Socrates and 
Anaxagoras concerns not only temporal priority, but also change. For Socrates, if all 
things were ouyKpLVÖµEva the resultant condition would be bµov rrdvra Xp1jµaTa, 
which would preclude change, whereas for Anaxagoras bµov XptjTa nävTa is the 
original state from which all change proceeds. 
Not only was 5µov Xpi taTa lTthrra the precursor to change in Anaxagorean 
physics, but bµoü 1TdVTa also represents a present within which opposites are not 
There is then a sharp irony both in separate and change occurs from `like into like'? Z 
Plato's use of bµov XprjµaTa TraVTa as the impossible state which precludes change, 
but also in the fact that this occurs within an argument to prove that in the process of 
generation opposites turn into opposites. For conversely, Anaxagorean generation 
proceeds from 5µov trävrra and revolves around a principle of `like into like' and 
'predominance' 23 
Clearly 6 io"v xpij taTa irdvTa is incompatible with the Phaedo's `argument from 
opposites' (70c4-72e2). Moreover, because of the centrality of opposites, the 
20 Phd72c3-4. Amongst the extant fragments of the Presocratics the verbs 6Laicpivw and auyicp(vw 
and their cognates are used only by Anaxagoras. 21 See Anaxag. B4; 12; and 13; and Sider, 1981,103. 
22 See Anaxag. B6; 8; and 10 respectively. 
23 See Anaxag. B12 and Sven-Tage, 1982,22. 
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`argument from opposites' also prefigures the later analysis of causation, 24 which 
will show why the falsity of bµov trdtrra is so important and has ramifications 
beyond this particular passage. 25 As is clear from Anaxagoras B1 and elsewhere, he 
is concerned with a comprehensive physics, capable of explaining all generation and 
destruction. Likewise Plato's Socrates aims in the Phaedo at a comprehensive 
account of causation, with the Forms. 26 Causation occurs through the presence of a 
Form, itself a pure, real, and distinct entity which cannot, under any circumstances, 
tolerate the presence of its opposite. Thus, for Socrates, separability is essential in 
order to have rräv-ra, rather than an indiscriminate and unchangeable mass, so that 
Anaxagoras' foundational premise can be seen as a paradox which posits the 
existence of näv-ra, while precluding their essential distinctness by using 5µov 27 In 
this way, when Plato cites Anaxagoras in the former argument, he is also laying the 
groundwork for the later theories which will reveal why Anaxagoras' Sµov is so 
fundamentally false. 
7.3 The `Anaxagoras episode' 
7.3.1 Conventional treatments of this passage 
I now move on to the `Anaxagoras episode' within Socrates' intellectual 
`autobiography', in which he recounts his expectations of and reactions to reading 
Anaxagoras (97b8-99d2). As well as being an important part of the transition into 
the final arguments for the immortality of the soul it shows Socrates' retrospective 
reflection on his own intellectual development. Although Socrates often presents the 
views of others, giving either specific or vague sources, 28 it is only here and in the 
Apology that he comments directly on his own development. 
24 The importance of this connection is highlighted by the anonymous question at Phd10334-10, 
which leads Socrates to an explicit comparison between opposite qualities in particulars (as in 'the 
argument from opposites') and the pure opposites themselves (Phut 103a11-c2). 
s NB the recurrence of this phrase at Phd. 101e5 which, I will argue below, 7.5.2, is once again a 
specific allusion to Anaxagoras. 
See n. 97. 
Cf. e. g. Anaxag. B8 on the absolute inseparability of opposites. 28 E. g. Phd. 61d9; Tht. 201d8; Gorg. 507e6. 
Chapter 7 192 
According to its standard interpretation the passage could, be summarised as 
demonstrating Plato's aspirations to a teleological account of causation and his 
frustration with physicists like Anaxagoras, who explain phenomena in terms of 
physical prerequisites, but without reference to the value and so to the real cause of 
the occurrence. Although the importance of this passage is recognised, there has 
been little discussion of its details'29 and most of the debate surrounding it focuses on 
the question of whether Socrates' teleological aspirations are relevant to the theories 
of the `final argument'. 30 Thus, Lennox says that although these two sections share 
the theme of explanation, they nevertheless present `two radically different accounts 
of explanation', so that `commentators have tended to polarize around two extreme 
positions' by suggesting that the `teleological parenthesis is of no significance' or 
that `teleological explanations' are actually concealed with the `deuteros pious'. 31 
The detailed commentaries on the `Anaxagoras episode' itself are mainly concerned 
with identifying which Anaxagorean fragments contain the specific doctrines at issue 
or pointing out other possible sources, although their significance is not discussed. 32 
Neither this approach, nor assessments of its relevance for the `final argument', do 
justice to the elaborate detail and complexity of this passage, 33 which seem oddly 
superfluous if one follows the traditional interpretation. The challenge remains to 
account for the significance of its individual details. 
Moreover, in addition to traditional questions about this passage's relationship to the 
`final' argument, there is also a puzzling discontinuity within its more immediate 
context. For although Socrates' insistence on the importance of soul and rationality 
29 Lennox, 1985, is an exception; along with certain others. See n. 1, above. -' 
30 Vlastos, 1973, for example, in his important and controversial article 'Reasons and causes in the 
Phaedo', rejects a teleological interpretation of the final argument and suggests that it describes 
relationships of logical entailment as opposed to causation. These ideas have been heavily contested, 
for example by Wiggins, 1986, who denies that the Forms themselves are causes, but supports a 
teleological view. Although everything is caused by the Good, this is not intelligible to mortals and 
can only by understood to a degree through its 'intelligible determinations', the Forms. Finally, in a 
recent article of 1998, Sedley restates the case for seeing the Forms as causes and as an ontological 
rather than, epistemological category, having suggested in a 1989 article that the desired teleology 
actually manifests itself to a certain degree in the Phd. 's myth. 
31 Lennox, 1985,201-2. Although Lennox disputes both positions, he does present his own ideas as to 
why we should assume the relevance of teleology for the deuteros pious. 3 E. g. Rowe, 1993,237-8; Burnet, 1911,98; Geddes, 1863,113f.; Loriaux, 1975,82 and 85. 33 Cf. Ooms Renard, 1999,115, who comments on the 'pseudo-explanation' at 98c5-d6: 'Notice the 
extraordinary sophistication of this account, usually hurriedly summarised as "material". ' 
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would be likely to make a theory of causation based on vo"vs seem significant and 
attractive, the `Anaxagoras episode' is effectively sandwiched between two closely 
cohering sections, without obvious relevance to them. Lennox calls it `an apparently 
parenthetical discussion of Anaxagoras' and says `the radical discontinuity between 
the Anaxagorean excursus and the rest of the exploration of the aitia of generation 
and destruction is clear, and clearly self-conscious'. 34 Immediately preceding this 
`Anaxagoras episode' Socrates begins his autobiography with a discussion of various 
physical and mathematical theories, some of which might be associated with figures 
such as Empedocles and Alcmaeon, as well as Anaxagoras. 35 This is followed by the 
`Anaxagoras episode' which then leads into what Socrates calls his `second-sailing'. 
Beginning with the rejection of colour and shape as causes of beauty (100c10-e3), 
the `second-sailing' then moves on to examples (100e8-101b8)36 which all relate 
back to first part of the autobiography (96d8-e4). 7 
In this way, the Anaxagoras episode ostensibly stands apart from both its immediate 
and wider context, and seems to challenge its readers to uncover its place within the 
dialogue as a whole as well as the significance of its own argumentation. 
7.3.2 The significance of vows 
I propose that the key to much of the episode's importance lies in fully understanding 
its concept of voüs. Until the closing moments the focus on vows draws the parts of 
this passage together, with all the varying causal explanations presented as correctly 
or incorrectly attributed to vows. Moreover, vov5 also suggests a link with the 
rational soul, which has been such an important concept earlier in the dialogue. 
We would do best to begin by pointing out and clarifying vow's various roles here. 
The first can be seen within Socrates' statement of Anaxagoras' views: votS EUTIV 
sa Lennox, 1985,197, and 200 respectively. 35 See e. g. Rowe, 1993,230ff. 
16 Namely: the idea that a head could be the cause of one man being greater than another; that two 
causes ten to be greater than eight; or that a half causes a two-cubit rule to be longer than a one-cubit 
one. 
" Lennox, 1985,197 n. 6, cites this along with three other 'pieces of evidence that indicate that the 
sense of intrusion of the Anaxagorean discussion is intentional'. 
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6 &aKOQµwv TE Kai TrdvTwv aLTloc (97c1-2). Yet vows is not simply the cause 
of cosmological order, but has other important dimensions, which are revealed 
through the explanations themselves, as well as the puns on this term within the 
passage. 
Socrates claims that his inference that a cosmic vows would work towards what is 
best led him to believe that he had found a teacher about the cause of realities KaTr 
vovv EµavTw (97d7). Despite Burnet's view that such a pun would be 'frigid' '38 the 
way Socrates states his approval for Anaxagoras is usually taken to involve a pun on 
the Anaxagorean vows. Another very similar pun is then found when Socrates 
criticises Anaxagoras for positing spurious causes such as air and aether for the 
ordering of rrpdyµaTa: bp @ dv6pa T(Z µßv vC oü&v Xpc'µevov (98b8). 39 Even 
commentators who acknowledge these puns do not explain their significance. Yet 
such puns imply that Socrates is concerned with both the cosmic and individual 
human voice and is suggesting a possible link between them. 
Correspondence between the cosmic and personal vows is an idea explored in a 
number of Platonic dialogues, 40 and Plato's inclusion of both in the discussion here 
also emerges when Socrates considers what constitutes the correct explanation for 
remaining in prison, beginning Sarrep äv EL TLS X&/Wv 8TH EwKpä1TS TrdVTa 
öaa rrpdTTEL vw npcTTEL... (98c4). This shows that vows is to be seen as the 
instrument of moral judgement and also strengthens the connection between vows, 
representing individual rationality, and soul. .x 
A further point, of crucial significance, comes from these ideas of vows as personal 
intellect. When Socrates uses vows in contexts such as those above, he suggests that 
it plays a part in the individual's reasoning and decision making. By saying TaDTa 
&T XoyiCö ievoc is i¬VOs 11ÜPTIKEVaL CJý1TJV BL8daKaXov... KaTä VOÜV EµauT43 
38 Burnet, 1911,104. 
39 See e. g. Gallop, 1975,174, who notices both puns and claims, contra Burnet, that they are 'in 
keeping with Socrates' ironical treatment of Anaxagoras. Cf. Sprague, 1994,53; Rowe, 1993,235; 
Geddes, 1863,112. 
40 E. g. Ti. 47b: LVa TQS eV o paVW KaTL86VTES TOO VOÜ TrEpL65ous Xprjaatp Oa eTrl Täc 
TrEpl4opäs T&T 'njg nap' kµiv &avoi crew T, ýuyyEVeis tKEtvaLS oüvas"".. Cf. e. g. T00b; 
Phlb. 28d-30d, and Harte, 1999,394, on this passage: 'Socrate etablit un parallele entre l'intelligence 
humaine, couronnement du corps humain anime, et l'intelligence divine, couronnement encore plus 
glorieux du corps cosmique animb'. 
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(97d6) he implies that the points he makes here are consistent with what he himself 
feels to be rational41 Thus, if vows is a term describing Socrates' personal 
reasoning, it should be manifest within the very process of reasoning in the passage 
as a whole, and can be further understood from analysing the composition of the 
argument. To put it another way, vows is seen as that which motivates individual 
decisions and as that which confers order on the universe. How it does so is partially 
to be understood through analysing the content of Socrates' examples of voüs-based 
explanation. Yet, since voüs represents not only Socrates' topic of discussion, but 
also his thought processes, a clearer understanding of how it fulfills its causal role is 
also to be found within the way in which his argument is structured. 
7.4 Style and vows-based reasoning 
Taking both content and structure of argument in this passage as being an indication 
of what vows does or does not involve, we can now move on to trace the particular 
contributions of the main types of argument. This is largely bound up with 
examining how Plato imitates his predecessors' style to demonstrate his criticisms 
and also to construct his own position. At some points the allusions and criticism are 
specifically aimed at Anaxagoras, while at others the style evokes a more general 
impression of the type of writing found in Presocratic prose. There are three main 
parts to my discussion, dealing with: repetition of key terms; repetition of certain 
syntactical, semantic, and lexical structures; and the possible allusiveness of 
Socrates' `sitting' example (98c5-d6). 
7.4.1 Key-word repetition 
My first comments are on key-word repetition, which constitutes one element of 
Plato's argumentation. Such repetition is subtly reminiscent of Anaxagoras' own 
style and a related aspect of his argumentation (see Chapter 5). Much of his 
argument progresses through the restatement of key words along with the assertion 
41 Cf. White, 1989,160: 'The dimension of mind that arranges and causes all things is in some sense 
consonant with the mind of Socrates himself. Apart from this point, White's arguments have little in 
common with mine. 
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of further characteristics and points, rather than using what we might recognise as 
patterns of inference and proof characteristic of argumentation. 2 The nature and 
power of Anaxagoras' vows is given as a self-evident assertion, then supported and 
strengthened through incantatory repetition. 43 
As in Anaxagoras, the large amount of `key-word' repetition in the Phaedo passage 
contributes to the emphasis and expansion of what Socrates himself presents as a 
self-evident truth: namely the integral connection of vows, universal order, and the 
good. This is especially the case in the first part of the `Anaxagoras episode', in 
which Socrates outlines his expectations of Anaxagoras' book (97b8-98b6). When 
compared to other parts of the Phaedo, the amount of `key-word' repetition is 
exceptionally high, meaning that a few significant lexemes are repeated at numerous 
points throughout. Moreover, the general repetitiveness of the. passage is further 
enhanced by the relatively small vocabulary used here 44 
The noteable examples of key-word repetition in this passage are: voüs; KoOµEw and 
its compound &aKoa th ; rräs; a T1os and its cognates; and IEXTLaros'/ äµe(VüW. 
voüs, Koa. IEW, atTLos, and Träs are also interconnected and all used in close 
conjunction. 45 
Plato, like Anaxagoras, uses a nexus of significant words to transmit his ideas and 
includes certain Anaxagorean key-words along with some of his own. Although 
three of the repeated lexemes, vows, KOCµVw, and rräs, are also prominent in 
Anaxagoras, the terms atTLoc and its cognates along with MEXTLa-rosy dµe(vwv are a 
Platonic addition. Just like Anaxagoras, Socrates seems to rely on repetition of key- 
terms to make his central point. 
The question of what legitimises the attribution of normative structure to vots as a 
cause can be answered with reference to the very connection of voüs, Koaµiw, and' 
'2 Cf. e. g. Schofield, 1980,4-6. 
43 E. g. Deichgräber, 1933,353 and passim. "This passage's `lexeme-token ratio' is 0.52 (see 4.1.2), significantly lower than in the others (four of 
the remaining passages have ratios ranging from 0.69-0.73, while the final ratio was 0.79), and 
indicates a lesser degree of lexemic variation. 
45 E. g. 97c1-5. 
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'iä , which 
is so central to this passage and recalls Anaxagoras' own rräVTa 
8LEK6Qý. LraE VORS 46 KÖaIIos, for the Greeks, appears to have been a normative term, 
suggesting good order. A clear testimony to such usage is the beginning of Gorgias' 
famous Encomium of Helen, where the term signifies something like `the good 
appropriate to each thing': 
K6Qµoc TrOXEL µßv Evav8pia, vwµaTL & KdXXos, OVA & Qo4ta, 
TrpäyµaTL & dpcTi, XöycP & aXi OELa" Ta & EvavT(a TO ThW 
47 dKoapIa. 
For Plato Koaµos has a similar normative sense, 48 representing a whole whose 
elements are arranged in the best possible way. 49 For example, at Philebus 64b, 
having enumerated all the necessary elements for the mixture which constitutes the 
best life, Socrates call this Kö tos TLS d0`6µaTO9 dptwv KaXws EµývXou 
awµaToc. According to Harte, the use of Köaµos here confirms `le parallele 
implicite entre l'ordre cosmique et l'ordonnancement de la bonne äme humaine'. 5° 
This suggests that, just as there was an association of cosmological and personal 
vows in the Phaedo passage, 51 so the use of 6q tog here might also be seen to 
evoke a connection which Plato sees between cosmological and human order. 
46 Anaxag. B12. Cf. Harte, 1999,385, and passim on the normativity of universal structure and its 
essential connection with intelligence in the Phlb. 
47 Gorg. B. 11.1. 
48 Cf. McCabe, 1994,68: 'The [Socrates'] objective then is what we might call cosmic teleology " the 
thesis that the whole cosmos is tied together in a single structure; because it is structured, it is good'. 
The normativity of kosmein is also noted by Menn, 1995,2: 'to put things in order is to put each of 
them where it is best for it to be'. However, although not perfectly clear, Menn still seems to see voüs' 
normativity as responsible for its ordering role, rather than vice versa, since he (2) says that 'to know 
that S is P because of nous depends on knowing that it is best for S to be P, and indeed this 
dependence is analytic. Moreover, he later suggests (17) that Socrates' reason for expecting 
Anaxagoras to give explanations in terms of the best is because (given the connection between nous, 
sophia, and phronesis): 'from the beginning, when Plato considered the possibility of explanation 
through nous, he had intended nous as a virtue. This is presupposed in the Phaedo, in Socrates' 
disappointment with Anaxagoras'. 
There are some very rare instances in which the verb Koa. tw or the noun Kbvµoc in the plural seems 
to have a pejorative sense, denoting unnecessary material adornments: e. g. Phd. 114e2; Phdr. 239d1. 
However, as with e. g. the word 'finery', the ironic pejorative implications appear to depend on the 
4primary 
normative sense of their word-group. 
9 Cf. Harte, 1999,385 and passim; and Lennox, 1985,217, on the Timaeus. 50 Harte, 1999,399. Cf. Phlb. 30c6 on vo, S and cosmological order. See also Menn, 1995,3. 
51 This goes against e. g. Lennox, 1985,198-204, who sees normativity as stemming solely from 
voIS, while K6vµos is neutral, with the result that he talks about `a good K6vµoc', rather than simply 
Oag6g. 
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At other points, the normativity of K6Qµoc is retained, although its cosmological 
aspects are not mentioned. So, at Gorgias 506d-e, as part of the argument to prove 
that the temperate soul is good, Socrates claims that it is the Köaµos appropriate to 
each thing, which makes it good. 52 Here the focus is the soul, although implements, 
bodies, and all living things are also mentioned as entities for which this principle is 
true. 53 Similarly, at Republic 443e, achieving order (KOaµtw) within the self is 
presented as one of the necessary steps towards becoming just. 54 
Furthermore, the Kövµos which voüs confers is not localised, but universal, as is 
established and emphasised through the repetition of Trdg in conjunction with 
Köaµos- and vows. Thus vows brings universal normativity, and its essential 
connection with normativity extends throughout its complete sphere of activity. As 
the passage progresses, what it means for vows to play such a role will be clarified, 
which forms an important reason for voüs' suitability as an ordering principle in 
itself. 
So, if it is universal order which implies normativity, perhaps we can offer a 
retranslation of the crucial, but ambiguous phrase Töv yE vovv KovµowTa TrdVTa 
KOap. ¬ty Kai KaaTOV TLO vaL TQÜT7j &rm av ßEÄTLQTa In (97c5-6), whit 1 is 
usually translated as something like `the mind in arranging things arranges 
everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be' S5 In this case the 
repetition of Koa. 1 w seems puzzlingly tautological. If, however, we take the 
participle as causal, and the Kat as epexegetic, this would then give us `mind, since 
it orders all things, 56 orders insofar as it arranges each thing in whichever way would 
52 Gorg. 506e: Köa. LoS TLS dpa &yyEV6. EV0T IV E'KdOTW 6 EKdaTOU OLKELOT riyaeav nap&XEL 
EKaaTOV TCJV 6VTWV. Cf. 504a2ff. 
53 Gorg. 506d. 
s' On the connection between K6aµos and virtue cf. also e. g. Chrm. 159b3; Phdr. 259b2. ss Trans. Fowler, 1914. 
56 It is important to include ruivra within the causal clause, since this makes clear that it is universal 
order which leads to the normative arrangement of each component contra e. g. Menn, 1995,2, who 
translates the phrase: `noun, when it orders [kosmounta], orders all things and puts each one of them 
where it is best for it to be'. 
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be best', 57 a translation which makes sense of the double KO 4w as well as clearly 
supporting the view that KoaµovvTa rrd s$ v-ra is responsible for normativity. 
What, then, of the key-words in the Platonic passage which are not used by 
Anaxagoras? Along with (3EXTLQ709/ äµElvwv, the term atTLos and its cognates 
stands out from the other key-words within this passage as being distinctively non- 
Anaxagorean. From the way in which Plato both changes Anaxagoras' TrdVTa 
8LEKOC1VJQE VOÜS to VOÜS EQTLV Ö SLaKoap. WV TE Kal TrdVTWV aLTLog and 
appears to use atTLOS interchangeably with Koaµhw, aLTLOS seems to be either 
integrally connected or synonymous with KOCT I W. So Plato appears to suggest that 
Anaxagoras' use of KoaµEw commits him to the notion of atria, while at the same 
time emphasising his failure to acknowledge this through the proliferation of aLTLOS- 
59 words in this passage as compared to their absence in Anaxagoras' own works. 
Once again, Plato subtly manipulates Anaxagoras' language to show that, even if his 
words suggest correct inclinations, he failed to attain the truth. For if we take aITLa 
to denote `reason' or `cause' it might initially seem that Anaxagoras himself made 
the connection between causation and order, since his voDg both established order 
and set in motion the processes necessary to change in the COSMOS. 60 Yet for Plato it 
will emerge from the `second sailing' that the kind of order which is related to a 
cause (atria) is one with two metaphysical levels, in which the absolute distinctness 
of primary entities is essential to their acting as causes. 1 In Anaxagoras' cosmos, 
however, there is a condition of 5µov rrävra, in which all entities are composed of 
the same type of matter and, with the exception of voüs, there is no absolute 
separation. So Plato's emphasis on atTta in his account of Anaxagoras seems to 
point to inconsistencies in the latter's philosophy, since it suggests that Anaxagoras' 
talk of universal order commits him to an account of causation which his physics 
S7 Alternatively, the causal sense of KO Lo could still be retained even if scat was not taken to be 
exegetic, and would simply give the second part of the sentence as 'orders and arranges each thing... '. 
s$ This translation also points to the fact that universal order implies the best position of each 
individual constituent, which will be shown below to be an important aspect of this concept here. 
s' Cf. Menn, 1995,2: `so long as Anaxagoras does not explain why the different material components 
of the world are in their proper order, he is making no real use of nous as a cause. 
60 E. g. Anaxag. B 12 and B 13. 
61 See p. 219ff. 
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could never support. Even if it is implied by certain terminology, true al. Tta could 
never be a part of Anaxagorean physics. 
This is made clearer within Socrates' account of the spurious causes given by 
Anaxagoras and the parallel examples in the passage which follows, where the key- 
word repetition of a"Mos and its cognates continues. Here Socrates denies that 
Anaxagoras' airs, aethers, and waters, are causes (oi6E TLvas atTlas: 98b9) and 
says that the parallel cases give causes, but neglect to give the true causes (Phd. 
98d6-el) which Socrates then outlines. 
Yet atTLos is not the only prominent term in the `Anaxagoras episode' that is 
noticeably absent from Anaxagoras himself; the other signficant example is 
IEXTLUTOT/ di. IELvwv. Just as with atTLos, the implied connection between 
IEXTLQTOS/ aµ¬(vc v and KoaµhW suggests that Anaxagoras' ideas about universal 
order must have been mistaken. For while they compelled him towards terminology 
which itself implies teleology, his physics itself made this impossible. This is also 
emphasised by the second part of the `Anaxagoras episode' since ßEATLoTOc/ 
%tELvu v, which has dominated the previous passage, does not occur within the 
account of spurious causes (98b7-d8), and only reappears when Socrates outlines the 
true cause for his actions (98e2). 
A final point to notice is that Plato has changed the aorist indicative of Anaxagoras' 
phrase, TravTa 8LEKÖuýLIxaE vovs, for a present participle in vows EQTLV 6 
SLaKoa L 3v TE Kai. Trän rwv atTLOS. In some ways, this play of tenses is 
reminiscent of his dropping of fjv in the `argument from opposites'. Here, however, 
the present participle perhaps represents Socrates' desire for a conception of voüc 
whose ordering role is constant 62 
So, to conclude, it seems that Plato uses the Anaxagorean device of key-word 
repetition, in order to introduce and emphasise the essential interconnections between 
voüs, universal order, and normativity in causation, and to show their incompatibility 
62 Cf. Loriaux, 1975,77, who suggests that the use of the present participle suggests the stable and 
definitive role of voüs. 
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with Anaxagorean physics, as well as strengthening the connection between cosmos 
and individual, both in terms of order and rationality. 
7.4.2 `Argumentationsstil' 
Another key aspect of style in this passage , as I pointed out 
in Chapter 5, is the 
widespread use of the `Argumentationsstil' or `scientific style', so characteristic of 
Anaxagoras and other Presocratic prose. This is especially so at the beginning 
(97b8-98b6), where Socrates outlines his philosophical expectations of Anaxagoras' 
book. Here, stylistic allusion is more general than with the key-word repetition, and 
seems reminiscent of Presocratic prose in general, 63 rather than Anaxagoras 
exclusively. 
The main feature of such a style, as I outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, is structural as 
well as lexemic repetition. 64 Along with the syntactic continuity conferred by the 
indirect discourse, a strong degree of logical interconnectedness within the passage is 
accompanied by repetition of clause structure, on a semantic, syntactic, and formal 
level, and this results in a degree of stylistic continuity which is rare in the Phaedo. 
Semantically, there is a repeated pattern of a given cause or condition followed by 
reasoned inference. As a whole the passage is largely made up of conditionals or 
simple reported thought, preceded by a short phrase denoting cause, and these are 
also interspersed with a couple of explanatory ydp clauses. Hypotaxis prevails, 
clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short, and the word order is unremarkable, 
appearing to reproduce the logical order of the train of thought. Moreover, while the 
passage's syntactic complexity differentiates it from the simple narrative 
sequentiality of historical prose narratives, its other features such as lack of variation 
also distinguish this stylistically from the periodic structure associated with Attic 
oratory. 
These combined features foreground the structure, and bear many similarities to 
aspects of the Presocratic prose of Anaxagoras, Zeno, Melissus, and Diogenes of 
63 Of course, some features are also shared with Presocratic verse writers. However, it is chiefly the 
conjunction of key features within prose which interests me here. " On key-word repetition and the general lack of lexemic variation, see n. 44. 
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Apollonia. If the key-word repetition discussed above forged the necessary links 
between vows, universal order, and normativity, it is the prominent structure of 
argumentation, which now demonstrates more clearly what the structure of this vows 
comprises. In the `peroration' Socrates gave various reasons for rationality's 
(4p6viaLs) normativity and through key-word repetition he has suggested here that 
vows' ordering powers are another reason. As he then explains what would 
constitute an ordered explanation, he is simultaneously setting out patterns of voDg- 
based explanation and thus showing why this provides a suitable model for order. 
The features of `Argumentationsstil' in the `Anaxagoras episode' do also differ from 
those in the Presocratics. For example, the type of conditionals found in Presocratic 
prose are almost exclusively counterfactuals, used to argue the impossibility of a 
premise in the protasis, by showing that the resultant apodosis depicts an impossible 
state of affairs. So, for instance, Anaxagoras argues Et µßj yäp Eý' EavToü ýv, 
ÜXXd TEü) 4t4tELKTO (iXXq), p. ETEIXEV du d1TdVTWV XPT1µdTWV, EL Eýt tELKTÖ 
TEW. 65 The structure is similar to that of hypothetical inversion, common in oratory, 
in which the falsity of the state of affairs presented in the apodosis proves the falsity 
of the protasis. In all these cases the process of inference establishes the 
impossibility of the initial premise. 6 In logical terms these conditionals can be seen 
as modus tollen arguments: if p then q; not q; therefore not p. We could analyse the 
Anaxagorean example as: if vows was mixed with something it would share in all 
things; vows does not share in all things; therefore voüs is not mixed with anything. 
In the `Anaxagoras episode', however, Socrates does not argue through 
counterfactual conditionals, but from protases taken to be true, to the truth of the 
apodoses: as in Et TotO' o)Tws 9XEL [i. e. if vows is the cause of all things], T6v 
'E VOÜV KO031OÜVTa 1TdVTa K001. I. EIV Kai 9KaaTOV TLOEVRL Ta&fl ÖTrO, dV 
ßEXTLQTa 9xrl (97c4-6). Even in those cases which reveal Anaxagoras' failings by 
implication, the structure of the conditionals is the same. So, in Kal Et & µEVw 
4a(r1 EdvaL aüTrnv, ETrEKSLTJyýaeoOaL Ws dµELVOV ýv av'Týv iv µEQw EtvaL 
65 E. g. Anaxag. B12 Cf. e. g. Meliss. B8 and ZenoB2 . For an analysis of this structure of conditional 
see Wakker, 1995,154, who says that such a conditional, in which the implication goes from the 
apodosis to the protasis, is only to be found in argumentative patterns. 
6 Even a rare example such as Meliss. B6 , el. yap <aTrELpov> eire, 
9v Ein äv, the reason for this 
being the case is still presented in terms of a counterfactual: el yelp 860 eirl, ovic &v 86vaLTo 
änELpa etvaL, dX ZXoi äv rreipara 1rp6c äXX7lXa. 
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(97e3-98a1) Socrates argues that claiming (earth] to be in the middle implies an 
obligation to explain why it is better for it to be in the middle. 
Unlike the Presocratics the underlying logical structure of Socrates' arguments is 
modus ponens: 67 if p then (should be) q; p; therefore (should be) q. 68 My last 
example could then be analysed as follows: if he says that it is in the middle he 
[should] explain why it is better for it to be in the middle; he does explain why it is in 
the middle (implied); therefore he should explain why this is better. 69 
Essentially, there is no substantial difference between the structure of the modus 
tollens and ponens arguments. Yet modus tollens, beginning with `if p then q', 
refutes p through denial of q, while modus ponens takes the opposite approach, 
positing p in order to argue for q. In this way, the former is more suited to 
functioning as an instrument of refutation, the latter more conducive to gradual 
elaboration of a larger system, by establishing rather than refuting propositions. The 
points which are accepted can be developed into a coherent system so that the 
structure of argument evokes the idea of a perfectly coherent system so important for 
the concept of vows, order, and cause here. 
However, there is also a further latent implication in the rhetoric of the modus 
ponens, which is that Anaxagoras did not in fact fulfil the obligations laid on him by 
the argument. When Socrates argues that, if Anaxagoras claimed that the earth was 
in the middle he should then explain why this position was better, we also know that 
there is an unspoken `but he did not' in Socrates words. In this way it has similar 
force to rhetorical questions where the speaker asks whether the converse of a 
proposition is true, implicitly leaving no choice but to give the negative answer, and 
thus emphasising the truth of the proposition. Once again, then, Socrates is using the 
methods of Anaxagoras and other physicists, but subtly diverging, so as to refute 
their ideas while offering his own alternative. 
67 It is only the first conditional (97c4) that does not involve a modal operator. 6' In most cases, moreover, the apodosis points not so much to some fact of the matter in the physical 
world, as to some obligation upon the person who would explain the physical world. 69 Although much of the sequence is implicit, Socrates' prescriptions for explanation of cosmological 
phenomena are general and it can be assumed that Anaxagoras was explaining something like the 
position of the moon, so that it is fairly safe to see the second and third stages of the modus ponens as 
implicit. 
Chapter 7 204 
The main point here remains the stated connection of voüs, universal order, and the 
good. Argumentation then gives a series of further points showing the type of 
considerations to which a physical theory motivated by such a premise might lead. 
Investigation of generation and destruction will be physically comprehensive, since it 
covers all aspects of existence, activity or passivity (97c6-dl). This 
comprehensiveness will also extend to an evaluative level, being explained in terms 
of what is best, knowledge of which also entails knowledge of the inferior (97d1-5). 
Explanation should be in terms of cause and necessity, saying why a particular 
phenomenon is better (97e3-4), both in terms of actions and experiences (98a6-7). 
For Socrates such a cause, it is implied, would provide a sufficient explanation of 
generation and destruction: Kal El µ0L Tairra ätro4afvoL, TrapEQKevdaµ. r1v we 
oÜKETL rro6Ea%tEvos a'Tiac äXXo dd8os (98a1-2). Finally, the explanation of 
cause is expected to outline not only the best for each individual thing, but also a 
common good, so that it seems that overall coherence should also form part of such a 
theory. Thus comprehensiveness involves not only the separate quality and actions 
of the individual thing, -but also its place within the system as a whole, implying 
Socrates' desire for a theory of causation which is holistic on a physical, evaluative, 
and epistemological level. 
It seems, therefore, that universal order implies absolute coherence of all elements 
and brings together both the ethical and physical. Since the organisational principle 
of a cosmos is good, universal coherence will involve understanding the goodness of 
each thing, both as an individual and in relation to the other constituents. As shown 
above, vows as the cause of universal order is understood on the basis of vows 
('rationality') in the individual. If we consider the model of rationality that is 
appealed to in the Phaedo, it is possible to see why voüs would be suitable as an 
organisational principle within the theory of causation outlined here. 
In the Phaedo the real objects of intelligence are presented as a complete set of 
entities, 70 which comprise all types, whether it be ethical, physical, or 
70 See e. g. Phd. 65d12-el, where Socrates, having mentioned 'absolute' justice, beauty, and goodness, 
then says: Vyw & Trepl trävrwv, otov µeyOovg TripL, iryLelac, [axvoS, Kal Twv äXXwv M 
X yw' b1Tdvrwv Ti obatac 6 TvyXdvcL ¬Kavrov 6v; 75c10-d4; 77a2-5; 100c6. 
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mathematical. ' Yet the notion of rationality is also to be understood from the very 
reasoning processes which are used by Socrates, so that an argument like the 
`argument from affinity', which groups entities according to their essential 
characteristics, can be seen to suggest that rationality involves understanding the 
relationship of elements to each other, as does the process of recognition of qualities 
described in the `recollection argument'. 2 Consistency is a crucial part of the 
Phaedo and of the Platonic Socratic notion of rationality. 73 Moreover, 
comprehensive understanding of physical processes also extends to the realm of 
sensibles, as is seen in the `argument from opposites'. 74 
Along with general stylistic austerity, another characteristic both of Presocratic prose 
writing and the `Anaxagoras episode' is the abstract noun-form consisting of the 
definite article and a neuter adjective. For example, Anaxagoras himself talks about 
TÖ a tLKp6v and Tö µhya, and Tov TE &LEpOÜ Kai TOD hpoO Kat TOD Oepý . ot) 
Kai TOD uXpoü Kai, Toü Xaµrrpoü Kal TOD Codepov. 75 In the Phaedo passage 
the number of instances of this noun-form is very high, all comprising either Tö + 
various degrees of äyaeoT or XEipov; words with a special significance in this 
context. 
Given the context and allusiveness of this passage, the use of this noun-form does not 
seem coincidental. Yet, even if seen as an allusion to writers like Anaxagoras, its 
implications are fairly general. In the earlier prose such terms are often used to 
represent basic and general entitites. 76 So, for example, in Anaxagoras B12 ,a key 
point of the initial separation caused by voüs is given in terms of separating drrö TE 
TOD äpaLoü TÖ 1TUKV6V Kal aTr6 TOD &IJUXPOÜ Tö Ocpµöv etc., while in Melissus 
71 Cf. the inclusion of all these spheres within the 'final argument' (see Chapter 8 p. 228). Also cf. 
Ch. 6 p. 144 and passim, above, on the comprehensiveness and other features of 4p6vnaLc. 
72 See e. g. Phd. 75d9-e4. 
73 See 8.8.1, and e. g Gorg. 48lbff.; Euthphr. lld, 15c; and Vlastos, 1983,53ff. on consistency in the 
elenchus. 74 Phd. 70d7-e1: art TOIVVV KaT dvOptii WV, i S' 8S, QK61TEL 1. L6VOV TOÜTO, El PObXEL NOV 
I.. laOELV, Q Ka KQTü ýCýWV TrdVTWV KaI 4UTIZV, Kai aUXXif38r1v ýatrep IXEL yY VEQIV crept 
TTdvTWV t& 41EV aP OÜTU L 'yt'yVETaL TrdLTQ. 
's Anaxag. B3 and 4 respectively. Cf. Webster, 1952-3,24, who claims that, 'in its full development' 
this noun-form is found in 'the early Hippocratic writings, Anaxagoras, and Thucydides'. 
76 See Webster, 1952-3,24, who says that this noun-form, as well as signifying 'a particular member 
of a class' was also used to represent: 'any member of a class (and therefore all members), a standard 
member of a class (and therefore very nearly the quality by virtue of which it is a member of the 
class). Cf. also Lloyd, 1966,81, n. 1. 
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a process of change between opposites is represented as basic to our beliefs and is 
expressed similarly: 80KEL &1 iAV TÖ TE 6Epµbv i -uXpbv ytvEQOaL Kai. Tb 
civXpbv 6Epµ6v etc 77 There is then a contrast between Presocratic texts, where 
normative terms like Tb tEXTLQTOV play no part, and Socrates' account, where they 
are central to causation and a basic and general element. 
7.4.3 Complexity 
A final, though imprecise, stylistic allusion can perhaps be seen in the next part of 
the `Anaxagoras episode', where Socrates discusses Anaxagoras' causes and presents 
purportedly parallel examples (98b7-d8). As shown above, `key-word' repetition of 
aLTLos and its cognates ensures that causation clearly remains as the focus, even 
though `pseudo-causes' are now being outlined. The most striking feature of this 
passage is the long and detailed physiological description of how Socrates is able to 
bend his legs and thus to sit (98c5-d6), offered as a `pseudo-explanation' of his 
reasons for not escaping from prison. Although there are no close extant parallels, 
one might see Diogenes' anatomical explanations in B6 as providing an example of 
the kind of detailed biological explanation to which Plato alludes. 78 Specific 
features, like complementary pairs of biological components or processes, are found 
in both passages. 9 
The main point of this Phaedo passage appears simply to be that such explanations 
are false because they offer an account of Socrates' practical deliberation in terms of 
the material components necessary for his actions, rather than the true moral causes. 
The length and detail of the hypothetical explanation seems to add no more specific 
criteria to his criticism, but rather to ridicule the pseudo-complexity of his 
predecessors' detailed physical theories, by means of humorous exaggeration. A 
useful model here may be Koestler's analysis of satire (within his points on humour), 
in which a situation is projected into an exaggerated or alternative format, giving the 
77 Meliss. B8. 
7$ Given Anaxagoras' interest in anatomy and his influence on Diogenes, it is possible that he also 
wrote similar passages. 79 E. g. it 6aT41V Kal VEÜpWV (Phd. 98c7); ETTLTELVEaeaL Kat QV(eaecu (Phd. 98dl); r 1, t1rra LTLV 
Kai. Tr v arrXnvLTLV and inrb Tb SEpp. a Kai. SL6L T? s aapKds (Diog. Apoll. B6). Cf. Appendix II 
p. 281, below, on proliferation of anatomical pairs in early Hippocratic treatises. 
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incongruity necessary to produce humour. 80 Here, humour depends on both types of 
transposition, as the physiological explanation is exaggerated, and given in a context 
where an ethical explanation would be expected. 
Socrates then offers his own explanation (98elff. ). Once again causes are simply 
given in terms of what seems best to the protagonists. Unlike the 'pseudo- 
explanation' which precedes it, this explanation is short and straightforward, perhaps 
suggesting that the former type of explanation substitutes physical complexity for a 
true moral cause. 
Socrates implies the merits of simplicity in a number of ways. First, he criticises the 
spurious causes of Anaxagoras because they comprise `many things' (rroXXä). 81 This 
implies, as Ooms Renard has suggested, that causation should involve a principle of 
`economy'. 82 Similarly, at 98d8, when he gives a hypothetical parallel for such 
causes, they are once again described in terms of large quantities ((IXXa µvpta 
Toiairra aLrtc i¬vOc). In addition, simplicity not only concerns quantity, but also 
simplicity and directness in the cause/effect relationship. As Socrates moves on to 
the `safe' cause, not only is its simplicity striking, 83 but he himself says that this 
belief is held &TACOT Kai äTEXvcos (100d3-4) and describes the spurious alternative 
causes as KoµJEtas (101cß). 84 
The variety of allusion within this passage, both to Anaxagoras and more generally 
to a certain range of Presocratic writing, ranges from near direct quotation to vague 
structural similarities. Key word repetition establishes foundational- principles 
which, when combined with various argumentative structures, point to a correct 
process of reasoning, as well as indicating certain faults in the predecessors. In this 
80 Koestler, 1964,73-4. 
81 Phd. 98c2. 
82 Ooms Renard, 1999,119 and 116: 'The first hint of rejections of the first type of account (98d8) 
complains about the number of atTtaL (a hint of criticism in terms of lack of economy)'. 
87 Cf. McCabe, 1994,60-4, on the necessity of simplicity for a successful explanans and how this 
allows forms as opposed to particulars to serve as explanations. 84 The issue of quantity might also further such connections with the Forms, since each Form is a 
single item as opposed to the plurality of particulars. See e. g. McCabe, 1994,51, who suggests that 
plurality refers not only to the number of particulars but, crucially for the contrast with Forms, it is 
also characteristic of the individual particular because of its complexity: 'because he has many 
different characters, properties, relations'. This strengthens the complexity/quantity link. 
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way, Plato uses what he sees as the implications of Anaxagoras' points about voi, in 
order to make claims about its role in universal structure and argue for its 
normativity, employing imitation to show his opponents' faults, as well as to suggest 
his own principles. 
Before moving on to discuss possible ways in which the `Anaxagoras episode' fits 
into the dialogue as a whole, I will consider one further point within the passage 
itself. At the conclusion of this episode Socrates extends the argument to include 
certain theories which do not cite vovs as a cause (99b4ff. ), complaining that they 
give spurious causes as opposed to the good, which really holds everything together 
(99c5-6). Thus, he appears to have made an unexplained leap from the claim that 
vows-based causes depend upon the good, to the further claim that all true causation 
necessarily depends upon the good. If, as suggested by the traditional interpretation, 
the good is dependent upon vote, in the absence of voüs there seems to be no 
justification for Socrates' claim that T6 dyaObv Kai. UOV QWSELV Kai. QUVEXEIV 
(99c6). If however, it resides in the idea of a universal order, which situates each 
individual and arranges their interrelationships, it would seem that auv6ELv Kal 
QWEXcLv are now themselves sufficient reasons for assuming normativity. 
7.5 Beyond the 'Anaxagoras episode' 
We have seen that there is more to the `Anaxagoras episode' than the traditional 
reading suggests, and that, like the `apology', it works towards establishing the 
normativity of wisdom/rationality (expressed as voüs), so important throughout the 
Phaedo. On the whole, the pursuit of teleology appears to be abandoned after the 
autobiography, 85 although in Chapter 8I discuss briefly how one might see the 
teleological theme as maintained in the `second sailing'. 86 To conclude the present 
85 Although there is some controversy over whether IaTep10r)v (99c8) indicates Socrates' 
abandonment of teleology, by showing, as Vlastos, 1973,87 claims, 'that he is still, at the time of 
speaking, "deprived" of the teleological aitia', or whether, as according to Wiggins, 1986,3, contra 
Vlastos, the 'deprivation' was in the past and does not preclude the search for teleology in the 'second 
sailing'. 
86 For interesting suggestions as to how teleology is incorporated see also e. g. Lennox, 1985,202ff., 
who argues that the deuteros pious and final argument should be taken together. The fact that the first 
Forms mentioned in the final argument are the beautiful and the good (IOOb5ff. ) also suggests that the 
cause of normativity might remain a concern. Cf. Lennox, 1985,203, on the use of such forms 'to 
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chapter I shall propose that Plato is still engaging with Anaxagoras in the first parts 
of the `second sailing', in a way which can have a significant effect on the 
interpretation of this section. 
7.5.1 `Like into like' 
Socrates' ostensible abandonment of teleology together with a thematic shift makes 
the apparent discontinuity between the `Anaxagoras episode' and its immediate 
context very marked, but there has been little attempt to explore in detail what 
significance this discontinuity might have outside of the immediate context. As well 
as questions about how this passage fits into its wider context, there is the question of 
whether and how it is connected to the earlier Anaxagorean allusion in the `argument 
from opposites'. 
As I said above, the view that no significant connection exists between the 
`Anaxagoras episode' and its immediate context derives largely from ostensible 
changes in subject matter, since the sections before and after this episode concern not 
cosmology and universal teleology, but individual questions about height and 
number. So it appears to be sandwiched between two sections which fit closely 
together, while itself unrelated to these. 
However, even if the principal concerns of the `Anaxagoras episode' seem absent 
from its surrounding passages, there are ways in which one can see Anaxagoras 
himself as the connection between them. Socrates' intellectual autobiography begins 
with his early belief that growth comes about through eating and drinking: 
ETTEL8C V yap k TWV QLTCWV TatS µßv aap t adpKES Trpoo~y&wvTaL, 
TOLS 61 6UT01S 6aT6t, Kal 01 TW KaTcI TÖV a&TÖV X6y0V Kai. T06S 
aXXols T2l afT(JV OTKEIa kdOTOLS 1Tpo0'yEVIlTal, TÖTE & TÖV OXtyoV 
ÖyKOV 6vTa i aTEpOV TrOXbV yeyovivaL, Kal OIJTw ytyvEaOaL TÖV 
QµLKp6v dv6pwrrov Ii yav. (Phd. 96c9-d5) 
exemplify the deuteros pious'. Furthermore, if, as suggested above, the 'Anaxagoras episode' moves 
towards an ideal of simple causation, the apparent simplicity of the causes posited in the final 
argument could perhaps be taken to exemplify this idea. See Ch. 8 p. 270, below. 
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As others have noted, these ideas are extremely reminiscent of Anaxagoras, 87 a close 
parallel being rrws yap Div kK µý TPLX69 'y VOLTO Op1ý teal aäpý iK µßj 
aapK6s;, 88 which illustrates the principle of `like into like'. 
As the autobiography continues, Socrates discusses his concerns about how addition 
of one to one could cause two, when the opposite, dividing one, would have the same 
result. For he finds it unacceptable for opposite causes to produce the same effect 
(Phd. 97a6-b3), given that this violates an important principle of causation: `if x 
causes anything to be F (whose opposite is un-F) ... x's opposite must not cause 
anything to be F'. 89 This reliance on a notion of `like causing like' is reminiscent of 
Anaxagorean physics, and such similarities could perhaps be seen to pave the way 
for the switch to the `Anaxagoras episode', in spite of apparent differences in subject 
matter. For, although the role of vows is presented as the reason for Socrates' 
interest in Anaxagoras, if he was already inclining towards other aspects of 
Anaxagorean physics, this could provide an additional reason why Socrates was 
drawn to his doctrines concerning vows. 
Furthermore, while the `Anaxagoras episode' evidently gives Socrates' reasons for 
rejecting Anaxagoras' vows-based account of causation, Socrates' attraction to 
Anaxagorean ideas still seems to continue into the `second sailing', which is 
essentially dependent upon a principle of `like causes like'. As Sedley says, 
discussing this passage: `what is essentially the same principle that like causes like 
can be traced back to Anaxagoras (B10), and forward to Aristotle ... and Hellenistic 
debate' 90 
So even though Plato has revealed his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras, both in the 
`argument from opposites' and the `Anaxagoras episode', he now appears to drift 
back towards ideas that sound dangerously Anaxagorean, and still needs to show 
more closely what constitutes the differences between them. When Socrates moves 
87 E. g. Rowe, 1993,233. 
°S Anaxag. B 10. 
89 Sedley, 1998,121. 
90 Sedley, 1998,117. 
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on to the second part of the final argument (102b3ff. ) he presents very clear reasons 
why Anaxagoras' `like from like' idea cannot be acceptable. Yet, even before this, 
in the `hypothesis' passage which concludes the discussion of the `safe causes', 
comes the first hint that Socrates' attitude to Anaxagoras is anything but positive. 
7.5.2 Who are the d rtAoyticol of IOlel? 
Socrates' explanation of the so-called `method of hypothesis' in Phd. 101d2-102a1 is 
one of the most frequently discussed passages in the dialogue. Having suggested that 
such a method is ideal philosophical practice, he proceeds to compare it to the 
spurious methods of the dvTiXoyucoi, who do not care about realities (101el-4). It is 
generally assumed that oi, dVTLX0yyLKOL refers to of 1TEPI rots dVTLXoyLKOVs 
Xöyous 8LaTP(4SaVTES mentioned earlier, who have come to believe that there is 
nothing sound or stable either in XöyoL or in npä. yµaTa (Phd. 90b9-c4). 91 Certainly 
it is clear that both groups have a damaging effect on the progress of argument, as 
their names suggest. However, readers have failed to notice that certain verbal 
allusions suggest that Plato might also have one particular predecessor in mind, 
namely Anaxagoras. 
In the `hypothesis' passage, the dLV TLXoyLKOL are those whose wisdom makes them 
sufficient for `mixing all things together' (bµov trävýra KUKWV-rES). 92 Once again, 
we have the Anaxagorean catchphrase 6 toi) TrävTa 93 Not only has this phrase 
already represented Anaxagoras' philosophy in the `argument from opposites', but as 
the first words of his book, it would certainly have had a definite emblematic 
significance. In Plato the phrase only occurs here and in the `argument from 
opposites', while in other pre-Hellenistic literature the only extant uses are -in - 
Aristotle and Eudemus, always with reference to Anaxagoras 94 Moreover, given 
91 See e. g. Bostock, 1986,186, n. 9,: 'ot dvrLXoyLKOL. These people are no doubt to be identified with 
the people 'bent on victory' who are referred to at 91a2-6 as caring nothing for the truth. Plato gives 
us a portrait of them in his Euthydemus'. Cf. e. g. Rowe, 1993,248; Blank, 1986,150; Burnet, 1911, 
114; Gallop, 1975,191; Geddes, 1863,125. 
92 Phd. 1Ole5 
93 Although the ideas expressed here could also be seen to suggest Heraclitean philosophy (e. g. B125). 
94 The phrase also appears a few times in the Hippocratic Corpus: Haem. 9.4; Judie. 22.4; and Mul. 
44.8,91.14,242.15. However, in all these instances mivra clearly refers to specific objects and is 
never universal. 
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that Anaxagoras has also been such an important figure in recent sections of the 
dialogue, the Anaxagorean allusion seems unmistakeable, even though its 
significance has not been noted within the modern secondary literature 95 This draws 
our attention, once again, to the problems which would result from what Plato sees as 
the paradoxical bµov irdvTa which, as I suggested above, implies the absolute 
inseparability of opposites. In this way it prefigures the next passage, in which 
Socrates will categorically deny that absolute opposites can ever tolerate each other's 
presence and so deliver his final rejection of Anaxagorean physics. 
Even though bµoi TrdVTa here appears to be a clear reference to Anaxagoras, such 
an idea could also be applicable to ol, nepl TO' dVTLXOyLKOÜs X6yovs 
6LaTp(JavTec, mentioned in the earlier `misology' passage (Phd. 90b9). 
Nevertheless, there is a further aspect of Socrates' criticisms which suggests that they 
are more appropriate to Anaxagoras than to the earlier disputants. According to 
Socrates the later dvTLXoyLKOt talk about the beginning (äpXrj) and its consequences. 
For the earlier disputants beginnings hold little interest, since their sole concern is the 
continuous universal flux and instability of the present (90c4-6), 96 while talk of 
beginnings would presumably entail some notion of stable identity. For Anaxagoras, 
however, beginnings and their consequences are of course crucial, and dpx , along 
9S As far as I am aware, the allusion has been entirely overlooked by contemporary readers of the 
dialogue, the only exception being Dixsaut, 1991,387. However, she simply identifies the phrase as 
Anaxagorean and does not discuss its significance. The failure of commentators to notice this very 
definite allusion seems to stem from insufficient attention to Plato's Greek and is reflected in their 
translations. The conventional translation of bµov 1rdv-ra in Anaxag. B1 is something like 'all things 
together`, a translation also usually given for the explicit quotation of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo's 
argument from opposites'. Nevertheless, 6 ov irdvra in the 'hypothesis' passage is translated very 
differently: e. g. Hackforth, 1955,136, 'whose wisdom enables them to jumble everything up 
together'; Rowe, 1993a, 248, 'mixing up everything together'; Warrington, 1963,152, 'amid all the 
welter of their ideas'; Gallop, 1975,54; and Fowler, 1914,349. By giving two such different 
translations of the very same phrase these works obscure the verbal allusion in the later passage. 
96 Cf. Loriaux, 1975,104-5, who suggests, that although verbal allusions point to 90b9-c3, 'cette 
identification ne fait pas entierement justice au texte qui nous occupe'. He suggests that it is in fact 
criticising the physicists of 95eff, because of the mention of dpXrj and wpgilglva. However, his 
discussion gives no relevant quotation of sources and fails to spot any specific Anaxagorean allusion. 
There are some other reasons for seeing these disputants as the later dv rLXoylKO(: e. g. the verbal echo, 
enhanced by the description of the earlier disputants as 'very wise' (aoOtTaroL) and the later 
dvrLXoyLKO( as confusing things through their 'wisdom' (vTrb ao4 lac); or the fact that both groups, as 
already mentioned, harm arguments. Yet it is quite possible that dvrtXoylKot refers to various 
thinkers, so that it is not necessary to choose exclusively between Anaxagoras and the earlier 
disputants. Indeed such a move would be quite typical of Plato and might help explain why 
dvvrlXoylKol is plural, even if it refers primarily to Anaxagoras. 
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with its cognate verbs, is common in his extant writings. For example: 
Kal TYPS TTEPLXWp1'IQL0$ TfS au LTTdaTjs VOÜS &OT7gaEV, (ßT6 
TrEpLXWpf aaL T fiv äpxrfv. Kal trpwTOV (iTrb TO QµLKpoü i pearo 
TTEPLXWpEIV, EITEL 8E TTXEOV 1TEPLXWPEL, Kat TTEpLXWpiiaEL iTTl TTXEOV. 
or - 
Kal ETTER 7jpearo 6 VOÜ$ KLVELV, d7T6 TOD KLVOU4. LEVOV tTUVT69 
a 97 TTEKPLVETO... 
Moreover, from the way Plato subtly changes the tense of both of his main 
quotations from Anaxagoras, he seems dissatisfied with Anaxagorean beginnings, 
both in terms of the primordial state 5µov Xp1 itaTa 1TdVTa, and perhaps also 
because Anaxagoras posits vows as the original cause, but then fails to account for 
the continuing effect of vors in causation. 
A further related point is the failure of the äVTLXOyLKOL to have either one logos or 
thought about reality: ov8ý Ets nEpl Tofrrou Xöyos OW 4povTLs. Socrates has 
just advocated the importance of finding a single base hypothesis which provides a 
sufficient logos for all the hypotheses derived from it, as opposed to simply 
introducing many different reasons for things. So the `one', Ets, in Socrates' 
criticism can be seen to imply that he finds fault with the C! WTLXOyLK0 for having 
more than one logos, another point missed by commentators. This points fits nicely 
with the general picture of Anaxagoras as having several conflicting beliefs. The 
earlier disputants of Phaedo 90b9, on the other hand, are criticised for the very 
reason that they commit themselves to nothing and see all logoi as unsound and 
unstable. 8 
There are a number of ways in which Anaxagoras seems, problematically, to have 
more than one Xöyos. First, in very general terms, Anaxagorean physics posits both 
97 Anaxag. frs. B 12. and B 13. 9e The phrase could also be translated as 'no logos or thought at all' as opposed to 'not one logos or 
thought'. However, not only is the latter translation more natural but, even if we disregard 
Anaxagoras, an emphasis on 'one' rather than 'none at all' still seems much more relevant here. 
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universal order and 5µov rrdvTa, two incompatible XdyoL. More specifically, it is 
also open to criticism, along with the sine qua non explanations, given as causes by 
Anaxagoras and other physicists, for being numerous and arbitrary. For these would 
allow more than one Xöyos of causation for single events, since the same event 
could be seen to result from various different sine qua non `causes'. Thus, there 
would be a potential plurality of XöyoL for this model of `causation'. In addition, 
these 'causes' do not differ substantially from arbitrary causes like `heads' (100e8- 
b2) or `divisions' and `additions' (96e6-97b3) which, respectively, cause opposites 
and are opposite causes of the same event, 99 once again leading to multiple and 
conflicting XöyoL of causation. 
Finally, the view that Anaxagoras is the butt of Socrates' criticism might also be 
strengthened if Echecrates' comment on this passage is taken as a Platonic pun 
directed at Anaxagoras. Echecrates says that `Socrates made these matters 
exceedingly clear, even to somebody of limited intelligence', To Kal QµIKPbV VODV 
EXOVTL (102a5), a phrase that seems all the more significant given Socrates' 
previous description of Anaxagoras as dv8pa r µßv vw ov&v XptµEvov (98b7- 
8). Echecrates' interruption is one of only two points where the frame dialogue 
breaks into the main narrative and it is certainly very striking. Usually, his words are 
understood as simply drawing the reader's attention to the status of the theory 
Socrates has just explained, 100 or as demarcating the end of the `safe hypothesis' of 
causation. 1°' However, if they do reveal Echecrates' awareness of the presence of 
Anaxagorean ideas, this could be seen as further confirmation of Anaxagoras' 
relevance, since it is not only implied in Socrates' words, but also clearly understood 
by Echecrates, a character to whom these words are reported. 
For the reasons stated above it seems fair to say that there is a clear engagement with 
Anaxagoras in the passages discussed. Moreover, as the dialogue continues, 
Socrates begins to mount an argument which presents an implicit challenge to certain 
"Cf. e. g. Sedley, 1998,119-20. 
100 See e. g. Rowe, 1993b, 50-1; Warner, 1989a, 77: `Few of us like to think that our intelligence is less 
than feeble, thus this latter passage acts as a rhetorical device encouraging us to go along with a 
particularly difficult piece of argument by suggesting that to understand it is to see its validity'. 
01 Blank, 1986,149. 
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of Anaxagoras' ideas and will ultimately lead to a clear dismissal of his central 
principles. 
7.5.3 The mutual exclusivity of opposites 
The `method of hypothesis' is usually taken to mark the end of the first part of the 
`second sailing', in which Socrates explains the `safe hypothesis' (101d2) of Form- 
participation. This is, for example -rw KaX4 TrdVTa Tä KaXä KaXd (100d7-8); or 
more generally, that each thing comes into being ieTaaXöv TFS I. S(as ova(ac 
EKaUTOV oD äv RETda, (101c3-4). Conventionally, the sections of the dialogue 
which follow the `method of hypothesis' (102b3-107b10) are then taken to be the 
second part of the `second sailing'. Known as the `final argument' they are felt to 
revolve around the `subtler answer' (105c1-2), rather than the earlier `safe 
hypothesis'. 102 Whereas the conventional reading thus posits a switch from the `safe 
hypothesis' to the `subtler answer' at 102b3, I suggest that the ideas outlined in 
102b3-103e9 are not only related to the `subtler answer', but also very important for 
establishing the `safe hypothesis'. The mutual exclusivity of opposite property- 
instances, outlined within this section, can therefore be seen as not only the 
beginning of the `final argument', but also as a continuing explanation of the `safe 
hypothesis' itself. 
Up to the `method of hypothesis' the outline of the `safe hypothesis' sounds very 
much like Anaxagoras' own `like into like' principle of causation. Admittedly, in 
Anaxagoras this principle only assumes two particulars, whereas the `safe 
hypothesis' posits two distinct ontological kinds, with participation in a Form 
causing a `like' property instance to be present in a particular. However, so far the 
argument has been directed at refuting and replacing causation by `unlikes' and, in 
spite of the differences between the Socratic and Anaxagorean accounts of causation, 
the former has not yet presented a reason for rejecting the latter. 
102 See e. g. Bostock, 1986,178: 'The little interlude at 102a... evidently marks a break in the 
argument. When we come back to our topic at 102b we begin upon the final argument for the 
immortality of the soul'. Cf. e. g. Rowe, 1993a, 248-9; Gallop, 1975,192; Frede, 1978,27; O'Brien, 
1967-8,199; Dixsaut, 1991,387. 
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Yet, it now seems as if the dvTLXoyLKO( passage in the `method of hypothesis' is 
actually criticising Anaxagoras. Although earlier parts of the dialogue provide some 
reasons for these criticisms, Socrates' return to a critique of Anaxagoras in the 
`method of hypothesis' can also be seen to introduce a new attack on his ideas. I 
propose that the next section, which establishes the mutual exclusivity of opposite 
property-instances, can be taken to refute those aspects of Anaxagoras' theory not yet 
disproved which pose serious problems for the `safe hypothesis'. In so doing, 
Socrates adds a further point to the `safe hypothesis', answering a potential objection 
to this theory of causation. In other words, 102b3ff. functions as a further refutation 
of Anaxagoras, while providing a necessary addition to the `safe hypothesis' model 
of causation. 
7.5.4 The problems of the Anaxagorean `like into like' principle 
The beginning of the 'second sailing', up to the `method of hypothesis', shows that 
`like causes like', insofar as properties in particulars are caused by the particular's 
participation in the corresponding Form. While this gives an alternative to the 
problematic idea that something can be caused by an entity which does not `match' 
it, it does not yet show the necessity of the ontologically distinct forms for such a 
'like into like' notion of causation. This is revealed in the next section, by exposing 
problems inherent in Anaxagorean `like into like' principle, which is not based on a 
dualistic ontology. 
This section, where Socrates discusses the relative heights of Simmias, Phaedo, and 
himself, can be read as exploring the ramifications of Anaxagorean physics for 
.... _u,.. 
Socrates' `safe hypothesis' of causation. In so doing, Socrates exposes the problems 
of Anaxagorean ideas by considering them in the context of his own `safe 
hypothesis'. These are problems to which the `safe hypothesis' itself could be seen 
as liable, up to this point. However, he now shows that there are clear differences 
between his own theories and Anaxagoras', so the 'safe hypothesis' does not face the 
problems exposed in Anaxagoras' system. 
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In the `puzzles' which Socrates has dealt with so far he has considered examples of 
causation in at most two particulars. However, the problems to which Anaxagoras' 
theories are liable will only emerge from considering the relationship of more than 
two sensibles. It is therefore highly significant that this is exactly what happens at 
102b3, when Socrates discusses the relationships between Simmias, himself, and 
Phaedo. 
Proving that property-instances must be distinct and non-constitutive 
From the outline of the `safe hypothesis' so far, it is not clear exactly how Form- 
participation works. Using the example of magnitude Plato now shows that a 
particular participating in a Form cannot actually have a property Trpös EaUTr . In 
doing so he treats Tb p. ya and Tb aµnKpöv as referring to pairs of opposite Forms 
and opposite property-instances which derive from these Forms. tos 
The simple hypothesis has already laid down that the cause of one thing being larger 
than another will in every case be the Form Largeness: Tb µetCov lTdv 9TEpOV 
ETEpou o 8&. aXXü [ IEIC6v EUTLV i I. LEyEOEL, Kat &L T0ÜT0 BLEI (OV, Slü TÖ 
. Ey¬9os (101a2-4). So when it is said that Simmias is larger than Socrates, ELgg(av 
ZwKpaTOVs... µE(CW Etval (102b4-5), we can assume from the safe hypothesis that 
the Form of Largeness will be the cause. 
This is fairly straightforward with two entities, one larger than the other. However, if 
a third entity, bigger than both the others, is introduced, the idea suddenly becomes 
problematic. In the case of Simmias, we can make two points about his height 
relative to Phaedo and Socrates: 
1. Simmias is large(r) than Socrates because of Largeness. 
2. Simmias is small(er) than Phaedo because of Smallness. 
In Socrates' explanation of the safe hypothesis there have only been two types of 
entity, Forms and particulars, so that there is therefore no reason not to see property- 
103 Phd. 102d6-8. 
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instances in particulars as being constitutive of the particular. If this were the case, 
Simmias himself would actually be made up of his property-instances, large and 
small, so that Simmias would be who he is (i. e. large and small) because of 
Largeness and Smallness, and two opposite Forms would be causes of the same 
outcome. 
Nevertheless, as Socrates points out, it is not the case that Simmias is smaller than 
Phaedo and larger than Socrates by being Simmias (T4 ZLµµIav EZvaL), but Toü 
ýth' TW [LE'YEAEL iMEPEXELV TT V aTLLKp6TflTa Ü7thXWV, TW & T6 g& eeoS Tf S 
QµLKpöTflTOc rrapEXwv ÜTrEpEXoV (102c12-d2). It is the presence of two distinct 
opposed property-instances, within Simmias which allows him to `be' large in 
relation to Socrates and small in relation to Phaedo. These property-instances, 
therefore, cannot be constitutive. Clearly compresence of opposites does occur in 
particulars, since they can `be' both large and small, relative to other particulars. 
Yet, without distinct and non-constitutive property-instances it would not be possible 
to account for the relations between different particulars which lead to compresence. 
Anaxagoras, however, has only particulars and no distinct property-instances. Thus, 
he can only account for compresence by claiming that a particular has two 
oppositional properties in relation `to itself (Trpös iavr6): 
OÜTE yap TOD QýLLKPOD EQTL TÖ 'YE ýýýLXL TOV, ý EÄQQQOV &C (Td 
yap i6V OÜK EQTL TÖ [Lh Oi1K EZVQL) - CAME Kai TOD [LEydXou CLEL 
EQTL 4AELCOV. Kal LQOV EQTZ TW aI. LLKPW i meoS, 1TpOS iauT6 sý 
gKaoTOV EQTL Ka). V ya Kat aýLLKPOV. 
104 
As Schofield remarks, this fragment is `pretty obscure' and its interpretation is very 
uncertain. Nevertheless, it seems that for Anaxagoras smallness and largeness are 
properties which a particular has `in itself (Trpös tau-r6). Since matter is infinitely 
divisible, 105 there will always be something smaller than any constituent of the 
world, no matter how small, and vice versa for the large. In this way, the small and 
the large are therefore equal in number, coextensive, and can only be distinguished in 
104 Anaxag. B3. 
p05 See e. g. Anaxag. BI. 
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relative terms. 106 Thus a particular will be large and small `in itself (npbs 
tau-r6). 107 If then asked both why a thing is large and why small, the only possible 
answer will be Trpbs Eav-rö, offering the same explanans for opposite explananda 
and therefore contravening an important Platonic principle. 
There are clear reasons for seeing 102b3ff as concerned with such points. 
Stylistically, the passage is reminiscent of Anaxagoras B3. For example, Socrates 
uses the preposition rrpös in phrases like ßµLKp6T11Ta EXEL 6 EWKPdTns Wpbs T6 
EKE(vou µE yeOos (102c4), recalling Anaxagoras' Trp6c EaUT6 8 9KaaTOV EaTL 
Kai, thya Kat QµLKpöv. More generally, `the small' and `the large' are very 
important in Anaxagoras' extant fragments. 108 
It is not only these ideas about magnitude which are incompatible with Socrates' 
explanation of compresence, but also the Anaxagorean principle of predominance, '09 
according to which there is a portion of everything in everything (Ev travT1 TravTbs 
µoipa EVEQTL), tlo and the identity of a particular is determined by the phenomena 
which predominate in it: ZTEpOV bE OÜSEV EQTLV Öi. LOLOV OÜSEVL, (LAXE ÖTWV 
TTXELQTa EVL, TaDTa EVS1jX6TaTa ZV 9KaaT6v EQTL Kai ýv. 
111 Clearly, this 
would preclude meaningful compresence since, even though all things, including 
opposites, are present, only the one thing which predominates in a particular would 
actually constitute its identity. 
Absolute property-instances 
Evidently, Anaxagorean predominance cannot account for compresence in the 
Platonic sense, whereby a particular could actually be said to have opposite 
106 Cf. e. g. Hussey, 1972,135. For possible readings of Kal t rov cri Tw UgLKp( 1rXf1Oos see 
Schofield, 1975,84, who concludes that the its 'general intepretation' is 'the large and the small are 
alike in respect of quantity or number'. 
107 The meaning of this phrase is not at all clear and various possibilities are discussed by Schofield, 
1975,85. Sider, 1981,60, takes irpd iauTS... vµLKpöv to mean that 'the relative terms Large(r) and 
Small(er) meet at a point that can be considered to partake of both qualities'. However, this suggests 
that it is only at the certain point when something has these qualities that it will be both large and 
small, even though the fragment seems to imply that each thing will always have both these qualities. 
108 E. g. Anaxag. B 1,3, and 6. 
109 On 'predominance' see Anaxag. B 12; Sven-Tage, 1982,2; Mean, 1995,26. 
10 Anaxag. B 11. 
Anaxag. B 12. Cf. Sven-Tage, 1982,22. 
Chapter 7 220 
properties simultaneously. However, the theory itself presents another possibility 
about the workings of property-instances which would be a problem for Socrates, 
insofar as it suggests the idea that entities could vary in the degree to which they are 
present in particulars. So, even if taking property-instances as non-constitutive 
allows for compresence without violating the principle that the same thing is not 
caused by opposites, there may be, as we shall see, further problems if the presence 
of property-instances can itself vary by degree. 
Socrates says, for example, that Simmias is both large and small because he has 
largeness in relation to Socrates and smallness in relation to Phaedo. If, however, 
property-instances could vary in the degree to which they were present, it might then 
be the case that there was less largeness in Simmias than in Phaedo. Of course, we 
could still explain Simmias being smaller than Phaedo in terms of his smallness, but 
the option would also be there to attribute this to his lesser degree of largeness. 
Since it is the Form of Largeness which causes largeness to be present, the Form of 
Largeness (i. e. because it is present, but to a lesser degree) would then be the cause 
of Simmias being small(er) than Phaedo, contravening the principle that an opposite 
cannot cause its own opposite. "2 
In order to avoid such difficulties, it is necessary that Form-participation is absolute 
and the degree to which a property-instance is present in a particular cannot vary. It 
is only is this way that Socrates can state, for example, that it is exclusively the 
`largeness' in Phaedo which makes him `large' in relation to Simmias: [AycOos ? XEL 
6 laL8wv Trpis TV Egqi(ou a tLKpöTr1Ta (102c7-8). 113 
112 For these principles see e. g. Sedley, 1998,121 113 Bostock, 1986,181-3, raises similar issues, in order to eliminate the possibility that 'we are trying 
to talk of the particular degree of largeness that Simmias has'. He says that if this were the case 
largeness would be the same as height and would result in Simmias' height being the cause of both 
large and small. The problems he envisages are similar to those I describe above, which would result 
from property-instances varying by degree. However, Bostock's points derive from his suggestion 
either that a particular 'height' is a Form or that there is a particular largeness 'peculiar to Simmias'. 
The first of these is surely incompatible with Plato's insistence on largeness and smallness alone 
without a further category of 'magnitude', while the second suggestion that different largenesses are 
particular to individuals is once again not an option considered by Socrates. It is on these grounds that 
Bostock then dismisses the idea that there is a third entity, 'largeness in us', the property-instance, as 
well as Forms and particulars. Yet, as I have argued, it is the very issue of 'degree' which shows the 
need for an invariable property-instance, which is a different entity from, although present in, the 
particular itself. 
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Accordingly, the ideas in 102b3-103a3 can be seen to provide us with two more 
important points about Form-participation: the causation of a property in a particular 
does not occur through the particular taking on*that property in itself (rrpös tauT6), 
but because of the presence of a distinct property-instance; and that participation is 
absolute, insofar as property-instances do not come to be present in particulars to 
varying degrees. These points, necessary for `like into like' causation to work, are 
incompatible with Anaxagorean physics, in spite of his `like into like' principle. 
The principles outlined by Socrates here depend upon the invariablity of property- 
instances, and require them to derive from Forms, so as to have these characteristics. 
For particulars change constantly and allow compresent opposites, Forms and their 
property-instances. Thus, the `anonymous objection' episode (103a4-c2) can be seen 
to reinforce these ideas. Having suggested the flaws of Anaxagorean physics in the 
initial `argument from opposites', Socrates has returned to the topic of opposites and 
shown why a theory of `like into like' which might initially appear to incline towards 
Anaxagoras is in fact fundamentally at odds with him. His response to the 
`anonymous objection' -shows the need for property-instances, though present in 
particulars, to be like Forms, insofar as they cannot accept their opposites. 114 
For Anaxagoras, with his belief in the inseparability of opposites, the homogeneity of 
matter, and bµov irävrra, no such distinct absolutes can exist: there can simply be no 
such qualities as largeness or smallness. Because of the indivisible mixture of matter 
within one ontological level which constitutes Anaxagoras' universe, he does not and 
could not posit the distinct and unchanging Forms introduced by Socrates. So 
despite any superficial similarities one might see between Anaxagoras and Plato 
because of `like into like' causation, the Phaedo makes it perfectly clear, as it shows 
what such a conception of causation would involve, that in an Anaxagorean universe 
no talk of causation can make any sense. 
In the passage we have been discussing (102a11-103c4) Socrates introduces a third 
entity to the causal process, Tö (e. g. ) .t yeOos 
ev i uiv which, along with the 
114 N. B. the way in which the avrb r6 terminology, which previously differentiated Forms from their 
property-instances(102d6-7), now incorporates both (103b4-5). 
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Forms, has mutually exclusive opposites. The status of these `ZvovTa' has raised 
several difficulties, even though, as I will show in Chapter 8, they are clearly 
presented as a third and distinct type of entity, along with Forms and particulars. 
Yet Plato does more than just add a third type of entity. On my present analysis of 
this section he actually argues for the necessity of these entities, in order to maintain 
his safe hypothesis of causation. He does this by pointing towards the problems that 
would result from the Anaxagorean counter-example, making the presence of this 
counter-example felt through the stylistic structure which makes relevant allusions to 
Anaxagoras both in this passage and elsewhere. In other words, seeing the 
Anaxagorean undertones in this passage leads us to understand more closely some of 
the problems which Plato is dealing with here. Conversely, it also allows us to see 
this passage itself as another stage in Plato's refutation of Anaxagoras. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The study of allusion is 'conventionally an aspect of literary analysis which does not 
concern itself with texts written in what is considered as `philosophical style'. This 
may, in part, account for the neglect of such extensive and significant allusions 
within the Phaedo, both to Anaxagoras and to other Presocratic writers. 
Nevertheless, however they are classified, such authors do have a style and I have 
suggested ways in which allusion within this stylistic context can actually provide a 
rich and complex basis for philosophical argument. 
Anaxagoras appears to escape the monism of the Eleatics and the perpetual flux of 
the Ephesians. He posits a world in which-change occurs through separation and 
combination, and works on a principle of `like into like'. Moreover, his universe is 
ordered by a distinct entity which is, at least in name, representative of rationality. 
No wonder then that some of his ideas seem close to those presented by the Phaedo's 
Socrates.. Yet, at the same time, his theory of the inseparability of opposites also 
poses a fundamental threat to the very principle of causation on which the 
immortality of the soul depends. 
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Anaxagoras' ideas are often present in the Phaedo, whether implicitly or explicitly. 
With every allusion, however, Plato constructs his refutation of Anaxagoras and uses 
it establish his own position. In rejecting Anaxagoras' voüs, in attacking 
Anaxagorean `causation', Plato strengthens his own conceptions. "5 As is clear from 
the treatment of Anaxagoras in the dialogue, where any apparent agreement 
eventually leads to subversion, refutation, and replacement, the Phaedo presents him 
as an attractive, but ultimately a dangerous figure. 
1 15 Cf. Nightingale, 1995, e. g. 7 and 91, 'Plato criticizes his model even as he imitates its themes and 
structure'; and e. g. Ch. 5 on Plato's own construcitve use of the genres he criticises. However, she is 
only concerned with rhetoric and poetry and does not touch on possible Presocratic allusions in Plato. 
Moreover, she avoids 'Plato's methods and doctrines, or indeed, ... 
his development and practice of 
analytic thinking' (10) 
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Chapter 8 
`Taking refuge in XöyoL': language and style in the `second sailing' 
8o Eli poi XplvaL EIS TOÜ$' XÖ'YOUS KaTa4vy6vTa EV 4KE(V0t 
QKOTTEIV TwV övTwv Týv äXi6Eiav (99e4-6). 
In the last two chapters I demonstrated how style is important in setting out 
arguments and principles, both Plato's own and those he rejects. Socrates' views of 
Opövr)Qts, for example, were established through features like repetition and 
metaphor, while Anaxagoras' incorrect use of vo)v trapped him into particular 
teleological commitments incompatible with his metaphysics, all suggesting a close 
relationship between verbal expression and beliefs about reality. In addition, 
consideration of style revealed clear interconnections between different sections of 
the dialogue and so supported a holistic reading. 
My aim in this chapter is once again to demonstrate the importance of language and 
style for the construction of argument, this time within Socrates' Seinepos TrXovs, 
`second sailing' (99d1ff. ). This section, containing the so-called `method of 
hypothesis' and `final argument', is discussed far more than any other part of the 
Phaedo. 1 Accordingly, I will not be examining un- or under-explored parts of the 
text, as in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, in spite of the vast amount of 
secondary material on the `second sailing', I shall aim to show that closer attention to 
style can make an important difference to our understanding of this section, helping 
both to increase its overall coherence and to reach alternative analyses of particular 
points. Most significantly, I suggest that style can help us to interpret Socrates' 
proof that the soul is dOdvaios and ävtX¬Opoc in a way which eradicates some 
problems conventionally seen to arise from it. 
1 Cf. Kanayama, 2000,41. 
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I shall also use style to examine what Socrates means by saying that his method here 
is & Xöyois [QKOrrcty] (100al-2). 2 Although the precise meaning of Xöyos is 
unclear, 3 it combines an idea of `account', `explanation', `definition', and 
`argument', with the means of expression: `words', `speech', or `discourse'. To 
these one might add a notion of structure dimension, derived from an early Greek 
sense of XEyeiv: `collecting', `gathering', or 'enumerating'. So the meaning of 
Xöyos seems bound up with the language in which argument and definition are 
structured. 
Furthermore, one might also see the phrase Ev X6yoL9, in this particular context, as 
carrying certain evaluative connotations, insofar as searching in this way might lead 
to knowledge of Ta &'-ra. At the beginning of the `second sailing' not only does 
Socrates use Xöyoi, when let down by his senses, but stresses that this is in no way 
epistemologically inferior to using Epya (100al-3). Moreover, in conclusion, he 
suggests that following through the Xöyos will yield a sufficient proof (107b6-9). As 
we know from the earlier `misology' passage, X6yoL are not self-evidently normative 
(e. g. 90b6ff. ). Nevertheless, it seems that in the `second sailing', at least, Xöyos 
carries some connotation of methodological propriety. 
The idea of a connection between Xöyos and truth is also found elsewhere. 
Heraclitus, for example, claims that the truth about reality comes from the X6yos, 5 
while in Plato himself there are other passages where Xöyos or correct Aöyos is 
associated with the correct use of language to accord with metaphysical truth. 6 For 
2 Kanayama, 2000, covers similar issues, offering an interpretation of Phaedo 96-107 which also 
considers the meaning of 'studying in logoi'. I read ICanayama's article, having already formulated 
my own reading of the 'second sailing', and it is interesting to note that there are a number of 
similarities between the points we make. However, it is not only my dependence on stylistic points 
which distinguishes our views. There are also many key differences between our arguments and 
conclusions, which I will outline below. 
Cf. e. g. Hackforth, 1955,138 and Desjardins, 1990,123: 'One of the most pervasive terms in Plato's 
dialogues, logos is perhaps at the same time one of the most ambiguous - its meaning ranging all the 
way from speech, statement, and definition to argument, account, discourse, structure, rationality, and 
even rationally structuring mind itself. 
4 Mortley, 1986,12; Heidegger, 1959,124. This dimension can perhaps be seen in e. g. the second 
proposed definition of logos at Tht. 206e7ff. and less explicitly in logos as 'the interweaving of forms' 
at Soph. 259e5. Cf. Fattal, 1991,147: '... 1'utilisation platonicienne du logos n'est pas sans se rEferer 
indirectment au fonctionnement simultanement synthetique et analytique du verbe legein homerique. ' 
s Heraclit. B50. 
6 These ideas have been widely discussed. See e. g. McCabe, 1994,192ff.; Mourelatos, 1973,16 and 
passim. 
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instance, in two apparently connected passages from the Theaetetus and Sophist, 7 the 
dialogues containing the most explicit discussion of Aöyoc, linguistic and 
metaphysical impossibility go hand in hand, causing insurmountable problems for 
the Xöyos itself. 8 
Given the connection of the term Xöyos with both verbal expression and argument, 
explanation, and definition, it seems that Aöyos in the `second sailing' has a 
methodological sense, meaning something like the use of discourse to construct a 
correct argument and account. Accordingly, by examining how language and style 
represent the beliefs and arguments about reality expressed in the `second sailing' we 
may further our understanding of what Plato means by XöyoL here and how they 
might give some degree of access to reality. 
This consideration brings the two aims of my chapter together. In working through 
the `second sailing' in order to see how style might affect our interpretation of the 
different stages of argument, we may see how Plato uses discourse to construct his 
beliefs and arguments about reality, and so further our understanding of what he 




I differentiate the different stages of the argument with Platonic terms, so that the 
first `simple' theory of causation, by which the cause of a property in a particular is 
participation in a matching form, 9 will be known, as in Chapter 7, as the `safe 
7 Along with methodological similarities, one might also see the Sophist passage as supplying the 
Theaetetus' omitted critique of Parmenides (183d11). Cf. Burnyeat, 1990,79. 
a Plato attacks the Heraclitean Ephesians at Tht. I83a2ff., the Parmenidean monists at Soph. 244b6-e5. 
For the Ephesians the complete absence of stability renders both language and metaphysics 
meaningless, prohibiting even terms like ODTW, '(va µßj v1 owµev aJToiG rep A6yw (183a2-b5). 
The monists' comprehensive unity apparently precludes any linguistic or metaphysical distinction and 
results in the positing of paradoxical self-contradictory properties: e. g. the Parmenidean ZV Tb näv 
eivat is inconsistent with Tbv 6p66v A6yovnamely that Tb ZV must truly be without parts 
(Soph. 244e2ff. ). Cf. McCabe, 1994,145ff. and 200ff., on these passages. Cf. also e. g. Ti. 49b-e. 
where the difficulties, caused by elemental changeability, in our account of the universe are expressed 
in terms of the linguistic problem of what to call these elements. We mistakenly refer to unstable 
elements with e. g. ToDTo or T66E, but should only use TOLOOTOV. 
9 E. g. 100d4-6. 
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hypothesis'. 10 By contrast, I refer to the theory which deals with causation by non- 
opposites as the `subtler answer. " 
8.1.1 Style in the `second sailing' 
Although the stages of the `second sailing' are not stylistically homogeneous, there 
are certain stylistic features and trends which predominate throughout and bring it 
closest, in very general terms, to the style I have named `verbal minimalism'. Chief 
amongst these features is a strong degree of verbal and structural repetition, which 
varies between arguments whose stages of progress are accompanied by small 
changes in structure, 12 and arguments using a sequence of examples to illustrate the 
same point, where the structure is more or less repeated and the subject changed. 13 
In this way the reader's attention is drawn to structure, in the former case to its 
changes, in the latter to its continuity. 
In very general terms the progress of the argument is clearly laid out and divided into 
stages, with phrases and particles often marking the beginning or end of a phase, 14 
and particles used to indicate logical connections between units or sections. 15 There 
is a proliferation of nouns formed from T6 + neuter adjective, ranging from physical 
terms like T6 Oepµöv and T6 4vXp6v (e. g. 103c11ff. ) to mathematical, T6 
rrEpLTTöv and T6 dpTiov (e. g. 104b1-3), to ethical, T6 &IKaLov and T6 d8iicoV (e. g. 
105d16-el), so that, even in terms of vocabulary, we see elements of structural 
repetition. This is especially true of the many a-privative substantives, a number of 
which appear to be very rare or even neologisms. Moreover, the vocabulary is 
generally repetitive and, along with structural and lexemic repetition, there is a near 
complete lack of clear-cut imagery in the `second sailing. 16 
10 101d2. Cf. 105b7. 
11 105b8-c2. 
12 E. g. 104diff. 
13 E. g. 105b8ff. 
14 E. g. 105b5-6; 105e8-10; the use of bpio ieOa in 104c 11; Echecrates' and Phaedo's conversation at 
102x4-10; dpa in e. g. 102b11 or 105e6 
15 E. g. yip in 102b8,103b2,104d5,106c3; oüv in 104d1; dpa in 104c7,104e1,105d3; To(vvv in 
104b6,104e7; oi, KOÜV in 106b1,106c9 etc. 16 A possible exception is inreKXwpeiv (e. g. 102d9), a rare verb, first used in Herodotus to denote the 
withdrawal of an army before an enemy invasion (Hdt. 9.13 and 14), and then found only in this 
section of the Phaedo, once in both Plato's Laws (Leg. 785b1) and Hippocrates (Hp. loc. hom. 33). 
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Included in this part of the Phaedo is my earlier Passage IV (105b5-106a1) and many 
of the features I have just outlined were those which I identified, in Part I, as 
characteristic of Passage N. Not all characteristic features of Passage N 
predominate throughout the `second sailing'. For example, recurrent and striking 
ellipse is only prominent in Passage IV (105c10-e7) and one other section (104d12- 
e6), while the short question and answer style is mixed in the `second sailing' with 
longer continuous speeches. Nevertheless, Passage N also has the least clear 
generic affiliations of all six passages in 
. 
Part I and, though perhaps to a slightly 
lesser degree, this stylistic distinctiveness is also true, in various ways, of the `second 
sailing' as a whole. 
As I explained in the last chapter, 102b4ff. can be seen to allude to Anaxagoras in 
certain ways and the TO + neuter adjective noun-form is typical of the Presocratics, 
while the clustered a-privatives of 105d13ff. might recall Parmenides. Yet on the 
whole, the passage is a distinctively Platonic mix of structured repetition and careful 
variation, with sections like 105c8ff unusual, even from a Platonic point of view. 
Certain specific features can be pinpointed as unusual: extreme ellipse; novel a- 
privatives; structures like w a"V TI EV ; TW (7(LaTL EyyivnTaL [Oepµöv] 
Irrrat, 
repeated at 105b8ff. There are also terms like UXoµaL, which not only have an 
unusual application in this section, 17 but are also repeated continuously. 
Through repetition and distinctiveness, then, attention is drawn to the stylistic 
structure. Moreover, a number of points are also made in linguistic terms, suggesting 
the importance of language in this section. Nevertheless, it might still seem that my 
analysis of the `second sailing' does not focus so straightforwardly on style as the 
Other recurrent terms here with possible military associations, like SEXoµaL, btro. t vw, ktnoipw, and 
TrpoaEpxoµaL, might then also then be seen to tie in with any martial undertones. Nevertheless, in 
spite of Burnet's widely accepted comments that `the metaphors are military throughout' (Burnet, 
1911,102., Cf. e. g. Hackforth, 1955,155; O'Brien, 1967-8,204), the general usage of these other 
terms is so broad that they cannot be restricted to the solely military sense which would lead to their 
clear classification as deviant (vehicle) terminology. Furthermore, even if some implication of 
hostility is retained, the terms themselves are used so many times here, that they soon become 
naturalised within the passage. Questions about their precise meaning are part of a wider uncertainty 
concerning the precise meaning of many aspects of the argument in general. 
17 Although it does not constitute so significant a deviation from its normal usage as to constitute a 
clear case of imagery. Seen. 16, above. 
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previous two case studies. In one respect, this stems from the vast amount of 
secondary literature written on this passage. At many stages, in order to engage with 
this, I have had to break into my own analysis and address certain viewpoints within 
their own terms of reference. Yet, there is another reason. As I will explain below, 
the `second sailing' fits together into a tightly cohesive structure, within which a full 
explanation of individual aspects can only really be given in terms of the overall 
structure both of particular sections and the `second sailing' as a whole. This has 
made it far more difficult than in the previous chapters to comment on the specific 
significance of individual stylistic points, without offering simultaneously an broader 
overview of the argument. 
8.1.2 Causes or explanations? 
There has been considerable debate over whether `the second sailing' deals primarily 
with `causes' or `explanations', the former taken as having an ontological basis, the 
latter epistemological. ' 8. My own understanding of the argument incorporates both 
these aspects, as long as explanations are based on an underlying reality. For, if this 
is the case, the cause/explanation distinction is essentially one of emphasis and not 
substantive. 19 Nevertheless, I shall use `cause', since this emphasises the 
metaphysical aspect and avoids the dangers of the `second sailing' being viewed as 
purely pragmatic. 20 
Furthermore my conception of `cause' is broad, departing from the modern notion of 
`cause' as `efficient cause, 21 and involving no assumption of antecedence. 22 1 
" See e. g. Sedley, 1998,121 n. 7 and 122: 'They constitute less an epistemological than an ontological 
category'. Cf. also e. g. Rowe, 1993b. and Ooms Renard, 1999. " Cf. McCabe, 1994,63-4. 
20 Explanation, unlike causation; can be seen as either 'real' or 'pragmatic'. As Ruben, 1990,21-3, 
explains, 'real explanations' only exist by virtue of 'the way the things in the world which they are 
about really are'. By contrast, the 'explanatory pragmatist' sees explanation as entirely 'audience- 
variant', with ontology playing no role. Cf. also Hankinson, 1998,4: 'Causes are actual items, events, 
agents, facts, states of affairs; explanations, on the other hand, are propositional'. 
21 Ruben, 1990,46. 
22 If 'causation' does not involve antecedence, it will be freed from Aristotle's objection that the 
effects caused by Forms should not be intermittent (GC 335b. 18-21). Cf. Fine, 1987,79-81. 
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follow Sedley in taking a `cause' to be an item which `has some characteristic which 
made it all along such as to bring about the effect'. 23 
8.2 `Synonymy' and `Form-participation': the `safe hypothesis' (100bl-102a9) as a 
single Xdyos 
In Chapter 7, I discussed how one might see the `safe hypothesis' as a single Xöyos 
of causation, unlike the accounts given by other physicists, such as Anaxagoras. Yet 
Socrates still presents the hypothesis with several different formulations, giving us, 
effectively, some degree of synonymy between varying expressions of the same 
principle; stylistic variation combined with semantic continuity. 
8.2.1 Flexible terminology in the account of the `safe hypothesis'24 
At the outset of the `second sailing' Socrates outlines the `safe hypothesis', 
presenting the Form/particular relationship as the simple dependence of particular on 
matching Form. 25 The relationship, whose precise nature is not specified, is 
represented by several formulations, including the verb p. ETEXEIV, the nouns 
Trapouala and Kolvwvia, and the datives T4 Ka)4 and p. EyMEI 26 The same words 
describe both Form and particular, but with small linguistic variations. Thus, in of & 
sly ZV dXXo KaXdv EIVaL ý& 6TL I. LETEXEL EKE(VOU TOD KaXOÜ (100c5-6) an 
adjective represents the particular, an adjectival substantive, Tö KaXÖv, the Form. 
Later, the substantive is both Form and particular, with the former singular, the latter 
plural: T4 Ka )4 Ta KaXa y(yvETal KaXd (100e2-3). What the language clearly 
shows is that Socrates sees causation as the direct `effect' of Form on particular, by 
which a `like' Form causes a `like' particular, however this occurs precisely. It is 
this relationship, between `like' Forms and particulars, which I describe as 
u Sedley, 1998,122. 
24 Although I shall be touching on aspects of the so-called 'method of hypothesis' at 10ldl-102a1 
(100a3-7 is often seen as connected) and have already discussed parts in Ch. 7, I will not be discussing 
it in great detail as a separate section. For I am trying to stress the continuity, interconnectedness, and 
methodological significance of the 'second sailing' as a whole, without seeing one particular part as 
being the significant statement of method. 
u Cf. Vlastos, 1973,86: ' "Participation" here designates that one-way relation of ontological 
dependence between temporal things and eternal Forms... '. 
26 Cf. Sedley, 1998,115, on the variation of Platonic expressions conveying cause in general. 
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`matching'. Admittedly, Socrates' `assertion' (&L Xvpt(oµaL) that To Ka)n 
Träv-ra Ta KaX& KaXd (100d7-8), could be taken to demonstrate a preference for 
this particular formulation. However, the fact that he does not then stick to this 
phrasing suggests that he is asserting the certainty of a `like' causes `like' principle, 
rather than advocating correct terminology. 
It seems then that the varied formulations here emphasise the importance of the `like 
into like' principle over any detailed explanation of the process, 27 a reading 
corroborated by the end of the list of possible formulations, if this controversial 
phrase is read as Kai, öirws 7rpooayopereo1tevr7 (100d6). Nevertheless, even the 
alternative conjectures, trpoayevo1Avou and other forms of irpoiyy1yvoµai, 28 could 
be taken to indicate that the principle is certain, whatever the exact nature of 
participation. 29 
So, it seems that no specific terminology encapsulates the precise working of 
participation. However, in spite of his varied verbal formulations, Socrates implies 
that he, unlike the dV-nXoyLKO(, has a single account of causation, JT Xöyos 
(101 e4). 
27 Cf. Rowe, 1993b, 57 and 61. However, while Rowe says that participation's exact nature is not 
outlined here, he claims that the different formulations actually represent distinct explanatory 
hypotheses which would give further explanations of how participation works and that the best of 
these would provide a X6yos for the Form-participation hypothesis, a course of action recommended 
(10ld6ff. ), but never carried out. Pace Rowe, it seems unlikely that the missing logos of Form 
participation (Cim6ee L] T(JV dVWOEV ßEÄT(. aTrl, 101d8) is any of these formulations. For this would 
imply that the extended explanation of Form-participation is prior to the Form-participation principle 
itself. Moreover, it also appears that further explanation of this principle is actually given in the 
'second sailing'. For the ways in which the points made after the 'method of hypothesis' augment this 
explanation, see e. g. 7.5.4, above and p. 252, below. Even Rowe himself suggests that the more 
'subtle' answer supplements the 'safe' by 'showing how a particular object comes to be occupied by 
the Form in question' (Rowe, 1993b, 67). On the controversy over what would constitute the 'higher' 
hypothesis see e. g. Kanayama, 2000,51 ff. and for other views on dvweev see Blank, 1986. 
2 See e. g. Rowe, 1993b, 56 n. 16; and the OCT. 
29 Cf. Vlastos, 1973,86 n. 30, on lrpoaayopevogivrl as indicating the uncertainty of the precise nature 
of 'participation'. He adds that, even if Trpooytyvoµai. is read: 'the difference will not be great..., and 
will not affect at all the important thing in the citation, sc. the avowal of uncertainty in E1re öml 6f 
ical 8Trws'. Pace Rowe, 1993b, 56, trpoaytyvogat does not seem to imply the superiority of one 
particular formulation. 
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8.2.2 Why have different formulations? 
If the `safe hypothesis' of causation is so clear and invariable, even with the details 
unstated, why does Plato present such a range of expressions, rather than a single 
formulation? In terms of how style corresponds to beliefs, it appears then that there 
can be synonymy between differing verbal expressions and that some underlying 
structural continuity transcends the differences. This suggests that particular words 
and phrases are not so significant for a X6yoc as the structure into which they are 
combined. 
One might take this thought a step further, extracting not only points about the 
composition of Xöyos, but also reasons why Socrates might see X6yos as connected 
with reality. What the synonymy gives us is expressions with different elements, but 
a common principle. Likewise the `safe hypothesis' of causation is universally true. 
Whether we are talking about what makes one person taller than another or ten more 
than eight (100e8-101b8), the cause will be a `like' Form. No matter what precise 
elements are involved, the structure of causation remains the same. 
8.3 The introduction of Ivov-ra (102a10-103a7): fixed and changing terminology 
At the end of Chapter 7,1 showed how one might see the section discussing the 
respective heights of Simmias, Socrates, and Phaedo (102a10-103a3) as an 
expansion of the `safe hypothesis', which demonstrates the necessity, of distinct, 
`non-constitutive' and `absolute' property-instances. I will now consider how this 
passage also leads into and establishes important points for the `subtler answer'., 
There has been considerable debate over whether phrases like Tö Ev tµiv µ&y¬Oos 
(102d7-8) or talk of Tb µ&y¬Aos possessed by Simmias (e. g. 102c2-3) imply that 
there is a third type of entity and, if so, what type of entity it is and how it relates to 
Forms and particulars. Style in this section can be seen to shed some light on these 
issues. 
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8.3.1 Introducing a third type of entity (102a10-d4) 
In Chapter 7, I proposed that this section demonstrates the need for a third type of 
entity, 30 distinct property-instances ' which are present non-constitutively in 
particulars, so that opposite causes do not produce the same result. The existence of 
this entity is stressed through various formulations. A phrase like ob ydp Troy 
Tre4 uKEVaL ELµµiav ÜJTEPýXELV T0ÜTC0, TW ELµµiav EtVaL, 6AX& TW . tEyOEL 6 
TvyXdvEL lXWv (102c1-3) clearly shows that Simmias possesses distinct 
`largeness'. Similarly, Socrates and Phaedo are not small because EwKPdT IT 6 
E )KpdTTW EaTty (102c3-4) and ca[8wv 6 4at8wv ta rtv (102c7-8), but because 
of `smallness'. 
Also introduced here are the terms E18os and Enovvµta (102b1-3), where the former 
denotes Forms, the latter the predicate attached to individuals who have certain 
property-instances through Form-participation. Socrates possesses both `smallness' 
and. `largeness' in relation to Simmias and Cebes respectively: errwvvµtav 9XEL 
Up. 1LKp6s TE Kai, µ&yas EivaL (102c11-12). The iii vvg1a, which is evidently not 
essentially linked to individuals and can be compresent with its opposites, 31 will be 
an important term in distinguishing the relationship between different types of entity. 
8.3.2 Ivov*a and Forms: the `withdraw or perish' option (102d5-103a3) 
While Socrates can admit compresent opposites and have the `eponyms' `large' and 
`small' simultaneously, there are two types of entity which cannot: airrö T6 
. EyeOoc, presumably the Form `Large', and T6 Ev ýµiv t&ycOos, its property- 
instance (102d6-9). Thus, this stage of the argument implies unambiguously the 
existence of three different kinds of entity: particulars, Forms, and those which I 
shall call EvovTa from hereon. 32 9vovTa come to be present in particulars and give 
the particulars certain characteristics. I use the term Ivovvra, 33 indicating only that 
30 See Ch. 7 p. 224, above. 
31 On the term'compresence', as used here and throughout this chapter, see Ch. 7 n. 7, above. 
32 Given that these ¬vovra are clearly distinguished from Forms, I am not using terms like 'immanent 
Forms', in order to avoid confusion. 
33 Cf. Frede, 1978,40 n. 6, for the term Ivov. 
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they are entities which come to be in things, as with T6 4v ýµiv µiyE6os, and are 
distinct from both Forms and particulars, without other commitments as to their 
precise nature. 4 
Neither Forms nor Evovrra can withstand the compresence of opposites, and it is here 
that Socrates first introduces the `withdraw or perish' alternative, explaining what 
happens to them when an opposite approaches. He claims that the Form and Lvov 
`Large' f4 e&yeLV Kai. {nrEKXu pEIV ÖTav afTLJ TTpoo{i TÖ ivavT(OV, Td 
QµLKpöv, f npoaeXüövTOS EKE(VOU d roXu X vaL (102d9-e2). Whereas Forms are 
indestructible and eternal, EvovTa are characterised by coming to be only in things. 
Thus, it seems that Forms would flee when an opposite approaches, while bvovTa, 
unable to exist outside of the particular in which they are instantiated, would perish. 
The `withdraw or perish' opposition recurs throughout the `second sailing' and, 
despite slight changes of expression, it is always presented in terms of opposing 
alternatives, being destroyed or yielding and fleeing. For example: rjrot änEpxeTal 
rj ärr6XXvral (103a1-2); ' inrEKXc)pißELv aim@ r ätroXEta8al (103d8); and rjrot 
ärro)MgEva i irrrEKXo poüvTa (104b10-cl). 35 Given that IvovTa alone appear to 
be at issue as the argument progresses, commentators have worried in case only the 
`perish' option is real. Hackforth's view that the `withdrawal' option does only 
apply to soul and `is apparently brought in to provide for that case', 36' has come under 
34 The nature of what I call Ivovra is very controversial and widely discussed. On the debate in 
general and for further references, see Gallop, 1975,195; and Fine, 1986,76 n. 7. Hackforth, 1955, 
150 n. 1, posits ontologically distinct 'immanent forms': 'it is immanent form - characters like Tb 
OuXpöv which can approach and reside in concrete subjects that Socrates has been and is still 
concerned with... '. Cf. also e. g. Vlastos, 1973,83; Frede, 1978,35. There have been various 
objections to such views. See e. g. Fine, 1986,76, who calls lvovra'immanent characters', but sees 
them not as 'a distinct ontological category from Forms, but (parts of) Forms themselves, when they 
are in things'. Kanayama, 2000, seems to suggest that the 'subtler aitiai' which come to be present in 
e. g. bodies, are particulars (71-3), and clearly distinguishes them from Forms (70). My IvovTa are in 
some ways close to O'Brien's (1967-8,201-2) 'particularization' which, like Forms, cannot become 
their opposites, but are nevertheless ontologically particulars. Yet O'Brien's 'particularization' are 
very clearly not a third type of entity, but special particulars which, for some reason, cannot admit 
their opposites: 'There will be no 'third thing', no fieriness in fire that is not particular fire and not the 
form of fire'. By contrast, I see the Ivovra as clearly conceived of as a third type of entity which, 
despite its potential destructibility, cannot simply be some type of particulars, given that particulars 
themselves are characterised by the compresence of opposites (see e. g. McCabe, 1994,37ff. ). 
Moreover, even if our intepretations of this point are similar, there are several substantial differences 
between our overall analyses which I will detail ad loc. below. 
3s Cf. O'Brien, 1967-8,204: 'Plato's language makes it clear, here and throughout the argument, that 
'withdraw or perish' offers a true alternative'. 36 Hackforth, 1955,148 n. 3. Cf. e. g. Dixsaut, 1991,389, n. 300. 
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heavy fire. 37 Certainly, if the `withdraw' option was actually real for the soul alone, 
the `withdraw or perish' opposition would appear question-begging. Yet, given that 
Forms and, as we shall see later, the gods, would `withdraw' rather than `perish' on 
the approach of opposites, these concerns can be dispelled. The `withdrawal' of 
these entities thus legitimates the opposition, and the first occurrence of the 
opposition (102e9-10) clearly applies to Forms as well as Zvovra, even if Forms are 
not focused on explicitly in later stages of the `second sailing'. 38 
8.3.3 The `anonymous objection': It ovra, Forms, particulars, and eponymy (103a4- 
103c6) 
According to the `anonymous objection' (103a5-10) Socrates' recent claims that, for 
example, Tb by¬6os could never admit Tb vµLKpöv and become other than it is 
(102d7-e3), conflict with the earlier `argument from opposites', which depicts 
change as a transition between opposites. Socrates responds by giving his clearest 
explanation of the distinction between his three types of entity. The `argument from 
opposites' dealt with particulars (Trpd yµaTa), whereas they are now concerned with 
Evov (TO Ev ý tdv) and Form (TO Ev -nj 4vaEL: 103b5), through whose presence 
particulars acquire their ETrcOvvµ(aL. It is evident that three distinct types of entity are 
being posited here, supporting the suggestion made in the previous section. 
The `anonymous objection' also has more general ramifications for the function of 
style in argument. Whereas the exposition of `safe hypothesis' included different 
verbal formulations with equivalent meanings, the `anonymous objection' episode 
makes the very opposite move, as similar expressions vary in meaning, according to 
context. First there are the general verbal likenesses between the formulations of the 
two theses confused by the anonymous objector. The `argument from opposites' 
proposes that, for example, iK ßpaSuTEpou Tb OdTTOV [yevýaETaL] (71a3-4), so 
37 E. g. O'Brien, 1967-8,204, objects that, if Hackforth is correct, 'withdrawal' would amount to 
'perishing', rendering the distinction superfluous. Cf. Gallop, 1975,195, who also criticises 
Hackforth's view: 'in view of the repeated stress upon it [i. e. the withdrawal/ perish distinction], and 
its wide range of application..., it seems better to find distinct interpretations for each option, if 
possible'. 
8 Of course, the idea of Forms 'withdrawing' might, in itself, seem strange. However, this can be 
resolved by understanding 'withdrawal' not so much as physical withdrawal in the context of the 
Forms, but as not accepting [the opposite] and yet not perishing. This would seem to account for the 
important aspects of the 'withdrawal' option. 
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that opposites (expressed by the Tö + neuter adjective form) come about (y[yveaOai) 
from their opposites. Socrates later point is that rb o7lzKp6v Tb kV fjity OK 
EeEAEL TTOTt 1u ya 7t7L'(oOaL 
(102e6-7). Both contexts refer to a change 
(ytyveaOai) in an entity (the adjectival substantive). Admittedly, the `argument from 
opposites' mentions 'rrpäyp. aTa at one point (71a10), and Socrates does later specify 
that he is concerned with opposites Ev f µiv (102d7; 102e7). Yet until Socrates 
responds to the `anonymous objection', the distinctions between them are not clearly 
laid out, so that their verbal similarities may well lead to or at least augment their 
confusion with each other. 
Sameness and difference: terminology and the link between &vov'a and Forms 
These ideas already suggest how style indicates another point about Xbyos and 
reality. Similar expressions vary in meaning according to context, just as the 
qualities of particulars in the earlier `recollection argument' were also presented as 
context-dependent 39 Moreover, Socrates' response to the `anonymous objection' 
contains another perhaps more significant example of how similar or even identical 
terms and expressions can have different meanings. 
In qualifying the expressions, Socrates cleared up the objector's confusion between 
TrpäyµaTa and bvovTa. However, Socrates' response also provides a very pointed 
example of a verbal formulation which has undergone an unexplained change in 
meaning. He has stated, shortly before, ' that neither Form (ai rb rd µiye6os), nor 
Ivov (rb &i ufv µEy¬Aos) will admit their opposites (102d6-9), using the already 
familiar aUT6 T6 expression to denote Forms. 0 Nevertheless, in his subsequent 
response, which verbally echoes this statement, the airrd Tö formulation, far from 
distinguishing Forms from gvovTa, now clearly designates both: airrö TO EV VTioV 
EaUTW EVaVTIOV OUK dv 1TOTE 'YEVOLTO, o&TE TÖ kV ý LV OÜTE TÖ EV r 
4vcEL (103b4-5). 
39 GSee e. g. 74b7-9: ap oO %eol AhV 6QOL KQt IXa MOTE TobTý Övra T ithV tea OaLVETaL, 
TOO & 00; 
40' See e. g. 74e7, where az rd rd Lvov distinguishes the Form from equal particulars and cf, e. g. 
75c11-dl. 
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Why this sudden switch in the scope of the aürrb T6 terminology? In opposition to 
Ivov-ra at 102d6-9, it now incorporates EvovTa as well as Forms and is antithetical to 
particulars (rrpdyµaTa). As applied to Forms the definitive pronoun airr6 
presumably indicates something about their pure and essential nature - the Form of 
the good is `the unchanging Good itself , as opposed to particular instances of 
goodness, prone to change and destruction. 
When it first appears, then, at the point where Socrates introduces the `withdraw or 
perish' option, airrb Tö distinguishes Forms from ZvovTa, because the latter come 
to be within particulars and can admit destruction (102d6ff. ). Thus, if one point of 
airrb T6 is to indicate permanence, it is well suited to the Forms/gvov-ra opposition, 
given that the key difference between them is the latter's destructibility. 
By contrast, in Socrates' response to the `anonymous objection' the important 
distinction is between entities which admit their opposites and those which do not. 
Here, Socrates stresses similarities rather than differences between Forms and 
Evovrra, neither of which accept their opposites and which are both opposed to 
particulars, since these accept compresent opposites. Thus gvovTa are on the Forms 
side of an abT6 TöhrpdWara opposition and abT6 T6 can be seen to indicate the 
essential nature of Forms with respect to non-acceptance of opposites, a 
characteristic shared by the EvovTa. So the changing scope of abT6 TO draws 
attention to how EvovTa can be defined in terms of both crucial differences and 
similarities to Forms. Style reflects the actual relationship between these two types 
of entity, given that the application of abT6 TO to the Forms' reflects the basis for, 
on the one hand, their distinctness from, and on the other, their similarities to, 
IvovTa 41 
41 O'Brien, 1967-8,209, points out this dual usage of avrö Td, and says that here the 
'particularization' which cannot accept its opposite, is being likened to the Form in this respect, and is 
therefore indicated with the Form terminology. In spite of apparent similarities between our positions, 
O'Brien takes all examples of the phrase elsewhere to refer, unequivocally, to Forms. 
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8.3.4 Summary 
From the end of the `method of hypothesis' to the `anonymous objection' there are a 
number of new points. While the `safe hypothesis' involves Forms and particulars, 
we are now given Evov-ra, a third type of entity, which come to be in particulars and 
are like Forms, because of their non-acceptance of opposites, like particulars, 
because of destructibility. On the approach of opposites, Forms `withdraw' and 
EvovTa `perish'. 
Style, then, can signify clear differentiation, as when distinguishing the three 
different kinds of entity or establishing the `withdraw or perish' option. However, 
the flexibility of aiTb Tö and, to a lesser extent, the stylistic similarities between this 
passage and the `argument from opposites', have also clearly shown particular words 
and structures to have a significance, which is not fixed, but context-dependent. So, 
Xöyoc seems to depend upon the particular structure and context of its individual 
elements and, in this respect, once again mirrors Socrates' account of reality. We 
have only to think, for example, of the equal sticks and stones at 74b8-9, or of the 
later `pseudo- causes', like Socrates' limbs, whose role varies with context (98c5ff. ). 
8.4 - Non-opposites and `essential' opposites: the `onomy' relationship 
Socrates has now made space for EvovTa, which come to be in particulars and cannot 
accept their opposites. So far, however, his examples have only explicitly involved 
the oppositional property-instances T6 µEyeOos and Tb QµLKp6v. Yet, given that 
soul is not an opposite (nor a property-instance), in order to demonstrate the 
relevance of EvovTa for the soul, he will need to show that they include non- 
opposites (and a wider range of substances). 
8.4.1 Non-opposites and `essential' opposites (103c7-el) 
This section introduces four distinct substances: fire, heat, snow, and cold. The 
question and answer 6epµöv TI KaXEis Kal LvXpöv; / EywyE (103c11-12) makes it 
clear that heat and cold, like the earlier large and small, are viewed as substances. 
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Although heat differs from fire and cold from snow (103d2-3), they are nevertheless 
connected so that snow will not accept the opposite of cold, heat, nor fire cold, but 
will `withdraw or perish' on their approach. Thus, although not spelt out explicitly, 
Socrates suggests that certain non-opposites (e. g. snow) are `essentially' linked to 
particular opposites (e. g. cold) insofar as the non-opposites (e. g. snow) will not 
receive the opposites (e. g. heat) of their 'essential' opposites (e. g. cold). 2 
At this stage it is not entirely clear exactly what type of entities Plato has in mind and 
commentators often see this uncertainty as extending throughout many of the 
subsequent examples in the `second sailing'. 3 Up to this point Socrates has 
discussed what we would call properties, as opposed to substances. When he then 
introduces fire and snow, they are sometimes taken to be Forms, but more commonly 
to be physical particulars, " seemingly on the assumption of a property/substance 
distinction. Given that property-instances in the `second-sailing' are clearly treated 
as substances, they can, however, be grouped along with fire and snow, as different 
kinds of Evov-ra. It is non-acceptance of opposites which distinguishes them from 
particulars. So it seems that fire and snow together with heat, cold, large and small, 
can at least be categorised as EvovTa, rather than particulars 45 
8.4.2 
. 
The `onomy' relationship (103e2-104c10) 
Socrates has made clear that certain non-opposites are connected with particular 
opposites so that the former will not accept the opposites of the latter. He then goes 
42 I will be using the term 'essential' without its usual philosophical implications, to denote this aspect 
of the relationship between certain opposite and non-opposite ? vovra. 
" Cf. O'Brien, 1967-8,202ff. Cf. Sedley, 1998,115: 'Plato does not in this context show the slightest 
interest in distinguishing between metaphysically different kinds of things'. 
" So e. g. Rowe, 1993a, 253, says that snow etc. must be either property-instances or Forms, but not 
particulars. Yet here and on the argument as a whole, the most common view appears to be that the 
'second sailing' concerns a mixture of entities and that, while three and oddness are Forms or 
property-instances, snow and fire etc. are physical particulars: e. g. Bostock, 1986,188, says that it 
concerns a mixture of 'forms', 'forms-in-something', and 'physical stuffs such as fire and snow'; 
Fine, 1987,95, suggests that a thing which 'brings along' an opposite 'can, but need not, be a Form'; 
Hackforth, 1955,162 especially n. 3; Frede, 1978,33-4; Hankinson, 1998,94. 
;s If we are trying to establish parallelism between e. g. fire and large, we might also ask whether there 
are Forms of fire and snow, just as are clearly posited of large and small (e. g. 102d6). The question of 
what phenomena have Forms is an important issue in Rep. X and Parm. 130ff. (see e. g. McCabe, 1994, 
79-80), though never firmly answered. In the Phaedo, it is left very open. Although instances when 
Forms are clearly at issue discuss only Forms of qualities (e. g. 65d4ff.; 78d3ff. ), Forms of physical 
substances such as snow are at no point precluded. 
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on to expand upon and clarify their relationship, describing it in terms of a shared 
6voµa. 
A certain thing's 6vop a is held not only by that thing itself, but also by a non- 
opposite which EXEL ... Trv 
EKE(vov µop4fv act (103e4-5). Socrates' first 
example involves the opposite odd (To irEpLTT6v) and three (r Tptac), although he 
soon brings in other odd numbers similarly related to TO TTEPLTT6V, as well as 
moving on to the relationship between even numbers and TO äPTLOV (103e6-104b5). 
Thus the relationship between a non-opposite and its `essential' opposite is `onomy', 
with the former always sharing the 6voµa of the latter. Each of the odd numbers is 
always trEpLTTÖ , each of the even always 
dpTLos, different though each is from TO 
TTEpLTT6v and Tb apTLOV. 
Socrates then adds that not only will opposites not accept their opposites, but also 
non-opposites will not accept the opposites of their `essential' opposites. Instead, 
non-opposites will `withdraw or perish' on their approach, so that three, for example, 
will not tolerate the presence of the even (104b6-c10). 
What type of entities have 8vouara? 
As I mentioned when discussing fire and snow, the question what type of entities are 
at issue here is controversial. I propose that `onomy' specifically characterises how 
related 9vov-ra inhere in particulars, and that it is this specific relationship between 
9vovTa which is being discussed throughout this section (103e2-104b10). 
Accordingly, I need to give reasons why EvovTa are the exclusive focus here, as 
opposed to the Forms and particulars which many commentators also take to be 
involved in this passage. 
First, why suppose that Plato is concerned here with 4votTa as opposed to Forms? 
The passage establishes the principle that certain non-opposites have `essential' 
opposites and will not accept the opposites of these. Even though Forms will not, as 
the earlier argument shows (e. g. 102dSff. ) accept their opposites, they are absolutely 
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pure, simple, and independent, 46 so that it would make little sense to talk of them 
having even an `essential' relationship with other Forms. The subsequent argument 
strengthens the case against a focus on Forms, as it becomes clear that the non- 
opposites and opposites under consideration actually enter and occupy particulars. 
If this is the case, however, one may well be puzzled by airrb Tb etSos (103e3), 
given that the airrb -rö terminology is perhaps most closely associated with Forms. 
Thus, O'Brien argues that µr} µbvov airrö Tb Eilios dýLo"vaOaL Toi) airroü 
övöµaTOs EIS* TOY äE. Xpövov (103e2-4) definitely refers to the Form, claiming 
that it corresponds to the earlier airrb Tb µEyeOos, which is clearly distinguished 
from Tb Ev 71µw thyEAos (102d6-8). However, as I showed above, the airrb T6 
terminology can elsewhere be taken clearly and significantly to include bvovTa 
(103b4-5), and cannot be seen exclusively to refer to Forms. 7 Likewise ¬l8os, 
which might also be understood specifically to denote Forms, has a range of 
meanings and does not necessarily exclude EvovTa 48 
Another apparent difficulty in this passage arises from the qualifications EIS' T6V 
del Xpövov and öTavrrep j in: 
µiß µWVOV avT6 Tb Et8oc äýLOÜVAai TOO airrov 6v6µaTo Ei. S TOY dEl 
Xp6vov, OX & Kat 6AX0 TL Ö EaTL ýLhV OÜK iKCLVO, 9XEL &TV 
EKELVOV µLOP hv ad, 8TavTrEp (103e2-5). 
0' Brien argues that ¬1s TÖv ad Xp6vov refers exclusively to airrb TÖ Etsos, 
while STavlrEp i is in opposition to this and applicable to dAXo TL... Since only 
Forms have permanence, 6T6 TO et8os at least must denote Forms 49 If the phrase 
46 Cf. McCabe, 1994,64: 'They (i. e. Forms] are.. . quite simple..., so that they 
have no properties at 
all. They are just "themselves by themselves", just one. " Even though O'Brien, 1967-8,209, has noticed this earlier broadened application of 6r6 T6 (see 
n. 4 1, above), he still maintains, without justification, that the term here refers unequivocally to Forms. 
48 For the varied meanings of elks see e. g. 73a2,76c12,79a6,98a2,100b4,106d6. Moreover, for 
example, in 102b1, where icZv cl. Mv certainly appears to refer to Forms, Ivovra have not yet been 
introduced into the account of causation at all, so that we cannot see it as a clear way of distinguishing 
Forms from Evov ra. Cf. Hackforth, 1955,150, who says that the phrase airrb Tb EtSoS refers to 
'immanent forms', even though 'it might seem natural' to take it as signifying 'transcendent forms'. 
He also cites 104c7 as an example where etSr1 clearly refers to 'immanent' and not 'transcendent' 
forms. 
49 O'Brien, 1967-8,213. 
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really is distinguishing between things which have their name `for all time' as 
opposed to those which share the gop(ýi of these, `whenever they exist', it is easy to 
see why the first part would be seen as referring to Forms. Yet, given that the 
examples which follow clearly show that the important distinction here is between 
`essential' opposite and related non-opposite, it seems highly unlikely that a 
Form/particular distinction would be invoked at this point. Furthermore, since 
Socrates subsequently suggests that not only is Tb rrEpLTT6v always (d¬t) said to 
have its name, but also other things which share this name (103e6-104a3), it does not 
appear that he is indicating a `persistence' based distinction between these pairs of 
entities. 
An alternative reading of 103e2-5 is available, and would support this view. If, as is 
quite natural, we take the whole of &ýLOD Oat TOD airroOv övöµaTOS etc Tbv d. ei 
Xpbvov as applicable to the subject in both parts of the antithesis, it would also refer 
to dXXo TI... Consequently, ets Tbv aEl Xpövov, far from precluding and being in 
opposition to öTavTrep j, would then appear actually to be compatible with it. 50 The 
phrase would then mean that both airrb Tb e1Sos and duo TI.. . always have the 
same övoµa, whenever they exist, a reading which fits in perfectly with opposite and 
non-opposite ZvovTa, since these have no permanent existence, being destroyed by 
the approach of their opposites. 
Along with airrö T6 El8os, other terms have also been construed as referring to 
Forms. Notably, O'Brien claims that here and elsewhere a singular noun, like t 
TPLdS, denotes the Form and plural numbers like Tä TETTapa the particulars s' 
However, even if linguistic usage varies between the two halves of this passage, the 
contrasting halves are actually so closely parallel that it seems highly unlikely that 
the second, ostensibly a demonstration of precisely the same principle as the first, 52 
should concern entirely different types of entity: 
IXX Sý. LWT O' TW 1TWT ITýOUKE Kat h TPL&T Kai h 1TEgTTT&T Kai. 6 
fl LLQUc TOD dPLe1io 'TTas, WATE 01)K WV ÖTTEP T6 TTEPLTTÖV de 
so Grammatically it is possible to take öTavlTep to refer collectively to the two neuter subjects 6T6 
TÖ etSoT and äO TL... 
11 O'Brien, 1967-8,218-219. Cf. Gallop, 1975,205-6, contra O'Brien. 
32 This is supported by the use of aü at the beginning of the second part. 
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9KaaTOS al1TCJV EQTL TTEPLTT6V Kat ati Tä &)O KCLI TiTTapa Kat aiTag 
b 9TEPOS ab UTLXOS TOD äpiO OD OÜK (r)V öTrEp TÖ apTLOV 84WS 
gKUQTOS abTLJV QPTLÖS EQTLV ad- (104a7-b4) 
This view is strengthened by the fact that the corresponding phrases 6 ijiiaus TO 
äpiOp. ov a'Tras and iiras 6 ZTepos at QT(Xoc suggest that two complementary 
sets of numbers are at issue. 53 
Hence it seems improbable that Forms are the focus here, and there are also good 
reasons for discounting particulars. aürrö T6 (103e3) immediately suggests that 
particulars are not at issue, a view supported by the fact that the non-opposites and 
their `essential' opposites clearly have fixed 6voµaTa, whereas particulars are 
characterised by their changeability54 and acceptance of compresent opposites, 55 
unlike substances sharing an ovoµa (104b6-c3). 
So given that, as I have shown above, there are also good reasons for supposing that 
the earlier parts of this *section are concerned solely with Evovvra, there seems to be 
no sufficient linguistic evidence here for seeing these lines as dealing with Forms or 
particulars rather than Evov-ra. 
8.4.3 " `Onomy' and `eponymy' 
This is the second description of a relationship between entities in linguistic terms 
within the `second sailing'. Socrates said earlier that particulars derive ktrwvvµdm 
from their Evovrra and participation in the Forms, 56 a very different relationship 
from that between entities sharing the same övoµa, which is exclusive to IvovTa. 
We can therefore distinguish between `eponymy'/`onomy': the former denotes the 
non-essential presence of Z 'ovTa within particulars; the latter the invariable 
relationship between non-opposite 9vovTa and their `essential' opposite IvovTa. 
53 O'Brien, 1967-8,218, does notice the parallel, but dismisses it, by saying that the linguistic 
distinction becomes 'firmer' as the argument continues. 54 See e. g. the description of sensibles at 79a9-10 as µr)SEtroTE KaT& Ta&rd. Cf. e. g. 80b4. 
ss See e. g. 102a6 and cl Iff and n. 34, above. 
56 See 103b7ff. and 102b3ff. respectively. See also p. 237, above. 
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As the argument continues, the `onomy' relationship will also help to establish a 
more expansive understanding of how Form-participation occurs. 
As far as I am aware, this `eponymy'/`onomy' distinction has not been discussed. 
Frede, one of the few who discuss `eponyms', says that the ` "eponymy" criterion' is 
found at both 103b8-9 and 103e, 57 failing to notice that the former deals with 
Errwvvµ(ai, the latter with ovoµaTa. She goes on to say that `eponymy' is ultimately 
insufficient because it does not distinguish between essential and accidental 
properties, 58 when, in fact, the unnoticed distinction between `onomy' and 
`eponymy' suggests a version of the essential/accidental opposition itself. 
ovoµaTa and ETrwvvµ(al are both types of predicate. Attributing ovoµaTa to an 
entity indicates fixed and permanent characteristics and relationships in Evov-ra, 
while Errwvvµ(al are the transitory names acquired by particulars. Yet the verbal 
structure of 6voµaTa and ETrwvvµ(aL is the same. The gvov three, for example, is 
odd (&M 1TEPLTT6$: 104b2), while the claim that Elµµ(av EWKpdTOUS ... tE(Cw 
elvaL (102b5) means that Simmias has the `Emrwvvµ(a' g yas. The significance of 
predication is therefore, as with other stylistic points, dependent on its context. For 
predicating an adjective of a particular noun could denote either an `essential' or a 
transient attribute. This ambiguity also goes beyond the verbal level, highlighting a 
possible confusion in how we understand actual entities. For seeing Simmias to be 
large, we might suppose this to be a quality he has essentially, by virtue of being 
Simmias, rather than having this quality through the presence of an Evov, large. 
Clarification of the ambiguity between predicates may then lead to a greater 
understanding of the entities they describe. 
8.5 Defining Zvovrra: structure and ambiguity (104c11-105b4) 
Having outlined the relationship between non-opposites and their `essential' 
opposites, insofar as the former will not tolerate the compresence of the latter, 
S7 Frede, 1978,37. Cf. Ooms Renard, 1999,135-40, who also claims that the same underlying 
'eponymy principle' is present both in 102b and 103e. 
58 Frede, 1978,37: 6 "Eponymy" as such is not sufficient, because. .. all things can be called after their 
properties, even if they are only accidental ones'. 
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Socrates now defines the kind of entities involved (104c11-12), and expands his 
explanation of how these interact with particulars. Strangely, the style can be seen to 
create some degree of confusion, given that the repetition of certain stylistic 
structures suggests a continuity and parallelism of meaning, while a coherent 
interpretation of the passage depends upon recognising that the significance of 
particular terms and phrases actually changes from line to line. This recognition can 
only be achieved through consideration of the structure as a whole. 
8.5.1 What kind of entities are at issue here 
At 104 cll Socrates asks povXEL oDv... SplvWµEOa btroia Tairra iUTlv;. 
Presumably, öiroLa Tairra refers to the final items of his previous point, dX' dTTa 
TAL EvaVT(a ObX tTO[LiVEI ETrLÖVTa, as opposed to Ta ELSA Tä bavT(a (104a7- 
9). Accordingly, he is apparently offering to define the non-opposite ? vovTa of the 
previous passage, which share the övoga of an `essential' opposite Ivov and will not 
accept its opposite, although not being opposites themselves. 
Socrates begins by explaining their function in relation to the particulars in which 
they come to be present: TdSE E111 äv, a ÖTL äv KaTävXT. 1 µßj µövov dllayKd(EI 
Thv airrov t&av airrb taXEuv, c XX z Kal EvavT(ov at Tw dE( TWOS (104d1- 
3) S9 This line contains several difficulties, as suggested by Cebes' tress VyELg;. 
Not only is there the question of tWEa's precise meaning, but the grammar is also 
unclear, and there has been considerable debate over which of 'a and ÖTL are subject 
and object of KaTdaX1. Either alternative is problematic. For although atroü 
appears to refer to the subject and airrö the object, both are singular, while bi 
suggests that one should be plural. 
ä seems to be the subject of KaTda , referring back to 
äff' dTTa in 104c8, the non- 
opposite E1871 which do not accept opposites. As long as we accept that airroü 
s' I follow the 1995 OCT in reading at rw (10443) rather than the main manuscripts' of r. On the 
implausibility of airrw see e. g Gallop, 1975,236; Rowe, 1993a, 256: 'The MS reading avTwL (0) is 
impossible; Robin's TWL (a TLvi) is the best available solution'. Moreover, at Tw is not an 
emendation, but a legitimate (re)interpretation of the inherited original, or putative original, sequence 
ATTOI, the (Byzantine) interpretation of which as avrw has no independent weight. 
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(104d2) refers to the subject of KaTdaX, 6° the apparent contrast between rv aßrrov 
t8Eav and Evavrr(ov at T) &EC Twos, which the subject of KaTday is said to 
bring (104d1-3), suggests that the subject of KaTdCTXT. l must be a non-opposite. This 
also suggests that LSEa, which describes an opposite at 104b9, is not restricted to 
opposites, but pertains to both opposites and non-opposites. Finally, it is not 
implausible that the subject could shift between plural (a) and singular (airrov), 
which would resolve the grammatical difficulty. 61 
One might then translate 104d5-7 as: `so, Cebes, would these be the kind of things 
which, whatever they [occupy], compel it not only to have their own form, but also 
(the form) of something opposite to something [i. e. an `essential' opposite]'. This 
would make sense of Socrates' next point, about f Twv TpL@V 16M (104d5-7). 
Here the previous point seems to have been condensed so that, rather than the ISEa 
coming from occupation by a non-opposite 9vov, the Wa itself now does the 
occupying. A comparison of both points suggests that, despite ambiguities in the 
precise sense of I&a and KaTEXELv, the crux is that occupation by a non-opposite 
Evov such as three means that the occupied particular will be occupied by both a 
non-opposite and its related `essential' opposite. 
Some of the stylistic parallels here therefore appear illusory or deceptive. For 
despite strong parallelism between 104d1-3 and 104d5-7, many of the verbal 
similarities are misleading, implying semantic similarity where there are, in fact, 
differences. We have already seen, for example, how the precise sense of t6ta 
wavers. Yet I5Ea is not alone. ä äv ij TwV Tpt V t&ta KaTdaX (104d5-6) is 
(104d1), suggesting a parallelism similar to the previous h öTL äv KaTdUXTI 
between the two instances. However, whereas at first, notwithstanding certain 
difficulties, ä seems to be the subject, grammar dictates that in the second phrase ä 
must be the object of KaTdaX1, since ý TCw TpUwv LS4a is obviously the subject. 62 
Thus, the non-opposite Evov'ra remains as the grammatical subject in both phrases. 
60 This view is widely accepted, by e. g. O'Brien, 1967-8,215-6; Gallop, 1975,202; Bostock, 1986, 
186; Rowe, 1993a, 256. They all offer reasons for rejecting the idea that 8TL is the subject and afrroü 
refers to the object of KaTäv3, as suggested by e. g. Hackforth, 1955,151. 
61 See e. g. Gallop, 1975,202, and Bostock, 1986,185-6. 
62 Cf. Kanayama, 2000,68-9 contra those who take ä at 104d1 and 5 as semantically parallel. 
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All in all, and, in spite of certain ambiguities, retaining the non-opposite 9vovTa as 
the subject of these lines allows an interpretation which is coherent both internally 
and in relation to the preceding and following sections. krimp äpTL A&yoµev 
(104d5) supports this reading, explicitly connecting these words with the passage 
where f Tp1ds and Tö TrEpLTT6V exemplified the `onomy' relationship between 
non-opposites and their `essential' opposite 9vovTa. This link is also suggested by 
the reappearance of µop4ý in Socrates' next remarks (104d10), a term used only here 
and in the first explanation of `onomy', where Socrates says that something (on my 
reading a non-opposite Evov) which shares another's 6voµa, even though different 
from it, has Ti V EKE(vov µop4r v d¬i (103e5). 
8.5.2 Clarifying the relationship between ivovra and particulars 
I now want to focus on two important points. The first is the way that a new 
`technical' sense is acquired by the a-privative form of adjective. Although the 
significance of this sense is not fully recognisable immediately (104e5), it will 
become important later in the argument. The second point is the clarification of the 
EvovTa/particulars relationship in this section's summary (104e7-105b3). 
ävapT! os apa ý TpLäs (104e5) concludes the arguments about i Twv TpLwv 
i&Ea, beginning at 104d5. Being an LVapTLov seems to involve the following: 
compelling the thing it occupies to be odd (10d5-6) and never accepting the t&a of 
the even. So when three is, in conclusion, described as divapTLoc, the. a-privative 
adjective appears to encapsulate the ideas that it brings its essential `opposite', the 
uneven, and will not allow the compresence of that negated by the a-privative. As I 
said above, this sense of a-privative terms will soon become significant. 
Socrates now gives his definition of what kind of things are non-opposites, but still 
do not accept opposites. Both in his recapitulation of the question and his answer 
(104d6-105a5) he says that non-opposites always `bring along with' them their 
opposites: ofov vüv fi TpLäs Tw äpTtw OUK otaa ivavTta ov&EV TI µäXXov 
airr6 [T6 EvavTtov] SEXETaL, T6 yäp ivavT(ov dd. airrw k1rL4 peL. The verb 
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Eiri4 peLV, introduced here, conveys the important aspects of the relationship 
between non-opposite and `essential' opposite Ivovra, and particulars. 
105a2-5 is a clear final summary, consistent with my interpretation of this section's 
earlier parts. Not only do opposites not accept their opposites (µßj µövov T6 
EvavTtov Tb EvavTtov µrß SEXea0ai), but also those things which bear opposites to 
whatever they approach (DML Kat EKEIVO, ö äV ilTU p71 TL EvavT(ov EKEivw, 
Eý' ÖTL äv d. urb irl). The bearer itself (airrb Tb ETrt4Epov) would never accept 
the opposite of the thing being borne [by it] (Týv TOD irrt4Epo t you ivaVTL6Tr1Ta 
I. LTISEITOTE SEýaaOai). A number of points are left unclear, like the precise 
relationship between the non-opposite and `essential' opposite ? vov and how exactly 
9vovTa come to be within particulars. Nevertheless, the conclusion clarifies the idea 
that non-opposite EvovTa bring `essential' opposite EvovTa to particulars and will not 
accept the presence of the latters' opposites. 
Gallop suggests that there is an absence of `systematic doctrine' here. 63 Certain 
terms do appear to vary in meaning, while others remain consistent, but with aspects 
of meaning left unclear. Nevertheless, on linguistic grounds it still seems possible to 
maintain that throughout this section the subject is gvovTa and to reach a consistent 
interpretation of the passage which is also compatible with its wider context. To do 
this, one must follow the structure closely, understanding terms and phrases only in 
relation to the other parts of the passage as a whole. While this may not yield a full 
elucidation of terms like KaTEXELv or Etri4Ep¬Lv, it still sheds light upon the crucial 
aspects of their meaning in the immediate context and also on their role within the 
passage as a whole. The structure of argument here therefore suggests another point 
about searching Ev X67oLT: the importance of overall coherence, rather than the 
fixed significance of individual elements, reflecting the same ideas about the 
necessity of coherence for an ordered universe found in the earlier `Anaxagoras 
episode'. 
63 Gallop, 1975,195-6. 
64 See Ch. 7 p. 206, above, and also 8.8.1, below. 
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8.6 `The subtler answer': a-privative terms and the proof that the soul is dOävaTo 
(105b5-el0) 
Having made various points about how EvovTa come to be present within particulars, 
Socrates now incorporates these into his `subtler answer'. Here, by relying on the 
special sense of a-privative terms first established in the preceding section, he is able 
to offer a proof that the soul is äOävaTos. This is one side of the proof Cebes earlier 
claimed to be necessary if one is to be justifiably confident when death approaches: 
Ö 65 TL EßTL #A lraVTdTraoLV d OdVaTÖV TE Kal avthxEApov (88b5-6) 
8.6.1 Why the answer is Kopoo-re'pos and `safe' (IOSbS-c7) 
In this section Socrates proposes a second account of `causation', his Koµ(JJoTipav 
(subtler) answer. This is the idea that the presence of a non-opposite within a 
particular brings about the presence of its essential opposite, just as fire brings about 
heat in a body. As is widely acknowledged, it seems strange that Socrates describes 
this answer as Kop45oTEpav, given that he has previously used that term pejoratively, 
when criticising the spurious causal entities posited by others to explain phenomena 
like the coming-into-being of two: T&T & QX(aELS Ta&ras Kai. -TrpoaOEQ¬Ls Kal 
Täs Mas Täs Tolairras icon ktac (101c7-8). It seems unlikely that Plato 
intends his Kop4ioTEpav answer as literally a `subtler answer' which displaces the 
earlier `safe' hypothesis. To solve the problem, both Rowe and Ooms-Renard 
suggest that it actually augments the original hypothesis, by supplementing the 
explanation of how Form-participation occurs, without adding extra entities in the 
manner of the physicists criticised by Socrates 66 
Kop oTEpav, then, can be taken to mean more complex, but not superior. The idea 
of complexity does link the 'subtler answer' to the other physicists, 67 although there 
are also clear differences. Hackforth understands KO. UJoTEpav as 'cleverer' without 
6$ Cf. Socrates' later recapitulation of Cebes' point: dýtotS inL8ELX"vaL fiµwv Týv ýuAv 
d: v6Xe6p6v TE Kai äOavaTov oüaav(95b9-cl). 
"Rowe, 1993,65ff. and Ooms-Renard, 1999,141ff. 
67 Cf. Ooms-Renard, 1999,142. 
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irony and claims that the account of causation is `carried a stage further' here 68 
However, although the `subtler answer' expands upon the explanation of Form- 
participation, there are no substantial reasons for taking it as a refinement or 
replacement theory of causation itself, and it seems more likely to be a derivative 
account of the phenomena which occur because of simple Form-participation 
causation. 69 The language is very different from that with which causation was 
clearly indicated in the `safe hypothesis'. As Ooms-Renard points out, aTT(a is not 
used in the `subtler answer', 70 and its last appearance in the `second sailing' is at 
101c4. Moreover, the `subtler answer' does not involve any of the formulations used 
earlier to signify causation '71 
but introduces a new and distinct expression: w all Ti 
& T(7) ac 1aTL E'Y'YEVijTaL eEPýLÖV EQTQL (105b8-9) 72 This simply suggests that 
the presence of something in a body means that another related thing will also be 
present, but does not state that the former causes the latter in the same clear way as 
the account of causation in the `safe hypothesis'. 
Yet one might also see Koµ46s as having a more precise sense than simple 
`expansion'. In the earlier `hypothesis' passage Koµ etas characterised the pseudo- 
causes of `wiser' people (101c6-9), who posit a multitude of different explanatory 
entities. By contrast, Socrates has a single account of causation (eis X6yos), based 
on a simple one-to-one mapping between Form and particular. Moreover, if we go 
back further, to the `Anaxagoras passage', one of the reasons Anaxagoras' `pseudo- 
causes' were criticised was because of their plurality. 73 
For Koµ jös to have connotations of plurality would make sense in the context of the 
`subtler answer'. For, while the single Xöyos of the `safe hypothesis' apparently 
depends upon a direct one-to-one relationship between its constituents, the `subtler 
68 Hackforth, 1955,158 and 161. Cf. e. g. Hankinson, 1998,94, who sees Plato's 'subtler causes' as 'a 
non-trivial account of causal explanation', as opposed to the 'charge of triviality' to which the safe 
cause is open; Bostock, 1986,184ff.; Vlastos, 1973,102ff. 
69 Cf. e. g. Gallop, 1975,211: 'the new answer does not supersede the old "safe" one in terms of 
Forms, but supplements it, by showing how a particular object comes to be occupied by the Form in 
question' ; Rowe, 1993b, 67. 
Ooms Renard, 1999,143. Even so, Kanayama, 2000, still refers to the entities discussed in the 
'subtler answer' as 'subtler aitiai' (see e. g. 69). 71 For a list of these see Sedley, 1998,115; and p. 232ff., above. 72 O'Brien, 1967-8,223, gives a good translation: '[what is it that], whatever things it comes to be in, 
in its body, the same thing will be hot'. 
73 See Ch. 7 p. 209, above. 
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answer' incorporates what could be seen in various respects as several Xö'yot. Most 
simply, it involves multiple principles, like the mutual exclusivity of opposite ? vovTa 
and how certain non-opposite EvovTa share an opposite's 6voµa. Furthermore, 
according to the `subtler answer', the presence of a number of non-opposite ova 
could be understood as explaining the presence of an opposite. For example, three, 
five, and other odd numbers, all lead to the presence of the odd (104a7-b2). The 
`subtler answer's dependence on a number of XöyoL could then be a reason for its 
description as Kop4JorEpav, since plurality is a characteristic it shares with the 
physicists' pseudo-causes. 
However, although this `secondary' account of `causation' derives from the primary 
direct Form/particular relationship which constitutes the real atT(a, there is, as 
Socrates says, a degree of `safety' in the `subtler answer': AEyw... & Tciv vüv 
XEyoµ. EVCwv äXXrIv bpGv daodXELav (105b6-8). For the `subtler answer' rests on 
the idea of `onomy', insofar as non-opposite Evov ra are connected with opposites in 
such a way that the presence of the former in a particular will invariably necessitate 
the presence of the latter. As commentators like Rowe and Fine have suggested, the 
'subtler answer's safety clearly does not derive from specifying "necessary" 
conditions for causation. For the odd's presence does not necessitate the presence of 
three, even though three "causes" the odd to be present. 74 Nevertheless, some 
'safety' still derives from the invariability of the `onomy' principle, because the 
`subtler answer' rules out causation of opposites by opposites. 75 In these ways, it is 
not, as Rowe and Fine suggest, liable to the same objections as the earlier 'pseudo- 
causes'. 76 
74 Rowe, 1993b, 66-7; Fine, 1987,97. Cf. also Gallop, 1975,21Off. 75 Cf. Kanayama, 2000,73ff. 
76 Rowe, 1993b, 66-7, claims that 'safe' must be ironic because several non-opposites can bring the 
same opposite and the method is therefore 'indistinguishable from the one which led to the puzzles of 
96-7'. Fine, 1987,97, goes further, proposing that the 'subtler answer' 'allows some explanations 
involving opposites', and citing Gallop's example of 'fever' and 'the opposite of fever - hypothermia' 
as able to explain illness. However, 'fever' in the 'subtler answer' passage is treated as a non- 
opposite which leads to an opposite, 'illness', so that this problem would not arise. Moreover, if 
'hypothermia' were also included in the passage it would probably be treated as another non-opposite, 
akin to 'fever', insofar as both entail the presence of 'illness'. 
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8.6.2 a -privative terms and why the soul is dOdvaroc (105c8-e10) 
The significance of the a- privative form 
At 104e5 Socrates concluded that the three is uneven (dvdpTLoc dpa t TpLd) in an 
argument which appears to imply that, if something is called divdpTLos, it will always 
bring the odd, its `essential' opposite, to whatever it occupies, and will never accept 
the compresence of the even, the opposite of its `essential opposite'. From various 
points above, we can also draw the further inference that, should the odd, the 
opposite of its `essential opposite', approach, the äväpTLOS thing will either 
`withdraw or perish' (e. g. 104c1). 
In this earlier section the only a-privative term is civdpTLos, describing the even. 
However from the `subtler answer' passage it emerges that certain properties are 
attributed not only to ävdpTLos, but to a-privatives in general. The first example 
here, divdpTLov (105d15), refers back to the earlier section. Yet the point is soon 
expanded to incorporate others: 
TÖ & S&KQLOV 111 6EX6p. EVOV Kür. Ö äV RLOVYLKÖV gh SEXETCLL; 
äµovQ0V, 9411, TÖ & d&IKOV. 
(105d16-el) 
This seems to imply that the earlier points about opposites and non-opposites applied 
to Tö dvdp-rtov are indeed true of a-privatives in general. Something which cannot 
accept the compresence of the opposite of its `essential' opposite (and, by 
implication, will `withdraw or perish' should this happen, and will also compel its 
`essential' opposite to be present in whatever it occupies), is known by a term formed 
from an a-privative and the adjective applied to the opposite of its `essential' 
opposite. For example, whatever is unable to accept the opposite Tö SLKaLov will be 
known by a term made up of the a-privative and SLKatoc, namely d&&KOS 77 
77 Cf. Gallop, 1975,215 and Kanayama, 2000,82: dVdp-nov, dSLKov, and äµouaov are simply terms 
given to `what does not admit the Form of the even/ the just/ the cultured'. Cf. also 83 on `the idiom 
of "a-G" ... [as introduced] to apply to what rings up the 
F and occupies other things'. While I am 
pleased to see that, in drawing attention to the special function of the a-privative form, I agree with 
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A novel usage 
So far a variety of linguistic structures have not only contributed to the structure of 
the argument, but have also represented different relationships between entities. 
Here, morphological phenomena, the recurrent a-privative compounds, take on such 
a role. Thus Plato seems to attribute a novel and specific sense not solely to a specific 
lexeme, but to a general lexemic form. Effectively, he is technicalising a linguistic 
form in a way crucial to the passage's argument. The attribution of this `technical' 
a-privative to adjectives from such varied lexical fields reflects how, for Socrates 
here, such diverse entities all fit into the same `causal' structure. 
Various features bring out the novelty and significance of this form. The general 
structure of 105dff., within which the a-privatives are systematised, is distinctive, 
without clear extant parallels, as I showed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, although 
strings of a-privatives are fairly common, especially in verse, 78 and Prier sees the 
79 cluster in Pannendes B8 as indicative of an `archaic' trend, there are no extant 
examples like the Phaedo's systematisation of this compound. Several of the a- 
privative lexemes here are either very rare or actually unique, to Plato within 
surviving literature, 80 so that he not only gives the form itself a new specialised 
sense, but is possibly even creating new lexemes to fit into this system. These are 
a#KTOs', dvdpTLos, and dOepp. os, all appearing only in this passage, as well as 
ävtXE6pos, which is extremely rare. 81 
Kanayama, the latest on the 'second sailing', there are many crucial differences between our 
understanding of this function. For example, Kanayama seems only to allow for Forms and 
particulars, seeing a-privative terms as referring to those things which cannot admit opposite Forms. 
He also suggests (82) that e. g. being dvdprtoc does not necessarily indicate that something is 'odd'. 
On my analysis, a term like dvdprtoc refers either to an essential opposite or to the non-opposites 
linked to it in an 'onomy' relationship, meaning that they will always be 'odd'. Moreover, our 
understanding of the final proof is very different. See n. 87, below. 
78 Cf. Ch. 5 p. 125, above. 
" Describing Parm B8., Prier, 1976,109, writes that 'these symbolic characteristics are all formed, 
except one, with the archaic alpha privative prefix'. 
8° See Ch. 4, p. 85, above. 81 Cf. Gallop, 1975,215: 'at 106a3-10'un-hot" and "un-coolable" translate words coined by Plato to 
parallel "im-mortal" '. 
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The specialised meaning of äväpTLO9, the first of the a-privatives used here, is made 
particularly prominent. The later examples (105dl3ff. ) feature the positive and 
negative form of the same stem, such as Tö SLKaLov/Tö d6LKov and 
µovaKLKWdM tovaov (105d13-el). By contrast, prior to the introduction of dvdpTLos 
at 104e5, the opposite of äpTLos is known as TTEp6TT69. So Socrates' switch to 
ävdpTtoc to conclude his points about EvovTa not accepting the compresence of 
opposite EvovTa might suggest that the a-privative form denotes more than the 
straightforward opposition conveyed by pairs such as TrEpLTT6S and dpTios. 
The soul is d0d aros 
The a-privative form signifies that the entity to which it is applied cannot accept the 
presence of that negated by the a. From the earlier sections, we can also infer that, 
when the latter approaches, the former will either `withdraw or perish'. Although the 
a-privative terms are based on opposition, they are also applicable to those non- 
opposites that bring `essential' opposites to particulars and do not accept the 
opposites of these (just as three is MpTloc)" So a term like ävdpTLos applies not 
only to the odd, but to all odd numbers: they are linked by an bvoµa. Thus, once it is 
accepted that the soul always brings life to a body (105d3-5), the transition to calling 
the soul aOavaTOS follows. 
On my analysis Socrates' conclusion that the soul is d0dvaTO9 implies that when the 
soul is present in a body life is also necessarily present and, accordingly, death 
cannot be admitted. Admittedly, the precise nature of the soul is not evident. 
However, this passage presents the soul's actions as at least closely analogous to 
EvovTa. For example, the soul is said to `occupy' (KaTEXELv) a thing and `bring' 
(Erri4Epu) life (105d3). This recalls 104d1-105a5, where KaTeXcty refers to an Lvov 
as present in a particular and Ems epw to how the presence of a non-opposite entails 
the presence of its connected opposite. 82 
82 Cf. Hackforth, 1955,162, on how this argument must be concerned with [immanent] forms: 'surely 
the use of the word KaTda in 105d3 is... conclusive;... it is inconceivable that it could mean there 
anything other than what it meant at 104d 1, namely the occupation of a subject by an immanent form'. 
However, I do not agree with Hackforth that soul is an 'immanent form'. 
Chapter 8 255 
Given the restricted sense of a-privative terms, this stage of the argument has only 
shown that if a body has a soul it will also have life and will not admit death without 
both the former either `withdrawing or perishing'. This all depends on the points 
established earlier, which dictate that the presence of certain non-opposite bvovTa in 
particulars means that `essential' opposite 9vovra will also be present, and that 
neither non-opposite nor opposite Evov-ra will admit 9vov-ra opposite to the latter, 
but will either `withdraw or perish'. 
So far, then, the `second-sailing' has satisfied the first of Cebes' demands, having 
provided a proof that the soul is äMävaTos. In addition, it has given a clearer 
indication both of how particulars take on characteristics, and of how life, death, and 
soul are related. However, the issue of `indestructibility', being ävtxEepos, has still 
not been mentioned, and there has certainly been no argument to show that the soul 
has this property. All Socrates has shown is that the soul will not remain in a body if 
death enters, but will 'withdraw or perish'. The very careful language in which this 
argument is established makes it clear that Socrates means no more than this when he 
talks about the soul being äOävaros. 
8.7 The soul as ävwXE6poc (105e11-107b10) 
Socrates now sets out to fulfil Cebes' second demand (88b5-6), by offering proof 
that the soul is ävaEOpos. The standard criticism of his argument here is that it 
depends on the question-begging assumption that being dedVaTos entails being 
dvcAE6pos, and actually offers no independent proof that the soul is dvc5XEepos. 
However, my understanding of a edvaTos derived from the preceding sections allows 
us to see the two terms as having significantly different meanings. Exploiting these 
two meanings, Plato is now able to offer a proof that the soul is d t. ' X Opoc, which is 
distinct from the proof that it is dOdvaTo , given 
in the previous section. 
8.7.1 The meaning of dntAEBpos and its distinctness from dOdvaroc 
At 105e11 Socrates embarks on a lengthy proof that the soul is dvctXeOpos. Yet he is 
often accused of taking dOävaTos to imply `indestructibility', in line with its 
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conventional sense, 83 allowing him simply to make the assumption that an dOävaTOs 
soul will also be dvwXeOpos, without adding any substantive new points. Yet, if one 
can show that the two terms have very distinct meanings here and that proofs are 
given not only for the soul being äOävaTOS but also ävWX¬Opos, it may be possible to 
dismiss such accusations. 
The usual solution seems to be to claim that, although both terms indeed convey 
indestructibility, there are nevertheless clear and important differences between the 
types or aspects of indestructibility that they signify. However, these readings run 
into difficulties, because of their insistence that dOdvaTOS conveys indestructibility 
and that, accordingly, OdvaTos refers to the destruction of the soul. 84 
By contrast, my earlier analysis points to an alternative understanding of dOävaTog, 
according to which, once present in a body, the soul (being dOdYaTos) precludes 
death's presence, and death will only be admitted if the soul `withdraws or 
perishes'. 85 In accordance with the sense of a-privative terms established through 
usage in the `second sailing', äeävaTos means only the inability to accept the 
compresence of death and carries no implication of indestructibility. Moreover, 
other aspects of the `subtler answer' passage also point towards such a conclusion. 
Socrates asks `what is it that, whatever body it comes to be in, that body will be 
e3 On this conventional sense see e. g. Gallop, 1982,208. 
84 A common suggestion is e. g. that edvaros refers to the soul's destruction on separation from the 
body, while Ueepos denotes some other type of destruction of the soul. Hackforth, 1955,163: 'the 
adjective d0dvaTov signifies no more than soul's immunity from that particular kind of extinction 
which might be supposed to befall it when it parts company with the body. The succeeding page 
(106a-c), in which it is argued that soul is dvwXApov (dSLdo6opov) as well as dOdvarov, starts from 
the implied assumption that there are other possible kinds of extinction'. Cf. e. g. Frede, 1978,30. 
Yet, as O'Brien, 1967,100-3, rightly objects, Socrates only seems to be concerned with the worry 
about whether destruction of the soul could occur on separation from the body (cf. 91d5-7). By 
contrast, O'Brien, 1967-8,100-3, suggests a permanence based distinction, with d0dvaTOS meaning 
that the soul survives separation from the body, while divtXe0poc means that this is 'always' the case. 
Yet he also adds that dv eepo ' here 'has no new content that would justify a fresh train of 
argument'. There is, however, no clear textual evidence for the permanence based distinction. 
Moreover, the idea that dv64epoc signifies 'always escapes destruction' as opposed to 'sometimes', 
seems very strange, if we consider Socrates' points at 105e11-c7, where he considers the possibility 
that e. g. Tb dvdprtov might be dvo ¬Opoc. For if O'Brien's idea is correct, in order to preserve the 
parallelism and inferential structure of the argument, it would seems necessary for terms like Tb 
avdpTLov and Tb dc VKTOV to convey some notion of 'indestructibility' as well. 
es Rostock, 1986,191, concedes that Socrates 'is perhaps aware that he is not using these words [i. e. 
dedvaTos and other a-privative terms] in quite their usual sense'. However, he takes to mean that 
'souls cannot die and still exist' and suggests that, in the d: vcXeOpoc point, dOdvaToS 'is taken in its 
usual sense'. 
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alive? ' (105c8), 86 to which Cebes replies `the soul'. Clearly, they are discussing how 
life arises in a body, not in a soul. Therefore, given that OdvaTo is introduced as 
the opposite to life, it appears that it likewise refers to the death of body, as opposed 
to the destruction of soul. If we take d0dvaTos purely to indicate that soul cannot be 
present in a body simultaneously with death, there will then be room for a very 
distinct meaning of ävtXE6poc. 87 
ävctXEOpos, just like ä6dvaTOS, appears to have a special sense, deriving from the 
understanding of `destruction' and `existence' established in the `second sailing'. In 
the `second sailing' Socrates has repeatedly pointed out that those entities which 
cannot accept the compresence of opposites (or opposites of `essential' opposites, in 
the case of non-opposites) will either `withdraw or perish', on the approach of these 
opposites. The term used for `perishing' is ärr6AXvµi, 88 so that being ävc6Xeepos 
seems to indicate a capacity for withdrawal from a particular and independent 
existence. For Evov-ra, entities which come to be present in particulars, being 
ävc3, XE6pos would mean surviving the approach of their opposite, having withdrawn 
from the particular. This is the crucial point behind the second stage of the 'subtler 
answer' argument (105e1Iff. ): that something dvtXE6poc will `withdraw' rather than 
`perish' when its opposite approaches the particular in which it is present. So, given 
that äOdvaTOS simply means that the soul and death can never be compresent in a 
body, Socrates clearly still needs to show that soul is äv6XEOpos, by proving that it (a 
86 Translation taken from O'Brien, 1967-8,225. 
87 Yet even Kanayama, 2000,84-5, who insists earlier that a-privative terms simply denote the non- 
acceptance of the negated opposite and that dOdvaros. accordingly means "not admitting death" (82, 
see my n. 77, above), ultimately moves away from this strict sense of 'death' and 'being dedvaios', 
back towards the more conventional account and, problematically, equates destruction with bodily 
death. Kanayama says that we cannot take ä9avaroS to imply indestructibility, not simply because 
Socrates has only so far shown that it means either 'withdrawing or perishing' when death enters a 
body, but because we are ignorant about death. He suggests that if, for example, Callicles' view of 
death as the loss of physical pleasure is correct, destruction can only come from this and not from 
bodily death. Kanayama can only entertain this view if he dismisses his earlier view that the soul 
being d0ävaros means it cannot accept death, since clearly a body which does not pursue physical 
pleasures (and is therefore 'dead' on Callicles view) can still have a soul. Pace Kanayama, it is very 
clear that 'death' in the 'second sailing' refers to bodily death. Accordingly, since it seems that 
Kanayama is thinking of bodily death as `destruction', once we have dismissed his suggestion that 
'death' could have other senses, he offers no real alternative to d9dvaToc. This much is clear in his 
final point, 'the question of why whatever is dedvaroc is indestructible boils down to the question 
why what always brings up life is indestructible', since dOdvaroc here refers precisely to just what 
'always brings up life'. 
ss dmo"ivaL (102e2); eLTrbXXuTraL (103a2); diroXetaOai (103d8); dttoXX6µeva (104cl). 
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non-opposite) will `withdraw' rather than `perish' when death (the opposite of its 
`essential' opposite) comes to a living body. 
This fits well with the presentation of individual points, such as: 
Et µßv Tä äOävaTOV itat ävwXE6p6v ivTLV, d&üvarov c VA, ÖTav 
OdvaToc ETr' abTr v ti , aTröXvaOat (106b2-3). 
Here dvtXEOpos evidently adds something different to dOdVaTOS. However, on the 
traditional reading, which takes OdvaTos as the soul's destruction, both terms will 
mean that the soul cannot be destroyed by death's approach, although the Greek 
suggests that only dvWXEOpoc should have this meaning. By contrast, if dOdvaTOS 
actually indicates only that something cannot be compresent with death, then the 
phrase makes sense, since dvwXE6pos adds that, on the approach of death, not only 
would a thing not remain, but it would `withdraw' and still exist. 
This understanding of dOdvaros and dv(AEOpos is also consistent with the points 
which Socrates makes about the other a-privative 9VOVTa (106d11-c8). Socrates 
says that OdvaTOV µiv yap Sr} EK TGJV' TTpOELpIII. iiVWV OU UýETai [i. e. ý Ov ] 
oü8' EQTai TEAvllK1ia... (106b3-4) and gives parallels such as three and odd not 
becoming even. In response to the imagined objection that the odd would simply be 
destroyed on the approach of the even (106b7-c2), Socrates then makes it clear that 
the a-privative does not imply indestructibility. For bvovTa like Td Tp(a and T6 
1TEp6TT6V may well be äväpTLa, but are not also indestructible: T6 yäp thId pTLov 
o)K dvdXEOpöv EaTLV (106c3-4). Equally, by implication, in the parallel case of 
soul, even if the point that soul and f ýwý are dOävaTos has already been 
demonstrated, their indestructibility (being ävoXEOpos) remains to be proven. This 
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makes sense of Socrates' next main point: 
oüKOVV Kal vüv Trepi TOO HavdTOV, EI µßv iµiv bµoXoyetTaL Kai 
dVWXEOPov ElvaL, Jv) äv Eire Trpös To dOävaTos EtvaL Kal 
dvtX¬Opos" el & µßj, dXXov äv BEÖL Xöyov (106c9-dl). 
When non-opposites and their `essential' opposite Evovrra are approached by their 
opposite, unable to tolerate its compresence, they will perish. This is the case for T6 
äväp-riov and, by implication for other sorts of EvovTa: crept Trvpbs Kai Oepµoü 
Kai TWV dXXu v ovrws &eµaX6µeOa (106c6-7). 89 If Socrates is to prove that the 
soul is ävc5X¬Opos he must show that, unlike these Evovra, it will `withdraw' and 
continue to exist, as opposed to perish, when death, the opposite of its `essential' 
opposite, comes to the body in which it is present. The soul, then, is dOdvaTOs. Yet 
this does not show that it is also äv6XcOpos, and Socrates will need a separate proof. 
A final point about ävw'X¬Opos is its distinctness from the other a-privative terms in 
the `second-sailing'. For the latter, this linguistic form indicates that, if the opposite 
EvovTa approach, the thing referred to by the a-privative will withdraw or perish 
(e. g. Tb äpTLov approaching T6 d. väpTLov). Yet it seems that ävw'XEOpos itself 
refers not to one of a pair of opposite EvovTa, but to a thing's ability to avoid the 
`perish' alternative. Another special feature, as compared with the other a- 
privatives, is that it is never used in isolation, but is always added to another a- 
privative. For example, there is its first appearance is in the protasis, ft TW dvapT(W 
dvayKaiov i'v dvwXEBpcp ETVQL, as a term potentially predicated of Tö dvdpTLOV. 
No other a-privative terms are predicated of each other and, indeed, it would make 
little sense if they were. For the fact that, foi example, three is dvdpTLOS indicates 
its connection with an `essential' opposite, the odd, whose opposite it cannot tolerate. 
Three simply is three and comes to a particular along with the odd. It would make 
little sense to suggest that it was also a#KTOS or dOeppos. It is only dvwxE6pos 
which could be added and represented as an additional property, added to other a- 
89 This is consistent with my view of the 'second sailing' from 103c7 as clearly concerned with 
i=vovra. For an Evov like the Three or the Odd the a-privative dvdpTLoc means that they will not be 
present in a body at the same time as Tb äpnov, but will 'withdraw' or 'perish'. Yet, Ivovra do not 
have separate existence outside of particulars and so are not dvoXeOpos. Hence the earlier point that 
Ivovra have certain dvöµara, Sravnep >'j (103e5). 
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privatives, since it connotes imperishability on the approach of an opposite and not 
the bringing of another bvov. 
8.7.2 The proof that the soul is dzx AEBpoc 
By 106d1 the difference between dedvaros and dvoXcOpos is clear. Up to now 
Socrates' points about soul rest on the similarities between it and IvovTa. However, 
to prove that the soul is th' XeOpos he will have to show the difference between 
them. 90 
Socrates introduces the very final stage by claiming that if Tb dOdvaTOV is also 
dvtXEOpov, this would be sufficient proof that the soul is dvWXE6pos. However, 
without this, dMov äv &o,. X6yov (106d1). Cebes simply replies that no further 
X6yos is needed, since T6 d0dvaTOV, being d(S&ov, could never admit `destruction' 
(4 Oopd). It is here that many commentators accuse Plato of appealing to the 
conventional understanding of aeavaTos and thus assuming it implies dvtXE6pos, 
without supplying further proof. As Bostock says: 
Cebes takes it to be just obvious [italics his] that whatever is immortal will also be 
imperishable; no fu ther argument is needed. ... 
That is obvious if the word "immortal" is 
taken in its usual sense. This is confirmed by the next line, where he adds that the immortal, 
"being everlasting", will surely not admit destruction. That is, he simply takes it for granted 
that the immortal is everlasting...! conclude that Plato has not in fact seen that further 
argument is required, because he too is taking the word "immortal' in its usual sense 91 
However, the fact that Cebes requires no further proof does not mean that Plato's 
Socrates or Plato himself shares this opinion. 92 For, although the argument so far 
does suggest that, if Tö dedVaTOV is also dv(AE6pov, so too must the soul be 
ävtAeOpos, it also clearly implies that this has not yet been proven. 93 
90 Cf. O'Brien, 1967-8,105. 
91 Bostock, 1986,191. 
92 Cf. e. g. Frede, 1978,31, who says that 'Socrates not simply accepts Cebes' assent that the deathless 
is indestructible, but... '. 
" Socrates nowhere implies that, within the 'second sailing' d6dvarog is being seen as either 
synonomous with or implying dviXeOpoc. It is true that no clear distinction is made between them by 
Cebes at 88b5-6 or by Socrates at 95c1, when he recapitulates Cebes' words, and it seems that Cebes 
may well see them as synonymous, an idea corroborated by the present passage (106d2-4). Yet this 
does not imply that Socrates or Plato have the same view (cf. Hackforth, 1955,100 n. 3, on dOdvaTov 
and dt XeOpov as 'used synonymously' at 88b, although he does not mention that Cebes is in fact 
speaking). O'Brien, 1967-8,98, sees Socrates' definition of death as iuAT 6Xeepos (91d. 7) as 
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So it seems that the proof that 6 eCOävaTOV is (IvtX¬Opov will be found in Socrates' 
next comments: 
b 6E ye 6e6s otµat, 94rß 6 EwKpd7S, Kal airrö Tö Tfs Ccis ethos 
icai EL TL äAXo dOdvaT6v taTwv, rrapä Trat wv av bµoXoygeEcn 
g7jUITOTE ürr6XXuoOaL (106d5-7). 
The challenge remains to find a way of showing how the 66s point proves the 
soul's indestructibility without simply deriving this from its being dedvaTO9 (as 
d0dvaTos is used here), 94 and without assuming that an appeal to religion is 
necessarily independent of argument 95 
Let us accept, once and for all: deavaTOS, as used by Socrates within this argument, 
refers simply to that which does not allow the compresence of death; with no 
implication of indestructibility. If, however, there is something else which, like the 
soul, is äOdvaTos (in the sense in which the word is used in the `second sailing'), 
and also ava)xE6pos, this will show that being dedvaros implies being dv6XEOpos. 
It is here that Socrates suggests that 6 OE6s is both aedVaTOS and dv6XeOpos. 
One might object that simply showing the existence of something both dOdvaTOv 
and dv6X¬Opov is not enough to prove a necessary connection between the two, by 
which all äOdvaTa would also be c vcAcepa. However a-privative terms, as used in 
understood throughout the 'second sailing'. However, at this point Socrates is actually summarising 
Cebes' concerns and presents this definition as a point to be refuted, rather than his own belief. Here, 
I am in agreement with Kanayama, 2000,82, who points out Plato's very explicit distinction between 
the two terms'. 
" In an effort to 'save' the argument there have been various attempts to show that the appeal to 6 
6e6s and T6 Tijs CWf1S etSos makes a substantive contribution to the argument at this point. Frede, 
1978,31-2 for example, sees the significance as their common characteristic of being 'essentially 
alive'. Clearly, as Frede suggests, Socrates is making a point about their common essential 
indestructibility. Her view relies upon the idea that it is the soul's essential 'deathlessness' which 
implies 'indestructibility', because 'destruction for a living being is its loss of life' (she claims that 
this is true for any living being). However, the resultant identification of dOdvaTOS with dvCXEOpos 
leads to the problems discussed above and still leaves Plato guilty of the 'obvious mistake' from 
which she is trying to exonerate him: 'assuming that deathlessness-indestructibility-everlastingness'. 
9S Some older commentaries suggest that this 'appeal to religious faith' represents a departure from 
'argument': e. g. Taylor, 1926,206. Cf. Hackforth, 1955,164: 'it may be that beneath the surface 
there is an appeal to religious faith'. He does, however, see this 'appeal' beginning with Cebes' use of 
di&ov. 
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the `second-sailing' indicate not just that an entity has a certain property, but give its 
key characteristic, in virtue of which it is either indestructible or perishable, given 
that only the approach of the negated term could bring about its destruction. So if the 
gods cannot be destroyed it is because death cannot destroy them and they are 
indestructible in virtue of being aedvaTOS. Hence, we can infer that being 
dOdvaTOs implies dvthXe6pos. 96 
The relevance of the `affinity argument' 
Socrates' justification here comes from the earlier `affinity argument'. There, he 
posited `two types of being, the visible and invisible' (79a6-7), the latter being 
unchangeable, indestructible, and divine, and comprising god(s) and the Forms (see 
e. g. 80b1-3). Clearly, it is the latter type which could be described as dv(LWpos. 
One might suppose that this, in itself, stands as an argument that the soul is 
ävwXE6poS, since it is this type to which the soul is most similar. Moreover, Socrates 
also describes `invisible' being as d6dvaTO9 (e. g. 79d2 and 80b1). 97 However, there 
are various reasons why it is only the indestructibility of T6 6eiov in the `affinity 
argument' which directly supports the soul's indestructibility. 
Why then, can Socrates not simply infer the soul's indestructibility from the 
indestructibility of the Forms in this passage? It may well be the case that, within the 
`affinity argument', which distinguishes two types of being and does not mention 
IvovTa, the soul is `most like' the Forms (80a10-b3). In the `second-sailing', 
however, up until the dIc XEOpos point, it is 9vov-ra to which the soul seems most 
similar, with no apparent grounds for assuming that the soul does not, just like 
gvov-ra, admit destruction. In other words, although the soul might resemble the 
Forms in such respects as purity, it could be more like 4vovTa in an incapacity for 
independent existence. 
96 To put it another way, one might add that, if ib dOdvaTSv is dv646pov, this can only be in virtue 
of being aOavaTov, because it would not make sense to predicate any other d-privative terms of it, in 
virtue of which it could be either destructible or indestructible (we would not say that soul was e. g. 
eLVdpTLOT). 
97 E. g. 79d2 and 80b1, where he describes the 'invisible' as TW ov OeL Kai deavdTq Kal wirr 
Kal ILOVOELSEI Kai d8LaX& ) Kal del 41QaOTU)T KaTfl TafrrC lxovTL Maur i. 
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Furthermore, dOdvaTos is used in two different senses in the `affinity' and 'final' 
arguments, and we cannot infer from the description of the indestructible `invisible 
being' as aOdvaTos in the former that dOdvaTO9 in the latter also implies 
indestructibility. In the `affinity' argument aedvaTOs appears to be connected with 
permanence and indestructibility: äd öv Kal e Odvarov Kal taairrws ? Xov 
(79d2). 98 In the `second sailing' it implies nothing about permanent existence. 9 
Since Socrates presents not only Forms but also T6 Oetov as unchangeable and 
permanent in the `affinity' argument, it seems safe to assume the indestructibility of 
5 OeLos. There are reasons why the indestructibility of 6 Oeios in the `affinity 
argument' can be seen as relevant to the soul in a way that the Forms are not. 100 
Most importantly, it can be assumed that, for Plato, 6 OEios, like the soul, is also 
äOävaTos in the `second sailing' sense, given that a defining feature of the gods, 
often referred to as of d0dvaToL, 101 is that they do not accept death, in opposition to 
mortals. '°2 
So god and soul both seem essentially äOdvaros, insofar as neither can tolerate the 
compresence of death. In the case of God Tb äOdvaTov, as the word is used in the 
`second sailing', is also äv6XEOpov. From this it can be inferred that the same can be 
said of the soul. Thus, the affinity argument shows that things like Forms and the 
gods do not perish. The `second sailing' shows why death must constitute the 
separation of the soul from the body; connects the `essential' deathlessness of souls 
with that of the gods; and therefore, through the implicit assumption of the `affinity' 
argument's claim that the gods are indestructible, can also posit that `essential' 
98 Cf. Gallop, 1982,208. 
99 It would make no sense to call Forms dedvaTOs in this way. For this would signify that they 
cannot be present along with death. Yet Forms are entirely independent of all other entities. 
10° O'Brien, 1967-8, claims that the 'indestructibility of souls in the last argument differs from the 
indestructibility of forms as it were genetically' and is unrelated to the 'rich complex of ideas' 
associated with forms in the 'affinity argument'. Although I share his view that the indestructibility of 
Forms in the 'affinity' argument does not prove the soul's indestructibility, contra O'Brien I propose 
that the 'affinity argument' model of indestructibility is, by means of 6 0eioS, associated with soul in 
the 'final' argument. 
101 Cf. Rowe, 1993a, 263: 'standardly, of Ocot = of ddOdvaTOi'. 
102 See e. g. the 'affinity' argument, where T6 6etov is opposed to T6 6vrly6v (80a3 and 8-9) and T6 
dLOpüiTrLvov (80b1-3). 
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deathlessness implies indestructibility. Taken together, then, they offer the proof that 
the soul is both MdvaTos and eLvtXe6pos. 103 
Finally, what of the relationship of the soul to the Forms? In some respects the soul 
seems to have similarities with the EvovTa, insofar as it comes to be present in 
particulars, along with life, whose 6vo is it shares and whose opposite, death, it will 
not accept. However, the soul is not destroyed by being uninstantiated in the body, a 
feature which distances it from the Evovra and brings it closer to the Forms 
themselves. O'Brien sees it as a `dilemma' that the `conclusion' (i. e. the proof that 
the soul is dvWX¬Opoc) rests on establishing the soul's difference from the bvovra to 
which it has been linked in the previous arguments. 104 However, the two sides to the 
soul which emerge from the different stages of the argument are not inconsistent and 
simply reflect its mixed nature. Given the characteristics of souls, shown by the 
different stages within this argument, this mixed nature should hardly be 
surprising. '05 
8.8 What is X yos? 
In the `misology' passage (89c11-91a6) Socrates suggests that XöyoL can be true. ' 06 
At the beginning of the `second sailing', he then says that he will use Xßyoi. to seek 
the truth about reality, a method no more indirect than using Ipya (99e4-100a3). 
One of my aims in this chapter has been to consider what is meant by searching & 
Xbyois, and so to establish the meaning of XdyoL, explaining how they can convey 
the truth and why they are so central to the `second-sailing'. 
Our consideration of how language and style represent the beliefs and arguments 
expressed in the `second sailing' has given some indication of what constitutes Xöyos 
103 Of course, one might argue that the question is now why we should accept the affinity argument as 
proof of the god's indestructibility. However, even if we still have an explanatory circle, now that it 
has been broadened to incorporate the principles of the 'affinity' argument, we might at least hope that 
there is sufficient material for it to be large rather than vicious. 104 O'Brien, 1967-8,106. 
pos Cf. Bostock, 1986,188-9: 'No doubt it [i. e. the soul] is intended to be something invisible and 
incorporeal like a form, but also something that is a particular individual [italics mine] like a lump of 
snow'. 
106 See 90b8; c9; d9ff. 
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and how different aspects of this X6yos can be seen to reflect Socrates' 
understanding of reality. In effect, we already have some ideas as to why Socrates 
might see inquiring Ev Xöyois as presenting an account of reality and (therefore) as 
methodologically sound. By bringing together the separate points, we can now reach 
a more general picture of what is involved in the use of XdToL. 
8.8.1 . ld yoc and consistency 
One of the standard senses attributed to X6yos by Socrates is, of course words: the 
very words in which something is expressed; and the importance of verbal features in 
the `second sailing' is highlighted, for example, by the way that key relationships are 
indicated with `naming' terminology, övoµa or iirwvvµta, and the way that the a- 
privative noun form takes on a special sense. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the mirroring of reality by the Xdyos derives from 
more than a particular sense of individual words and phrases. From the very outset 
of the 'second-sailing' Socrates shows the necessity for caution about language, 
pointing out that it can be deceptive: 5µoXoy¬is T6 TOY ZL 4L(aV &TrEPýXELV 
2: WKpdTouc 01J, ß' 6S* rotc /5Tj laut Ae'yerat OÜTW Kal TÖ &MIRs 9XEIV; (102b8- 
CIO). 
That individual words, phrases, or structures themselves do not refer in a fixed way 
to reality is also suggested in other ways, for instance through the many verbal 
ambiguities within the `second sailing'. 107 1 have already discussed the flexibility in 
meaning of the airrö TO formulation, and to this one could add the case of 
aedvaTo 
, used very differently here from its earlier more `conventional' sense 
in 
the `affinity argument'. Other important terms also have this element of 
multivocity. '°8 
107 In seeing the language as functioning in this way, my argument runs contrary to Vlastos, 1973, 
109, who laments the lack of 'lucidity' which Plato could have achieved, 'had he availed himself, as 
Aristotle was to do, of the expository device of philosophical lexicography'! 
108 E. g. Socrates criticises the dVTLXOyLKOL for talking about the dp !' and Tä it IKEivr1S 
epicrp4 wv (101e2-3), despite having described his own enterprise in the 'second sailing' with 
cognates of these very terms: dX' oüv Sh TafTrl ye &ipuri a (100a3) and Kai. EtµL ITdXLV In 
EKELVa TQ TToXvep XTiTa Kai. dPXO1ae dTr iKEtvcV (100b4-5). Thus, for Socrates, rather than 
actual beginnings, the terms seem to denote first principles and deduction within intellectual inquiry. 
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Conversely, Socrates' use of `synonymy' also suggests that individual words, 
phrases, or formulations, do not constitute Xöyos. This is particularly clear in the 
discussion of the `safe hypothesis' where, although varied formulations express a 
single principle, Socrates implies that this is to be seen not only as a single tiroeeats, 
but also as Eis Xöyos (101e4). 
So it seems that XöyoL are something to do with overall verbal structure and the way 
that particular features fit into the whole, rather than simply words considered 
individually. Throughout the `second sailing' it is the passage's stylistic structure 
which holds the key to its understanding, but only when taken as a coherent whole. 
The idea that reasoning in XöyoLc depends on how elements fit together suggests 
that true XöyoL will be consistent, a view supported by several instances where 
methodological points about argument are explicitly made in terms of X yoi. For 
example, one reason why (Socrates claims) Simmias' Xöyos that soul is `harmony' 
must be rejected is that it does not `harmonise' with the `recollection argument', 
already accepted as true (91e5-92a5): 
ODTOs O, N aOL 6 AÖy'oc EKEdVW TTGJs ovuifo rat; 
ov8aµws, E4 ii, 6 ZLµµias. 
Kai [. LT V, ' s' 5s, 7TpETrEL "YE E11TEp TW 04 A6 'CJ Qvv<o&- 
EtvaL Kai To TrEpi. äpµovtas (92c3-6) 
Similarly, at the beginning of the `second sailing' Socrates will take as true those 
things which are consistent (au t4wveiv) with the strongest X6yos (100a4-5), while 
in the `hypothesis' passage he advocates examining whether the consequences which 
are posited of a hypothesis are consistent with each other, et aot d X1XoiS 
QuµýwvEL ý 8&a4wvet (101d5-6), and seems to suggest that, if they are, there will 
be a single X6yoc. 109 
109 Cf. Kanayama, 2000,64, on avµ4Xvety as indicating consistency. But e. g. Gentzler, 1991,266, 
objects to the 'consistency' reading here, insofar as consistency does not per se imply truth. However, 
as I shall argue below, there are reasons why Socrates might take the consistency of X6yoL here as 
providing a reason for seeing them as true. 
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If true XöyoL are consistent and false inconsistent, this cannot vary by degree, since 
even the smallest degree of inconsistency means that, as a whole, there is no 
consistency. This could then explain why, in the `misology' passage, Socrates points 
out that, whereas very few men are either extremely good or bad, this is not the case 
for X6yoL (90b4-5). This implies that the majority of (or even all) X yoL are at one 
or other of these extremes, '10 a view which fits in with the `consistency' reading of 
Xöyos. 
Furthermore, Socrates presents the argument as conclusive (106e8-107a1), endorsing 
Cebes' suggestion that it is sufficient and correct, OtKOVV ZyWye... IXW trapä 
TQÜTa aXXO TL MyELV of & iri UU TrLUTEIV TOLS XÖyOLs (107a2-3). He responds 
to Simmias' concerns by telling him that, if he follows through the first hypotheses 
sufficiently, he will follow the Xöyos as far as humanly possible and will be fully 
satisfied (107b4-9). tll This is the only place in the Phaedo where Socrates suggests 
that an argument is fully satisfactory. 112 Yet, he leaves us to draw our understanding 
of how it achieves this status from the passage itself. 
The consistency required of correct XöyoL is also reflected in the general style of the 
`second sailing', insofar as many individual features are used in so novel or 
changeable a way that understanding depends upon piecing together a consistent 
interpretation of all the elements. Yet the coherence and consistency of the 'second 
sailing' extends beyond its immediate context. At the end of Chapter 6, I suggested 
that a comparison of Socrates 'apology' and the `argument from opposites' in their 
wider context indicates that arguments should establish and take account of, not only 
the underlying structure and principles of processes, but also the qualities of the 
entities which such processes involve. It seems that here, in the `second sailing', 
these two elements are finally brought together into one coherent whole. For in a 
style which can be broadly termed 'verbal minimalism' it lays out the structure of 
causation, but its interpretation also depends upon understanding the qualities of the 
110 This is corroborated by the way that X&yoL are depicted as either true or false (90b8). Socrates is 
doing more than `hinting' that there are many bad XdyoL, as Hackforth, 1955,107, suggests. 
1 
Cf. Frede, 1978,27. 
12 Cf. e. g. Sedley, 1995,17, on the cogency of the final argument. 
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entities involved, if we are to demarcate their roles within this process and their 
interrelationships. 
As is suggested by Socrates' initial intention to look for T11V Twv 6vTwv dXý&Lav 
with X67oL (99e6) and by his final endorsement of the `second sailing' as conclusive 
and satisfactory (106e8-107b9), it seems that true X6yoL do reflect Socrates' beliefs 
about reality. They do this through the verbal structure of argument and the 
consistency of a correct X6yoc. 
Although this understanding of Xöyos is to a certain extent based upon its 
conventional meaning combined with certain explicit comments concerning Xöyos, it 
is chiefly constructed by the language and style of the `second sailing', and the way 
that the cohesion of its overall structure, both internally and in its relation to other 
parts of the dialogue, holds the key to its interpretation. The 'second sailing' clearly 
shows the significance of style for the interpretation of its arguments, and 
demonstrates the importance of reading the dialogue holistically. 
8.9 Teleology 
In the `intellectual autobiography' Socrates criticises Anaxagoras because his vo"vs- 
based theory of causation is not teleological. His criticism then extends to other 
physicists, insofar as the causes they posit bear no relation to `the good' (99c1-7). 
Yet, as I have discussed in Chapter 7, the issue of teleology seems to disappear after 
this episode in a way which commentators have found extremely puzzling. There 
are, however, ways in which one might see the issue of teleology as present in the 
`second sailing', the first stemming from points made in the `apology', the second 
from the ideas about order, rationality, and normativity, suggested by the 
`Anaxagoras episode'. 
From the `apology' it appears that normativity is attributed to the qualities: purity; 
uniqueness; comprehensiveness; distinctness; simplicity; and singularity. 
113 These 
emerge as valuable both per se and epistemologically, and so may provide a reason 
113 See Ch. 6 p. 159, above. 
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for seeing `the good' as implicitly involved in the `second sailing'. After all, it is the 
uniqueness of the Forms which provides the basis for the `second sailing' as a whole, 
and the simplicity of the Form/particular relationship which is reflected in the style 
of the formulations of the `safe hypothesis'. This simplicity is most visible in the 
phrase Socrates uses to express that which he asserts with certainty, To KaX4 lIdvTa 
Tä KaM KaXd (100d7-8), where the principle is reduced to its most basic and 
simple linguistic formulation. No other terms intrude into the description of the 
direct and unique relationship between matching Form, particulars and resultant 
property, except for 1rävTa, which stresses that the principle is true for all particulars. 
Even when the argument moves on to the `subtler answer', it still relies on the 
simplicity, distinctness, and unchangeability of Forms, reflected in the incapacity of 
their derivative Evovra to be compresent with their opposites. 
In the criticism of Anaxagoras, Socrates gives an explanation of what a voüs-based 
account of cosmological causation should look like. The teleology implied by 
KoaµEo is reflected in the characteristics of a vows-based system, based on universal 
coherence, covering all aspects of existence, activity, or passivity (97c6-dl). 
Individual elements have significance in terms of their place within the system as a 
whole and the way they help to expand upon connections between the other 
elements, while there are also certain self-evident foundational premises. Socrates 
states that such a causal account would, for him, be a sufficient explanation of 
generation and destruction (98a1-2) and, in many ways, these features correspond to 
the concept of rationality developed within the overall argumentation of the Phaedo, 
especially in the `second sailing'. For the `second sailing' presents an entirely 
coherent system, which covers all ontological types and whose components make 
sense in the way in which they fit together. The foundational premise on which the 
argument is based, and which is simply accepted, is the existence of the Forms. 
Moreover, it is also striking that the `second sailing' is the only argument in the 
Phaedo which Socrates explicitly describes as adequate (106b), even though he has 
earlier presented the imagined vows-based teleological account as satisfactory. 
Yet, even if the consistency of the `second sailing' resembles the teleological vo"vs- 
based theory of causation anticipated in the `Anaxagoras episode, the normativity of 
the latter account explicitly relies not only upon the consistency of the whole, but 
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also on the individual and common good of its elements. These factors are 
ostensibly missing from the `second sailing' and one might well argue that 
consistency does not in itself imply normativity. However, one of Socrates' earlier 
comments, at the close of the `Anaxagoras episode' (99c3-5), suggests that a causal 
account can only be consistent, if it is teleological. He criticises those who hyovvTaL 
TOUTOU WATXaVTa dv TTOTE taXUPÖTEPOV Kai dOavaTWTEpOV Kai µdXXov 
thraVTa QUVEXOVTa EýEUPEIV, Kal WS dMIM9 Tb d. yaOOv Kai. 6 ov QUVSEIv 
Kal UUVE)(ELV of &v oLovTaL. The clear implication is that the good is necessary 
for universal coherence. 114 Therefore, given that the `second sailing' provides a 
satisfactory and consistent account of causation, one might infer that there must be 
an underlying element of teleology in it, and that it is the consistency of the Xöyos 
which leads not only to its epistemological legitimacy, but also to its normativity. 
This would then provide a reason for seeing the theory of causation outlined in the 
`second sailing' as teleological, on the basis of its claim to consistency and 
simplicity, even without explicit reference to value. 
115 
114 Cf. Ch. 7 p209., above. 's Cf. Kanayama, 2000,99, for an alternative account of why the 'second sailing' might be 
teleological. 
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Conclusion 
As modern readers of Plato, it is difficult for us to appreciate fully the stylistic 
diversity, complexity, and innovation within the Phaedo. To do so, we need to move 
beyond translation, going back to the Greek and paying attention to its structure, sound, 
and variety; trying to understand, as far as possible, the dialogue's literary context, so 
as to recognise the extent of both its indebtedness and originality. My primary aims in 
this thesis have been, quite simply, to show that this is a worthwhile and even necessary 
part of interpreting the Phaedo, by demonstrating the significance of style for its 
arguments. 
Although I have only discussed certain parts of the Phaedo, it seems sufficiently clear 
that taking style into account can help towards our understanding of individual sections, 
both in themselves and their relationships with each other, and can point us towards a 
more holistic reading of the dialogue. Stylistic analysis provides a means of 
understanding disparate sections on the same terms and, accordingly, helps to reveals 
their connections. Yet it can only do so if the methodology and terms of reference 
employed are adequate for the task. 
I have aimed to produce a methodology that is sufficiently sophisticated and 
comprehensive to deal with all modes of discourse within the Phaedo, including several 
features which play no substantial part in conventional stylistic analysis, such as the 
many structural phenomena that are so important within my interpretation. Often it is 
these which have yielded the most interesting results. Similarly, in my discussions of 
generic affiliations, I have treated all genres as relevant. In many cases it is Plato's use 
of genres usually ignored or treated separately- from wider stylistic investigations, such 
as early philosophical writing, which has once again produced some of the most 
significant conclusions. 
In broader terms, I have tried to develop a methodology and approach which could be 
of use in examining wider questions concerning the role of style in philosophical 
discourse. Inevitably, my thesis has simply scratched at the surface. Nevertheless, I 
hope that it has at least paved the way for further investigation of the Phaedo itself; 
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Platonic works in general; and other philosophers, especially 'hybrid' writers like 
Lucretius and Nietzsche, but perhaps even those whose style is more `conventional'. 
Thus, it might facilitate a more general systematisation of how style functions within 
philosophical argument. 
As readers of Plato, we must surely be struck by his stylistic mastery, even if we cannot 
fully appreciate it. What I have tried to do is to offer an approach which recognises the 
philosophical significance of style and so begins to move towards establishing what 
might be called a `poetics' of argument. 
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Appendix I 




R (j) - juxtaposition repetition 
R (s) - successive clause or unit repetition 
R (r) - ring composition 
R (k) - key-word repetition 
P1- pleonasm 
SE - sound effect used as a parallel structure 
Passage I 
avTrl ji 6pOrj rrpas äpETTv äXXayrj +, EKEtVO µövov Tb vöµLQµa 6p66v 
69a6/I. 1 + 69a9/I. 4: P; R (s); SE 
i 6ovds irp6g f 6ovds 69a711.2: P; R (j); SE 
X&Tras Trp6T XiTras 69a7/I. 2: P; R (j); SE 
460ov lrp6T 46ßov 69a8/I. 3: P; R (j); SE 
. LECCW lTpös EXäTTW 69a8/1.3: P 
Kal TOVTOV [p. b TTCNTa] Kat IIETC TOÜTOU (69b1/I. 6): P; R 0); SE 
Wvovµevä TE Kai, TLplrpaQKöµeva 69b111.6: P; SE 
RCT6 4povrjaEws + XwpLC6µeva & 4povr aEws 69b3/I. 8 + 69b6/I. 11: P; Rep (s) 
Kal TrpoayLyvoµEVwv Kd a royLyvo. t vwv 69b4/I. 9: P; SE 
XwpiC6ivva & 4povi a¬WT Kai QXXaTT6p. ¬va dvTt (Mi Xwv 69b6/1.11: P 
oü&v vyiýs ova' etXi18 s E}m 69b8. /I. 13: P; P1 
Tb S' dXT)eig To 6VTL 69b8. /I. 13: P; P1 
%L J TOS Kai dTEXEQTOg 69c5/1.18: P; P1; SE 
KEKaeapgV09 TE Kai TETEXEaýLEVOS 69c6/1.19: P; P1; SE 
KaTd 'yE TÖ 8UVaT6v ob&v d1TEÄL170V EV TW PIQ dX C TTaVTI Tp6Trc 
. rrpovft uL 'v 69d3/1.24: P; P1 
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6pOws npouOvµ71071V Kat TL ijvvQapev 69d511.25: P; P1 
ELµµta TE Kai KE3rs 69d711.28: P 
oü XaX¬rn 4Epw ov8' (iyavaKTw 69e1/I. 30: P; P1 
EKEL OÜ&V fjTTOV Tý EVed&E 69e2/I. 31: P 
&EQTrOTaLs TE dyae06$' EVTEÜýEaOaL Kal ETatpoL$ 69e2I. 31: P 
b[AV TrLAavc TEp6 ELI.. LL EV rlj alToXOytc f1 TOL$ 'AArjvatwv 6LKaaTais 
69e3/I. 32: P 
ý6oväs Trpbs n8oväs Kat Xmas rrpös Xirnas Kat ý6ßov TTpbs 460ov 69a7/1.2- 
L; SE 
Kat äv8p¬La Kat QW4poaiVr1 Kat 8LKaLOQVVr1 Kat au X1f3StIv 6ArI"s äp¬Tn 
69b2/I. 7: L; SE 
Kat 1ý8oVWV Kat 060WV Kat TWV C(XXWV TTÖWTWV T(ZV TOLo&TWV 69b5/1.10: L; SE 
äv6paTro8W'8rls TE Kat o1&v vylýs ov8' dX71%g gn 69b8/I. 13: L; Pl 
Kat ij aW4poaVvii Kati 6LKaLOQ6vrý Kat 71 ävSpEta 69c1/I. 14: L; SE 
6pOrj 69a6/I. 1; al 015; d3/24; d5/27: R (k) 
dpE-n v 69a7/I. 2; b3/8; b6/12: R (k) 
äXXayrj 69a7/I. 2; a8/3; al 015; b6/11: R (s) 
4p6v7laLS 69a10/I. 5; b3/8; c2/15: R (s) 
TW ÖIiTL 69b2/I. 7; 7/12; cl/14; c4/17: R (s + k) 
Kal äv8pELa icai, vWOpoaüv'q Kat 8LKaLoavvT1 69b2/I. 7; cl/14: R (s) 
aMj 69b8/I. 13; b8/13; b3/8: R (j + s) 
KdOapaLs 69c1/I. 14; c3/16; c6/19: R (s) 
TEXETa 69c3/I. 16; c5/18; c7/20; c8/21: R (s) 
rrpou6vpl&gv 69d4/25; d5/26: R (s) 
Passage II. 
ý6 tLAta. TE Kal auvovata 81c5/II. 2: P; Pl 
Siä Tb &EL avv¬ivai Kai. SLä Thv iroXX v µAft qv 81c5/II. 2: P 
ßapüvETat TE Kal XKCTaL 81c10/II. 7: P; Pl 
TOD dLSoüs TE Kai. "A18ov 81c11/II. 8: P; SE 
TQ JiV1 
. 
laTa TE Kai, TOWS TQo0US 81 c 11 /II. 8: P 
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ai µý KaOapws d. 7rOMCLcaL ä)v\ä TOD 6paTOV µETýXovcaL 81d3/II. 9: P 
Täs T(ZV äya663v aÜTäs EdvaL, &X6 Täs Twv 4avXwv 81 d6/II. 14: P; SE 
5T IOTLKI')V Kat TTOXLTLK1 v 82a12/II. 36: P; SE 
au 4poaiv-qv TE Kai. 8LKaLouvvTly 82b1/II. 37: P: SE 
EOouc TE Kai [iEAE1-7js82b2/II. 38: P 
ýtXoao tas TE Kal vov 82b3/II. 39: P 
TrOXLTLK6V Kai fjµEpov 82b6/II. 42: P 
otKO46opiav TE Kai TrEv(av 82c5/II. 51: P; P1; SE 
äTLµfav TE Kai. ä8oýLav 82c6/II. 52: P; P1; SE 
4 LXapXoi TE Kai, 4 LXS TLµoL 82c7/II. 53: P; SE 
EýtppLO s... Kal 3apb Ka 'yEMES Kai bpaTÖv 81c8III. 5: L 
yaaTpLµapyia9 TE Kal vf3pEL9 Kal OiXotroatas 81e6/II. 23: L 
a8LKLas TE Kai. TvpavvI8as Kal äpTrayäs 82a4/II. 28: L; SE 
TC( TWV X, KWV TE Kai. LEpdKWV Kai LKTCVWV ybi 82a5/II. 29: L; SE 
71 rrou REXLTT(. JV r'j O411Kwv ? µvp fl KWV 82b6/II. 42: L; SE 
ÜITEXOVTaL TCJV KaTCI T6 Qwµa ETTLOU4. LtWV &TTaa63v Kat KapTEpOÜQL Kad Ob 
Trapa8L66a6LV avraLs EavTOVs 82c3/II. 49: L; P1 
bpa-rov 81 c9/II. 6; c10/7; 81d4/12; d4/12: R (j +s + r) 
etKös 81d5/II. 13; d6/14; 81e3/20; 82a1/25; b5/41; b9/45: R (s + r+ k) 
1rXavdaOaL 81d8/II. 16; d9/17: R (s) 
9 vS&OG kLv 81e2/II. 19; e2/19: R (s) 
l. LEX rr1v 81c6/II. 3; e3/20; e7/24; 82a9/33; b2/38 R (k) 
4LX- compounds: 82b10/II. 46; c1/47; c3/49; c6/52; c7/53; c8/54: R (s) 
äirL6vTL 82c1/II. 47; c3/49; c8/54: R (s + r) 
Passage III. 
b SLaKOa UJV TE Kai TTdVTWV atTLOS 97c2/III. 3: P 
TTÜVTa KOcYp 1v KaZ KaaTOV TLO VaI TaÜ7 örn &v IEXTLaTa ZXi 97c5/III. 6: 
P; Pl 
TrdcXELv f trol¬iv 97d1/III. 10: P; SE 
1TEpt aÜTOÜ EKE(VOU Kal TTEpt TWV dXwv 97d2/III. 11: P 
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TÖ IIPLQTOV Kal Tö BEATLQTOV 97d3/III. 12: P; P1; SE 
TTÄaTEId EUTLV ý QTpoyyüXT) 97e1/III. 18: P 
-r v aLTtav Kal Tr}v dLVCLYK11V 97e2/III. 19: P/ PI 
Kal QEX1VQ Kal T()V dXXWV äaTpwV 98a3/III. 24: P 
Kat noLEiv Kat TT(i XELv ' rrdaXEL 98a6/III. 27: P; R (j); SE 
TT v aLTLaV Kat KOLVj 1TÜQL Tb EKdaTO) F3 XTLQTOV 98b1/III. 3I: P 
Tä 13 XTLQTOV Kat Tä XELpov 98b5/III. 35: P 
'YL'YVETaL tj änöXXUTaL ý EQTL 97c7/III. 8: L 
11 E'tVaL ýj dXXo bTLODV näCXELV ýj TroLEiv 97c8/III. 9: L 
TdXOUc TE 1TEPL irpöS dXX Xa Kal TPOTr(iV Kal TWV dXXWV Traft tTWV 
98a4/III. 25: L 
voüs 97c1/III. 2; c3/4; c5/6; 97d7/16; 98a7/28: R (s + k) 
8LaK00l, u6v 97c2/III. 3; 97c5/6; c5/6; 98a8/29: R (j + s) 
rräv-rwv 98c2/III. 3; c4/5; c5/6; 98b1/31; b2/32: R (s + k) 
aLTLos 97c2/III. 3; c2/4; 97c4/5; c6/7; d7/16; e2/19; 98a2/23; a8/29; bl/31: R (s + k) 
PATLaTa, äya06s, i tELvov 97c6/III. 7; c8/9; d3/12; d4/13; e2/19; e3/20; e4/21; 
98a6/27; a9/30; b2/32; b3/33; b5/35: R (s + k) 
E1T¬K8LT ytjaeaOaL 97e1/III. 18; e4/21: R (s) 
TrapEQKevävµr1v 98a1/III. 22; a3/24: R (s) 
' Avaýayöpov ävayLyv &n ov ros 97b8/III. 1: SE 
Passage IV. 
TL CWT EVaVTtoV ýj oü8Ev 105d6/IV. 9: P 
Tb U &icaLOV µr} SEXbµEVOV Kat ö äv µouaLKöV µßj 84XETaL 105d16/IV. 19: 
P; SE 
a90V9OV, i#I, Tb S& MLKOV 105e1/IV. 21: P; SE 
Qws Kal . aTlIKTO9 106a5/IV. 36: P; P1 
oünoT' av dlTEQßEVVUTO otS' alTWMUTO 106a9/IV. 40: P; P1; SE 
'YvX'j 105c10/IV. 3; d3/6; d10/13; e4/24; e6/26: R (s + k) 
OdvaTos 105e9/IV. 13; e2/22; e3/23; e4/24; e6/26; e7/27: R (s + k) 
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8# T raL 105d11/IV. 14; d13/16; d16/19; d17/20; e2/22; e4/24; 106a6/37: R (s + k) 
dvwXEOpcq 106a1/IV32; al/32; a3/34; a8/39: R (s + k) 
ärreX66v 6XETO 106alO/IV. 41: P1 
ä-privatives in 105d15/18; el/21; el/21; e6/26; e7/27; ell/31; 106a3/34; a5/36; 
a8/39: R(j+s+k) 
Passage V 
TroiKRRiI, XpdL taaLv 8iELXrIµµEn 110b7N. 3: P 
Xa. lTTpoTEpWV Kai KaeapWTEpWV 1IOc2N. 6: P; PI; SE 
T1 V $& 80 11 XEUK- y 0V Ti Xtovos XEUKOTEpav 11Oc4N. 8: P 
TrXEL6vWV Kai KaXXLövcw 110c6N. 10: P; SE 
Ü8aT69 TE Kat aEpos 110c8/V. 12: P 
Ob TOLOÜTOV E1vaL Kür ETL TOÜTWV KaU[cü 110e1N. 21: P 
Ka E&J&a[. LEVOL oü& &E4OapµEVOL 11Oe3N. 23: P; PI; SE 
o llTE8Övoc Kal äXtnis 110e4N. 24: P 
ata TE Kat vöaovS 110e6N. 26: P 
TÖ '8WP TE Kai 1i edXaTTa 11118N. 35: P 
7jµly dip, EKELVOLS T6v at6Epa 111b1N. 36: P 
ClI et 7Ip TE Ü6aTOS &ýEQTI1KEV 111b5N. 40: P 
Kat aft Upoc 111b6N. 41: P 
äXmr TE Kai, tEpä 111b7N. 42: P 
-rr}v µßv yap &Xoupyý ElvaL Kai. Oauµakv Tb KäXAos, n )V Sý XpuaO¬L&% 
Ti V& öai- XEVKI) y iou f Xiövos XEVKOTipa IlOc3/V. 7: L 
8Ev8pa TE Kai aVh Kai TOÜS Kapiro 110d4N. 16: L 
T1v TE XELÖTTITa Kai Týv 6La4iäELav Kal Ta XpthpaTa KaXXtu 110d6N. 18: L T 
adp&ta TE Kai T. daiTl6a9 Kai a apä-y8ovs Kai lTdVTa Tä TOLatITa IlOd8N. 20: 
L 
KQOap01 Kat Ol, KaTE8718Ea. thvOL oi8 8LE4OQPghVOL 110e3N. 23: L; Pl 
Kat X(OOLS Kat yfi Kat TOLS ZMOLS CL)0LS TE Kat 4UTOLS 1 10e5/V. 25: L 
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TOÜTOLS TE äITavL Kai ETL XPUQW TE Kal dpyvpw KaI TOL$ (IDOLS at TOLS 
TOLOVTOL9110e7N. 27: L 
1roXXä TrX1 OEL Kal µeydXa Kai, rravTaXov -rfs 'Yfs 111a2/V. 29: L 
Kai Öt! JEL Kai QK07ý Kai 4pOVTlaEL Kai TTdQL TOTS TOLOÜTOLS 111b4N. 39: L 
Kai Orjµas TE Kai µavTE(as Kal a1UOQEIS TWV eEWV Kal TOLaÜTa' 
auvoua as 111b8N. 43: L 
Tbv yE f Xiov icd a¬X1 vrJv Kal äaTpa 111c1N. 45: L 
rrouKdXii 1 10b7N. 3 and dl/13; d2/14: R (s + k) 
4v6µEva 110d3/V. 15; d4N. 16: R (j); SE 
ä4EQTdvaL 11 1b5N. 40; b5/40; b6/41: R (s) 
Passage VI. 
EUXEpWs KaL EVK6XwT 117c4NI. 2: P; P1; SE 
Tr(VOVTÜ TE Kai TTETrWKÖTa 117c7NI. 5: R 0); SE; P 
KXdWV Kai äyavaKTCV 117d5NI. 12: P 
7IQUXtaV TE awyETE KaL KapTEpLELTE 117e2NI. 17: P; P1 
, IUXVVe1j[. LEV TE Kal ETfEQXOPLEV TOD 8aKpüELV 117e3/VI. 18: P 
TOBT 1T68aT Kai, TCt OK&X11 117e7NI. 22: P 
4 XOLTÖ TE Kal mjyvUTO 118a2NI. 25: P; P1 
ärr68oTE Kat µý äµEX1jrn1Te 118a8NI. 31: P 
Tö aT6µa Kai. Toils o46aXµoüs 118a14NI. 37: P 
4POVLILCJT6. TOU Kai. SLKaLOTdTOU 118a17NI. 40: P; SE 
dpLQTOV Kai, äXXws 4poVgt(TäTOV Kal SLKaLoTdTOV 118a17NI. 40: L 
6aKpvELv 117c6/VI. 4; c8/6; d3/10; e4/19: R (s + k) 
KXdWV I 17d5NI. 12; d6/13; c9/7: R (s +k) 
EKKaXv JdItEvos 118a6/VI. 29; a6/29: R (j); SE 
Appendix 1 279 
Appendix II 
The Use of Pairs and Lists 
My stylistic analysis has shown that Plato's incorporation of differing types and 
quantities of pairs and lists is an important feature of his style, which varies along 
with his different modes of writing. Thus, although pairs and lists are so esssential 
and ubiquitous a feature of Greek literature that any clear-cut classification of usage 
or kinds would be impossible, a framework outlining at least some major types is 
indispensable to a discussion of Platonic style. 
There has been limited discussion concerning specific types of pairs and lists in 
Greek literature, ' with Dover's points about `multiples' perhaps the most thorough 
examination. 2 However, even Dover has very broad categories of exclusion and only 
analyses usage in eleven prose passages, 3 so that his findings, while interesting, are 
extremely selective. I have attempted to analyse pairs and lists so as to encapsulate 
the main classifications -of different types as well as some very general tendencies. 
Since pairs and lists are such a common feature in all Greek genres, I will only 
comment on those genre/s or author/s whose usage of pairs and lists stands out from 
normal usage, either because of quantity or type. 
1) Pairs 
In very broad terms, pairs fall into three main groups: complementary;. pleonastic; 
and oppositional. They are often reinforced by aural parallelism, and an important 
distinction can also be drawn between unusual and common or cliched pairs. 
While all types of pairs are well represented in verse, quantity is rarely exceptional, 
except perhaps for the large use of amplificatory pairs in certain plays of Sophocles 
1 E. g. Fehling, 1969,271 ff., deals with the 'einfacher Kontrast', a single pair of oppositional words; 
Smith, 1983, assesses the distribution and function of catalogue structure within the early Hippocratic 
treatises, and sees lists as indicative of an 'archaic mentality' (284), although his investigation is not 
? urely stylistic. 
See Dover, 1997,144ff. 
3 On the differences between Dover's 'multiples' and my pairs and lists, and on the limitations of 
Dover's analysis, see Ch. 3, p. 49, above. 
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and Aeschylus 4 In epic, one can note the emergence of clich6d pairs, such as 
'men/gods', `slave/free', `word/deed', which then occur widely throughout later 
literature. 5 Apart from this there are the gnomic antitheses of Hesiod, comprising 
short structures with at least two pairs of corresponding terms, seen by Fehling as a 
Hesiodic innovation. 6 This construction is also very prominent in Theognis, 
Heraclitus, and Democritus, 7 and is often seen as a root of rhetorical antithesis. 8 
The most extensive use of pairs is found in rhetorical and philosophical/technical 
prose. 9 Oratory tends to feature the widest variety, with much pleonasm and aural 
parallelism, particularly homoeoteleuton; the clearest examples, no doubt, belonging 
to the exaggerated style of Gorgias. 10 In general, pairs with sound effects and/or 
pleonasm tend to occur in parts of speeches containing the highest concentration of 
`rhetorical' features, notably introductions and conclusions, often in conjunction with 
antitheses. " So, for example, Antiphon incorporates a wide variety of pairs, 12 
including quite elaborate pleonasms, especially in the highly `rhetorical' 
Tetralogies. 13 Usher talks about Isocrates' predisposition towards `amplification 
involving words only', 14 like KaXcGs Kal TEX1LKw9,15 and even the so-called plain 
style of Lysias involves many pairs. 16 
° See Earp, 1944,102ff, on the large numbers of 'doublets' in Sophocles' early plays; and 103, on the 
'excess of doublets' in Aeschylus (cf. Earp, 1948,84); although even in these works, the numbers of 
such pairs are not especially high when compared with the works of Plato. 
See Lloyd, 1966,91, for more pairs and references in Homer. Cf. e. g. Hes. Th. 296,204,302; 
Op. 303. Fehling, 1969,282-3, gives a list of such pairs, with various examples. Cf. Dover, 1997, 
145. 
6 See, Fehling, 1969,94. 
7 E. g. Heraclit. B. 61,9dXaaua t8Wp Kaeapd)TaTOV Kal . Lap(TaTov, IXO6aLV µhv IT6TI. OV Kal 
vuT1pLov, dv0pwtrotc 6 änOTOV Kal 6VOPLov; cf. e. g. B67; 111; Democrit. B40, OOTE U611=11 
OÜTW Xp1jµaow 68aLµWVOD V üvepwrroL, d>X 6pOoo ivrl Kal TroXýpoabvrl; 44,58,65, and 68. 
a See e. g. Nordern, 1915,19ff. on Heraclitus and Democritus; but cf. Kennedy, 1963,33-4, who says 
that, although antithesis can be traced to this group of authors, its development is largely attributable 
to the Greeks' 'fondness' for 'contrasting figures'. 
9 Although the figures for 'multiples' with two items in Dover, 1997,146, only represent small 
samples of texts, it is interesting to note the exceptionally high numbers found in the samples from 
Gorgias, Demosthenes, and one of the Isocratean texts. 
10 For a list of pairs with pleonasm and parisosis in Gorg. B11, see Jouanna, 1988,21. Cf. Kennedy, 
1963, on Gorgias and on the ancient writers on Gorgias 11 E. g. Lys. 7.1: ... 01 K(VSUVOI KOtV01. ytyvovTat Kat TOLS j. tr6EV dSLKOÜaL Kat TOLS rr0XX& 
apTYlK6aWV. 
E. g. Antiphonl. l and 1.27ff. 13 E. g. 4.6: 6 Viv boplC aw Kai TrapowWv Tray ? Spa Kal ov&v ýjlovaTo. 14 Usher, 1973,43, who does, however, point out that numbers of instances are not vast (48). Cf. 
Adams, 1905,355, on Demosthenes' fondness for pleonasm. 
Appendix 11 281 
Early philosophical texts also include many pairs. As well as the more varied 
instances in Heraclitus and Democritus, for example, the plainer prose of writers like 
Melissus often contains cliched oppositional and sometimes complementary pairs of 
physical properties or cosmological terms. 17 There are many lists, such as Et yap 
9UTL yi Ka1 r)&)p Kat eft p Kd Trap Kd at&gpos Kd Xpucr6g, Kat TÖ C43ov 
TÖ R TEOV116S, Kai Aav Kal XEVKOV... 
18, 
a tendency which continues within 
the later philosophical treatises of writers such as Aristotle. 19 In the more `poetic' 
prose of Heraclitus and Democritus, pairs are still very common, but tend to be less 
cliched. 
Historiography is the one prose genre in which the occurrence - of pairs is very 
limited, especially so in the narrative sections, but also elsewhere. ° 
Finally, the Hippocratic treatises have especially large numbers of pairs, including 
lists of opposing items, similar to those found in the philosophers '21 but also more 
varied types, often with pleonasm and/or sound effects. Most pronounced in On 
Breaths, 22 but found as well in texts like On Art and Ancient Medicine, 23 this is one 
of the features which has led to these works being associated with sophistic or 
epideictic writing. 24 The speech of the doctor Eryximachus, in Plato's Symposium, is 
also full of pairs, both cliched sequences of oppositions, 25 and many others which are 
15 Cf. e. g. Isoc. 8.25 and 26: µr18' dvaßoXi v dam' dTraxxaAv and 64EXLµwTipav Kal 
Kep6aXEWTEpav. Such a tendency can also be seen in the writing of Isocrates' pupil, Theopompus of 
Chios (see Russell, 1991,108-9). 
16 E. g. Lys. 12.3: µr} Sßä Tfiv emetpiav dvat(WT Kal d8UVdT(S iTrip TO d6EX40ü Kal iµauToü 
iv Kai-nyop(av troi1Qoµai. These even occur within the narrative sections. E. g. Lys. 1.13: &ELVr 
Si dvaaTäaa Kal hlrtoüaa... and KdLy( Toürwv ov&e`v IvOUµoüµevos OW Wovowv .... 17 Although some such as 'land/water' are also widespread cliches in other texts. 
1e Meliss. fr. 8.2 (D-K). Cf. e. g. Anaxag. B4,8,12,15; Diog. Apoll. B2,3,5; 
1' E. g. Arist. Metaph. 1004bl2ff.; Cat. 9a31ff.; Theophr. CP1 0.7.16; 1.16.9; 2.15.6. 
20 Even in the antitheses used in Thucydidean speeches, there are few pairs, although certain cliched 
pairs do appear: e. g. Kal Is nbXEµov Kal IT EipAvnv and Pdpßapov il "EXXrlva rroVgtov 
(Th. 2.36.3 and 4. Cf. 6.33.5). See also the low number of double 'multiples' in the Thucydidean and 
Herodotean examples in Dover, 1997,146, 
21 E. g. Hp. Ater. I and 6; Morb. Sacr. 20; Cf. Lasserre, 1983,169, on binary structures in Hp. Loc. Hom. 
and cf. e. g. Acut. 57; Ep. 1.32. 
u See Jouanna, 1988,20, on pairs with pleonasm and parisosis in Hp. Flat. 
23 In Dover, 1997,146, the sample from Hp. VM has a far higher number of 'multiples' with two items 
than any of the other selected texts. 
24 On Hp. Flat. and deArte see Jouanna, 1988,167 and Jones, 1923,221. On VM see Jouanna, 1990, 
9. 
25 Smp. 188a3ff. Td TE 6Eplid Kal T21 OUXpd Kal ýijpd Kal trypd. Cf e. g. 186d7. 
Appendix 11 282 
complementary or pleonastic, 26 and so can perhaps be seen to reflect the trend 
towards pairs in medical writers. 
As the six selected passages show, Plato's own use of pairs varies enormously. In 
general, however, it seems safe to say that there is a strong tendency towards pairs 
throughout the Platonic dialogues, which involves pairs of all types. 
Lists 
Like pairs, lists are, to a certain degree, common to all genres. One might draw a 
basic though fairly vague distinction between the distribution of tripartite lists and 
those with more than three components. The latter often constitute catalogues of, for 
example, names, places, and physical symptoms, and occur in various forms in most 
genres of writing. The number of components is frequently large and there is rarely 
symmetry or aural parallelism. Such lists are found, for instance, in epic and 
27 28 29 3° hymns, history, medical writing, and Old Comedy. In Old Comedy 
polysyndeton is common, as is asyndeton, 31 the latter also frequent in medical32 and 
geographical texts. 33 
Tripartite lists are especially common in oratory, often with sound effects and/or 
ascending structure. 34 This tendency towards groups of three is also reflected in 
tripartite clause structure. 35 In addition, Aristophanes' works contains large numbers 
26 E. g. 1K irXeo Et1aS Kal dKo . I(aS (188b3-4); 
lpwTa... bp6volav (186e1.2); 4UXaic1u TE Kal 
iavly (188c1-2). 
27 E. g. Hes. Th. 2l lff.; 243; 337; h. Nom. 3.30; 19.6. 
28 E. g. Th. 6.27.2; X. An. 1.2.16; 6.6.1; HG. 2.3.10. 
29 Hp. Aer 3; 7; Morb. Sacr. 1; 2; 11; VM 3; Af. '39; 25. See also Smith, 1983, on the use of catalogue 
structure in early medical writing. 
30 E. g. Ar. Eq. 252; Pax653; Ra. 187; Pherercr. 338.6. On lists in Aristophanes see e. g. most recently, 
Silk, 2000,126ff. 
" E. g. Ach. 30-1; Nu. 1074; 1076; 1508; Pa341; Av. 489; 632; Ra. 113; 619; Eq. 137; Cratin. 37,1; 72,1; 
109,3. 
32 E. g Hp-4f 40; Epid. 1.2; 1.12; Alim. 25and 26 (although, according to Joly, 136, this is a Hellenistic 
text). 
33 See Ch. 5, p. 127, above. In addition, asyndeton, often with aural parallelism, is also sometimes used 
in rhetorical/sophistic displays, as with the large amount of asyndeton at the end of Agathon's speech 
in P1. Smp. 197d-e. 
34 On ascending structure, see e. g. Silk, 2000,130. 
35 E. g. Isoc. 17.39; 15.232; 21.2; Lys. 12.99. Cf. Race 1990,20ff., on Pindar. 
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of tripartite lists, often occuring singly, 36 but sometimes within unusually long 
sequences of lists or other parallel structures. 37 
Another pattern of list found frequently from the fifth century on in prose is the 
listing of two or more specific components followed by a more general one, such as 
XeLµwva Kai, 6Epos ical Trävrras tr6vovs, 38 a feature common throughout the 
Platonic corpus 39 
Finally one interesting form of tripartite expressions involves the three components 
together forming a whole. Fehling says that these are a counterpart to polar 
oppositions, and mentions groups like Hesiod's complementary I O'QL µhv Kal 
OrIpot Kal oLwvois TTETE7jV6Ls', 4° or those comprising three alternatives which make 
up a whole. To this we might add certain expressions of time, such as Homer's Td 
T E6VTa, Tä T Eaa6iieVa rrpö r E6VTa, 
41 
a formulation used elsewhere in 
similar forms, especially in philosophical and technical literature. 42 
36 E. g. Nu. 308; 982; 1133; 1322; Eq. 246; 181; Cratin. 82.5; Pherecr. 255,2. 
37 E. g. Nu. 415-427, where triparite lists are found in alternate lines; Pax717; Ra. 728. (These are 
similar to the lists of pairs, such as Nu. 1012; 1074; Pax341; Av. 489; Ra. 113). Cf. Silk, 2000,130. 
38 X. Mem. 1.2.1. Cf. e. g. Isoc. 15.234; Hp. VM 1, Isoc. 19.36; 11.38; X. Mem. 1.1.15; Lys. 1.50. 
s' E. g. Euthphr. l3c; Chrm. 159d; 161e; 165e; 173b; Crito53a; Lach. 192b; 185b; Men. 74a; Gorg. 450d; 
Rep. 329a; 515a; 198a; Tht. 153c; Soph. 220c; Phlb. 16a. 
40 Op. 277. Fehling, 1969,276. 
'' 11.1.70. 
42 See e. g. Meliss. B2; 7.3; Heraclit. B30; Hp. Prog. 1. Lloyd, 1966,91, suggests that this universalising 
function was also an aspect of the early use of pairs. 
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